USA v. Fritz et al

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case No. 1:25-cr-00094-JLK Document 98 _ filed 02/24/26 USDC Colorado pgil
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Criminal Action No. 25-cr-00094-JLK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

V.

2. CHRISTIAN GRANAT,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM SENTENCING OPINION

Kane, J.

On December 8, 2025, Mr. Granat entered into a plea agreement and pleaded guilty to a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, conspiracy to violate the laws of the United States, namely by
possessing a machinegun in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(0) and 924(a)(2) and making an
unregistered machinegun in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(f). Mr. Granat came before me today
for sentencing on this conviction.

For a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, the maximum term of imprisonment is five years, the
maximum term of supervised release is three years, the maximum fine is $250,000, and a $100
special assessment fee is required. I may impose a term of probation of one to five years under
18 U.S.C. § 3561(c)(1). If probation is imposed, it must include at least one of the following
conditions: restitution, community service, or a fine, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)(2).

In the Presentence Report (“PSR”), the Probation Officer calculates the advisory
Sentencing Guidelines range as 46 to 57 months of imprisonment followed by up to 1 to 3 years

of supervised release. PSR §] 106, ECF No. 86. This range is based on a total offense level of 23

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

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and a Criminal History Category of I. The base offense level for Mr. Granat’s crime of
conviction is 18. Id. ¶ 38. The Probation Officer increased this level by four because the offense
involved between 8 and 24 firearms under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B). Id. ¶ 39. The offense level
was further increased by four levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B)(ii) based on the
Probation Officer’s determination that Mr. Granat knew a firearm involved in the offense lacked
a serial number. Id. ¶ 40. The offense level was then decreased by 3 for Mr. Granat’s acceptance
of responsibility, resulting in a total offense level of 23. Id. ¶¶ 49-51. Under the Guidelines, the
fine range for an offense level of 23 is $20,000 to $200,000.
I. RULINGS ON OBJECTIONS TO THE PSR
Before considering the appropriate sentence in this case, I first rule on Mr. Granat’s
Objections to the PSR and his Motion for a Non-Guideline Sentence. Mr. Granat raises nine
objections to the PSR: two objections that affect the calculation of the advisory Guidelines range;
six objections that do not affect the Guidelines calculation; and one objection to the proposed
special conditions of supervision. See Def.’s Obj. to PSR, ECF No. 71.
Objections Affecting the Guidelines Range
Objection to Paragraph 39 of the PSR (the Offense Level Calculation)
In the PSR, a four-level Guidelines enhancement was applied pursuant to U.S.S.G. §
2K2.1(b)(1)(B) on the ground that the offense involved between 8 and 24 firearms. PSR ¶ 39.
The prosecution contends that the offense involved at least eight privately manufactured firearms
(“PMFs”) that qualify as “firearms” for the purposes of U.S.G.G. § 2K2.1, which uses the
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definition of “firearms” in the Gun Control Act (“GCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3)(B). Resp. to
Def.’s Obj. to PSR at 1, ECF No. 89.
Specifically, the prosecution points to seven Glock-type firearm frames, as well as a fully
completed and functioning Glock-type 9mm pistol recovered from Mr. Granat’s co-defendant,
Aiden Fritz, at the time both were taken into custody. Id. at 2. The Glock-type frames as well as
the functioning Glock-type 9mm pistol were allegedly manufactured by Mr. Granat using a 3D
printer.
Mr. Granat objects to the four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B),
arguing that his offense involved fewer than eight firearms and therefore, does not warrant the
enhancement. Def.’s Obj. to PSR at 2-5. Mr. Granat raises two arguments in support of his
objection. First, citing to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, comment n.5, he argues that the Guidelines advise to
“count only those firearms that were unlawfully sought to be obtained, unlawfully possessed, or
unlawfully distributed.” Id. at 2-3. He contends, at the time of offense, his possession of firearms
was not unlawful, and therefore, manufacturing 3D printed frames for his personal use did not
violate federal law. Id.
Mr. Granat’s assertion that the 3D printed frames were manufactured solely for his
personal use is contradicted by the record. The record reflects that, although certain firearm
frames had not yet been distributed, other frames had in fact been distributed to third parties.
Specifically, the PSR includes the following facts:
 GRANAT also advised that he would print a PMF frame for the [Confidential
Informant (“CI”)]. The CI informed GRANAT that the AR-platform
[machinegun conversion devices “]MCDs[“] previously purchased were too
wide and GRANAT stated, “[y]ea, I shaved these ones down (referring to the
MCDs he was holding).” GRANAT agreed to print and sell 10 AR-platform
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MCDs for $400, 10 Glock-style MCDs for $200, and 2 Glock 19-style PMFs
for $200 ($800 total). PSR ¶ 19 (emphasis added).1
 On February 19, 2025, investigators utilized the ATF CI to conduct a controlled
purchase of MCDs and a PMF from FRITZ at 4304 Prestige Point. . . . Upon
entering the residence, FRITZ was observed carrying a black, polymer-framed
pistol, which the CI later reported appeared to be a “ghost gun” (a PMF absent
of any serial numbers). FRITZ provided the CI with a Glock-style PMF and told
the CI that if it broke, GRANAT would mail the CI a new one. FRITZ took the
slide off his pistol and demonstrated how it would fit on the PMF frame
provided to the CI. FRITZ advised the CI that GRANAT only printed one PMF
frame and instructed the CI to remove the remaining polymer filament on the
PMF frame. FRITZ then advised the CI, “we’ll send you the link for the rails
and shit” needed to finish the firearm. Id. ¶ 20 (emphasis added).2
 On February 20, 2025, investigators utilized the ATF CI to conduct another
controlled purchase. . . . FRITZ then provided the CI with a Glock-style PMF
frame and stated, ‘and then he (GRANAT) wants me to give you this lower too
. . .’ FRITZ then removed the slide from his pistol and compared its frame to
the PMF frame he had sold to the CI. FRITZ explained which internal
components would need to be purchased in order for the frame to accept a slide
while packaging the Glock-style MCDs in a plastic sandwich bag. Id. ¶ 21
(emphasis added).
