Garcia Bautista v. Noem et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Nina Y. Wang
Case No. 26-cv-00272-NYW
SAUL GARCIA BAUTISTA,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity,
PAMELA BONDI, in her official capacity,
ROBERT HAGAN, in his official capacity, and
JUAN BALTAZAR, in his official capacity,
Respondents.
______________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
______________________________________________________________________
This matter is before the Court on the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”), filed by Petitioner Saul Garcia Bautista (“Petitioner”).
[Doc. 1]. 	Respondents filed a consolidated response in opposition, [Doc. 7], and
Petitioner has replied, [Doc. 8]. For the reasons set forth below, the Petition is GRANTED
in part.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Saul Garcia Bautista (“Petitioner” or “Mr. Garcia”) is a noncitizen who
has resided in the United States for “over ten years.” [Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 1, 22]. He was taken
into custody by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) on January
19, 2026, and has been held without a bond hearing ever since. [Id. at ¶¶ 1, 23, 25]. The
Government purports to detain Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). See [id. at ¶ 1; Doc.
7 at 2]. 	Petitioner disputes the Government’s interpretation of § 1225(b) and contends
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that he is actually subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which would entitle him
to a bond hearing. [Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 2, 33, 35, 40–44]. But because § 1225(b)(2)(A) provides
for mandatory detention, he has no opportunity for release on bond while the Government
considers him detained under this provision. See [id. at ¶ 25].
In the Petition, Mr. Garcia brings three claims challenging the lawfulness of
Respondents’ 	decision 	to 	detain 	him 	without 	a 	bond 	hearing. 	He 	asserts 	that
Respondents’ 	erroneous 	application 	of 	§ 	1225(b) 	and 	§ 	1226(a) 	violates 	(1) 	the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“Count One”); Mr. Garcia’s substantive due process
rights under the Fifth Amendment (“Count Two”); and Mr. Garcia’s procedural due
process rights under the Fifth Amendment (“Count Three”). [Id. at ¶¶ 39–55].
Mr. Garcia seeks, among other things, a writ of habeas corpus ordering that he
either be immediately released from custody or granted a bond hearing. 	[Id. at 15–16].
If the Court orders a bond hearing, Mr. Garcia asks the Court to order various additional
procedural 	protections, 	such 	as 	placing 	the 	burden 	of 	proof 	at 	the 	hearing 	on
Respondents and requiring that the immigration judge consider Mr. Garcia’s ability to pay
as part of the factors in setting bond. [Id. at 16]. Mr. Garcia also asks for “attorneys’ fees
and costs of this suit under the Equal Access to Justice Act.” [Id.].
This matter is fully briefed and ripe for disposition. 	No Party has requested an
evidentiary hearing or oral argument, and the Court finds that no hearing is necessary.
Garcia Cortes v. Noem, No. 25-cv-02677-CNS, 2025 WL 2652880, at *1 (D. Colo. Sept.
16, 2025) (declining to hold a hearing where the petitioner’s habeas challenge was
“fundamentally legal in nature”).
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LEGAL STANDARD
Section 2241 of Title 28 authorizes a court to issue a writ of habeas corpus when
a person is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 	28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 	“[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a
person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the
writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484
(1973). 	“Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through
habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687–88 (2001)).
ANALYSIS
Petitioner’s 	claims 	primarily 	turn 	on 	whether 	Respondents 	may 	detain 	him
pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A), such that he is not entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a).
The Court summarizes the statutory framework before turning to the Parties’ arguments.
I. 	Statutory Framework
Sections 1225 and 1226 govern detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of
removal. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018). Section 1226 “sets forth
‘the default rule’ for detaining noncitizens ‘already present in the United States.’” Quispe-
Ardiles v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-01382-MSN-WEF, 2025 WL 2783800, at *5 (E.D. Va. Sept.
30, 2025) (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303). This section permits, but does not require,
the Attorney General to detain noncitizens pending removal proceedings, subject to
certain exceptions not applicable here. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303; 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)–
(2) (the Attorney General “may continue to detain” or “may release” the noncitizen
(emphasis added)). 	Section 1226(a) thus establishes a discretionary framework for the
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detention of noncitizens pending removal proceedings.
Section 1225(b) “supplement[s] § 1226’s detention scheme.” 	Rodriguez v.
Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1246 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (quoting Rodriguez Diaz v.
Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2022)). 	Section 1225(b) “applies primarily to
[noncitizens] seeking entry into the United States.” 	Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297. 	This
section provides, in relevant part, that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, 	if 	the 	examining 	immigration 	officer 	determines 	that 	an 	alien 	seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be
detained” pending removal proceedings. 	8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).1
Under § 1225(a)(1), an “applicant for admission” is
An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who
arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival
and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been
interdicted in international or United States waters).
Absent an exception for urgent humanitarian reasons not implicated in this case,
“detention under § 1225(b)(2) is considered mandatory,” and “[i]ndividuals detained under
§ 1225 are not entitled to a bond hearing.” 	Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d
475, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297).
1 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), “certain applicants for admission who are deemed
inadmissible are subject to expedited removal, unless they express a fear of persecution
or an intent to apply for asylum.” Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz, 802 F. Supp. 3d 297, 304
(D. Mass. Oct. 3, 2025), appeal docketed, No. 25-2152 (1st Cir. Dec. 3, 2025); see also
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (directing an immigration officer to “order [a person deemed
inadmissible] removed from the United States without further hearing or review unless
[the person] indicates either an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of persecution”).
Respondents do not argue that Mr. Garcia is detained pursuant to § 1225(b)(1), see [Doc.
7], so the Court does not substantively address detention under this subsection.
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II. 	Application to Petitioner’s Statutory Claim
The Court’s analysis begins with Count One, the statutory claim. 	Respondents
argue that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies and requires Petitioner’s detention, so he is not entitled
to a bond hearing. 	See [Doc. 7]. 	This Court, following the clear weight of persuasive
authority, has already rejected Respondents’ position. 	See Loa Caballero v. Baltazar,
No. 25-cv-03120-NYW, 2025 WL 2977650, at *5 (D. Colo. Oct. 22, 2025) (“[F]ederal
courts have overwhelmingly rejected Respondents’ ‘broad interpretation of section
1225(b)(2).’” (collecting cases)).2 In Loa Caballero, this Court reviewed a similar habeas
petition filed by a noncitizen who had resided in the United States for nearly 20 years
before he was detained by ICE. See id. at *1. Like Mr. Garcia, the Government did not
provide the petitioner in Loa Caballero with a bond hearing because it asserted that §
1225 	mandated 	his 	detention. 	See 	id. 	The 	Court 	disagreed, 	emphasizing 	that
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) only provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens “seeking admission”
to the country. Id. at *6. “The plain meaning of the phrase ‘seeking admission’ requires
that the applicant must be presently and actively seeking lawful entry into the United
States.” Id. Thus, noncitizens who are merely “present”—and have been for “years upon
2 In addition to this Court’s ruling in Loa Caballero, a majority of other judges in this District
have concluded that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to noncitizens similarly situated to
Mr. Garcia, who have been present in the country for some time and are not actively
“seeking admission.” 	See, e.g., Mendoza Gutierrez v. Baltasar, No. 25-cv-02720-RMR,
2025 WL 2962908 (D. Colo. Oct. 17, 2024) (Rodriguez, J.), appeal docketed, No. 25-
1460 (10th Cir. Dec. 16, 2025); Moya Pineda v. Baltasar, No. 25-cv-02955-GPG, 2025
WL 3516291 (D. Colo. Oct. 20, 2025) (Gallagher, J.); Nava Hernandez v. Baltazar, No.
25-cv-03094-CNS, 2025 WL 2996643 (D. Colo. Oct. 24, 2025) (Sweeney, J.); Florez
Marin v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03697-PAB, 2025 WL 3677019 (D. Colo. Dec. 18, 2025)
(Brimmer, C.J.); Aleman Hernandez v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03688-SKC-SBP, 2025 WL
3718159 (D. Colo. Dec. 23, 2025) (Crews, J.); Garcia Abanil v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-04029-
WJM-STV, 2026 WL 100587 (D. Colo. Jan. 14, 2026) (Martinez, J.).
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years” without obtaining legal status—are not “seeking admission” under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
Id. (quoting Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 797 F. Supp. 3d 771, 781 (E.D. Mich. 2025)).
Interpreting § 1225(b)(2)(A) to mandate detention for all “applicants for admission” would
render the “seeking admission” language superfluous. 	Id. at *7. 	The Court concluded
that both the plain text of § 1225 and applicable canons of statutory interpretation
demonstrated that the petitioner in Loa Caballero was detained under § 1226, not § 1225.
