Artola Arauz v. Baltazar et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Charlotte N. Sweeney
Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03260-CNS
OSCAR ANTONIO ARTOLA ARAUZ,
Petitioner,
v.
JUAN BALTAZAR, in his official capacity as warden of the Aurora Contract Detention
Facility;
ROBERT GUARDIAN, in his official capacity as Field Office Director, Denver, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security;
TODD LYONS, in his official capacity as Acting Director of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; and
PAMELA BONDI, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the United States,
Respondents.
ORDER
Before the Court is Petitioner Oscar Artola Arauz’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus, ECF No. 1, and Petitioner’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary 	Injunction, 	ECF 	No. 	3. 	As 	the 	briefing 	demonstrates 	that 	Petitioner’s
challenge is fundamentally legal in nature, the Court declines to hold a hearing regarding
Petitioner’s challenge, see 28 U.S.C. § 2243, and, for the reasons outlined below, the
Court GRANTS the petition. Because Petitioner’s motion seeks relief on substantially
similar grounds, the Court DENIES as moot the motion. In doing so, the Court presumes
familiarity with the parties’ briefing. See ECF Nos. 1, 3, 13, 14.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
This case presents a now familiar factual background and legal posture. Petitioner
is a native of Nicaragua and arrived in the United States when he was nine years old.
ECF No. 3-1 ¶¶ 2, 3. He has lived in the United States for nearly 40 years. Id. Prior to his
detention, Petitioner lived in Florida, where he works in construction. Id. ¶¶ 6, 8. Most of
Petitioner’s relatives also live in Florida, id. ¶ 6, including his mother, who he helps support
because she is in poor health, id. ¶ 9.
Petitioner was taken into custody by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
on June 12, 2025 and was detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226. ECF No. 13-1 ¶¶ 13–
14. ICE subsequently cancelled Petitioner’s detention under § 1226 and now detains him
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), id. ¶ 14, which provides for mandatory detention. ICE
subsequently 	issued 	a 	Notice 	to 	Appear 	(NTA), 	charging 	Petitioner 	with 	being
inadmissible to the United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Id. ¶ 20. ICE
issued a warrant for Petitioner’s arrest and initiated removal proceedings against him. Id.
¶ 21.
On June 22, 2025, Petitioner was transferred to the Aurora Contract Detention
Facility (CDF) in Aurora, Colorado, where he is currently detained. Id. ¶¶ 3, 15. Since
arriving 	at 	the 	Aurora 	CDF, 	Petitioner 	has 	faced 	serious 	health 	issues, 	which
Respondents do not dispute. See ECF No. 3-1 ¶¶ 13–20; ECF No. 13 at 6. In July, after
Petitioner complained of chest pains and heart problems, the medical staff at Aurora CDF
transported Petitioner to an outside hospital for emergency medical care where he was
diagnosed with heart failure. See ECF No. 3-1 ¶¶ 13–20; ECF No. 13 at 6 (acknowledging
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that “Petitioner was diagnosed with heart failure” in July); ECF No. 13-1 ¶ 17 (stating that,
in July, “Petitioner’s medical condition required emergency attention,” necessitating his
“immediate[] transport[] to UC Health University of Colorado Hospital). After spending 10
days in the hospital, Petitioner was released and prescribed multiple medications to
address his diagnosis, see ECF No. 3-1 ¶ 17, some of which are unavailable at the
immigration detention facility, see, e.g., ECF No. 14-2 at 3. Petitioner is also under
doctor’s orders to monitor his weight, physical activity, diet, sleep, water, and medication
intake. ECF No. 3-1 ¶¶ 20–27. Follow-up medical appointments were ordered to ensure
Petitioner’s 	medications are working properly and so that he can be seen by a
cardiologist. Id. ¶¶ 17–20.1 Despite repeatedly raising his health concerns to the medical
personnel at the Aurora CDF and requesting access to an outside doctor over the
intervening 	months, 	Respondents 	failed 	to 	timely 	transport 	Petitioner 	to 	either
appointment. Id. ¶¶ 19, 20.
Petitioner was not seen by a medical professional outside the Aurora CDF until
October 21, 2025, when a doctor at the Aurora CDF reviewed Petitioner’s ECG and
immediately called an ambulance because the doctor “did not like what he saw.” ECF No.