 According to a case agent, FRITZ’[s] cell phone revealed messages indicating
GRANAT was going to split some of the proceeds from the sale of MCDs and
PMFs with FRITZ; however, additional details are unknown. Id. ¶ 29 (emphasis
added).
Based on the evidence presented, Mr. Granat was manufacturing the firearm frames for
distribution, not to retain for personal use. Accordingly, his characterization of the firearms as
1 Mr. Granat raises a limited objection to Paragraphs 18, 19, 21, 24, 27, and 38 of the PSR and
Page R-5 of the Sentencing Recommendation, challenging the classification of numerous devices
designed to convert firearms into machineguns as “firearms” or “MCDs.” I will address this
issue hereafter. Mr. Granat does not, however, dispute that he sold two Glock 19-style PMFs to
the CI.
2 Mr. Granat makes a limited objection to Paragraph 20 of the PSR, contending that the PMF
frames do not qualify as firearms as they are incomplete because they did not have rails attached.
He admits that while Mr. Fritz did advise the confidential informant that they would send him the
necessary links to finish the firearm, neither of them followed up with the CI regarding the rails
nor sent him any additional information. This issue is addressed below. But, again, Mr. Granat
does not dispute that he sold a Glock-style PMF to the CI.
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intended solely for personal use is inconsistent with facts. Federal law prohibits engaging in the
business of manufacturing firearms for sale or distribution without a license. United States v.
Vlha, 142 F.4th 1194, 1199 (9th Cir. 2025); 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A).3 Thus, these firearm
frames fall within the scope of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B).
Second, Mr. Granat contends that the four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. §
2K2.1(b)(1)(B) should not apply because the only firearm that qualifies is the completed and
functioning firearm possessed by Mr. Fritz at the time of arrest and that the possession of a single
firearm is not enough to trigger the enhancement.4 Def.’s Obj. to PSR at 3. He claims the seven
frames relied upon by the prosecution are not firearms because they are too incomplete. Id.
Under the Gun Control Act (“GCA”), a firearm is defined as
(A) any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily
be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive; (B) the frame or
receiver of any such weapon; (C) any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; or (D)
any destructive device. Such term does not include an antique firearm.
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3).
The U.S. Supreme Court has previously held that the GCA allows the ATF to regulate, “at
least some ‘partially complete’ frames or receivers.” Bondi v. VanDerStok, 604 U.S. 458, 478
(2025). At the same time, the Court emphasized that the GCA does not extend to “any
combination of parts susceptible of conversion into a frame or receiver with sufficient time,
tools, and expertise.” Id. at 481. It explained that “[l]ike the term ‘weapon,’ the artifact nouns
3 “It shall be unlawful—(1) for any person—(A) except a . . . licensed manufacturer . . . to
engage in the business of . . . manufacturing . . . firearms.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(a).
4 Because both parties agree, I will accept as true that the firearm possessed by Mr. Fritz upon his
capture is a “firearm” for the purposes of U.S.G.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B).
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‘frame’ and ‘receiver’ have their bounds. Some products may be so far from a finished frame or
receiver that they cannot fairly be described using those terms.” Id.
While the Supreme Court did not establish a bright-line test, it provided an example
illustrating when a partially complete frame can qualify as a firearm. The Court noted that a
frame requiring only the removal of plastic tabs and the drilling of a few pin holes was sufficient
to be considered a firearm under the GCA. The Court suggested that an ordinary person would
recognize such a product as a firearm frame, and it rhetorically added, “Just look again at the
second photo. What else would you call it?” Id. at 478.
Applying the Supreme Court’s guidance in Bondi v. VanDerStok to the present case, the
frames possessed by Mr. Granat, numbered Exhibits 13, 51, 114, 119, 120, 121, and 122 by the
ATF, qualify as firearms under § U.S.G.G. 2K2.1(b)(1)(B).
Exhibits 13, 51, 114, 119, and 120
In the ATF Report submitted by the prosecution, ATF Special Agent W. Griffon Lifrod
analyzed frames marked as exhibits 13, 51, 114, 119, and 120. Lifrod Report at 1, ECF No. 89-1.
After examination, he determined that each frame incorporated key characteristics of a
completed Glock-type pistol frame, including the trigger mechanism cavity, locking block cavity,
slide lock cavity, trigger pin hole, trigger housing pin hole, trigger cutout, magazine catch cavity,
and magazine well. Id. at 8-11. Based on these features, Agent Lifrod concluded that each of
these were designed to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive. Id. Furthermore, as can be
seen from the photos, the frames resemble firearms.
Mr. Granat argues that the frames are not firearms because they are incomplete. Def.’s
Obj. to PSR at 3-5. He asserts that they “could not be readily assembled into a firearm with
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additional parts” and were only partially machined, requiring further fabrication. Id. However, he
does not specify what additional parts or fabrication steps would be needed. This renders his
argument unpersuasive.
