Premark Health Science, Inc. v. PlantFuel, Inc. et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Civil Action No. 24-cv-01117-PAB-STV
PREMARK HEALTH SCIENCE, INC., a Texas corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.
PLANTFUEL, INC., a Delaware corporation,
PLANTFUEL LIFE, INC., a Canadian corporation, and
BRAD PYATT, an individual,
Defendants.
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff Premark Health Science, Inc.’s
Renewed Motion for Default Judgment Against PlantFuel Inc. [Docket No. 85].
I. 	BACKGROUND 1
A. Factual Allegations
Plaintiff Premark Health Science, Inc. (“Premark”) is a Texas corporation that is a
packager of food, dietary supplements, and skin care products. Docket No. 1 at 1, ¶ 1.
Defendant PlantFuel Life, Inc. (“PFL”) is a Canadian parent corporation of its U.S.
subsidiary, defendant PlantFuel, Inc. (“PlantFuel”), which was incorporated in Delaware.
1 The Court accepts the following well-pled allegations from the complaint as
true. See Mrs. Condies Salad Co. v. Colo. Blue Ribbon Foods, LLC, 858 F. Supp. 2d
1212, 1217 (D. Colo. 2012) (“in making a determination on a motion for default
judgment, the Court accepts the well-pled allegations of Plaintiff's Complaint as true”).
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Id. at 2, ¶¶ 4-5. Defendant Brad Pyatt is the founder and operator of PlantFuel. Id. at 4,
¶ 8. He was appointed to the executive leadership team of PFL on August 3, 2021. Id.
Between May 7, 2021 and March 31, 2022, defendants sent “several purchase
orders to Premark through emails and other communications from Pyatt under the
PlantFuel company name.” Id. at 5, ¶ 13. Premark provided the requested products to
defendants; defendants, however, did not pay all the invoices and owe $433,881.58,
excluding interest, to Premark. Id., ¶ 14. On February 21, 2024, Premark sent a letter
to PFL demanding payment of the outstanding balance and stating that it would file suit
if it was not paid. Id. at 6, ¶ 15. Defendants did not respond to the letter. Id. On April
23, 2024, Premark filed the instant suit, bringing claims against defendants for breach of
contract and unjust enrichment. Id. at 7-9, ¶¶ 23-36.
B. Procedural History
On May 9, 2024, process server Viktoria Richards served PlantFuel’s registered
agent, Registered Agents Inc. (“Registered Agents”), at 1942 Broadway, Ste. 314c,
Boulder, Colorado. See Docket No. 20. Ms. Richards states that she left service of
process with Blanca Hurtado, a receptionist at Registered Agents. See id. at 1. On
June 12, 2025, the Clerk of Court entered default against PlantFuel and PFL. Docket
No. 62. On June 23, 2025, Premark filed a motion for default judgment against
PlantFuel. Docket No. 63. On March 10, 2026, the Court denied Premark’s motion
without prejudice to avoid inconsistent judgments against Mr. Pyatt. See Docket No. 66
at 10-11. On April 8, 2026, Premark filed its renewed motion for default judgment.
Docket No. 85. On April 28, 2026, the Court presided over a bench trial on Premark’s
claims against Mr. Pyatt. See Docket No. 94. On April 29, 2026, at the close of
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evidence, the Court granted Mr. Pyatt’s oral motion for judgment pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 52. See Docket No. 95.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
In order to obtain a judgment by default, a party must follow the two-step process
described in Fed. R. Civ. P. 55. First, the party must seek an entry of default from the
Clerk of the Court under Rule 55(a). Second, after default has been entered by the
Clerk, the party must seek judgment under the strictures of Rule 55(b). See Williams v.
Smithson, 57 F.3d 1081, 1995 WL 365988, at *1 (10th Cir. June 20, 1995) (unpublished
table decision) (citing Meehan v. Snow, 652 F.2d 274, 276 (2d Cir. 1981)).
The decision to enter default judgment is “committed to the district court’s sound
discretion.” Olcott v. Del. Flood Co., 327 F.3d 1115, 1124 (10th Cir. 2003) (citation
omitted). In exercising that discretion, the Court considers that “[s]trong policies favor
resolution of disputes on their merits.” In re Rains, 946 F.2d 731, 732 (10th Cir. 1991)
(quotation and citations omitted). “The default judgment must normally be viewed as
available only when the adversary process has been halted because of an essentially
unresponsive party.” Id. It serves to protect a plaintiff against “interminable delay and
continued uncertainty as to his rights.” Id. at 733. When “ruling on a motion for default
judgment, the court may rely on detailed affidavits or documentary evidence to
determine the appropriate sum for the default judgment.” Seme v. E&H Prof’l Sec. Co.,
Inc., No. 08-cv-01569-RPM-KMT, 2010 WL 1553786, at *11 (D. Colo. Mar. 19, 2010).
A party may not simply sit out the litigation without consequence. See Cessna
Fin. Corp. v. Bielenberg Masonry Contracting, Inc., 715 F.2d 1442, 1444-45 (10th Cir.
