Crostarosa v. LAZ Parking Ltd. et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Nina Y. Wang
Civil Action No. 25-cv-00211-NYW-KAS
LUCAS CROSTAROSA, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
v.
LAZ PARKING LTD.;
ASURA TECHNOLOGIES USA, INC.; and
PARKING REVENUE RECOVERY SERVICES, INC.,
Defendants.
ORDER ON MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Asura Technologies USA, Inc.
and Parking Revenue Recovery Services, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration, [Doc. 15,
filed on March 6, 2025]1 (“Motion to Compel Arbitration”), and Defendant LAZ Parking
Ltd.’s Motion for Leave to Join in Motion to Compel Arbitration, [Doc. 24, filed on March
12, 2025] (“Joinder Motion”). The Court concludes that oral argument will not materially
assist in the resolution of this matter. Having considered both Motions and the associated
briefing, the applicable case law, and the entire docket, the Motion to Compel Arbitration
is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and the Joinder Motion is GRANTED.2 The
1 Where the Court refers to the filings made in the Electronic Court Filing (“ECF”) system
in this action, it uses the convention [Doc. ___]. When the Court refers to the ECF docket
number for a different action, it uses the convention ECF No. ___. 	In either case, the
Court identifies the page number as assigned by the ECF system.
2 Mr. Crostarosa does not oppose LAZ’s Joinder Motion, and his Opposition to the Motion
to Compel Arbitration proceeds as though LAZ moved to compel arbitration as well. See
[Doc. 25 at 14 (“All three Defendants jointly moved to compel arbitration.”)]. Accordingly,
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Motion to Compel Arbitration ruling is as follows: GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s claim against
Defendant Parking Revenue Recovery Services, Inc. (“PRRS”) and DENIED as to
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Asura Technologies USA, Inc. (“Asura”) and LAZ
Parking Ltd. (“LAZ”).
BACKGROUND3
LAZ 	provides 	parking management 	services 	all 	over 	the 	country, 	including
Colorado. 	[Doc. 1 at ¶ 2]. 	PRRS enforces parking payments for facilities managed by
LAZ, and it does so by using a video analytics system technology from Asura. 	[Id. at
¶¶ 4–6]. When Defendants deem that a vehicle has not properly paid for parking in a lot
managed by LAZ, Defendants use PRRS’s license plate recognition technology to obtain
the motor vehicle records associated with that vehicle. [Id. at ¶¶ 7–8]. PRRS then uses
the information in the records to mail a parking notice to the registered owner’s home
address. 	[Id. at ¶¶ 8–9]. 	The notice explains, among other things, what the parking
violation was, where the violation took place, and the amount owed, and includes
timestamped photos of the vehicle entering and exiting the parking location. [Id. at ¶¶ 10–
12].
On or about February 25, 2022, Plaintiff Lucas Crostarosa (“Plaintiff” or “Mr.
Crostarosa”) parked at a parking lot managed by LAZ in Denver, Colorado, at 2000
Larimer St. (the “Lot”). [Id. at ¶ 41]. Mr. Crostarosa did not pay for parking. [Doc. 25-4
the Joinder Motion is GRANTED, and the Court extends PRRS’s and Asura’s arguments
to LAZ.
3 The Court takes these facts from Plaintiff’s Complaint and accepts them as true for
purposes of this Order. 	See Munoz v. Conduent State & Loc. Sols., Inc., No. 24-2044,
2025 WL 799482, at *1 n.2 (10th Cir. Mar. 13, 2025); [Doc. 15 at 7 n.1].
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at ¶ 10]. 	The following month, on or about March of 2022, Mr. Crostarosa received a
parking notice from PRRS in the mail at his home address, stating that no payment was
received for his time in the Lot. 	[Doc. 1 at ¶ 43]. 	The notice also stated that Mr.
Crostarosa’s balance on his citation is $80. [Id.].
On January 21, 2025, Mr. Crostarosa initiated this putative class action. 	He
invokes the Court’s federal question jurisdiction by asserting a single cause of action,
alleging that Defendants’ access and use of motor vehicle records violated the Driver’s
Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–2725 (“DPPA”). [Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 16, 26, 38–39,
50, 62–69]. 	The DPPA authorizes a private right of action when an entity “knowingly
obtains, discloses or uses personal information, from a motor vehicle record, for a
purpose not permitted” under 18 U.S.C. § 2721, and the information pertains to the
individual bringing suit. 18 U.S.C. § 2724(a); Miller v. Image Data LLC, 91 F. App’x 122,
125 (10th Cir. 2004). Asura and PRRS filed the instant Motion to Compel Arbitration on
March 6, 2025, [Doc. 15], and LAZ filed its Motion for Leave to Join in Motion to Compel
Arbitration on March 12, 2025, [Doc. 24].