Exhibits 121 and 122
Similarly, Agent Lifrod examined Frames marked as exhibits 121 and 122 and concluded
that they shared the key characteristics of a completed Glock-type pistol frame. Lifrod Report at
11-12. While somewhat more crude due to the presence of excess material, these frames still
resemble a firearm. More importantly, Agent Lifrod’s assessment shows they are functionally
similar to Frames marked as exhibits 13, 51, 114, 119, and 120, as they retain the same internal
features. Id. He concluded that they too are “designed to expel a projectile by the action of an
explosive.” Id.
As these frames were “designed to… expel a projectile by the action of an explosive,”
they constitute firearms under U.S.G.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B). Consequently, Mr. Granat’s objection
to application of this four-level increase in his offense level is OVERRULED.
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Id. at 32.
Id. at 36.
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a 25-04563
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Page 12 of 164

Companson to NFC Glock 22 Frame

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Companson to NFC Glock 23 Frame

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Id. at 44.
Id. at 48.
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Id. at 51.
Id. at 54.
Objection to Paragraph 40 of the PSR (the Offense Level Calculation)
Mr. Granat additionally objects to the PSR’s application of a four-level increase under
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B)(ii). That enhancement applies if:
(B)(i) any firearm had a serial number that was modified such that the original
information is rendered illegible or unrecognizable to the unaided eye; or (ii) the
defendant knew that any firearm involved in the offense was not otherwise marked
with a serial number . . . or was willfully blind to or consciously avoided knowledge
of such fact . . . .
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B)(ii).
In objecting to the application of this provision, Mr. Granat raises the same arguments he
did for the U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B) enhancement. He contends that it was not unlawful for
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him to possess 3D-printed frames for personal use and that federal law does not require serial
numbers on privately manufactured firearms for personal use. He also asserts that none of the
frames qualifies as a firearm, and therefore, the frames cannot trigger the four-level increase in
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B)(ii).
Both arguments raised by Mr. Granat fail. First, as discussed in the section above, the
Glock-type frames Mr. Granat manufactured qualify as firearms. Therefore, the requirements of
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B)(ii) are applicable.
Second, Mr. Granat and Mr. Fritz sold the frames to the confidential informant. Again,
these frames were not made for personal use, but rather for distribution. None bore a serial
number. Mr. Granat knew they lacked serial numbers because he manufactured the frames
himself. Under the Guidelines, the enhancement applies whenever “any firearm” involved in the
offense meets this criterion. Here, Mr. Granat sold at least two without serial numbers to the CI.
Accordingly, the four-level enhancement under U.S.G.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B)(ii) is appropriate, and
Mr. Granat’s objection is OVERRULED.
Additional Objections and Clarifications That Do Not Impact the Guideline Range
Objection to Paragraph 16 of the PSR
Mr. Granat objects to the PSR’s characterization of “two suspected black polymer pistol
frames” in a photograph as firearms, arguing that the items were incomplete and did not meet the
statutory definition of a firearm. Def.’s Obj. to PSR at 6. In response, the prosecution argues that
the two suspected black polymer pistol frames were firearms and asserts that Mr. Granat failed to
present evidence demonstrating that they differed from the other frames recovered in this case.
Resp. to Def.’s Obj. to PSR at 9-10.
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The prosecution’s argument improperly shifts the burden of proof to Mr. Granat. Once a
defendant objects to a factual assertion in the PSR, the burden rests with the prosecution to prove
that fact by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Shinault, 147 F.3d 1266, 1277-
78 (10th Cir. 1998) (“When a defendant objects to a fact in a presentence report, the government
must prove that fact at a sentencing hearing by a preponderance of the evidence.”). The burden
does not shift to the defendant to disprove the contested fact.
Here, the prosecution has not presented evidence sufficient to establish that the two black
polymer pistol frames meet the statutory definition of a firearm. Mere conjecture or reliance on
similarity to other items is insufficient to satisfy its evidentiary burden. Accordingly, Mr.
Granat’s objection is SUSTAINED.
Objection to Paragraphs 18, 19, 21, 24, 27, and 38 of the PSR and Page R-5 of the Sentencing
Recommendation
Mr. Granat objects to the characterization of all devices recovered as machinegun
conversion devices, arguing that the Government cannot establish that the devices were
functional. He contends that, because the devices allegedly did not operate as intended, they
cannot qualify as machineguns under the National Firearms Act (“NFA”), 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)(6)
and (b). Mr. Granat admits that some of the devices recovered were functional and may be
machineguns under the NFA. See Def.’s Obj. to PSR at 6.
Section 5845(b) defines a “machinegun” to include:
any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot,
automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function
of the trigger. The term shall also include the frame or receiver of any such weapon,
any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts
designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun, and any
combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled if such parts are
in the possession or under the control of a person.
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26 U.S.C. § 5845(b). The statute expressly includes within the definition of “machinegun” any
part “designed and intended solely and exclusively” for use in converting a weapon into a
machinegun. Nothing in the statutory text requires that such a conversion device be functional at
the time of recovery.
Here, Mr. Granat does not dispute that he designed the MCDs for the purpose of
converting firearms into machineguns. His objection rests solely on the contention that the
devices did not function. Because functionality is not a statutory requirement under § 5845(b),
his argument is unpersuasive.
Mr. Granat also presents an expert report by Richard Vasquez. I find Mr. Vasquez’s
opinion unpersuasive, as it is speculative. He concludes that the material is flimsy based solely
on photographs, without providing any explanation for how he reached that conclusion or
conducting a direct examination of the exhibits themselves.
Accordingly, Mr. Granat’s objection is OVERRULED.
Objection to Paragraph 20 of the PSR
Mr. Granat reasserts his objection that the PMF frames provided to the CI on February 19
were not firearms because they were incomplete. Def.’s Obj. to PSR at 20. Specifically, they did
not have rails attached. Id.
