Viegas et al v. TH MSR Holdings LLC et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Chief Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Civil Action No. 25-cv-03666-PAB
KERI L. VIEGAS, and
JAMES VIEGAS,
Plaintiff,
v.
TH MSR HOLDINGS LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction [Docket No. 2]. 1 Defendant
Kelly McPherson filed a response. Docket No. 21. Defendants Chuck Broerman and El
Paso County, Colorado (“El Paso County”) filed a response. 2 Docket No. 22. Plaintiffs
filed a reply. Docket No. 23.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On April 17, 2025, defendant TH MSR Holdings LLC (“MSR Holdings”) initiated
foreclosure proceedings against plaintiffs pursuant to Colo. R. Civ. P. 120 in the District
Court for El Paso County, Colorado. See TH MSR Holdings LLC. v. Viegas, Case No.
2025CV03836. The property at issue is located at 17 South Sherwood Glen,
1 Because plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, the Court construes their filing
liberally without serving as their advocate. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110
(10th Cir. 1991).
2
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Monument, Colorado. See Docket No. 2 at 1. On October 23, 2025, a Rule 120
hearing was held before Judge Kelly McPherson. See TH MSR Holdings LLC, Case
No. 2025CV030836. On October 27, 2025, the case was administratively closed and
Judge McPherson entered an order authorizing the foreclosure sale. See id. Because
the foreclosure order included the incorrect case number in the caption, Judge
McPherson issued a corrected version of the order on October 29, 2025. See id. The
foreclosure sale is scheduled for December 3, 2025. See Docket No. 22 at 4.
Plaintiffs filed this case on November 14, 2025 against defendants MSR
Holdings, Brian G. Sayer, James G. Siler, Roundpoint Mortgage Servicing LLC
(“Roundpoint”), El Paso County Public Trustee Chuck Broerman, in his individual and
official capacity, El Paso County, Judge Kelly McPherson, and Zillow, Inc. (“Zillow”). 3
Docket No. 1. Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of the foreclosure proceedings. See id. at 1-3.
Plaintiffs allege that MSR Holdings is the lender and “foreclosing party” on the property
at issue, and Roundpoint is a mortgage servicing company that “transmitted false
information regarding Plaintiffs’ alleged default and ownership status.” See id. at 3.
Plaintiffs allege that defendants are “private parties, real-estate attorneys, a mortgage
servicer, the El Paso County Public Trustee, and a state judicial officer acting under
color of state law” who “deprived Plaintiffs of constitutional due process of law,
published false information about Plaintiffs’ private real property, slandered title,
manipulated the foreclosure process, and attempted to coerce payments by means of a
void foreclosure order entered after the case was closed.” Id. at 2. Specifically,
3 MSR Holdings, Mr. Sayer, Mr. Siler, Roundpoint, and Zillow have not yet
appeared in this case.
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plaintiffs assert claims under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id. at 12-13. The
complaint asserts “claims” for “Civil Right Conspiracy,” “Failure to Prevent Conspiracy,”
“Fraud and Constructive Fraud,” “Abuse of Process,” “Slander of Title,”
“Negligence/Gross Negligence,” “FDCPA Violations,” “Declaratory Judgment,” “Quiet
Title,” “Injunctive Relief,” “Wrongful Foreclosure,” “Violation of Anti-Peonage Act,”
“Unfair, Deceptive, Abusive Acts or Practices,” and “Fraudulent Scheme to Deprive
Property.” See id. at 13-18.
II. 	ANALYSIS
A. Standard for Granting Preliminary Injunctive Relief
To succeed on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show
(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood that the movant will suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips
in the movant’s favor; and (4) that the injunction is in the public interest. RoDa Drilling
Co. v. Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203, 1208 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Winter v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)); see Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1251 (10th Cir.
2010). “[B]ecause a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, the right to relief
must be clear and unequivocal.” Beltronics USA, Inc. v. Midwest Inventory Distrib.,
LLC, 562 F.3d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Greater Yellowstone Coal. v.
Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1256 (10th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Granting such “drastic relief,” United States ex rel. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian
Tribe of Okla. v. Enter. Mgmt. Consultants, Inc., 883 F.2d 886, 888-89 (10th Cir. 1989),
“is the exception rather than the rule.” GTE Corp. v. Williams, 731 F.2d 676, 678 (10th
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Cir. 1984). The same considerations apply to the issuance of a temporary restraining
order. See Lundgrin v. Claytor, 619 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1980).
