Howell et al v. Gate Gourmet, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 24-cv-00633-RMR-KAS
ASIA HOWELL and DEMARKIS MCCOLLISTER,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
GATE GOURMET, INC.,
Defendant.
_____________________________________________________________________
RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
_____________________________________________________________________
ENTERED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE KATHRYN A. STARNELLA
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand to the District
Court for Arapahoe County, Colorado [#15] (the “Motion”). Defendant filed a Response
[#18] in opposition to the Motion [#15] and Plaintiffs filed a Reply [#20]. Additionally, on
October 2, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority in Support of Their
Motion to Remand to the District Court for Arapahoe County, Colorado [#31] to draw the
Court’s attention to Air Transport Association of America, Inc. v. Moss, No. 23-cv-02421-
DDD-KAS, 2024 WL 4369137 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2024). The Motion [#15] has been
referred to the undersigned for recommendation. See Order Referring Motion [#22]. The
Court has reviewed the briefing, the entire case file, and the applicable law. For the
following reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Motion for Remand [#15] be
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GRANTED and that this matter be REMANDED to the District Court for Arapahoe County,
Colorado, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).1
I. Background
On February 2, 2024, Plaintiffs filed this action in the District Court for Arapahoe
County, Colorado. Compl. [#6]. Their claims arise from Defendant’s alleged failure to
provide 	Plaintiffs 	(and 	a 	putative 	class 	of 	current 	and 	former 	employees) 	with
compensated 10-minute rest periods required under Colorado wage-and-hour laws. Id.,
¶ 1. Plaintiff Asia Howell has worked for Defendant as a Customer Service Representative
since May 2022, while Plaintiff Demarkis McCollister worked for Defendant as a Customer
Service Assistant from September 2022 through November 23, 2023. Id., ¶¶ 19, 21.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant schedules Plaintiffs and other class members for at least
eight-hour shifts, which entitles them to two 10-minute rest periods. Id., ¶¶ 28-30. They
allege that during September 2022, October 2022, and March 2023, Defendant scheduled
Plaintiff McCollister for 12-hour shifts, entitling him to three 10-minute rest periods. Id., ¶
31.
Plaintiffs explain that Defendant’s employees “perform a ‘push’ when they go to
the Defendant’s kitchen to load trucks with food for the flights they are catering.” Id., ¶ 34.
A “push” is followed by a “load,” where employees unload the food into the aircraft. Id., ¶
37. Defendant allegedly “prohibits [Plaintiff] Howell and other Class Members from
1 Separately, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss [#11], to which Plaintiffs filed a Response [#26]
and Defendant filed a Reply [#28]. The Motion to Dismiss [#11] has also been referred to the
undersigned, see Order Referring Motion [#12], but because the Court finds that it lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ Complaint [#6], it cannot act upon the Motion to Dismiss [#11].
See, e.g., Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1974) (“A court lacking
jurisdiction cannot render judgment but must dismiss the cause at any stage of the proceedings
in which it becomes apparent that jurisdiction is lacking.”).
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clocking out to take a 10-minute rest period for each four hours of work, or major f[r]action
of that time, during their shift.” Id., ¶ 40. Moreover, Defendant allegedly “discourages
employees from taking any rest periods in between loads, even if a flight is delayed” and
“generally does not provide employees with the opportunity to use the bathroom during
their shift.” Id., ¶¶ 41, 44. Plaintiffs estimate that, due to Defendant’s failure to provide rest
periods, Plaintiff Howell has worked through more than 852 uncompensated rest periods
and Plaintiff McCollister worked through more than 665 uncompensated rest periods. Id.,
¶¶ 55-57. They allege that “[Defendant’s] practice has been and continues to be not to
provide compensated, duty-free, 10-minute rest periods to employees.” Id., ¶ 59.
Plaintiffs state two claims against Defendant: failure to provide compensated rest
periods in violation of the Colorado Wage Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-4-101 et seq. and 7
C.C.R. 1103-1; and failure to provide compensated rest periods in violation of the
Colorado Minimum Wages of Workers Act (“Colorado Minimum Wages Act”), Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 8-6-101 and 7 C.C.R. 1103-1:8. Id. at 8-10. The Colorado Wage Act claim is
purportedly brought on behalf of Plaintiff Howell and the “CWA [Colorado Wage Act]
Class” of all current and formerly employed hourly employees who worked for Defendant
in Colorado between February 2, 2021, and the present. Id. at 8; id., ¶ 66. The Colorado
Minimum Wages Act claim is purportedly brought on behalf of Plaintiff Howell and the
“CMWA [Colorado Minimum Wages Act] Class” of all individuals who worked for
Defendant as hourly employees in Colorado from January 29, 2018, to February 1, 2021.