To the extent the PMF frames given to the CI are identified in the ATF Report as Exhibits
13, 51, 114, 119, 120, 121, or 122, the objection is OVERRULED. The prosecution has provided
evidentiary support that is sufficient to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that those
items meet the applicable definition.
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Objection to Paragraph 30 of the PSR
Paragraph 30 of the PSR recounts that a proffer interview was conducted with Mr. Fritz
and summarizes information obtained during that interview. Mr. Granat objects to and requests
that I strike that information in the Def.’s Obj. to PSR at 8-9. He asserts that neither he nor his
counsel were aware of Mr. Fritz’s proffer interview with the government until July 9, 2025, when
they received a draft of the PSR. Id. He claims that he has not been provided with a report or any
details regarding the proffer interview and argues the allegations are prejudicial because he was
unable to adequately investigate and confront them. Id.
The prosecution has not responded to Mr. Granat’s objection. Given that the prosecution
has failed to address the objection, and in light of Mr. Granat’s lack of access to the necessary
information to investigate Mr. Fritz’s statements, ¶ 30 is stricken, and Mr. Granat’s objection is
SUSTAINED.
Objection to Page R-5 of the Sentencing Recommendation
Mr. Granat objects to the Probation Officer’s use of Mr. Fritz’s statement that they were
making “the most illegal guns you can make” show Mr. Granat’s intent. Id. While I accept as fact
that Mr. Fritz made this statement, it is not permissible to attribute it to Mr. Granat, and thus, I
will not do so.
Clarification to Paragraph 16, 20, and 68 of the PSR
Along with his objections, Mr. Granat provided clarifications to information in
Paragraphs 16, 20, and 68 of the PSR, and the Probation Officer incorporated those
clarifications.
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Objection to Special Conditions 6 through 10
Mr. Granat objected to five of the special conditions of supervision initially
recommended by the Probation Officer. In the updated Sentencing Recommendation, the
Probation Officer has eliminated those conditions.
Apart from the objections discussed above, the prosecution and Mr. Granat do not object
to any other aspect of the PSR. Therefore, I adopt the unchallenged factual statements as my
findings of fact for this sentencing.
II. MR. GRANAT’S MOTION FOR VARIANT
SENTENCE OF PROBATION (ECF NO. 83)
I have already informed the parties that I do not intend to follow the Sentencing
Guidelines for Mr. Granat’s sentence. This is because the Guidelines do not adequately take into
account Mr. Granat’s unique circumstances, which I discuss below. In summary, Mr. Granat
urgently needs both mental health and substance abuse treatment and, due to his military service,
quality treatment options are available to him through the VA. Mr. Granat has been on pretrial
release for over a year, and in that time, he has held steady employment and enrolled at a
technical college. Mr. Granat has strong family and community ties and will both need to be
supported and will need to provide support in those relationships in the coming years. Moreover,
the relevant Guidelines provisions have been recently amended, suggesting that the provisions in
the 2024 Guidelines that I must apply in this case did not adequately assess the criminal conduct.
These circumstances warrant the rejection of the Guidelines in this case.
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Given this conclusion, I determine the appropriate sentence for Mr. Granat based on an
exhaustive review of the record and the factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). I will provide my
full ruling on Mr. Granat’s Motion in imposing his sentence.
III. ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY
Although I am not applying the Sentencing Guidelines in this case, I still must ensure that
the range is accurately calculated. As I have already discussed, the Guidelines calculation in the
PSR decrease the offense level by three based on Mr. Granat’s acceptance of responsibility.
Generally, I have applied the reductions available under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) and (b) liberally,
whenever a defendant expressed true remorse. I have refused to apply the provisions as a tax on
individuals who exercised their right to trial. The commentary to the Guidelines lists
“appropriate considerations” for determining whether a defendant qualifies for the acceptance-
of-responsibility reductions, including, as relevant here, whether the defendant: admitted the
conduct of the offense of conviction and all other relevant conduct; voluntarily terminated the
criminal activity or withdrew from it or criminal associations; voluntarily and promptly
surrendered to the authorities; “voluntarily assisted the authorities in the recovery of the fruits
and instrumentalities of the offense”; engaged in post-offense rehabilitative efforts; and quickly
manifested the acceptance of responsibility. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, commentary n.1. Mr. Granat did
not voluntarily terminate his criminal conduct, has not admitted all relevant conduct here, and
has not ensured that the fruits and instrumentalities of his offense have been recovered. However,
the remorse has been genuine and complete, and it is clear he has accepted responsibility for his
actions. The prosecution has orally moved for the additional one-level decrease of the offense
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level under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b), and I have granted that motion. Therefore, I find the Sentencing
Guidelines calculation as stated in the PSR is accurate.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE § 3553(a) FACTORS
Section 3553(a) requires me to impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than
necessary” to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, to provide just
punishment, to afford adequate deterrence, to protect the public, and to provide the defendant
with training, care, or treatment in the most effective manner. The statute further demands
consideration of the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the
defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the applicable Sentencing Guidelines, and the need
to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Nature and Circumstances of the Offense
Mr. Granat has pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the laws of the United States,
namely by possessing a machinegun in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(o) and 924(a)(2) and
making an unregistered machinegun in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(f).
In this case, Mr. Granat acquired a 3D printer, obtained instructions for printing privately
made firearms and machinegun conversion devices, printed hundreds of those items, and then
sold them. It is obvious that selling these types of devices without any regulation or traceability
is incredibly dangerous. The full details of Defendants’ completed sales are unknown, but Mr.