14-2 ¶¶ 3–4. In support of Petitioner’s request for relief, an independent medical doctor,
Dr. Parveen Parmar, reviewed Petitioner’s medical file and concluded that Petitioner has
“severe heart failure and a high likelihood of significant morbidity and/or mortality in the
1 Specifically, Petitioner states that he was supposed to have at least two additional medical appointments
following his discharge from the hospital in July 2025, including: (1) a follow-up appointment at the hospital
by mid-September (60 days after he was discharged) to ensure his medications are working properly; and
(2) an appointment to see a cardiologist in early October. See ECF No. 3-1 ¶¶ 18–20. Petitioner states, and
Respondents do not dispute, that Respondents failed to bring Petitioner to either appointment. See id.
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next year, even with optimal medical management.” ECF No. 14-1 at 4. Dr. Parmar
characterizes Petitioner’s diagnosis as a “severe, life threatening, chronic condition.” Id.
While in detention, Petitioner appeared before an immigration judge (IJ) for a
custody redetermination hearing. ECF No. 13-1 ¶ 28. At the hearing, the IJ denied
Petitioner request for a change in custody, finding that she did not have jurisdiction to
consider Petitioner’s request. Id. Petitioner, like many others in his position, is seeking
habeas relief and requesting that the Court either immediately release him or order
Respondents to provide him with a bond hearing withing seven days. ECF No. 1 ¶ 9.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
As a general matter, district courts have authority to grant a writ of habeas corpus
to any person who demonstrates he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The individual in custody bears
the burden of proving that his detention is unlawful. Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275,
286 (1941).
III. 	ANALYSIS
As noted above, the issues presented in this case have been recently litigated in
many other cases arising from similar circumstances. These cases concern noncitizens,
like Petitioner, who have been present in the United States for many years and who are
being held in immigration-related detention and denied bond hearings following the
government’s recent reinterpretation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1226 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA). Respondents’ arguments here similarly echo nearly identical
arguments rejected by courts across the country and in this judicial district, including this
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Court. Compare ECF Nos. 1, 3, 13, 14 and e.g., Nava Hernandez v. Baltazar, et al., No.
1:25-CV-03094-CNS, 2025 WL 2996643 (D. Colo. Oct. 24, 2025); Hernandez Vazquez
v. Baltasar, et al., No. 1:25-cv-3049-GPG, ECF No. 22 (D. Colo. Oct. 23, 2025); Loa
Caballero v. Baltazar, et al., No. 1:25-cv-3120-NYW, 2025 WL 2977650 (D. Colo. Oct.
22, 2025); Moya Pineda v. Baltasar, et al., No. 1:25-cv-2955-GPG, ECF No. 21 (D. Colo.
Oct. 20, 2025); Mendoza Gutierrez v. Baltasar, et al., 2025 WL 2962908, No. 1:25-cv-
2720-RMR, 2025 WL 2962908 (D. Colo. Oct. 17, 2025); Garcia Cortes v. Noem, No. 1:25-
cv-02677-CNS, 2025 WL 2652880 (D. Colo. Sept. 16, 2025); Jimenez v. FCI Berlin,
Warden, No. 25-CV-326-LM-AJ, 2025 WL 2639390 (D.N.H. Sept. 8, 2025); Lopez-
Campos v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-CV-12486, 2025 WL 2496379 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025);
Romero v. Hyde, Civil Action No. 25-11631-BEM, 2025 WL 2403827 (D. Mass. Aug. 19,
2025); Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 25 Civ. 5937 (DEH), --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2025 WL
2371588 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025). As in other cases, Respondents here argue that
(1) the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Petitioner’s challenge to his mandatory detention;
and (2) even if the Court finds that it has jurisdiction, it should reject Petitioner’s challenge
and find that Petitioner is properly detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention
provision as an “applicant for admission” to the United States. ECF No. 13 at 2.
Unsurprisingly, Respondents have once again failed to persuade.