Id. at 9; id., ¶ 66.
On March 7, 2024, Defendant filed a Notice of Removal [#1] that invoked the
Court’s federal question jurisdiction. Notice of Removal [#1] at 1. Defendant argues that
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even though Plaintiffs pleaded only state-law claims, the relevant Colorado Overtime &
Minimum Pay Standards (“COMPS”) “provide that rest breaks may be governed by a
collective 	bargaining 	agreement” 	and 	that 	interpretation 	of 	Defendant’s 	collective
bargaining agreement is governed by the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 153. Id. at 2.
Defendants argue that the Railway Labor Act “fully preempts Plaintiffs’ claims, because
this dispute inevitably requires interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement as
binding authority to determine if any breach occurred.” Id.
Plaintiffs have moved to remand the case to state court, arguing that removal was
improper because their claims arise only under state law. Motion [#15] at 2.
II. Legal Standards
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and the presumption is that they
lack jurisdiction unless and until a [party] pleads sufficient facts to establish it.” Celli v.
Shoell, 40 F.3d 324, 327 (10th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c),
after a case is removed from state court, “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears
that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”
A. 	Preemption
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal district courts have original jurisdiction “of
all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”
Under the “well-pleaded complaint” rule, to determine whether a claim arises under
federal law, the Court will “examine the ‘well pleaded’ allegations of the complaint and
ignore potential defenses.” Dutcher v. Matheson, 733 F.3d 980, 985 (10th Cir. 2013); see
also Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6 (2003) (“[A] defense that relies on
the . . . pre-emptive effect of a federal statute . . . will not provide a basis for removal.”).
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However, the complete preemption doctrine is “an ‘independent corollary’” to the well-
pleaded complaint rule. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987) (quoting
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 22
(1983)). When a federal statute completely preempts a state law cause of action, “a claim
which comes within the scope of that cause of action, even if pleaded in terms of state
law, is in reality based on federal law.” Dutcher, 733 F.3d at 985 (quoting Beneficial Nat’l
Bank, 539 U.S. at 6); see also 14C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, FEDERAL
P RACTICE & P ROCEDURE § 3722.2 (4th ed., June 2024 update) (“[U]nder the complete-
preemption doctrine, a narrow class of claims are ‘necessarily federal’ so that they are
removable to federal court. In these cases, federal law does not merely preempt a state
law to some degree; rather, it substitutes a federal cause of action for the state cause of
action, thereby manifesting Congress’s intent to permit removal.”).
The Tenth Circuit has noted that preemption encompasses three common forms,
all falling under the umbrella of “ordinary preemption”: “express preemption, conflict
preemption, and field preemption.”2 Devon Energy Prod. Co., L.P. v. Mosaic Potash
Carlsbad, Inc., 693 F.3d 1195, 1203 n.4 (10th Cir. 2012). However, while ordinary
preemption does not render a state-law claim removable to federal court, complete
preemption does. Id. (citing Hansen v. Harper Excavating, Inc., 641 F.3d 1216, 1221 (10th
Cir. 2011)). This is true even if ordinary preemption is asserted as a defense and “even if
2 Express preemption “occurs when the language of the federal statute reveals an express
congressional intent to preempt state law”; field preemption “occurs when the federal scheme of
regulation is so pervasive that Congress must have intended to leave no room for a State to
supplement it”; and conflict preemption “occurs either when compliance with both the federal and
state laws is a physical impossibility, or when the state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” US Airways, Inc.
v. O’Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318, 1324 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Mount Olivet Cemetery Ass’n v. Salt
Lake City, 164 F.3d 480, 486 (10th Cir. 1998)).
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the validity of the preemption defense is the only issue to be resolved in the case.” Id.
(quoting BLAB T.V. of Mobile, Inc. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, Inc., 182 F.3d 851, 854
(11th Cir. 1999)); see also Sullivan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 424 F.3d 267, 273 n.7 (2d Cir.
2005) (noting that field preemption, a form of ordinary preemption, is distinct from
complete preemption) cited with approval in Devon Energy, 693 F.3d at 1203 n.4.
