Parker et al v. Souki

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Action No. 22-cv-0165-WJM-MDB
CHRISTOPHER PARKER, and
RED MANGO ENTERPRISES LTD.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CHARIF SOUKI,
Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION IN
LIMINE AND GRANTING SOUKI’S MOTION TO STRIKE IN PART
Before the Court is Plaintiffs Christopher Parker and Red Mango Enterprises
Ltd.’s (jointly, “Plaintiffs”) Motion in Limine (“Motion”). (ECF No. 182.) Defendant Charif
Souki filed a response, as well as a Motion to Strike in Part (“Motion to Strike”). (ECF
Nos. 195, 192.) For the following reasons, the Motion is granted in part and denied in
part, and the Motion to Strike is granted.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The parties are familiar with the underlying facts of this case by way of the
Court’s Order resolving Souki’s motion to dismiss and the parties’ cross motions for
summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 102, 170.) The Court incorporates that background
here.
II. 	APPLICABLE LAW
Motions in limine enable courts “to rule in advance of trial on the relevance of
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certain forecasted evidence, as to issues that are definitely set for trial, without lengthy
argument at, or interruption of, the trial.” Michael v. Rocky Mountain Festivals, Inc.,
2019 WL 10011881, at *1 (D. Colo. July 19, 2019) (citation omitted); see also Ward v.
Nat’l Credit Sys., Inc., 2024 WL 2846609, at *3 (D. Colo. June 5, 2024) (“Pretrial rulings
issued in response to motions in limine can save time during trial as well as cost and
effort for the Parties as they prepare their cases.”). Pretrial rulings, however, “are often
better left until trial when the Court can assess the question and evidence presented.”
Colorado Montana Wyoming State Area Conf. of NAACP v. Smith, 2024 WL 2939163,
at *2 (D. Colo. June 11, 2024) (citing Vanderheyden v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
2022 WL 4131439, at *2 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 2022)).
Whether to admit or exclude evidence is a decision that “lies within the sound
discretion of the trial court.” Robinson v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 16 F.3d 1083, 1086 (10th
Cir. 1994). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that the “evidence is
inadmissible on any relevant ground.” Pinon Sun Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Atain Specialty
Ins. Co., 2020 WL 1452166, at *3 (D. Colo. Mar. 25, 2020) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, the Court may deny a motion in limine if the movant fails to set out, with the
necessary specificity, the evidence it wishes to have excluded. Id. Denial of a motion in
limine, however, does not mean that the evidence will automatically be admitted at trial;
rather, “the court may alter its limine ruling based on developments at trial or on its
sound judicial discretion,” upon a party's timely objection. Id. (quotation omitted).
Under Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, “[e]vidence is relevant if: (a) it
has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Relevant
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evidence is generally admissible but may be excluded “if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. “Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.” Fed. R. Evid.
402.
III. 	ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs move to exclude “evidence and argument concerning (1) Plaintiffs’
sources of wealth, citizenship, and wealth planning strategies used as a means to
malign Mr. Parker’s character; (2) the flawed legal theory that Plaintiffs could have
mitigated their damages by selling the guaranteed Tellurian stock after Defendant Charif
Souki breached the guarantees; and (3) the equally flawed theory that Plaintiffs could
have mitigated their damages by purchasing a ‘protective put’ or similar product.” (ECF
No. 182 at 2.)
As to the first category of evidence, Plaintiffs seek to preclude Souki from
presenting evidence that casts Parker’s “wealth, citizenship, and wealth planning
strategies in a negative light,” including by
• 	characterizing Parker as “a multi-millionaire investor who enjoys dual
citizenship in a known tax haven”;
• 	referring to Parker’s work for the British government as “‘cloak and dagger
kind of stuff”;
• 	“ask[ing] about whether he had any connection to Harvey Weinstein’s
company” or “played in ‘Molly’s game’—the infamous illegal celebrity
poker game that was the subject of a major picture of the same name, and
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which has been in the news recently because of the similarities to recent
arrests surrounding gambling in the NBA”; and
• 	“implying that Mr. Parker established Red Mango for the purpose of
avoiding taxes.”