Defendants argue that by parking in the Lot, Mr. Crostarosa entered a contract
with Defendants, and that contract includes an arbitration provision. See [Doc. 15 at 5–
6; Doc. 24 at ¶ 4]. 	Defendants seek an order enforcing that arbitration provision and a
stay of this matter pending completion of arbitration. 	[Doc. 15 at 5–6]. 	Mr. Crostarosa
opposes Defendants’ motions, contending that he never agreed to any contract with
Defendants because the signs displaying the contract were not conspicuous, but even if
he did agree to that contract, his DPPA claim does not fall within the arbitration provision
and LAZ and Asura may not compel arbitration because they are not parties to the
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contract. See generally [Doc. 25].
LEGAL STANDARD
“There is a strong federal policy favoring arbitration for dispute resolution, and this
policy ‘requires a liberal reading of arbitration agreements.’” GATX Mgmt. Servs., LLC v.
Weakland, 171 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1162 (D. Colo. 2001) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 23 n.27 (1983)). The Federal Arbitration Act
(“FAA”) 	provides 	that contractual 	agreements 	to arbitrate disputes “shall 	be 	valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. Section 3 of the FAA obligates courts to stay
litigation on matters that the parties have agreed to arbitrate, while section 4 authorizes
a federal district court to compel arbitration for a dispute over which it would have
jurisdiction. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4. “By its terms, the [FAA] leaves no place for the exercise
of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the
parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been
signed.” Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985).
But because “arbitration is a matter of contract,” the Court cannot require a party
“to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” Howsam v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002) (quotation omitted). 	“Although the
Supreme Court has long recognized and enforced a liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements . . . the question whether parties have a valid arbitration
agreement at all is a gateway matter that is presumptively for courts to decide.” Bellman
v. i3Carbon, LLC, 563 F. App’x 608, 611 (10th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up); see also Brayman
v. KeyPoint Gov’t Sols., Inc., 83 F.4th 823, 832 (10th Cir. 2023) (“A court addressing a
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motion to compel arbitration therefore must first determine whether there exists an
enforceable agreement to arbitrate.” (citation omitted)). And “when considering a motion
to compel arbitration which is opposed on the ground that no agreement to arbitrate had
been made by the parties, [the court] should give to the opposing party the benefit of all
reasonable doubts and inferences that may arise.” 	Vernon v. Qwest Comm. Int’l, Inc.,
857 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1149 (D. Colo. 2012) (quotation omitted), aff’d, 925 F. Supp. 2d
1185 (D. Colo. 2013).
Then, the court “determine[s] such matters as . . . whether the agreement covers
a particular controversy.” 	Brayman, 83 F.4th at 832 (cleaned up); see also Cavlovic v.
J.C. Penney Corp., 884 F.3d 1051, 1057 (10th Cir. 2018) (after first finding a valid
agreement to arbitrate, the second step requires a court to determine whether the
allegations in the complaint are within the scope of the arbitration provision). 	The party
seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of establishing that the matter at issue is
subject to arbitration. 	See Hancock v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 701 F.3d 1248, 1261 (10th
Cir. 2012) (where parties dispute the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, movant must
prove “there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding the parties’ agreement”
(quotation omitted)); GATX, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1162.
ANALYSIS
I. 	Agreement to Arbitrate
The first step of the Court’s arbitrability inquiry asks whether the Parties entered
into a valid agreement to arbitrate. Brayman, 83 F.4th at 832. Whether a valid agreement
to arbitrate exists “is simply a matter of contract between the parties.” 	Walker v.
BuildDirect.com Techs., Inc., 733 F.3d 1001, 1004 (10th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted).
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Accordingly, courts apply “ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of
contracts to determine whether a party has agreed to arbitrate a dispute.” Id. (quotation
omitted).
Because the Parties appear to agree that Colorado law applies here, see [Doc. 15
at 9–10 (arguing that the arbitration clause is enforceable “[i]n accordance with the FAA
and Colorado law”); Doc. 25 at 7–11 (citing Colorado law and applying Colorado contract
law principles)], the Court proceeds accordingly, see Grynberg v. Total S.A., 538 F.3d
1336, 1346 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Because the parties’ arguments assume that Colorado law
applies, we will proceed under the same assumption.”). 	“To be enforceable, a contract
requires 	mutual 	assent 	to 	an 	exchange 	between 	competent 	parties 	for 	legal
consideration.” French v. Centura Health Corp., 509 P.3d 443, 449 (Colo. 2022). “Under
Colorado law, a contract requires a ‘meeting of the minds.’” 	Bellman, 563 F. App’x at
613. “The requisite meeting of the minds is established by the parties’ acts, conduct, and
words, along with the attendant circumstances, and not by any subjective, unexpressed
intent by either party.” 	French, 509 P.3d at 449; see also Leica Geosystems, Inc. v.