Fritz bragged that they sold an MCD to a 16-year-old. See id. ¶ 13. As I have already found and
is set out in the PSR, Mr. Granat’s crime involved at least 8 firearms and 417 machinegun
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conversion devices. See PSR ¶¶ 27-28. The extent of the destruction and danger that these
devices could cause is truly unfathomable.
Particularly relevant here because of where Mr. Granat presently lives, the U.S.
Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Wisconsin issued a press release in December 2024
explaining that machinegun conversion devices “are an emerging threat, and law enforcement
agents are increasingly finding them in Wisconsin.” U.S. Attorney’s Office And ATF Highlight
Emerging Threat Posed by Machinegun Conversion Devices, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western
Dist. of Wisc. (Dec. 2, 2024), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdwi/pr/us-attorneys-
office-and-atf-highlight-emerging-threat-posed-machinegun-conversion. The press release notes
that “[d]ischarging a weapon equipped with such a device in a public area endangers every child
and adult within range.” Id. Such discharges are occurring with increased frequency, as law
enforcement officers are finding staggering numbers of shell casings at homes, restaurants, street
corners, and other public places that have become shocking crime scenes. See, e.g., Bill
Hutchinson & Jennifer Vilcarino, Machine-gun conversion device dubbed ‘Glock switches’
taking violence to the ‘next level’: Experts, ABC News (June 12, 2024), https://abcnews.
com/US/machine-gun-conversion-device-taking-violence-level-experts/story?id=110855649
(accessed Feb. 24, 2026) (citing a 2023 ATF Report that 5,454 guns with machinegun conversion
devices were taken into ATF custody from 2017 to 2021). This is absolutely not a case in which
two teenagers were simply stealing hubcaps. This is a serious crime.
I question whether Mr. Granat would have stopped his criminal activity and how much
farther he would have gone if law enforcement had not thwarted his plans. As the prosecution
highlights, Mr. Granat admits that he engaged in the relevant criminal conduct in this case for
nearly a year. Mot. for Variant Sentence at 8, ECF No. 83 (“This conduct only lasted for a period
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of less than a year [until] his arrest in March 2025.”). There is no indication that he was hesitant
or second guessed his actions during that period. Instead, he was working on perfecting his
products and figuring out how to manufacture other similar ones.
Mr. Granat claims his “actions were driven not by any intent to arm others or profit from
illegal weapons trafficking, but rather by an immature and misguided fixation on his 3D printer
and the technical challenges to manufacture these devices.” Mot. for Variant Sentence at 7. He
explains that, after obtaining the 3D printer, “his focus quickly switched to firearms when he
discovered a prevalent online community normalizing and glorifying 3D-printed gun
construction.” Id. According to Mr. Granat, “[t]his pervasive online existence allowed [him] to
separate himself from the reality of what he was printing and lose sight of the dangerous and
illegal nature of what he was doing.” Id. at 7-8. Today, during his allocution, Mr. Granat stated:
“I thought it was cool, and it gave me something to feel important about.” I believe this is a true
statement.
This explanation, however, does not instill confidence that he could not again be
influenced or swept up such that he becomes a danger to the public. Undoubtedly, Mr. Granat is
smart and hardworking, but it is less certain whether he will grasp all the potential consequences
of his actions going forward.5
5 The PSR notes that Mr. Granat’s account statements show he spent $4,833.27 over 38
purchases at Puff Paradise Smoke Shop in Wadsworth, Illinois, between August 24 and
November 28, 2025. PSR ¶ 100. As the PSR recognizes, these purchases are alarming because
they indicate Mr. Granat likely violated the conditions of his pretrial release by leaving the
Eastern District of Wisconsin without authorization. Puff Paradise is located approximately 30
miles and across the state border from his residence in Wisconsin. At the sentencing hearing, Mr.
Granat’s counsel explained that Mr. Granat was buying kratom, a substance to which he has been
addicted and that is regulated in Wisconsin. Consumption of kratom produces stimulant effects in
low doses and sedative effects in high dose and can lead to psychological and physiological
dependence. See Drug Fact Sheet: Kratom, Dep’t of Justice (Apr. 2020),
https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-06/Kratom-2020_0.pdf. This conduct mere months
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History and Characteristics of the Defendant
By all accounts, Mr. Granat was a bright and caring child with lots of promise, but he has
faced numerous difficulties in his life. His family struggled financially, and his parents divorced
when he was a year old. During his elementary and middle school years, he experienced some
instability—he attended multiple schools, his mother moved out of state for a brief time, and he
had to adjust to changing circumstances with his parents and their partners over the years. Mr.
Granat was a good student, but he experienced pervasive bullying that negatively impacted him.
While Mr. Granat was in high school, he suffered a significant loss when his older
brother was convicted of a felony and sentenced to four years and nine months in prison. Mr.
Granat and his brother were very close, and the sudden absence of his brother and the
consequences for Mr. Granat made his high school years emotionally and socially challenging.
Mr. Granat’s grades declined, and he began experimenting with alcohol and drugs. In his junior
year of high school, the COVID-19 pandemic required him to again adjust to circumstances
beyond his control and to finish the school year virtually.
Mr. Granat then set his sights on joining the military. He graduated from high school
early and enlisted in the Army in late 2020, at the age of 17. He elected to become a Combat
Medic. After completing basic training, he received specialized training to “administer
emergency medical care in the field in both combat and humanitarian situations.” Military
Mitigation Memo. at 5, ECF No. 83-2 (citation omitted). Mr. Granat was called on to provide
emergency medical care to his fellow soldiers during his service, including during a training
exercise in which a soldier was seriously injured. See Mitigation Report at 10.
ago indicates Mr. Granat may continue to struggle with understanding the consequences of his
actions, whether it is because of substance dependency or some other reason.