See id. at *5–8. The Court has since reaffirmed its ruling in Loa Caballero in several other
similar habeas cases. See, e.g., Briales-Zuniga v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03439-NYW, 2026
WL 35227 (D. Colo. Jan. 6, 2026); Leyva Ramirez v. Baltasar, No. 26-cv-00199-NYW,
2026 WL 318989 (D. Colo. Feb. 6, 2026).3
Respondents acknowledge the issue presented in this case “is not materially
different” than Loa Cabellero, see [Doc. 7 at 1],4 and provide no persuasive reason for
3 The Fifth Circuit’s recent opinion in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, --- F.4th ---, 2026 WL
323330, at *5 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026) does not compel this Court to a contrary outcome.
As an initial matter, this Court is not bound by a decision by the Fifth Circuit, and neither
the Supreme Court nor the Tenth Circuit have opined on the issue. 	See, e.g., United
States v. Rhodes, 834 F. App’x 457, 462 (10th Cir. 2020) (observing that “district courts in
this circuit are bound by our decisions and those of the United States Supreme Court”);
Singh v. Baltazar, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2026 WL 352870, at *3–6 (D. Colo. Feb. 9, 2026)
(noting that courts in the District of Colorado are not bound by Buenrostro-Mendez;
pointing to the fact that another Circuit Court of Appeal and “the overwhelming number of
district court[s]” “have rejected the reasoning upon which the Buenrostro-Mendez majority
relied”; disagreeing with the Buenrostro-Mendez majority’s conclusion that there is “no
material disjunction . . . between the concept of ‘applying’ for something and ‘seeking’
something”; and declining to adopt the Buenrostro-Mendez majority’s interpretation of the
relevant statutory provisions as containing redundancies).
4 Respondents attached to their response and “incorporate[d] by reference . . . the legal
arguments Respondents presented on this issue in Mendoza Gutierrez v. Baltazar, Civil
Action No. 25-cv-02720-RMR, ECF No. 26 at 10-19,” “in order to conserve judicial and
party resources.” [Doc. 7 at 3]. The Court is not persuaded by this briefing for the same
reasons as explained in this Order.
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the Court to depart from the conclusion it reached in that case. Nor has the Tenth Circuit
yet addressed the issue, as Respondents recognize. 	See [id. at 2]. 	And although
Respondents preserve their arguments to the contrary, they concede that the Court’s
ruling in Loa Caballero will “lead the Court to the same result here.” See [id. at 3].
Accordingly, as in Loa Caballero and Briales-Zuniga, the Court concludes that
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) does not authorize Respondents’ detention of Mr. Garcia. 	The “default
rule” of discretionary detention under § 1226(a) therefore applies. 	See, e.g., Quispe-
Ardiles, 2025 WL 2783800, at *5, *7. And because Respondents have failed to provide
Mr. Garcia with a bond hearing or any other individualized custody determination, his
continued detention violates § 1226(a).
III. 	Due Process Claims
Mr. Garcia’s constitutional claims (Counts Two and Three) spring from his statutory
arguments. 	He argues that his erroneous detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates his
substantive and procedural due process rights. 	[Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 46–55]. 	Respondents do
not address Mr. Garcia’s allegations of due process violations and do not dispute that
noncitizens 	detained 	under 	§ 	1226(a) 	are 	entitled 	to 	an 	individualized 	custody
determination.
Having determined that § 1226(a) governs Mr. Garcia’s detention, the Court
concludes that his detention without a bond hearing violates due process. 	The Court
concurs with the numerous other district courts that have held that denying a bond hearing
to a noncitizen detained under § 1226(a) violates the noncitizen’s due process rights.
See, e.g., Garcia Cortes, 2025 WL 2652880, at *4; Garcia Abanil v. Baltazar, --- F. Supp.
3d ----, 2026 WL 100587, at *6–7 (D. Colo. Jan. 14, 2026); Lopez-Campos, 797 F. Supp.
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3d at 784–85. And because Mr. Garcia is detained under § 1226(a), at a minimum “the
process due to him is that which is afforded under [§ 1226(a)].” 	Lopez-Campos, 797 F.
Supp. 	3d 	at 	785. 	As 	explained 	above, 	that 	process 	is 	an 	individualized 	bond
determination. 	See, e.g., Velasquez Salazar v. Dedos, 806 F. Supp. 3d 1231, 1241
(D.N.M. 2025) (describing the process owed under § 1226 as “an individualized bond
hearing before an [immigration judge]”); Hyppolite v. Noem, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL
2829511, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2025) (“[Section] 1226(a) requires an individualized bond
determination . . . .”).