L.W.S. Leasing, Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1198 (D. Colo. 2012) (“An offer and assent
may be manifested by acts or conduct creating a contract.”).
Mr. Crostarosa disputes both the existence of a contract in this case and that he
agreed to arbitrate this dispute. 	Defendants argue that Mr. Crostarosa did agree to a
contract by parking in the Lot, and that contract states, among other things, that there is
“no free parking at any time” and “[b]y parking on this Lot, you hereby agree that the sole
remedy for an unresolved dispute is binding arbitration.” [Doc. 15 at 11–12; Doc. 15-3 at
2–4 (the “Contract”); Doc. 28 at 8]. 	This Contract, Defendants highlight, was posted on
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big signs in multiple places throughout the Lot, including at the Lot’s entrance and exit.
[Doc. 15-1 at ¶ 4; Doc. 15-3 at 2–4]. 	For his part, Mr. Crostarosa does not dispute that
the Contract was posted on multiple signs around the Lot but argues that the signs were
not sufficiently conspicuous and he did not see them. See [Doc. 25 at 8–10]. Because
he did not see the signs, Mr. Crostarosa concludes that he was not on notice that his
conduct of parking in the Lot had any “contract-forming effect” that would bind him to any
agreement, and therefore he did not assent to the Contract, let alone agree to arbitrate.
See [id. at 7–11].
The Court respectfully disagrees with Mr. Crostarosa that his conduct did not have
a contract-forming effect. On the contrary, a reasonable driver knows that when they park
in a parking lot, they agree to an implied contract with the lot owner: the lot owner allows
the driver to park on their property, and the driver agrees to follow the rules laid out by
the lot owner, including paying the required rates. If the driver does not follow the rules
or does not pay, they may be subject to a ticket or their car being towed. 	The driver is
free to leave the lot without parking if he does not want to agree to these implied terms.
“This exchange, on its own, is sufficient to meet the basic criteria necessary to establish
formation of a contract.” 	Butler v. Asura Techs. USA, Inc., No. 24-cv-00529-DDD-STV,
slip op. at 4 (D. Colo. Oct. 7, 2024), ECF No. 33 (“Butler Order”) (citing Lucht’s Concrete
Pumping, Inc. v. Horner, 255 P.3d 1058, 1061 (Colo. 2011)).
Of course, the rules of the parking lot must be reasonably conspicuous such that
a driver knows or can easily find out what they are agreeing to by parking in the lot. See
Grosvenor v. Qwest Corp., 854 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1026 (D. Colo. 2012) (whether a
contract 	was 	formed 	requires 	ascertaining 	whether 	the 	contractual 	terms 	were
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“reasonably conspicuous”). 	If the term 	is hidden or obscured, there can be no
presumption that there was a meeting of the minds as to that term. Id.
Here, the Court finds that the Contract—and the agreement to binding arbitration
within (the “Arbitration Agreement”)—was conspicuous. As the undisputed exhibits to the
Motion to Compel Arbitration show, there were multiple large red signs with the Contract
posted throughout the Lot:
[Doc. 15-1 at ¶ 4; Doc. 15-3 at 2–4]. 	These signs were posted in areas where a
reasonable driver would see them, such as the payment kiosk and by the lot entrance
and exit. [Doc. 15-1 at ¶ 4; Doc. 15-3 at 2–4]. As reflected above, the words in the sign
are in white font set against a bright red backdrop, an all-caps larger font is used for
headers 	including 	“ARBITRATION,” 	and 	the 	sign 	is 	split 	into 	three 	easy-to-read
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paragraphs. [Doc. 15-1 at ¶ 4; Doc. 15-3 at 2–4];4 cf. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-201, cmt. 10
(relevant factors in determining whether a term is conspicuous include the use of
headings and text that contrast with the surrounding text, placement of the term in the
larger context, and the effort needed to access the term). 	Those three paragraphs
constitute essential terms of the Contract: (1) there is no free parking at any time; (2) the
Lot’s rules and use limitations are strictly enforced including via License Plate Recognition
technology; and (3) by parking on this Lot, the customer agrees that arbitration is the sole
remedy for an unresolved dispute. [Doc. 15-1 at ¶ 4; Doc. 15-3 at 2–4].
Mr. Crostarosa’s failure to see the signs because it was dark out and because he
did not pay for parking, see [Doc. 25 at 8; Doc. 25-4 at ¶¶ 9–11], is legally insignificant.
“A contract was formed between the parties when Plaintiff[] manifested assent to the
implied terms of the agreement: 	temporary use of a parking spot in exchange for a
promise to pay if necessary.” Butler Order at 5–6 (citing E-21 Eng’g, Inc. v. Steve Stock
& Assocs., Inc., 252 P.3d 36, 39 (Colo. App. 2010)). “A reasonable person in Plaintiff[’s]
position would have understood the basic nature of this exchange as well as the fact that
it constituted a binding agreement, breach of which would have resulted in additional fees
or penalties.” Id. at 6. If Mr. Crostarosa wanted to learn what terms govern this parking
agreement, he could have read the conspicuous red signs. See Weller v. HSBC Mortg.