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Mr. Granat began dating another servicemember in 2021, and the couple married later
that year. Although it is reported that Mr. Granat was happy during the first year of his marriage,
the record suggests he may have been struggling with his mental health and substance use in late
2021,6 and that his substance abuse worsened as his marriage unraveled. In February 2023, Mr.
Granat learned that his wife had been having an affair with her commanding officer. Mr. Granat’s
mental health deteriorated, and he was admitted to an inpatient behavioral health treatment
program for six days. Later that year, he was deployed to South Korea. In January 2024, while he
and his wife were both stationed in South Korea, his wife filed for divorce. He was only 20 years
old. Shortly thereafter, while Mr. Granat was still in South Korea, his younger brother, for whom
he has been a role model and a caregiver, was diagnosed with a terminal genetic condition. This
series of hardships culminated in January 2024 with Mr. Granat stealing etomidate, “a hypnotic
agent typically administered before an anesthetic or sedative in a surgical context,” and self-
administering it. Mitigation Report at 12 n.19. Afterward, Mr. Granat was hospitalized for five
days.
As a result of this incident, Mr. Granat faced discharge from the Army. He fought to be
able to continue his service. A number of his fellow soldiers wrote letters in support of his
retention, including his uncle, Staff Sergeant Anthony Houts. In Staff Sergeant Houts’s letter, he
stated: “I would stake my career on [Mr. Granat] surpassing all expectations set on him.” Army
Retainability Memorandum, ECF No. 83-4 at 8. Despite his efforts, on June 14, 2024, Mr. Granat
was discharged from the Army under honorable conditions.
6 The Mitigation Report submitted by Mr. Granat includes an account of a traumatic experience
in which he was unconscious from alcohol use in October 2021. See Mitigation Report at 10.
This traumatic experience is not discussed elsewhere but can be assumed to have darkened Mr.
Granat’s military service and impacted his mental health.
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Now, Mr. Granat faces the consequences of these criminal proceedings for his dangerous
and thoughtless actions. While he is under the sentence of this Court, he will be greatly restricted
in what he can do. And, even after he has completed his sentence, he will have to live with the
legal and social limitations for convicted felons. Although he may still be able to fulfill his goal
of becoming a healthcare worker, that path will be much more difficult for him.
It should be emphasized that Mr. Granat’s life has not been only a series of struggles and
disappointments. He has notable accomplishments and a strong community of family and
friends. One factor that sets Mr. Granat’s circumstances apart is his service to our country. He
joined the military at a very young age and was honored to serve. He learned quickly and
excelled, despite the challenges that ultimately led to his discharge.
Additionally, Mr. Granat has the benefit of tremendous support from his family, friends,
and coworkers, which is not often the case for defendants in criminal cases. The Mitigation
Report submitted by Mr. Granat indicates that his family “will be there to support him no matter
what form [his] new life course takes.” Mitigation Report at 23. A theme from the many letters
that were submitted in support of Mr. Granat is that he will be a productive member of society
and is not a danger to the public. See Zasada Letter at 1, ECF No. 83-6 (referencing Mr. Granat’s
“commitment to becoming a positive, contributing member of society”); Garey Letter at 2, ECF
No. 83-8 (“I firmly believe he has the capacity to contribute meaningfully to society and to
continue to be a source of good for those around him.”); Castillo Letter at 1, ECF No. 83-10 (“I
do believe Christian will be a productive member of society.”); Pogorelec Letter at 1, ECF No.
83-12 (“Christian is not a threat to society nor is he likely to commit another criminal act.”).
However, the person described in the letters seems incongruous with a person who would so
cavalierly and committedly break the law and join in putting a machinegun in the hands of a 16-
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year-old. See, e.g., Garey Letter at 1 (describing Christian as having “a strong moral compass”
and “a heart for helping and protecting those who are marginalized, mistreated, or preyed upon”).
Mr. Granat has struggled with his mental health and substance abuse throughout his life.
As the Mitigation Report states, “it is well documented that [Mr. Granat] has turned to alcohol
and other substances as coping mechanisms in the past.” See, e.g., Mitigation Report at 19. There
are also reports that Mr. Granat has engaged in self-harm behaviors and suffered from suicidal
ideation at times. See, e.g., id. at 8, 11; PSR ¶¶ 70-72, 77. Mr. Granat “will need to address his
mental health, potential PTSD symptomology, and any connected negative coping mechanisms
like substance use.” Mitigation Report at 20. Perhaps because of his family support or because of
his own awareness, Mr. Granat has been able to reach out for help with his mental health
struggles in the past. This willingness makes it more likely that he will take advantage of the
opportunities provided to him and will work to improve his mental health and functioning in
society.
Kinds of Sentences Available
Mr. Granat’s need for treatment but also the uncertainty in his ability to appreciate the
consequences of his actions are key considerations in evaluating the kinds of sentences that are
available. As previously explained, the maximum term of imprisonment for Mr. Granat’s crime
of conviction is five years. With a prison sentence, a term of supervised release of zero to three
years may be imposed. Instead of imprisonment, Mr. Granat may be given a sentence of one to
five years of probation. The Probation Officer recommends a sentence of 24 months’
imprisonment, 2 years of supervised release, and a fine of $2,000. The Government advocates for
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a sentence of 36 months in prison followed by 3 years of supervised release. And Mr. Granat
requests a variant sentence of a term of probation.