IV. 	Appropriate Remedy
Mr. Garcia asks the Court to order Respondents to either release him immediately
or provide “a bond hearing as authorized under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).” [Doc. 1 at 16]. But
§ 1226(a) “does not require release—it provides DHS the discretion to grant an alien
release on bond.” Nava Hernandez, 2025 WL 2996643, at *8. This Court has previously
held that a bond hearing before an immigration judge is sufficient to vindicate the
procedural protections afforded by § 1226(a). 	See, e.g., Loa Caballero, 2025 WL
2977650, at *9; Briales-Zuniga, 2026 WL 35227, at *4. As in those cases, the Court finds
that an immigration judge is better suited than this Court to conduct the hearing and
consider whether Mr. Garcia poses a flight risk or danger to the community.
Mr. Garcia also asks the Court to order that at his bond hearing, “DHS bear[] the
burden of proof . . . and the immigration judge consider[] Mr. Garcia’s ability to pay bond
as part of the factors in setting bond.” [Doc. 1 at 16]. These requests are addressed only
in a single sentence in the “Prayer of Relief” section of the Petition. But the due process
analysis is fact-specific, Jennings, 583 U.S. at 314, and Mr. Garcia does not provide any
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analysis, citation to authority, or argument regarding these requests in either his Petition
or his reply. 	Without the benefit of substantive briefing, the Court will not undertake its
own analysis at this time. 	See United States v. Davis, 622 F. App’x 758, 759 (10th Cir.
2015) (“[I]t is not this court’s duty, after all, to make arguments for a litigant that he has
not made for himself.”).
Instead, the Court continues to concur with the other cases in this District that have
required the Government to bear the burden of proof at a § 1226(a) bond hearing where,
as here, the petitioner was initially erroneously detained under § 1225. See Diaz Lopez
v. Noem, No. 25-cv-04089-NYW, 2026 WL 206220, at *5 (D. Colo. Jan. 27, 2025) (this
Court taking the same approach in absence of substantive briefing on burden-shifting
issue); see also, e.g., Garcia Abanil, 2026 WL 100587, at *8 (“[T]he weight of authority in
this District is clear: 	it is the Government’s burden to justify a noncitizen’s continued
detention at a bond hearing.” (cleaned up) (collecting cases)). But see De La Cruz, 2026
WL 439217, at *4 (declining to shift burden to the Government in a similar case).
And the Court respectfully denies Mr. Garcia’s request that the Court order the
immigration judge to consider Mr. Garcia’s ability to pay when setting an amount of bond.
Without any argument explaining why due process requires such an order in this case or
citation to any legal authority giving the Court authority to prescribe factors that the
immigration judge must consider in rending their decision, the Court will leave it to the
immigration judge to determine the appropriate bond calculation in this case.
Accordingly, Respondents are ORDERED to provide Mr. Garcia with a bond
hearing before an immigration judge no later than March 5, 2026. 	At this hearing, the
Government shall bear the burden of justifying Mr. Garcia’s continued detention. 	If
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Respondents do not provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) as
required herein, he must be immediately released from detention. 	On or before March
12, 2026, the Parties shall file a joint status report concerning (1) the results of any bond
hearing that was conducted or, if no hearing was held, advise the Court of the date
Petitioner was released from custody; and (2) whether any additional proceedings in this
matter are required.
V. 	Attorney’s Costs and Fees under the EAJA
Finally, Mr. Garcia requests that the Court award attorney’s fees and costs under
the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). The Tenth Circuit recently held that the EAJA
“unambiguously authorize[s] fees in habeas actions challenging immigration detention.”
Daley v. Ceja, 158 F.4th 1152, 1166 (10th Cir. 2025). Should Mr. Garcia believe he has a
good faith basis to seek attorney’s fees pursuant to the EAJA, he may file a petition in
accordance 	with 	the deadlines 	and 	requirements 	set 	by 	the EAJA, 	28 	U.S.C. 	§
2412(d)(1)(A)–(B), and compliant with this District’s Local Rules for Civil Practice.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that:
(1) 	The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [Doc.
1] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as set forth herein;
(2) 	Respondents shall provide Petitioner a bond hearing no later than March 5,
2026, at which the Government will bear the burden of justifying Petitioner’s
continued detention. 	If Respondents do not provide Petitioner with a
bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) as required herein, Petitioner
must be immediately released from detention; and
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(3) 	On or before March 12, 2026, the Parties shall file a joint status report
concerning (1) the results of any bond hearing that was conducted or, if no
hearing was held, advise the Court of the date Petitioner was released from
custody; and (2) whether any additional proceedings in this matter are
required.
DATED: February 26, 2026 	BY THE COURT:
_________________________
Nina Y. Wang
United States District Judge
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