1983) (“[A] workable system of justice requires that litigants not be free to appear at
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their pleasure. We therefore must hold parties and their attorneys to a reasonably high
standard of diligence in observing the courts’ rules of procedure. The threat of
judgment by default serves as an incentive to meet this standard.”). One such
consequence is that, upon the entry of default against a defendant, the well-pleaded
allegations in the complaint are deemed admitted. See 10A Charles Alan Wright &
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2688.1 (4th ed., 2022 rev.). “Even after
default, however, it remains for the court to consider whether the unchallenged facts
constitute a legitimate cause of action, since a party in default does not admit
conclusions of law.” Id. A court need not accept conclusory allegations. Moffett v.
Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 291 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir. 2002). Although
“[s]pecific facts are not necessary” in order to state a claim, Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)), the well-pleaded facts must “permit the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (quotations and
alterations omitted). Thus, even though modern rules of pleading are somewhat
forgiving, “a complaint still must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting
all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal
theory.” Bryson v. Gonzales, 534 F.3d 1282, 1286 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation and
citation omitted).
To obtain a default judgment for a sum certain, the plaintiff must show the
following by affidavit. First, that the party in default is (1) not a minor or an incompetent
person, (2) is not in military service, and (3) has not made an appearance.
D.C.COLO.LCivR 55.1(a)(1). Second, the plaintiff must show that the sum is certain or
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the sum can be made certain by computation. D.C.COLO.LCivR 55.1(a)(2).
Additionally, the plaintiff must submit a proposed form of judgment that shows (1) the
party in favor of whom judgment shall be entered, (2) the party against whom judgment
shall be entered, (3) the sum certain amount consisting of the principal amount,
prejudgment interest, and the rate of post judgment interest, and (4) the sum certain of
attorney fees. D.C.COLO.LCivR 55.1(b).
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdiction
Before entering default judgment, the Court must determine whether it has
subject matter jurisdiction over the case and personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
See Dennis Garberg & Assocs., Inc. v. Pack-Tech Int’l Corp., 115 F.3d 767, 772 (10th
Cir. 1997) (holding that “a district court must determine whether it has jurisdiction over
the defendant before entering judgment by default against a party who has not
appeared in the case”). For the reasons stated in the Court’s order on Premark’s first
motion for default judgment, the Court finds that it has subject matter jurisdiction over
the case and personal jurisdiction over PlantFuel. See Docket No. 66 at 5-10.
B. Merits
Premark moves for default judgment on its breach of contract claim. See Docket
No. 85 at 6-7. Because jurisdiction is based on diversity, the Court applies Colorado’s
substantive law. See Essex Ins. Co. v. Vincent, 52 F.3d 894, 896 (10th Cir. 1995);
Boyd Rosene & Assocs., Inc. v. Kan. Mun. Gas Agency, 174 F.3d 1115, 1118 (10th Cir.
1999) (noting that, under Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), a federal
court sitting in diversity applies the substantive law of the forum state). Under Colorado
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law, Premark must establish four elements to make out a claim for breach of contract:
“(1) the existence of a contract; (2) performance by the plaintiff or some justification for
nonperformance; (3) failure to perform the contract by the defendant; and (4) resulting
damages to the plaintiff.” Spring Creek Expl. & Prod. Co. v. Hess Bakken Invs. II, LLC,
887 F.3d 1003, 1033 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting W. Distrib. Co. v. Diodosio, 841 P.2d
1053, 1058 (Colo. 1992)).
Premark alleges that PlantFuel entered a contract with Premark by sending or
verbally requesting purchase orders for Premark’s products. Docket No. 1 at 6-7,
¶¶ 16-22. The Court finds, based on the complaint’s well-pled allegations, that Premark
and PlantFuel had a contract pursuant to which PlantFuel agreed to pay Premark for the
products specified in the purchase orders. Premark alleges that it sent PlantFuel the
specified products, but PlantFuel failed to pay the full amount due on the invoices. See
id. Premark alleges that it sustained damages as a result of the unpaid invoices. See
id. at 5-6, ¶ 14. Taking these well-pled allegations as true, the Court finds that Premark
has sufficiently pled each element of a breach of contract claim. 2
C. Damages
Default judgment requires the court to ascertain the amount of damages. See
Reg’l. Dist. Council v. Mile High Rodbusters, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1235, 1243 (D. Colo.
2015) (citing Herzfeld v. Parker, 100 F.R.D. 770, 773 (D. Colo. 1984)). The court must
hold a hearing on the damages claimed before entering default judgment unless “the
2 Premark states that the Court “only needs to address Plaintiff’s unjust
enrichment claim in the alternative, or if it finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to the
requested relief under its breach-of-contract claim.” Docket No. 85 at 8. Because the
Court finds that Premark has sufficiently alleged its breach of contract claim, it will not
address Premark’s unjust enrichment claim.