As an initial matter, the Court finds no merit in Respondents’ argument that
§ 1252(a)(5) and § 1252(b)(9) bar the Court’s consideration of Petitioner’s claims, see
ECF No. 13 at 7–8. This Court has recently rejected similar arguments, and Respondents
present no unique or compelling rationale explaining why such jurisdictional bars would
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apply now. See, e.g., Nava Hernandez, 2025 WL 2996643, at *2; Garcia Cortes, 2025
WL 2652880, at *2. Accordingly, the Court finds that its recent analysis of § 1252(a)(5)
and § 1252(b)(9) in Nava-Hernandez applies equally here, and the Court adopts this
reasoning entirely. See 2025 WL 2996643, at *2. Both § 1252(a)(5) and § 1252(b)(9)
serve as jurisdictional bars limiting a district court’s ability to review final orders of removal.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (requiring that “a petition for review” of an “order of removal”
be filed “with an appropriate court of appeals”); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (limiting judicial
review to “a final order” of “any action taken or proceeding brought to remove a
[noncitizen]”). But like in Nava Hernandez, Petitioner here is not subject to a final order of
removal, and Respondents do not argue otherwise. See Nava Hernandez, 2025 WL
2996643, at *2. Similarly unavailing is Respondents’ argument that such jurisdictional
bars apply even without a final order of removal because Petitioner's claims “aris[e] from
his removal proceedings,” ECF No. 13 at 7. This Court has also previously rejected such
arguments. See Garcia Cortes, 2025 WL 2652880, at *2 (determining that no jurisdictional
bar applies because claims challenging the basis of an immigration detainee's mandatory
detention “are legal in nature and challenge specific conduct unrelated to removal
proceedings”); 	Nava 	Hernandez, 	2025 	WL 	2996643, 	at 	*2 	(same). 	Accordingly,
Respondents’ jurisdictional arguments fail.
The Court is likewise unpersuaded by Respondents’ argument on the merits that
Petitioner is properly subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A), as opposed
to the discretionary detention provision in § 1226(a). See ECF No. 13 at 9–18. As this
Court has found previously, the plain text of § 1225 and § 1226, the legislative history of
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the INA, and past applications of the statutes all support a finding that Petitioner, who has
lived in the United States for nearly 40 years and who was not detained while attempting
to enter the country, is not subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention provisions.2
See Nava Hernandez, 2025 WL 2996643, at *4–7; Garcia Cortes, 2025 WL 2652880, at
*2–3. Other courts in this district and across the nation also agree that § 1226(a) should
apply in such circumstances. See e.g., Loa Caballero, 2025 WL 2977650, at *7
(determining 	that 	petitioner, 	who 	“has 	been 	present 	in 	the 	United 	States 	since
approximately 2006” and “was not seeking lawful entry into the United States at the time
he was detained [because] he was already here,” was “not subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s
mandatory detention provision”); Mendoza Gutierrez, 2025 WL 2962908, at *6 (“a proper
understanding of the relevant statutes, in light of their plain text, overall structure, and
uniform case law interpreting them, compels the conclusion that § 1225’s provision for
mandatory detention of noncitizens ‘seeking admission’ does not apply to someone like
[petitioner], who has been residing in the United States for more than two years”) (citing
Lopez Benitez, 2025 WL 2371588, at *3); Corona Diaz v. Olson, et al., No. 25 CV 12141,
2025 WL 3022170, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 2025) (determining that petitioner “is not subject
to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and is instead subject to the discretionary
detention provisions of § 1226(a)” because there is “no evidence” that petitioner, who
“has been in the United States for over twenty-five years, . . . was seeking admission to
the United States”); Martinez-Elvir v. Olson, No. 3:25-CV-589-CHB, 2025 WL 3006772,
2 Although the INA provides for the mandatory detention of noncitizens already present in the United States
in certain circumstances, Respondents do not invoke those provisions here and instead only argue that
Petitioner’s detention subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A) is proper because he is an “applicant for admission” to the
United States. See ECF No. 13 at 9–18.
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at *7 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 27, 2025) (determining that petitioner is not subject to § 1225’s
mandatory detention provisions because petitioner “has lived in the United States for over
twelve years, has never sought admission to the country, and was arrested in front of his
home in Chicago—not while attempting to illegally cross the border or pass through a port
of entry”); Gomes v. Hyde, No. 1:25-CV-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299, at *7 (D. Mass.
July 7, 2025) (“[T]he plain text of Sections 1225 and 1226, together with the structure of
the 	larger 	statutory scheme, 	indicates 	that 	Section 	1225(b)(2) 	does 	not 	apply 	to
noncitizens who are arrested on a warrant issued by the Attorney General while residing
in the United States.”).