(Id. at 3–4.) Plaintiffs insist that “[n]one of this has anything to do with the matters to be
tried,” particularly because Souki’s fraud defense has been dismissed from the case.
(Id. at 4.)
The Court will permit Souki to present limited evidence about Parker’s
background, how and for what purpose Parker established Red Mango, and other
related information, as all that provides useful context and background to the claims and
defenses at issue in this trial. See United States v. Condrin, 473 F.3d 1283, 1286 n. 2
(10th Cir. 2007) (“Background evidence ‘is universally offered and admitted as an aid to
understanding.’“) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 401, advisory committee's note)).
For example, basic information about Parker’s business background and interest
in the liquified natural gas industry will help the jury understand why (or why not) the
parties allegedly entered into a contract regarding Tellurian shares. Without that
general context, the jury would be left wondering what precipitated the text message
conversations in the first place. Plaintiffs do not appear to object to this ruling, clarifying
that they “anticipate introducing background facts about Mr. Parker and his profile as an
investor, which will include some information about his work and financial history, so the
jury can understand how he came to enter into the relevant agreements with Souki.”
(ECF No. 181 at 4 n.7.) If this background evidence is relevant for Plaintiffs to
introduce, it is relevant for Souki to explore as well.
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The Court will preclude, however, Souki from trying to connect Parker’s
background to salacious issues pertaining to Harvey Weinstein, Molly’s Game, and the
like. That sort of connection is irrelevant to the breach of contract issue at the core of
this dispute. Fed. R. Evid. 401. It also risks unfairly prejudicing Plaintiffs in the eyes of
the jury. Fed. R. Evid. 403.
In sum, then, evidence pertaining to Parker’s business background, his
citizenship, and Red Mango’s purpose are generally fair game. But attempts to malign
his character with this information are not. If the Court senses that the volume or quality
of such evidence begins to veer too far afield from proper evidentiary purposes, the
parties can expect the Court to exclude it under Rule 403.
As to the second and third categories of evidence, Plaintiffs seek to preclude
Souki’s expert witness, Bryan D’Aguiar, from opining (1) “that Plaintiffs could have
mitigated their damages by selling their indemnified Tellurian shares on certain dates in
2021 and 2022—after Souki breached the guarantees,” and (2) that “Plaintiffs could
have mitigated their damages through ‘derivative strategies,’ including by purchasing a
‘protective put.” (Id. at 4, 10.) Plaintiffs contend that mitigation “is a completely
inapplicable legal theory in this case,” and is “is legally flawed and without an
evidentiary foundation.” (Id.) As such, Plaintiffs seek to exclude D’Aguiar from offering
his mitigation expert opinions at trial. (Id. at 13.)
But Plaintiffs’ challenge to D’Aguiar’s expert mitigation opinions has come too
late.1 Section III.H.6 of the Court’s Revised Practice Standards states: “A Rule 702
1 As to the practice standard problem, Plaintiffs’ argue that they “did not attack the legal
validity and evidentiary foundation of [Souki’s] mitigation defense [at the Rule 702 phase] as this
motion does.” (ECF No. 182 at 2 n.1.) But by acknowledging that the Motion attacks the “legal
validity and evidentiary foundation of [Souki’s] mitigation defense,” Plaintiffs effectively admit
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motion shall not be styled as a ‘motion in limine.’” (Emphasis in original.) And again: “A
motion seeking exclusion of expert testimony under Rule 702 is governed separately . .
. .” Id. § III.G.1. And perhaps most importantly: “A motion in limine that is a veiled
motion for summary judgment may also be denied out of hand.” Id. Yet that is exactly
what Plaintiffs try to do in their Motion: preclude Souki from asserting his mitigation
defense based on the alleged legal and evidentiary infirmities of D’Aguiar’s proffered
expert opinions.