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amount claimed is a liquidated sum or one capable of mathematical calculation.” Hunt
v. Inter-Globe Energy, Inc., 770 F.2d 145, 148 (10th Cir. 1985). “Actual proof must
support any default judgment for money damages where there is an uncertainty as to
the amount.” Mile High Rodbusters, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1243 (citing Klapprott v.
United States, 335 U.S. 601, 611–12 (1949)). “While the Court accepts the well-
pleaded facts of the complaint as true on a motion for default judgment, allegations
relating to the amount of damages are generally not accepted as true.” First Home
Bank v. USA Pro Roofing & Constr., LLC, No. 18-cv-00965-MSK-STV, 2018 WL
6990394, at *3 (D. Colo. Oct. 19, 2018); see also United States v. Craighead, 176 F.
App’x 922, 925 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished). “In making an independent
determination of the amount of damages, the court may rely on detailed affidavits or
documentary evidence.” BMO Harris Bank N.A. v. Marjanovic, No. 19-cv-02945-CMA-
KMT, 2021 WL 307501, at *4 (D. Colo. Jan. 29, 2021) (citations and quotation omitted).
Premark seeks $433,881.58 for the invoices that PlantFuel did not pay. See
Docket No. 85 at 9. Premark attaches to its motion the affidavit of David Palmer, who
was Premark’s CEO at the time of Premark and PlantFuel’s contract. See Docket No.
85-1. Mr. Palmer lists purchase orders and their associated invoices for which Premark
has not received full payment. See id. at 2-3, ¶ 6. The total unpaid balance is
$433,881.58. See id. at 2-3, ¶¶ 6-7. Accordingly, the Court finds that Premark is
entitled to $433,881.58 in damages.
Premark seeks prejudgment and post-judgment interest. See Docket No. 85 at
9-10. Pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 5-12-102, a prevailing party is permitted to recover
prejudgment interest at a rate of 8% per annum compounded annually from the date
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that the money becomes due. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 5-12-102(1)(b), (2); Yousuf v.
Cohlmia, 741 F.3d 31, 46 (10th Cir. 2014) (“In a diversity case, the issue of possible
entitlement to prejudgment interest is governed by state law.”) (internal quotation,
alteration, and citation omitted). Premark requests that prejudgment interest begin
accruing at the date of breach, which is 30 days from the invoice date for each of the
unpaid invoices. See Docket No. 85 at 9-10; Docket No. 85-1 at 3, ¶ 8. The Court finds
that, under Colorado law, Premark is entitled to prejudgment interest. Furthermore,
Premark is entitled to post-judgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961. See N. Star
Sci. Sols., LLC v. Michigan Health Clinics, No. 24-cv-00541-GPG-STV, 2025 WL
902427, at *6 (D. Colo. Feb. 25, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL
1251222 (D. Colo. Mar. 27, 2025) (“post-judgment interest . . . is mandatory under 28
U.S.C. § 1961”). “Post-judgment interest is due on the entire amount of the award,
including both damages and prejudgment interest thereon.” BMO Bank N.A. v.
Radiometrics Corp., No. 25-cv-00265-REB-KAS, 2025 WL 2605086, at *2 (D. Colo. July
10, 2025). Accordingly, the Court finds that Premark is entitled to prejudgment and
post-judgment interest.
Finally, Premark seeks to recover $405 for the cost of filing the complaint. See
Docket No. 85 at 10. The Court finds that Premark is entitled to recover this cost from
PlantFuel. See Mckesson Corp. v. Premier Pharmacy Grp., LLC, No. 24-cv-00355-
DDD-MDB, 2026 WL 950806, at *7 (D. Colo. Feb. 6, 2026), report and recommendation
adopted, 2026 WL 951431 (D. Colo. Feb. 23, 2026) (granting plaintiff’s motion for
default judgment and awarding plaintiff $405 for court filing costs).
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that plaintiff Premark Health Science, Inc.’s Renewed Motion for
Default Judgment Against PlantFuel Inc. [Docket No. 85] is GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that judgment shall enter in favor of plaintiff Premark Health Science,
Inc. and against defendant PlantFuel, Inc. in the amount of $433,881.58 for breach of
contract damages and $405 in costs. It is further
ORDERED that pre-judgment interest shall accrue, pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 5-12-102, beginning 30 days after the date of each invoice:
Invoice Unpaid Balance 	Invoice Date
$19,069.65 	7/6/2022
$46,702.49 	12/30/2021
$18,823.59 	6/2/2022
$36,690.28 	6/24/2022
$203,123.02 	9/17/2021
$2,559.15 	1/18/2022
$3,360 	2/10/2022
$103,553.40 	12/31/2022
It is further
ORDERED that post-judgment interest shall accrue pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1961. It is further
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ORDERED that, within 30 days of the Court’s order, Premark shall explain how
Premark intends to proceed regarding claims against PlantFuel Life, Inc. in light of the
Court’s ruling on Premark’s claims against Mr. Pyatt and PlantFuel. 3
DATED June 2, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
_____
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
United States District Judge
3 PFL has not appeared, and Premark has not moved for default judgment
against PFL.
_____
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