Sentencing Disparities
In an effort to show that imposing a term of probation in this case would not create
sentencing disparities, Mr. Granat submits that a criminal cases report spanning January 1, 2020,
to February 3, 2026, (and presumably limited to the District of Colorado) returned only six cases
in which a defendant had been charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) and none of the defendants in
those cases has been sentenced. Mot. for Variant Sentence at 16. Mr. Granat also ran a criminal
cases report for defendants charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 5861(f), which showed only one
case over the past fifteen years and the defendant in that case is awaiting sentencing. Id. My
search for relevant cases was much more fruitful, as I did not limit the parameters to such a
narrow timeframe or geographical range. No defendant in the cases I uncovered received a
sentence of probation nor has Mr. Granat drawn my attention to such a case. The following cases
provide a few examples:
 United States v. Bishop, 926 F.3d 621 (10th Cir. 2019) (noting that the defendant had
been sentenced to 33 months’ imprisonment, followed by 36 months’ supervised release
for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) and 26 U.S.C. § 5861(a));
 United States v. Haney, 264 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir. 2001) (at a time in which the Sentencing
Guidelines were mandatory, noting the defendant had been sentenced to 33 months for
possession of two machineguns in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)); and
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 United States v. Cordero-Velázquez, 124 F.4th 44 (1st Cir. 2024) (affirming a 48-month
sentence for violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(o) and 924(a)(2), despite a Guidelines range of
30-37 months).
In fact, in the sole case I uncovered where probation was imposed for a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(o), the Tenth Circuit reversed the sentence. See United States v. Hildreth, 485 F.3d
1120, 1130 (10th Cir. 2007). In Hildreth, the defendant had purchased one machinegun and
purchased and sold another firearm he believed might be a machinegun. Id. at 1126. The district
court sentenced the defendant to three years of probation, which the Tenth Circuit found to be
unreasonable, because the district court “essentially ignored” the recommended Guidelines range
of 27 to 33 months’ imprisonment. Id. at 1129. In reaching its holding, the Tenth Circuit relied on
a case that has since been reversed, but the court’s analysis is still instructive. Id. at 1126 (citing
United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585, 594 (10th Cir. 2006)). The Tenth Circuit criticized the
district court’s conclusions “because [its] reasons [did] not distinguish [the defendant] or his
offense from the ordinary defendant upon which the Guidelines sentence is calculated.” Id. at
1129. Here, I have considered the advisory Guidelines range and have articulated reasons that
distinguish Mr. Granat’s circumstances and justify rejecting the Guidelines.
Furthering the Purposes of Sentencing
The purposes of sentencing I find to be most relevant in this case are the need to promote
respect for the law, to protect the public, to deter Mr. Granat from committing any other crimes,
and to provide him with critical treatment. Law enforcement in this case spent significant time
and resources to stop Mr. Granat’s criminal conduct. Those efforts were necessary because Mr.
Granat was blatantly breaking laws meant to keep our communities safe. Lord Denning, one of
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the most remarkable legal minds of the twentieth century, who served as Master of the Rolls of
the Court of Appeal in England, explained that:
Punishment is the way in which society expresses its denunciation of wrong
doing: and, in order to maintain respect for law, it is essential that the punishment
inflicted for grave crimes should adequately reflect the revulsion felt by the great
majority of citizens for them. It is a mistake to consider the objects of punishment
as being deterrent or reformative or preventive and nothing else . . . . The truth is
that some crimes are so outrageous that society insists on adequate punishment,
because the wrong-doer deserves it, irrespective of whether it is a deterrent or not.
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Minutes of Evidence, Dec. 1, 1949, p. 207 (1950)
(quoted in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 158, 184 n.30 (1976)). I find that respect for the law, in
this case, demands a sentence of imprisonment.
Despite the confident assertions by Mr. Granat and his counsel that he has been
specifically deterred from any further criminal activity, I am not certain. As I have expressed, his
actions leave doubt as to whether he will fully understand the consequences of his actions and
conform his conduct to the requirements of this Court and the law going forward.
Mr. Granat needs extensive mental health and substance abuse treatment. I acknowledge
that Mr. Granat, because of his status as a veteran, would likely receive better care in the
community. See Mitigation Report at 20 (“It is unlikely that Christian would be able to access a
comparable level of care while in the Bureau of Prisons.”). His Mitigation Report and Motion for
Variant Sentence contain persuasive information on the alarming shortage of psychologists in
federal prisons. See id.; Mot. for Variant Sentence at 12 (citing publications from The Marshall
Project as well as a Nevada Law Journal article). Nevertheless, the other sentencing
considerations outweigh this lamentable circumstance. The BOP does have established programs
for substance abuse and mental health treatment, and Mr. Granat will be able to take advantage
of the care provide by the Department of Veterans Affairs upon his release.
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V. IMPOSITION OF THE SENTENCE
Researchers and scholars are documenting and paying more attention to the challenges of
young men in our society today, looking at educational outcomes, mental health, substance
abuse, incarceration, and other trends. I think it is important for Mr. Granat to know that he is not
alone in his struggles. People see the difficulties young men like Mr. Granat are facing, and they
care. I care. While his actions have consequences and he must be held accountable, he as a
person is not a failure; he still has the potential to contribute to society and even serve our
country, though it may be different than he originally envisioned. He will be required to engage
in extensive mental health treatment. This is an opportunity for him to learn and explore how his
individual brain works, to recognize its limitations and needs as well as its exceptional abilities.
The materials filed by Mr. Granat note how difficult it can be to readjust to civilian life
and the isolation veterans often feel. I encourage Mr. Granat to continue to look for community,
not online, not in the fringes of the internet, but in person, perhaps with other veterans. The
letters his friends and family submitted on his behalf indicate that he wants to be of service to the
community and, in particular, that he wants to provide support to marginalized groups. There is a
role for him—with his unique perspective—working within the system to make it better for
people who have faced some of the same challenges he has, including for children who are
bullied, trauma survivors, veterans, and individuals struggling with their mental health. Mr.