Unlike ordinary preemption, complete preemption “represents an ‘extraordinary
pre-emptive power’” so rare that the Supreme Court has recognized complete preemption
in three contexts: § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947; § 502 of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”); and actions for usury
against national banks under the National Bank Act.” Devon Energy, 693 F.3d at 1204-
05 (citing Hansen, 641 F.3d at 1221; Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int’l Ass’n of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 390 U.S. 557, 560-61 (1968) (Labor Management
Relations Act); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 62-63 (1987) (ERISA);
Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 539 U.S. at 6 (National Bank Act)).
In 	summary, 	courts 	must 	exercise 	care 	to 	distinguish 	between 	ordinary
preemption, which is an affirmative defense, and complete preemption, which confers
federal question jurisdiction. “[A] state claim may be removed to federal court in only two
circumstances—when Congress expressly so provides, . . . or when a federal statute
wholly displaces the state-law cause of action through complete pre-emption.” Beneficial
Nat’l Bank, 539 U.S. at 8 (internal citation omitted). A removing party may not simply rely
on Congress’s or a federal agency’s occupation of a particular field of law. “[A] federal
law may substantively displace state law under ordinary preemption but lack the
extraordinary force to create federal removal jurisdiction under the doctrine of complete
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preemption. If no other grounds for federal jurisdiction exist in such cases, then it falls to
the state courts to assess the merits of the ordinary preemption defense.” Geddes v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 321 F.3d 1349, 1353 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 398
n.13). Here, because the issue presented in Plaintiffs’ Motion [#15] is whether their claims
were removable, the only relevant question is whether the Railway Labor Act completely
preempts state law.
B. 	The Railway Labor Act
Congress passed the Railway Labor Act (“the Act”) “to promote stability in labor-
management relations by providing a comprehensive framework for resolving labor
disputes.” Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252 (1994). In furtherance of
this goal, “the [Act] establishes a mandatory arbitral mechanism for ‘the prompt and
orderly settlement’ of two classes of disputes.” Id. (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 151a). “Major
disputes” relate to the formation of or efforts to secure collective bargaining agreements,
while “minor disputes” relate to disagreements over the meaning of a bargained-for labor
agreement. Ertle v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 136 F.3d 690, 693 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing
Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 252-53).
Courts have found that the Act impliedly preempts state-law claims in three
situations: (1) state laws that prohibit collective bargaining by airline or railway employees
and thus directly conflict with the Act’s allowance of collective bargaining; (2) state law
causes of action that depend upon the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements,
because 	those 	“minor 	disputes” 	fall 	under 	Act-created 	arbitral 	bodies’ 	exclusive
jurisdiction; and (3) state laws that frustrate the Act’s purpose. Air Transp. Ass’n of Am.,
Inc. v. Moss, No. 23-cv-02421-DDD-KAS, 2024 WL 4369137, at *6-7 (D. Colo. Sept. 30,
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2024) (citations omitted). However, these three situations fall into the category of ordinary
field or conflict preemption, not complete preemption. Devon Energy, 693 F.3d at 1203
n.4 (“For our purposes, it is important to distinguish these common forms of preemption
from the doctrine of complete preemption—the doctrine at issue here.”); Sullivan, 424
F.3d at 273 (“Ordinary preemption is plainly a viable defense under the [Railway Labor
Act] RLA.”).
III. Analysis
Here, Plaintiffs pleaded only state-law claims in their Complaint [#6], and federal
question jurisdiction is Defendant’s only stated basis for removal. See Notice of Removal
[#1] at 1-2. Therefore, the Court has an independent obligation to ensure that the Railway
Labor Act supports complete preemption and, thus, subject-matter jurisdiction. Sullivan,
424 F.3d at 274.
The Railway Labor Act serves five purposes: (1) to avoid any interruption to
commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged in commerce; (2) to forbid any
limitation on employees’ freedom of association and to join a labor organization; (3) to
provide for the complete independence of carriers and employees to self-organize; (4) “to
provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes concerning rates of pay,
rules, or working conditions”; and (5) “to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of
all disputes growing out of grievances3 or out of the interpretation or application of
agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.” 45 U.S.C. § 151a.
Employee-carrier disputes concerning “grievances or . . . the interpretation or application
of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions . . . shall be handled
3 The Act uses “grievances” “as a synonym for disputes involving the application or interpretation
of a [collective bargaining agreement].” Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 255.