B. Nature of Plaintiffs’ Motion
Plaintiffs’ “emergency motion” is eight pages long and consists of an outline of
bullet points with citations to exhibits, which are attached to the motion. See Docket No.
2 . The grounds for the motion are not clear. Plaintiffs’ outline format does not include
explanation of their arguments or explanation of legal authority for their requested relief.
Moreover, plaintiffs cite evidence without explanation as to the evidence’s significance
or why such evidence entitles them to preliminary relief. See id. The Court “cannot
take on the responsibility of serving as the litigant’s attorney in constructing arguments
and searching the record.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840
(10th Cir. 2005); see also Hum. Rts. Def. Ctr. v. Grisham, 2025 WL 2051451, at *6
(D.N.M. July 22, 2025) (“A party who makes only ‘broad, conclusory statements’ in
support of his argument will generally be held to have waived the issue for failure to
develop it.”) (quoting Sports Racing Servs., Inc. v. Sports Car Club of Am., Inc., 131
F.3d 874, 880 & n.9 (10th Cir. 1997)).
Plaintiffs attach a proposed order, through which the Court infers that plaintiffs
are seeking the following injunctive relief:
a. 	An order enjoining TH MSR Holdings LLC from conducting, noticing,
publishing, postponing, rescheduling, or executing any foreclosure sale
involving the property located at: 17 South Sherwood Glen, Monument
Colorado 80132.
b. 	An order enjoining RoundPoint Mortgage Servicing LLC RoundPoint
Mortgage Servicing LLC from transmitting, reporting, publishing, or
disseminating any foreclosure status, default status, or related information
concerning the above property to any third party.
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c. 	An order enjoining Chuck Broerman, El Paso County Public Trustee from
noticing, advertising, publishing, postponing, continuing, or executing any
foreclosure sale involving the above property, and from taking any further
action to enforce, act upon, or rely upon the purported foreclosure order
dated October 27 or October 29, 2025.
d. 	An order enjoining Zillow, Inc. from listing, publishing, displaying, or
representing Plaintiffs' property as "For Sale," "Foreclosure," "Pre-
Foreclosure," or any similar status on any platform, website, or data feed.
e. 	An order enjoining Judge Kelly J. McPherson from enforcing,
implementing, or acting upon the purported foreclosure orders issued on
October 27 and October 29, 2025, in Case No. 25CV30836, and from
taking further action to authorize or ratify a foreclosure sale involving
Plaintiffs’ property
f. 	An order that plaintiffs shall remain in possession of the property, and title
and status shall be preserved pending further proceedings.
See Docket No. 2 at 49-51. Plaintiffs do not explain the claims that are the basis for
their requested relief or otherwise make allegations that support the requested relief.
C. Request to Enjoin Mortgage Companies
Plaintiffs seek an order that enjoins MSR Holdings from conducting the
December 3 sale and RoundPoint from providing information, such as default status,
concerning the property. Plaintiffs do not explain why they are entitled to injunctive
relief or how such requests are linked to the claims in their complaint. Plaintiffs seek an
order that enjoins MSR Holdings from “conducting, noticing, publishing, postponing,
rescheduling, or executing any foreclosure sale,” see Docket No. 2 at 49, but they do
not explain how they satisfy the four requirements for obtaining injunctive relief against
MSR Holdings. Plaintiffs point to no factual allegations in support of their requested
relief. The only allegation noted in the motion is that “TH MSR Holdings uploaded
‘evidence’ after case closure without notice.” See id. at 2. Plaintiffs do not explain what
this evidence is or why the fact that MSR Holding uploaded such evidence suggests
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that the Court should enjoin MSR Holdings from participating in the foreclosure sale.
Similarly, plaintiffs request that the Court enjoin Roundpoint from “transmitting,
reporting, publishing, or disseminating any foreclosure status, default status, or related
information concerning the above property to any third party” without noting any
allegations concerning Roundpoint’s conduct that supports their requested relief. See
id. at 50. Furthermore, plaintiffs do not explain Roundpoint’s role in the December 3
sale.