Servs., Inc., 971 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1080 (D. Colo. 2013) (“A party generally cannot avoid
contractual obligations by claiming that he or she did not read the agreement.” (quotation
4 The sign depicted in Exhibit 2 of the Motion to Compel Arbitration, [Doc. 15-2], was not
posted when Mr. Crostarosa parked at the Lot in 2022, see [Doc. 15-1 at ¶ 3]. Therefore,
it is irrelevant to the instant Motion. 	See [Doc. 28 at 10 n.3 (Defendants conceding in
their Reply that “[a]ny reference to the language from the Contract in [Doc. 15-2] instead
of [Doc. 15-3] in the Motion was inadvertent scrivener’s error”)].
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omitted)); see also Lasser v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., No. 19-cv-02045-RM-MEH, 2020
WL 1527333, at *3 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2020) (finding that a plaintiff is bound to an
arbitration agreement which he “had the resource to access – and open, read, and
understand,” even though he did not do so). Indeed, Mr. Crostarosa was on notice that
there were terms associated with parking in the Lot because of the very large, bright
“PUBLIC PARKING” sign outside of the Lot listing the parking rates. See [Doc. 1 at ¶ 41].
Finding that the Contract was sufficiently conspicuous and Plaintiff manifested
assent to the Arbitration Agreement by parking in the Lot, the final question for the Court
to address is which of the Defendants are on the other side of the Contract. The Parties
appear to agree that only Plaintiff and PRRS are parties to the Contract, and Asura and
LAZ are non-parties. 	See [Doc. 25 at 14–17 (Plaintiff arguing that the Contract only
mentions PRRS, and Asura and LAZ cannot compel Plaintiff to arbitrate based on the
Contract); Doc. 28 at 12–13 (Defendants conceding that Asura and LAZ are “nonparties”
to the Arbitration Agreement)].
As a result of the above analysis, the Court determines that the Arbitration
Agreement is a valid and enforceable agreement between Mr. Crostarosa and PRRS.
II. 	Mr. 	Crostarosa’s 	Claim 	against 	PRRS 	Falls 	Within 	the 	Scope 	of 	the
Arbitration Agreement
Next, the Court must determine whether Mr. Crostarosa’s claim against PRRS falls
within the scope of the Arbitration Agreement. 	“The factual allegations which form the
basis of the claim asserted, rather than the legal cause of action pled,” determine “whether
a particular dispute falls within the reach of the [arbitration] clause.” City & Cnty. of Denver
v. Dist. Ct., 939 P.2d 1353, 1364 (Colo. 1997). 	“If the allegations underlying the claim[]
touch matters covered by the parties’ [arbitration agreement], then those claims must be
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arbitrated, whatever the legal labels attached to them.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v.
Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla., 636 F.3d 562, 570 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted).
Mr. Crostarosa argues that the Arbitration Agreement is “narrow,” and that the
dispute at issue is “merely collateral to the agreement.” [Doc. 25 at 14]. In support of his
argument that the Arbitration Agreement is narrow, Mr. Crostarosa cites two cases,
Cummings v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 404 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2005) and
McDonnell Douglas Finance Corp. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 858 F.2d 825 (2d.
Cir. 1988). 	[Id. at 13]. 	However, these cases are not factually analogous to this case
because they concern arbitration agreements that were explicitly limited to specific
subject matters. See Cummings, 404 F.3d at 1262 (“[T]he parties clearly manifested an
intent to narrowly limit arbitration to specific disputes regarding the termination of the
Operating Agreement.”); McDonnell, 858 F.2d at 832 (arbitration clause at issue “is limited
to the context of Paragraph 4N and the circumstances that might surround the utility’s
decision to seek redemption pursuant to that Paragraph”). Here, there is no limitation on
what kind of dispute is subject to arbitration—instead, the Contract mandates that
arbitration is “the sole remedy for an unresolved dispute.” See [Doc. 25 at 12; Doc. 28 at
10].
Despite the lack of any explicit limitations in the Arbitration Agreement, Mr.
Crostarosa contends that the Arbitration Agreement’s use of the term “an unresolved
dispute” rather than “all unresolved disputes” or “any and all disputes” signifies that the
Arbitration Agreement is narrow in scope. 	[Doc. 25 at 5–6, 12–14]. 	On this basis, Mr.
Crostarosa attempts to distinguish this case from Butler, No. 24-cv-00529-DDD-STV,
where another court in this District compelled arbitration in a case with similar facts and
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a similar arbitration provision. See [id.]. The Court is respectfully unpersuaded.