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in the usual manner up to and including the chief operating officer of the carrier designated
to handle such disputes[.]” 45 U.S.C. § 153(i). Any unresolved disputes “may be referred
by petition of the parties or by either party to the appropriate division of the Adjustment
Board[.]” Id.; see also Sullivan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 424 F.3d 267, 270 (2d Cir. 2005)
(explaining that the Railway Labor Act gives primary jurisdiction to the Adjustment Board
to 	arbitrate 	disputes 	between 	airlines 	and 	employees 	arising 	from 	grievances 	or
application or interpretation of agreements regarding pay, rules, or working conditions).
The Railway Labor Act contains additional dispute resolution mechanisms should
the matter remain unresolved before the Adjustment Board. See 45 U.S.C. § 153(l). If a
carrier does not comply with an Adjustment Board order to pay money or to provide other
relief, the Railway Labor Act provides a mechanism for a person to seek enforcement of
that Adjustment Board order, which consists of filing a petition “in the District Court of the
United States for the district in which [the petitioner] resides or in which is located the
principal operating office of the carrier, or through which the carrier operates[.]” 45 U.S.C.
§ 153(p). Additionally, federal district courts may review adjustment boards’ decisions. 45
U.S.C. § 153(q). 	However, the Railway Labor Act contains no provision that provides
federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from grievances or
concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions. The absence of such provision
belies Defendant’s argument that Plaintiffs’ claims are completely preempted by the
Railway Labor Act.
Plaintiffs’ Colorado Wage Act and Colorado Minimum Wages Act claims hinge on
whether Defendant violated state law by purportedly “failing to provide rest periods” or
failing “to compensate the hourly employees for the rest periods that were not provided
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to them.” Compl. [#6] ¶¶ 77, 82. Defendant contends that Plaintiffs’ claims are “fully
preempt[ed]” or “completely preempted” by the Railway Labor Act. See Notice of Removal
[#1] at 2; Response [#18] at 3-4. In support, Defendant provides two arguments: (1) a
collective bargaining agreement, which provides a higher standard than Colorado,
governs Plaintiffs’ wage claims; and (2) remand to state court would frustrate the purpose
of Railway Labor Act preemption. Response [#18] at 4-8. As authority for complete
preemption, Defendant cites Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 263 (1994).
However, a close inspection of Hawaiian Airlines and subsequent Supreme Court
authority reveals a defect in Defendant’s arguments: While Defendant’s arguments
concern preemption, they do not concern complete preemption which provides federal
jurisdiction.
Hawaiian Airlines explored the scope of federal preemption under the Railway
Labor Act and, particularly, whether an airplane mechanic’s claims for wrongful discharge
under state law were preempted. 512 U.S. at 248, 250-52. The Supreme Court began its
analysis with the principles that federal preemption of state law is a question of
congressional 	intent 	and 	that 	courts 	should 	not 	lightly 	infer 	preemption 	of 	state
employment standards which fall within states’ “traditional police power” to regulate. Id.
252. These principles relate to “express preemption,” a form of ordinary preemption, not
complete preemption. The Court also acknowledged the Railway Labor Act’s purpose—
“to promote stability in labor-management relations by providing a comprehensive
framework for resolving labor disputes”—is achieved through “a mandatory arbitral
mechanism for ‘the prompt and orderly settlement’” of disputes concerning rates of pay,
rules, or working conditions, or disputes concerning the formation of collective bargaining
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agreements. Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 252. In examining the Act’s text and legislative
history, the Court noted an absence of “a clear and manifest congressional purpose to
create a regime that broadly pre-empts substantive protections extended by the States,
independent of any negotiated labor agreement.” Id. at 255-56. This consideration by the
Court relates to “field preemption,” another form of ordinary preemption, not complete
preemption.
Later in its analysis, the Court adopted a framework articulated in a Labor
Management Relations Act preemption case, Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.,
486 U.S. 399 (1988), in which the Lingle court found preemption only if resolution of a
state-law claim depends upon the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. Id.
262-63. In applying the Lingle framework, the Court reasoned that the mechanic’s
wrongful discharge claims were not subsumed by the collective bargaining agreement
and, thus, the claim should proceed to address the purely factual question of whether the
employer’s actions support the elements of those state-law claims. Id. at 266 (noting that
the state tort claims “require only the purely factual inquiry into any retaliatory motive of
the employer,” not interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement). Thus, the Court
held that the Railway Labor Act did not preempt the wrongful discharge claim even though
a collective bargaining agreement governed the terms of the mechanic’s employment. Id.
at 248-49, 266.