Moreover, the record reveals that Respondents’ current arguments are at odds
with Respondents’ own stated basis for detaining Petitioner in the first instance. ICE
initially detained Petitioner under § 1226—the same detention authority that Petitioner
requests Respondents utilize now and which provides for discretionary detention. See
ECF No. 13-1 ¶ 14. ICE subsequently cancelled Petitioner’s detention under § 1226 and,
by 	the 	time 	Petitioner’s 	removal 	proceedings 	were 	initiated 	on 	August 	5, 	2025,
Respondents’ new policy—requiring that all noncitizens who arrived in the United States
without inspection be subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)—was in place. See
id.; ECF No. 1 ¶ 3. Although Respondents provide no explanation for this change, the
Court notes that this timeline is not unlike similar cases where courts have found that
Respondents’ decision to detain a noncitizen pursuant § 1225(b)(2)(A) despite the initial
application of § 1226 to be an “impermissible post hoc rationalization.” Martinez-Elvir,
2025 WL 3006772, at *9 (citing Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
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591 U.S. 1, 22 (2020)); see also, e.g., Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *7 (rejecting
Respondents’ “new position . . . adopted post-hac” that petitioner was properly subject to
§ 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention, where petitioner was initially detained pursuant to
§ 1226 and where it “was not until [petitioner] requested a custody redetermination
hearing (bond hearing) that Respondents claimed his detention was under Section
1225(b)(2)(A)”); Barrera v. Tindall, No. 3:25-CV-541-RGJ, 2025 WL 2690565, at *4 (W.D.
Ky. Sept. 19, 2025) (“The Court will not credit [Respondents’] post-hoc justification in the
face of clear evidence that Barrera was detained pursuant Section 1226.”).
Simply put, because Petitioner has lived in the United States for nearly 40 years
and was not detained while attempting to enter the country, he is improperly subject to
mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and should instead be detained under
§ 1226(a), consistent with Respondents’ initial determination and the plain text, legislative
history, and past practices of the statutes at issue. Accordingly, the Court will grant
Petitioner relief on his first claim and orders that Respondents provide Petitioner with a
bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a) no later than November 7, 2025, at which time the
government will bear the burden of proving that Petitioner is flight risk or a danger to the
community such that his continued detention is justified.3 Because the Court’s ruling will
3 Petitioner requests that the Court order that Respondents bear the burden of proving that Petitioner is a
flight risk or a danger to the community by clear and convincing evidence. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 72, 73.
Respondents note that courts in this district are split on which party bears the burden of justifying a
noncitizen’s continued detention at a bond hearing but argue that the burden should be on Petitioner in this
instance. See ECF No. 13 at 21–22. The Court disagrees and instead follows the recent rulings in this
judicial district confirming that this is the government’s burden. See, e.g., Hernandez Vazquez, No. 25-cv-
3049, ECF No. 22 at 4 (granting petitioner’s request for “a bond hearing at which Respondents bear the
burden of proof of showing his continued detention is proper and was proper at the time of his arrest”); Loa
Caballero, 2025 WL 2977650, at *9 ( “Respondents bear the burden of justifying detention” at petitioner’s
bond hearing); Moya Pineda, No. 25-cv-2955, ECF No. 21 at 4 (“Respondents bear the burden of proof of
showing [petitioner’s] continued detention is proper”); Mendoza Gutierrez, 2025 WL 2962908, at *10
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afford Petitioner the relief he seeks, the Court need not address Petitioner's remaining
arguments at this time. See Loa Caballero, 2025 WL 2977650, at *8 (declining to rule on
petitioner’s remaining claims after granting petitioner all relief sought under § 1226(a));
Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2809996, at *3 (D. Mass. Oct.
3, 2025) (declining to address petitioner’s due process and APA arguments after finding
in petitioner's favor on statutory claim).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus, ECF No. 1. Respondents are ordered to either (1) provide Petitioner
with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within SEVEN DAYS (on or before
November 7, 2025), at which the government shall bear the burden of justifying
Petitioner’s continued detention by clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness or
flight risk; or (2) in the alternative, immediately release Petitioner from custody under
reasonable conditions of supervision. Respondents are also ordered to file a status report
within TEN DAYS of this order to certify compliance. The status report shall state if and
when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was denied,
the reasons for the denial. As Petitioner’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 3, is brought on substantially similar grounds as the
habeas petition, the Court DENIES the motion as moot.
(ordering that Petitioner “shall be immediately released from detention until he receives a bond hearing . . .
at which the Government shall bear the burden of justifying by clear and convincing evidence of
dangerousness or flight risk”).
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DATED this 31st day of October 2025.
BY THE COURT:
________________________________
Charlotte N. Sweeney
United States District Judge
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