Like this case, Butler is a DPPA case where the plaintiffs parked in lots monitored
by Asura and PRRS, those lots were monitored by Asura’s video analytics technology for
parking enforcement, and the plaintiffs later received parking notices mailed to their
homes stating that no payment was received for their time in the lots. Butler Order at 2–
3. The parking lots in Butler had large, conspicuous, red signs stating that “[b]y parking
on this Facility, you hereby agree that the sole remedy for all unresolved disputes is
binding arbitration.” Id. at 3. 	The court found that the DPPA claim “is clearly within the
scope of this statement,” because it “pertains to the Plaintiffs’ use of the lots monitored
by Defendants.” Id.
Mr. Crostarosa argues that the Contract here is different from the one in Butler—
and therefore the Court’s conclusion regarding whether the DPPA claim is within the
scope of the Arbitration Agreement should be different—because the provision in Butler
applied to “all unresolved disputes” whereas the arbitration clause here pertains to “an
unresolved dispute.” 	See [Doc. 25 at 5–6, 13]. 	Mr. Crostarosa does not cite any legal
authority making this distinction between “all” and “an” but contends that “it was the
mention of ‘all’ that ultimately led to the Butler court’s conclusion to compel arbitration.”
See [id. at 5–6]. The Court respectfully disagrees. The Butler court’s analysis regarding
whether the DPPA claim is within the scope of the arbitration agreement contains no
discussion of the importance of the word “all.”
The Court discerns no legally significant difference between “an unresolved
dispute” and “all unresolved disputes” in terms of the scope of the Arbitration Agreement.
The article “an” means “any,” which in the context of determining which disputes are
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covered by the Arbitration Agreement essentially operates the same as “all.” 	See, e.g.,
Williams v. Fundingsland, 221 P. 1084, 1085–86 (Colo. 1923) (ruling that in interpreting
the phrase “[i]f any of my children should die without issue, or without leaving a husband
or wife him or her surviving,” “[t]he indefinite article ‘a’ means one or any, and in this case
it would seem to mean ‘any’”); United States v. Hernandez, 107 F.4th 965, 969 (11th Cir.
2024) (“Usage guides confirm what we all know—that the indefinite ‘a’ points to a
nonspecific object, thing, or person that is not distinguished from the other members of a
class. 	Indeed, we’ve gone so far as to say that the term ‘a’ denotes ‘any.’” (quotation
omitted)); United States v. Otunyo, 63 F.4th 948, 956–57 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (holding that in
the context of a sentencing guideline which provides a certain base offense level
depending on if the defendant is convicted of “an offense referenced to this guideline,”
“‘an’ is best read to mean ‘any one,’” such that the base offense level depends on “if . . .
‘any one’ of the defendant’s convictions” referenced to the guideline); Kilroy v. Husted,
No. 2:11-cv-00145-GLF-TPK, 2011 WL 3321308, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 2, 2011) (“The
word ‘an’ is an indefinite article used as a function word before a singular noun and
generally signifies ‘any’ which is a synonym of ‘a.’”).
With no other limitations in the Arbitration Agreement, the Court finds that the
Arbitration Agreement is broad. See Hildebrand v. Par Network, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-02154-
CM-KGS, 2009 WL 4508578, at *3 (D. Kan. Dec. 1, 2009) (finding that an arbitration
clause referring to “an unresolved dispute by the parties to this Agreement” is “broad”);
cf. Sanchez v. Nitro-Lift Techs, LLC, 762 F.3d 1139, 1146–47 (10th Cir. 2014) (observing
that a “clause contain[ing] no limiting language, either restricting arbitration to any specific
disputes or to the agreement itself” is broad).
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Because the Court finds that the Arbitration Agreement is broad, the “presumption
of arbitrability” is “particularly applicable.” 	AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of
Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986); accord ARW Expl. Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455, 1462
(10th Cir. 1995). This means that “[i]n the absence of any express provision excluding a
particular grievance from arbitration, . . . only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to
exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail.” AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 650 (quotation
omitted). 	Through this lens, the Court considers whether Mr. Crostarosa’s DPPA claim
against PRRS falls within the scope of the Arbitration Agreement.
Mr. Crostarosa argues that it does not, because the Arbitration Agreement is
“clearly limited to the specific disputes mentioned in the contract – that being disputes for
unpaid parking,” while the DPPA claim is “merely collateral” and therefore “beyond the
purview” of the Arbitration Agreement. [Doc. 25 at 14]. Mr. Crostarosa contends that the
contract between the parties “solely governs disputes that arise from an individual’s failure
to pay for parking” and does not cover “[t]he fact Defendants pursue unpaid tickets by
violating the privacy rights of drivers.” [Id.] The Court respectfully disagrees.