Nearly a decade later, in Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003),
the Supreme Court clarified in what contexts complete preemption exists. In considering
the removability of a common law and state law usury claim against a bank, the Court
specified that a state claim may be removed two federal court in only two circumstances:
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(1) when Congress expressly provides for removal; and (2) “when a federal statute wholly
displaces the state-law cause of action through complete pre-emption,” i.e., the Labor
Management Relations Act and ERISA, the two categories of precedent where the Court
found complete preemption. 539 U.S. at 8. Beneficial National Bank did not identify the
Railway Labor Act as another category of precedent involving compete preemption.
In Sullivan v. American Airlines, 424 F.3d 267 (2005), the Second Circuit discussed
and distinguished Hawaiian Airlines from the situation pending before it, namely whether
the Railway Labor Act completely preempted defamation claims brought by unionized
airline 	employees 	against 	their 	employer following 	their 	termination 	for 	workplace
conduct. The Second Circuit’s analysis began with the following question: whether the
Hawaiian Airlines’ analogy between the Railway Labor Act and the Labor Management
Relations Act “as to ordinary preemption also extends to complete preemption.” 424 F.3d
at 274. In posing this question, the Second Circuit noted that Hawaiian Airlines “had no
occasion to consider whether the [Railway Labor Act], as does § 301 of the [Labor
Management Relations Act], supports federal subject-matter jurisdiction by completely
preempting state-law claims within its scope.” Id. Thus, the Second Circuit declined to
assume that Hawaiian Airlines was a complete-preemption case. Id.
In its analysis, the Second Circuit highlighted a key difference between the Labor
Management Relations Act and the Railway Labor Act: Section 301 of the Labor
Management 	Relations 	Act 	establishes 	removability 	when 	ordinary 	preemption 	is
established. See id.; 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (“[s]uits for violation of contracts between an
employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction
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of the parties”); 29 U.S.C. § 185(c) (“[f]or purposes of actions and proceedings by or
against labor organizations in the district courts for the United States, district courts shall
be deemed to have jurisdiction of a labor organization”). Thus, in the Labor Management
Relations Act context, “the defensive [ordinary] and complete-preemption inquiries
collapse into one[.]” Sullivan, 424 F.3d at 274-75. Therefore, while Hawaiian Airlines may
be useful for an ordinary preemption analysis in the context of the Railway Labor Act, it
was never meant to extend to a complete preemption analysis in that context. Id. at 275.
The Second Circuit drew upon Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1
(2003) to reach a conclusion about an “often overlooked” aspect of the compete-
preemption doctrine: “removal of state-law claims based on 	complete preemption
becomes possible . . . because a federal statute with completely preemptive force also
gives rise to original federal jurisdiction, and as a consequence allows removal under 28
U.S.C. § 1441.” Sullivan, 424 F.3d at 276. The court then considered the Railway Labor
Act’s text, which established that adjustment boards have exclusive, primary jurisdiction
over disputes arising from grievances or concerning rates of pay, rules, or working
conditions. 	Id. 	(citing 	45 	U.S.C. 	§§ 	153, 	184) 	(governing 	railroads 	and 	airlines,
respectively)). Thus, based on the Act’s text, the Sullivan court held that even if state-law
claims qualify as disputes about pay, rules, or working conditions under the Railway Labor
Act, the Act “does not completely preempt those claims and therefore does not provide
federal courts with original jurisdiction over them.” Id. at 269; see also id. at 277. To allow
removal would lead to an absurd result: a case would be removed to federal court but
then dismissed on ordinary preemption grounds “because only adjustment boards, not
federal courts, have primary jurisdiction over claims arising under the [Railway Labor
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Act].” Id. at 276. In contrast, removal under the Labor Management Relations Act, ERISA,
or the National Bank Act does not yield a similarly absurd result because upon removal
in those scenarios, “the district court may then adjudicate the claim on the merits under
the relevant preemptive statute.” Id.
As the Second Circuit recognized in Sullivan, circuits are split over whether
complete preemption exists under the Railway Labor Act. Id. at 277. This Court could find
no Tenth Circuit case deciding whether the Railway Labor Act completely preempts state-
law claims. The Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have found that the Act
does not completely preempt state-law claims. See Ry. Lab. Execs. Ass’n v. Pittsburgh
& Lake Erie R.R. Co., 858 F.2d 936, 942-43 (3d Cir. 1988) (“Because there is no RLA
[Railway Labor Act] . . . cause of action within the scope of which [plaintiff’s] state claim
falls and because we do not find the requisite Congressional intent, we hold that there is
no removal jurisdiction in this case.”), abrogation on other grounds noted in Maglioli v. All.