Accordingly, plaintiffs fail to show that they are likely to succeed on the merits of
their claims against MSR Holdings and Roundpoint. See Soesbe v. Countrywide Home
Loans, No. 09-cv-01961-PAB-KMT, 2009 WL 3418212, at *3 (D. Colo. Oct. 20, 2009)
(“Because plaintiff bears the burden of proof under the preliminary injunction standard,
the failure to aver sufficient detail in the factual allegations precludes the issuance of a
preliminary injunction.”) (citing Beltronics, 562 F.3d at 1070, 1075); Waterman v.
Harred, 2025 WL 317492, at *4 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2025) (“Our court has concluded that
the court, at the preliminary injunction stage, need only accept as true plaintiff's well-
pleaded factual contentions, not his conclusory allegations.”) (internal quotations and
citation omitted).
Turning to irreparable harm, plaintiffs state that they filed a Notice of Intent to
Cure that was submitted to “prevent immediate loss of their home.” 4 Docket No. 1 at 8.
Therefore, plaintiffs have represented that they will pay off the default on their mortgage
pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-38-104, which belies their assertion of irreparable
4 Plaintiffs allege that they “were coerced into filing an Intent to Cure under
duress on Nov. 13, 2025.” Docket No. 2 at 3. Plaintiffs provide no support for this
allegation.
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harm from the upcoming foreclosure sale. See Moore v. One W./Indy Mac Bank, No.
10-cv-01455-REB-CBS, 2010 WL 3398855, at *7 (D. Colo. July 12, 2010) (finding that
plaintiff failed to show irreparable harm from an upcoming foreclosure sale because she
“retains a right to redeem following a foreclosure sale and any subsequent harm in
losing her property may be compensated by money damages”); Wike v. Douglas Cnty.,
2023 WL 7181621, at *2 (D. Neb. Sept. 15, 2023) (“to the extent her motion can be read
as requesting enjoinment of the foreclosure proceedings, the Court cannot say such
harm would be irreparable given the option [plaintiff] has to pay whatever delinquencies
she owes to prevent or halt foreclosure of her property”). Thus, plaintiffs fail to show
that they will face irreparable harm from the foreclosure proceedings absent preliminary
relief.
Because plaintiffs have failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits and
irreparable harm, the Court will deny plaintiffs’ request for an injunction against MSR
Holdings and Roundpoint.
D. Request to Enjoin Mr. Broerman
Plaintiffs seek an order that enjoins Mr. Broerman from “noticing, advertising,
publishing, postponing, continuing, or executing any foreclosure sale involving the
above property, and from taking any further action to enforce, act upon, or rely upon the
purported foreclosure order dated October 27 or October 29, 2025.” See Docket No. 2
at 50. Plaintiffs fail to point to any allegations concerning Mr. Broerman or tie their
request for relief to their claims. Plaintiffs do not explain what Mr. Broerman’s role is in
the December 3 sale and therefore fail to explain why injunctive relief would be
appropriate to prevent alleged injuries arising out of the foreclosure proceedings.
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Accordingly, plaintiffs fail to show a likelihood of success on the merits on their claims
against Mr. Broerman. See Escobar v. Reid, 348 F. App’x 387, 389 (10th Cir. 2009)
(denying motion for preliminary injunction where plaintiff’s “conclusory statements do
not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of his case”).
E. Request to Enjoin Zillow
Plaintiffs seek an order that enjoins Zillow from publishing the property’s
foreclosure status. 5 Plaintiffs claim that “[m]ultiple third parties have already entered
Plaintiffs’ landed-patented property believing it was for sale.” See Docket No. 2 at 4.
Plaintiffs do not point to any allegations suggesting they are entitled to such relief
against Zillow. Plaintiffs merely allege that “Zillow pushed Plaintiffs’ home to market as
‘For Sale’” and conclude, without factual support, that doing so constitutes “Slander of
title + actionable negligence.” See id. Plaintiffs’ conclusory statements fail to show a
likelihood of success on their claims against Zillow.
Furthermore, plaintiffs fail to show irreparable harm from Zillow’s conduct and the
alleged trespassers. “A showing of irreparable harm . . . . requires a demonstration that
the act sought to be enjoined is causally-connected to the injury the movant believes is
imminent; otherwise, the injunction would be ineffective at preventing the harm.” GDHI
Mktg., LLC v. Antsel Mktg., LLC, No. 18-cv-02672-MSK-NRN, 2019 WL 851119, at *3
(D. Colo. Feb. 22, 2019). Plaintiffs make no allegations suggesting that the Zillow listing
caused individuals to trespass; therefore, there are no allegations suggesting that future
trespassing is imminent based on Zillow’s conduct. To the extent that plaintiffs allege
5 It does not appear that plaintiffs’ requested injunctive relief against Zillow is
related to the December 3 sale.