First, the Court notes that the legal standard that Mr. Crostarosa sets out regarding
collateral matters being beyond the purview of arbitration agreements is incomplete. 	In
fact, the case that Mr. Crostarosa cites in support, Cummings, explains that while
collateral matters will generally be ruled to be beyond the purview of a narrow arbitration
clause, “[w]here the arbitration clause is broad, there arises a presumption of arbitrability
and arbitration of even a collateral matter will be ordered if the claim alleged implicates
issues of contract construction or the parties’ rights and obligations under it.” 404 F.3d at
1261 (quotation omitted). 	As previously discussed, the Arbitration Agreement here is
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broad and contains no limitations or exclusions.
Second, Mr. Crostarosa offers no argument, only conclusory statements, in
support of his contention that the Arbitration Agreement does not apply to the DPPA claim.
Mr. Crostarosa states, without any explanation, that “[t]he fact Defendants pursue unpaid
tickets by violating the privacy rights of drivers” is a matter beyond the purview of the
Arbitration Agreement. See [Doc. 25 at 14]. But this position cannot be squared with Mr.
Crostarosa’s acknowledgment that the Arbitration Agreement applies to disputes arising
from a failure to pay for parking. See [id.]. Indeed, this case was only initiated following
Mr. Crostarosa’s receipt of a Parking Notice from PRRS stating that his vehicle “was
parked on private property on the date of issuance and was in breach of the posted rules
and use limitations of the property location identified above,” identifying the issue as “[n]o
payment received.” 	See [Doc. 1 at ¶ 43]. 	Sending this Parking Notice, Mr. Crostarosa
alleges, was not permissible under the DPPA. 	[Id. at ¶ 38]. 	The DPPA claim therefore
implicates the Contract and the Parties’ rights and obligations.
Mr. Crostarosa also does not address the fact that his DPPA claims relies on
allegations that explicitly “touch matters covered by the parties’ arbitration agreement.”
See Burlington, 636 F.3d at 570 (cleaned up). For instance, Mr. Crostarosa alleges that
Defendants use their License Plate Recognition technology to identify the license plates
on vehicles that have not paid for parking and use that information to access motor vehicle
records, including the registrants’ personal addresses, in order to mail the registrants a
parking notice. 	See [Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 7–11, 16, 44]. The Contract clearly provides that the
Lot “may be monitored by License Plate Recognition technology to ensure compliance
with the [Lot] rules” and that “[v]ehicles failing to comply with lot rules will be charged
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additional parking fees.” 	[Doc. 15-3 at 2]. 	Matters explicitly referenced in the Contract,
i.e. the use of a license plate recognition technology, are certainly within the purview of
the Arbitration Agreement.
Thus, the Court finds that Mr. Crostarosa’s DPPA claim against PRRS falls within
the scope of the Arbitration Agreement. 	The Motion to Compel Arbitration as to Mr.
Crostarosa’s claim against PRRS is respectfully GRANTED.
III. 	Asura and LAZ
Next, the Court addresses whether Mr. Crostarosa may be compelled to arbitrate
his claim as asserted against Asura and LAZ. 	See [Doc. 28 at 13–14]. LAZ and Asura
argue that the Court should apply the principles of equitable estoppel: even though LAZ
and Asura are not parties to the Contract, Mr. Crostarosa is treating the allegations
against all Defendants as “not only . . . closely related, but inseparable” and has alleged
“an intertwined and indistinguishable claim against Defendants.” [Id.]; see also [Doc. 24
at ¶ 4]. Thus, they contend, Mr. Crostarosa should be estopped from arbitrating his claim
against one Defendant and not the others. [Doc. 28 at 13–14]. Plaintiff opposes, arguing
that LAZ and Asura have not made the required showing for a non-signatory to move to
compel arbitration. See [Doc. 25 at 14–17].
Defendants primarily rely on Frazier v. Western Union Co., which held that a non-
signatory to a contract with an arbitration provision may compel arbitration where (1) the
plaintiffs’ 	claims 	against 	the 	non-signatory 	and 	a 	signatory 	to 	the 	contract 	were
interdependent, (2) plaintiffs asserted all of their claims collectively against all defendants,
and (3) plaintiffs’ claims were intertwined with the duties and obligations arising from the
contract with the arbitration provision. 377 F. Supp. 3d 1248, 1262–64 (D. Colo. 2019);
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[Doc. 28 at 13–14].
However, after Frazier was decided, the Colorado Supreme Court issued a
decision rejecting this theory of equitable estoppel and disavowing the cases that the
Frazier court relied on in its analysis: Santich v. VCG Holding Corp., 443 P.3d 62 (Colo.
2019). None of the Parties address this decision, but it is dispositive of the issue at hand.