Granat may still be able to fulfill his aspiration of becoming a healthcare worker, but another law
violation could close that door. He is at a crossroads, and the choices he makes won’t just shape
his future, they will continue to impact the lives of those around him.
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Accordingly, pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, it is the judgment of the
Court that Mr. Granat is hereby committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons to be
imprisoned for a term of 24 months. I make the recommendation to the Bureau of Prisons that
Mr. Granat be placed as near as possible to his family in Wisconsin and that he be placed at a
facility where substance abuse and mental health treatment will be available to him. The Motion
for Variant Sentence of Probation (ECF No. 83) is, therefore, GRANTED IN PART.
Upon release from imprisonment, he shall be placed on supervised release for a term of
three years. I find this term length is appropriate based on an individualized assessment of the
factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) and 3583(a)-(c). The term imposed considers the nature
and circumstances of the offense and Mr. Granat’s history and characteristics. Further, the term is
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to address the purpose of imposing supervised release.
Within 72 hours of release from the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, Mr. Granat shall report in
person to the Probation Office in the district where he is released.
Special Assessment and Fine
Mr. Granat shall pay a special assessment of $100. The special assessment obligation is
due and payable immediately, by lump sum. While I am not convinced that benefiting financially
was the goal of Mr. Granat’s criminal activity in this case, I agree with the Probation Officer that
the imposition of a fine is necessary to reflect the seriousness of the offense and because he did
in fact make money from the devices he manufactured and negotiated the prices for those
devices. Considering his financial circumstances, present earning capacity, need for medical
treatment, and family circumstances, however, I find a fine of $1,600 is appropriate and
sufficient.
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Conditions of Supervision
While on supervision, Mr. Granat must not commit another federal, state, or local crime,
and must not unlawfully possess a controlled substance.
He must refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. He must submit to one
drug test within 15 days of release from imprisonment and a maximum of 20 tests per year of
supervision thereafter.
He must cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the Probation Officer.
He must comply with the standard conditions adopted by this Court in General Order
2020-20.
Special Conditions
I find additional special conditions of supervision are appropriate based on the nature of
the crime, Mr. Granat’s clear history of substance abuse, and his mental health history.
Specifically, the condition for substance abuse treatment is necessary based on his history of
substance abuse, including his alcohol abuse and self-administration of etomidate. The condition
for mental health treatment is similarly necessary due to his present mental health diagnoses and
his exposure to stress and trauma. Lastly, a search condition is necessary because Mr. Granat’s
crime involved the production of dangerous and illegal weapons. The safety of the public and the
Probation Officer and his well-being demand that such a condition be imposed. The Mitigation
Report from the Public Defender’s Office suggests that Mr. Granat’s mental health conditions
may have been exacerbated by the execution of the warrant in this case. I am sensitive to the fact
that the search condition could trigger similar symptoms. But I emphasize that a search may only
be conducted when reasonable suspicion exists that Mr. Granat has violated a condition of his
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supervision and any search must be conducted at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner. I
expect that Mr. Granat will maintain an excellent relationship with his supervising Probation
Officer and that his actions will leave him confident that he is in full compliance with the terms
of his supervision.
Accordingly, I find that the following special conditions of supervision are determined to
be reasonably related to the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).
And I find, based on the nature and circumstances of the offense and Mr. Granat’s history and
characteristics, the following conditions do not constitute a greater deprivation of liberty than
reasonably necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing.
1. Mr. Granat must participate in a program of testing and/or treatment for substance
abuse approved by the Probation Officer and follow the rules and regulations of such program.
The Probation Officer, in consultation with the treatment provider, will supervise Mr. Granat’s
participation in the program as to modality, duration, and intensity. He must abstain from the use
of alcohol or other intoxicants during the course of treatment. He must not attempt to obstruct,
tamper with or circumvent the testing methods. He must pay for the cost of testing and/or
treatment based on his ability to pay.
2. Mr. Granat must participate in a program of mental health treatment approved by the
Probation Officer and follow the rules and regulations of such program. The Probation Officer, in
consultation with the treatment provider, will supervise Mr. Granat’s participation in the program
as to modality, duration, and intensity. He must pay for the cost of treatment based on his ability
to pay.
3. In any program of treatment on supervised release, any requirement to submit to
polygraph testing or eye-movement or reaction examination may not be used unless the
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Probation Officer files a report, and an evidentiary hearing will be held to determine if such
testing is appropriate and competently administered. A written order authorizing the testing must
be received from an Article III judge of this Court.
4. Mr. Granat must submit his person, property, house, residence, papers, computers (as
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1)), other electronic communications or data storage devices or
media, or office, to a search conducted by a United States Probation Officer. Failure to submit to
search may be grounds for revocation of release. Mr. Granat must warn any other occupants that
the premises may be subject to searches pursuant to this condition. An officer may conduct a
search pursuant to this condition only when reasonable suspicion exists that Mr. Granat has
violated a condition of his supervision and that the areas to be searched contain evidence of this
violation. Any search must be conducted at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner.
5. Mr. Granat must pay the fine imposed in accordance with the Schedule of Payments
sheet of the Judgment. He must also notify the court of any changes in economic circumstances
that might affect his ability to pay the fine.7
DATED this 24th day of February, 2026.
______________________________
JOHN L. KANE
SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
7 The prosecution filed a Notice (ECF No. 95) regarding forfeiture on February 23, 2026, and
advised that it is not seeking a criminal order of forfeiture for the items listed in the Indictment.
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