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defendants other than Zillow caused and will continue to cause trespassing, see Docket
No. 1 at 15, there are no allegations suggesting that other defendants’ conduct is
causally connected. 6 Plaintiffs therefore fail to show that the alleged harm is connected
to Zillow’s conduct
Accordingly, plaintiffs fail to show that they are entitled to injunctive relief against
Zillow.
F. Request to Enjoin Judge McPherson
Plaintiffs seek an order that enjoins Judge McPherson from “enforcing,
implementing, or acting upon the purported foreclosure orders issued on October 27
and October 29, 2025, in Case No. 25CV30836, and from taking further action to
authorize or ratify a foreclosure sale involving Plaintiffs' property pending further order of
this Court.” See Docket No. 2 at 50. Plaintiffs make no allegations that suggest Judge
McPherson will take further action in connection to the October 27 or October 29 orders.
Plaintiffs make no allegations suggesting that Judge McPherson will take any action in
connection to the upcoming foreclosure sale. The only allegations that plaintiffs make
regarding Judge McPherson concern her “Oath of Office” and the fact that she allegedly
had “no jurisdiction to enter orders after a case has closed.” See id. at 3. Plaintiffs do
not explain why these allegations support their request that Judge McPherson be barred
6 For the first time in reply, plaintiffs appear to suggest that “harassment,” in the
form of marketing calls and text messages regarding the foreclosure, constitutes
irreparable harm. See Docket No. 23 at 2-4. “[A]rguments raised for the first time in a
reply brief are generally deemed waived.” United States v. Harrell, 642 F.3d 907, 918
(10th Cir. 2011). Moreover, plaintiffs fail to connect this alleged harassment to any of
defendants’ conduct.
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from “taking further action to authorize or ratify a foreclosure sale.” 7 See id. at 50.
Accordingly, plaintiffs fail to show a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims
against Judge McPherson.
For each of their requested forms of relief, plaintiffs have failed to satisfy at least
one of the factors that is necessary for the issuance of a preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order. Therefore, the Court will deny plaintiffs’ motion. See State
v. EPA, 989 F.3d 874, 890 (10th Cir. 2021) (“When the failure to satisfy one factor is
dispositive, a court need not consider the other factors.”); Fasi v. HSBC Bank USA,
N.A., No. 12-cv-03290-PAB-MJW, 2013 WL 50434, at *3 (D. Colo. Jan. 3, 2013) (“The
Court need not reach the other factors of the inquiry because, absent a showing of
irreparable harm, Ms. Fasi does not provide sufficient support for issuance of injunctive
relief.”).
III. 	CONCLUSION
Therefore, it is
7 It appears that plaintiffs’ allegations against Judge McPherson are an attempt to
overcome the Rooker-Feldman bar. See Docket No. 2 at 3 (“Plaintiffs do not seek to
review any state-court judgment but challenge acts taken without jurisdiction, so the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply.”). Moreover, there is no merit to plaintiffs’
allegations. Plaintiffs claim that “Judge McPherson Lacked a Filed Oath of Office,” see
id. at 3; however, Judge McPherson did file an oath of office. See Docket No. 21-1.
Plaintiffs contend that Judge McPherson issuing a corrected foreclosure order after the
case was administratively closed was an action “taken without jurisdiction.” See Docket
No. 1 at 6. However, courts are permitted to take action in cases after they are
administratively closed, including to correct clerical errors. See, e.g., Witt v. Lane, 2020
WL 14046331, at *1 (Colo. App. May 28, 2020) (explaining that the district court issued
an order “stating that it understood all claims in the case had been resolved and, based
on that understanding, the case was closed” but “invited the parties to correct its
understanding by filing a pleading that clarifies the situation”) (internal quotation
omitted).
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ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
and Preliminary Injunction [Docket No. 2] is DENIED.
DATED December 1, 2025.
BY THE COURT:
___________________________
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
Chief United States District Judge
____________	__ ____________________
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