In Santich, a group of dancers brought a Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)
collective action lawsuit in the District of Colorado against the owners of the clubs where
they perform and the club owners’ parent companies. Id. at 64; First Amended Complaint,
Santich v. VCG Holding Corp., No. 17-cv-00631-RM-MEH (D. Colo. May 12, 2017), ECF
No. 65 (Santich Complaint). 	The plaintiffs brought six claims, including for violations
under the FLSA, violations of different states’ employment and labor laws, and unjust
enrichment. Santich Complaint at ¶¶ 125–194. The plaintiffs referred to all Defendants
collectively frequently throughout the complaint and brought their FLSA and unjust
enrichment claims against all defendants without distinguishing between the different
entities. See generally id.
The club-owner defendants in Santich successfully compelled arbitration based on
the arbitration clause included in the agreements that plaintiffs signed with the club
owners. 	Santich, 443 P.3d at 64. 	The corporate-parent defendants sought to compel
arbitration as well, but they were not parties to those agreements or any other contracts
with the plaintiffs. 	Id. 	So, the parent defendants argued that the dancers should be
equitably estopped from litigating their claims against one set of defendants because they
are in compelled arbitration of the same claims against another set of defendants. Id.
The 	federal 	magistrate 	judge 	recommended 	that 	the 	district 	court 	compel
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arbitration on that theory. 	Id. 	The judge relied on a Colorado Court of Appeals case,
Meister v. Stout, which held that equitable estoppel is available to non-signatories of an
arbitration 	agreement 	when 	a 	signatory 	to 	the 	agreement 	alleges 	“substantially
interdependent 	and 	concerted 	misconduct 	by 	a 	nonsignatory 	and 	one 	or 	more
signatories” to the agreement. See id. at 64–65; Meister, 353 P.3d 916, 921 (Colo. App.
2015), overruled by Santich, 443 P.3d 62. In Meister, the plaintiff asserted identical claims
against 	all 	defendants, 	arising 	from 	an 	operating 	agreement 	which 	contained 	an
arbitration provision. 	Meister, 353 P.3d at 921–22. 	The plaintiff never assigned
misconduct 	to 	any 	defendant 	individually, 	instead 	referring 	to 	them 	jointly 	as
“Defendants.” 	Id. 	The Meister court held that even though one of the defendants was
not a party to the operating agreement and therefore not a party to the arbitration clause,
it could compel arbitration under a theory of equitable estoppel. Id.
In reviewing the report and recommendation in Santich, the district court noted that
Meister failed to address one of the traditional requirements of equitable estoppel,
detrimental reliance. 	Santich, 443 P.3d at 64–65. 	But, the court explained, it was not
clear if this element was required in the arbitration context because the Colorado
Supreme Court had not issued any controlling decisions on point. Santich, 443 P.3d at
64–65. Thus, the district court certified the question to the Colorado Supreme Court. Id.
at 65.
The Colorado Supreme Court accepted the certification and began its analysis by
stating the rule that generally, only parties to a contract can compel arbitration under that
contract and they may only do so as to another signatory of the contract. Id. There are
seven exceptions to this rule, including estoppel. 	In Colorado, “equitable estoppel is
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generally understood as arising where one party induces another to detrimentally change
position in reasonable reliance on that party’s actions through words, conduct, or silence.”
Id. (quotation omitted). 	“However, Colorado law has never favored estoppel” and only
applies the doctrine “when all of the elements constituting an estoppel are clearly shown.”
Id. (collecting cases). The four elements of estoppel are:
[T]he party against whom the estoppel is asserted must know the [relevant] facts;
that party must also intend that its conduct be acted upon or must lead the other
party to believe that its conduct is so intended; the party claiming estoppel must
be 	ignorant 	of 	the 	true 	facts; 	and 	the 	party 	asserting 	the 	estoppel 	must
detrimentally rely on the other party’s conduct.
Id. (quoting Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Shorey, 826 P.2d 830, 841 (Colo. 1992).
The Santich Court reaffirmed this long-standing principle and rejected the creation
of “a new breed of equitable estoppel” in the arbitration context. 	Id. at 65–66. 	It
“disavow[ed] Meister’s endorsement of a special estoppel rule predicated upon the
interconnectivity of claims and actions taken in concert by signatories and nonsignatories
to an arbitration agreement” and held that an estoppel argument raised by a nonsignatory
to compel arbitration “must be supported by all four traditionally defined elements of
equitable estoppel.” Id. at 66. The Colorado Supreme Court was mindful that its decision
“may result in piecemeal litigation in which related claims simultaneously proceed in court
and arbitration,” but concluded that “policy reasons alone cannot replace necessary
predicates for the application of equitable estoppel.” Id. at 66 n.2 (cleaned up).