HC Holdings, LLC, 16 F.4th 393, 407 n.9 (3d Cir. 2021); Anderson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 2
F.3d 590, 597 (5th Cir. 1993) (concluding that the Railway Labor Act did not completely
preempt the plaintiff’s state-law claim “[a]nd without complete pre-emption, there is no
federal question jurisdiction.”); Roddy v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Inc., 395 F.3d 318, 326
(6th Cir. 2005) (“[I]t would be difficult to find such extraordinary preemptive force when
the Supreme Court has specifically rejected the contention that the [Railway Labor Act]
broadly 	preempts 	state-law 	claims 	based 	on 	discharge 	or 	discipline” 	for 	removal
purposes); Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2009)
(overruling prior cases which had held that the Railway Labor Act was subject to complete
preemption and stating that “because the [Act] is subject to ordinary rather than complete
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pre-emption, [the] complaint does not arise under federal law and is not removable”);
Geddes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 321 F.3d 1349, 1357 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that “the
doctrine of complete preemption does not apply to the [Act]”).
Just two circuits—the Seventh and Eighth—have held that the Railway Labor Act
completely preempts state-law claims but, at least in the Eighth Circuit, the issue “is an
open question” following the Supreme Court’s Beneficial National Bank decision, which
the Eighth Circuit has not revisited since. See Miller v. Southwest Airlines Co., 926 F.3d
898, 904-05 (7th Cir. 2019) (finding federal question jurisdiction over state-law claims
“concern[ing] collective bargaining regulated by federal law”); Richardson v. BNSF Ry.
Co., 2 F.4th 1063, 1073 (8th Cir. 2021) (Colloton, J., concurring); but see Gore v. Trans
World Airlines, 210 F.3d 944, 949 (8th Cir. 2000) (stating that because the Railway Labor
Act requires arbitration of minor disputes, “complete preemption applies to disputes
involving duties and rights created or defined by the collective bargaining agreement”);
Deford v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 867 F.2d 1080, 1085-86 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding complete
preemption doctrine applies to collective bargaining disputes because of the Railway
Labor Act’s “extraordinary” preemptive force that “takes over the whole field of railroad
labor disputes arising from collective bargaining agreements”).
In the absence of Tenth Circuit authority, the weight of authority from other circuits
teaches that the Railway Labor Act does not completely preempt a state-law claim
concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions. Without complete preemption,
federal question jurisdiction does not exist, and removal cannot occur. As noted earlier,
because the issue presented in Plaintiffs’ Motion [#15] is whether their claims were
removable, the only relevant question is whether the Railway Labor Act completely
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preempts state law. Based on the foregoing analysis, the answer to that question is no.
Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction over this dispute and this case must be remanded
to Arapahoe County District Court. Accordingly, the Court recommends that the case be
remanded pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing,
IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand to the District
Court for Arapahoe County, Colorado [#15] be GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1447(c), this matter
be REMANDED to the District Court for Arapahoe County, Colorado due to lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any party may file objections within 14 days of
service of this Recommendation. In relevant part, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) provides that,
“within 14 days after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition, a party
may 	serve 	and 	file 	specific 	written 	objections 	to 	the 	proposed 	findings 	and
recommendations. A party may respond to another party’s objections within 14 days after
being served with a copy.” “[A] party’s objections to the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review
by the district court or for appellate review.” United States v. 2121 E. 30th St., 73 F.3d
1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996). The objection must be “sufficiently specific to focus the
district court’s attention on the factual and legal issues that are truly in dispute.” Id. “[A]
party who fails to make a timely objection to the magistrate judge's findings and
Case No. 1:24-cv-00633-RMR-KAS Document 32 filed 10/29/24 USDC Colorado
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recommendations waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions.” Morales-
Fernandez v. I.N.S., 418 F.3d 1116, 1119 (10th Cir. 2005).
Dated: October 29, 2024 	BY THE COURT:
Kathryn A. Starnella
United States Magistrate Judge
Case No. 1:24-cv-00633-RMR-KAS Document 32 filed 10/29/24 USDC Colorado
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