The substance of Plaintiffs’ argument illustrates the point:
Souki’s mitigation theory is legally infirm for at least two
reasons. First, Plaintiffs had no duty to mitigate because
their damages—on the particular and undisputed facts
here—were legally unavoidable. Second, Souki’s proposed
post-breach sales of Plaintiffs’ guaranteed shares do not
qualify as substitute transactions for purposes of mitigation.
As such, Souki should be precluded from introducing
evidence and argument in support of his theory that Plaintiffs
could have mitigated their damages by selling the
guaranteed Tellurian shares after Souki breached.
(Id. at 4.)
Put differently, Plaintiffs contend that D’Aguiar’s mitigation opinions are not a “fit”
because they are not “based on sufficient facts or data.” Hafen v. Howell, 121 F.4th
1191, 1203 (10th Cir. 2024) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702(b)). This is plainly a Rule 702
argument.
Notably, Plaintiffs tried to exclude D’Aguiar’s mitigation opinions at the Rule 702
stage of this case, but they did not develop the argument as they do now. In a single
paragraph, Plaintiffs argued that D’Aguiar’s mitigation opinions were “based on pure
that their limine arguments are in reality Rule 702 arguments.
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speculation” because he “did not conduct any analysis to determine whether a trading
program would lead to [loss mitigation] and admitted that Plaintiffs were under no
obligation to sell their shares via such a trading program.” (ECF No. 155 at 9–10.) This
thin argument pales in comparison to the robust arguments Plaintiffs develop, over the
course of eight pages, in their Motion.
More fundamentally, these arguments also constitute summary judgment
arguments in that they seek to preclude Souki from presenting a defense at trial. Yet
Plaintiffs did not seek dismissal of Souki’s mitigation defense at the summary judgment
stage. (See generally ECF No. 127.) Instead, Plaintiffs focused there on Souki’s
statute of frauds and fraud defenses. (Id.) Again, “[a]n in limine motion is not a proper
vehicle for a party to ask the Court to weigh the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
particular claim or defense, because that is the function of a motion for summary
judgment, with its accompanying and crucial procedural safeguards.” Dry Clean Super
Ctr., Inc. v. Kwik Indus., Inc., 2012 WL 503510, at *4 (D. Colo. Feb. 15, 2012) (citations
omitted). And as previously mentioned, the Motion clearly violates the undersigned’s
Revised Practice Standards.
Because Plaintiffs could have raised this belatedly-developed argument at the
Rule 702 or summary judgment stage, the Court declines to address it at the limine
stage. By declining to exclude the mitigation opinions at the limine stage, however, the
Court does not intend to suggest that it has decided that this is a viable defense by
which Souki can overcome Plaintiffs’ claims or otherwise decrease their damages. The
Court concludes only that Plaintiffs cannot import their Rule 702 and summary judgment
arguments into their Motion in contravention of the Court’s Revised Practice Standards.
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Plaintiffs can seek to challenge Souki’s mitigation defense at the appropriate phase(s)
of trial.
For these reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part the Motion, and
grants Souki’s motion to strike the Motion to the extent it challenges D’Aguiar’s expert
opinions on mitigation. (ECF No. 190.) See Carroll v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co.,
2013 WL 5303483, at *2 (D. Colo. Sept. 20, 2013) (striking briefs for “failure to comply
with the Local Rules of the Court and Judge Martinez’s Practice Standards”); see also
Bio Med Techs. Corp. v. Sorin CRM USA, Inc., 2015 WL 11027596, at *1 (D. Colo. Apr.
8, 2015) (similar).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS that:
1. 	The Motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, as set forth
above. (ECF Nos. 177.)
2. 	Souki’s Motion to Strike in Part is GRANTED. (ECF No. 190.)
Dated this 14 th day of November, 2025.
BY THE COURT:
______________________
William J. Martínez
Senior United States District Judge
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