Since 2019, courts in this District have applied Santich and required proof of all
four elements of estoppel in arbitration contexts similar to the one here. 	See, e.g.,
Schneider v. SRC Energy, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1101–02 (D. Colo. 2019) (rejecting
equitable estoppel argument where the defendant “failed to make a clear showing that it
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detrimentally relied upon any conduct by [the] [p]laintiff”); Robertson v. Rep Processing,
LLC, No. 19-cv-02910-PAB-NYW, 2020 WL 5702296, at *5 (D. Colo. Sept. 24, 2020)
(declining to apply the “disfavored” equitable estoppel doctrine because the defendant
“cannot demonstrate all four elements of equitable estoppel”); Adams-Arapahoe Sch.
Dist. 28J v. Great Am. Ins. Co., No. 22-cv-00461-RM-STV, 2023 WL 2824301, at *14–15
(D. Colo. Feb. 15, 2023) (“Without a showing of detrimental reliance by the . . .
Defendants, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff is equitably estopped from bringing its
case in court.”).5 But see Butler Order (not grappling with Santich because the plaintiffs
did not raise any arguments that Asura and PRRS are differently situated with respect to
the contract at issue). The Court sees no reason to depart from the weight of authority in
this District.6
Returning to Asura and LAZ, Defendants make no attempt to prove the four
elements of estoppel. Nor do Asura and LAZ make any other arguments to explain why
5 Adams-Arapahoe is a report and recommendation in a case which settled while the
deadline to object was pending, and therefore the District Judge did not have the
opportunity to rule on the recommendation. 	See No. 22-cv-00461-RM-STV (D. Colo.),
ECF Nos. 166–67.
6 Defendants’ supplemental authority does not change the Court’s analysis. 	See [Doc.
40]. Defendants submitted an unpublished Northern District of Texas case, Tobey v. Ace
Parking Management, Inc., No. 3:24-cv-02932-X, 2025 WL 1919887 (N.D. Tex. July 11,
2025), which deals with a similar question as here, considering whether a parking lot
operator may enforce an arbitration agreement to which it is not a signatory under an
estoppel theory. See Tobey, 2025 WL 1919887 at *5. This is where the similarities end,
however. Unlike Colorado, Texas law recognizes a theory of estoppel called “intertwined
estoppel” which allows “compelling arbitration when a nonsignatory defendant has a close
relationship with one of the signatories and the claims are intimately founded in and
intertwined with the underlying contract obligations.” See id. It was under this framework
that the Tobey court concluded that yes, the parking lot operator may enforce the
arbitration agreement as a nonsignatory. Id. at *5–6. But, as established, Colorado law
rejects this theory of estoppel and instead requires proof of all four elements of equitable
estoppel. Thus, this supplemental authority is inapposite.
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they may enforce a contract to which they are not a party. Accordingly, Asura and LAZ
may not compel Mr. Crostarosa to arbitrate his DPPA claim against them. 	Defendants’
Motion to Compel Arbitration as to Asura and LAZ is respectfully DENIED.
IV. 	Stay of Litigation
Section 3 of the FAA obligates courts to stay litigation on matters that the parties
have agreed to arbitrate. 9 U.S.C. § 3; cf. Smith v. Spizzirri, 601 U.S. 472, 475–76 (2024)
(no discretion “[w]hen a federal court finds that a dispute is subject to arbitration[] and a
party has requested a stay of the court proceedings pending arbitration”). 	Because Mr.
Crostarosa’s claim against PRRS is arbitrable and PRRS requests a stay pending
completion of arbitration, [Doc. 15 at 6], the Court must stay the action against PRRS
pending arbitration. 	However, the action between Plaintiff and Asura and LAZ may
proceed.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that:
(1) 	Defendants Asura Technologies USA, Inc. and Parking Revenue Recovery
Services, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration [Doc. 15] is GRANTED as to
Plaintiff’s claim against Parking Revenue Recovery Services, Inc. and
DENIED as to Plaintiff’s claims against Asura Technologies USA, Inc. and
LAZ Parking Ltd.;
(2) 	Defendant LAZ Parking Ltd.’s Motion for Leave to Join in Motion to Compel
Arbitration [Doc. 24] is GRANTED;
(3) 	Plaintiff, Defendants Asura Technologies USA, Inc., and LAZ Parking Ltd.
are ORDERED to jointly contact Judge Starnella’s Chambers no later than
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January 29, 2026 for the purposes of resuming the scheduling of this matter
and discussing how the parallel litigation and arbitration will proceed,
including whether this action should be stayed pending resolution of the
arbitration against PRRS;
(4) 	The claim against Parking Revenue Recovery Services, Inc. is STAYED
pending resolution of arbitration proceedings; and
(5) 	Within 10 days after the completion of the arbitration between Plaintiff and
Parking 	Revenue 	Recovery 	Services, 	Plaintiff 	and 	Parking 	Revenue
Recovery Services shall jointly FILE a status report describing the results
of the arbitration and indicating what, if any, further action each of them
intends to take in this case.
DATED: January 23, 2026 	BY THE COURT:
_________________________
Nina Y. Wang
United States District Judge
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