Zhejiang Dingli Machinery Co., Ltd. v. United States

Slip Op. 26-119
UNITED STATES
COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Court No. 24-00219
COALITION OF AMERICAN
MANUFACTURERS OF MOBILE ACCESS
EQUIPMENT,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant,
and
ZHEJIANG DINGLI MACHINERY CO., LTD.,
Defendant-Intervenor.
Court No. 24-00221
ZHEJIANG DINGLI MACHINERY CO., LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant,
and
COALITION OF AMERICAN
MANUFACTURERS OF MOBILE ACCESS
EQUIPMENT,
Defendant-Intervenor.
Before: M. Miller Baker, Judge
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Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 	Page 2
OPINION
[Sustaining the Department of Commerce’s determi-
nation in two actions.]
Dated: September 23, 2026
Timothy C. Brightbill, Laura El-Sabaawi, Enbar Tole-
dano, and Theodore P. Brackemyre, Wiley Rein LLP,
Washington, DC, on the briefs for the Coalition of
American Manufacturers of Mobile Access Equipment,
plaintiff in Case 24-219 and defendant-intervenor in
Case 24-221.
Ned H. Marshak, Dharmendra N. Choudhary, and
Jordan C. Kahn, Grunfeld, Desiderio, Lebowitz, Sil-
verman & Klestadt LLP, New York, NY, on the briefs
for Zhejiang Dingli Machinery Co., Ltd., plaintiff in
Case 24-221 and defendant-intervenor in Case 24-219.
Kristin E. Olson, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litiga-
tion Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Jus-
tice, Washington, DC, on the briefs for Defendant. Of
counsel for Defendant was Charlie Chung, Attorney,
Office of the Chief Counsel for Trade Enforcement &
Compliance, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washing-
ton, DC.
Baker, Judge: The Department of Commerce’s im-
position of an antidumping duty is but the first step in
a sometimes decades-long cycle of administrative re-
views in which the agency determines the actual rates
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Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 	Page 3
for the preceding 12-month period. 1 These two cases
involve the first such review of an antidumping order
on mobile access equipment imported from China. 2
In Case 24-221, Zhejiang Dingli Machinery Co.,
Ltd. (Dingli), a Chinese producer, challenges the De-
partment’s choice of a primary surrogate country for
valuing inputs and asserts that the agency committed
certain legal errors. In Case 24-219, the Coalition of
American Manufacturers of Mobile Access Equipment,
a group of domestic producers, takes issue with how
Commerce valued various inputs, including its use of
a secondary surrogate country.
1 See Hung Vuong Corp. v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 3d
1321, 1332 n.4 (CIT 2020) (“On the anniversary of an anti-
dumping order, various affected parties (e.g., foreign pro-
ducers and exporters and domestic competitors) may re-
quest an ‘administrative review’ to determine the actual
assessment rates as to particular subject merchandise for
the preceding twelve-month period. In short, each review
is distinct, factually and legally, from any preceding re-
view(s) and is best understood as periodic maintenance of
the original antidumping order.”).
2 See also Coal. of Am. Mfrs. of Mobile Access Equip. v.
United States, Slip Op. 24-66, 2024 WL 2796654 (CIT 2024)
(Mobile Access I) (partially sustaining and partially re-
manding Commerce’s original determination imposing the
antidumping order); Coal. of Am. Mfrs. of Mobile Access
Equip. v. United States, Slip Op. 25-150, 2025 WL 3555132
(CIT 2025) (Mobile Access II) (sustaining the Department’s
redetermination following remand).
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Finding the Department’s determination supported
by substantial evidence and otherwise in accordance
with law, the court sustains it in both cases.
I
Invoking 	jurisdiction 	conferred 	by 	28 	U.S.C.
§ 1581(c), the Coalition and Dingli filed their respec-
tive suits under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii) to at-
tack different aspects of Commerce’s final decision.
Each then intervened in the other’s case, essentially
theorizing that the opponent’s desired relief would
only make matters worse. Caught in the crossfire, the
government urges the court to sustain the agency de-
termination as-is.
In § 1516a(a)(2) actions, “[t]he court shall hold un-
lawful any determination, finding, or conclusion found
. . . to be unsupported by substantial evidence on the
record, 	or 	otherwise 	not 	in 	accordance 	with 	law.”
19 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). 	The 	question 	is 	not
whether the court would have reached the same deci-
sion on the same record. Rather, it is whether the ad-
ministrative record as a whole permits Commerce’s
conclusion.
Substantial evidence has been defined as more
than a mere scintilla, as such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. To determine if substan-
tial evidence exists, we review the record as a
whole, including evidence that supports as well
as evidence that fairly detracts from the sub-
stantiality of the evidence.
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Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 	Page 5
Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 337 F.3d 1373,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (cleaned up); see also SSIH
Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 718 F.2d 365,
382 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (if Commerce makes a choice be-
tween “two fairly conflicting views,” the court may not
substitute its judgment even if its view would have
been different “had the matter been before it de novo”)
(quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474, 488 (1951)).
The court also reviews to ensure the agency en-
gaged in “reasoned decisionmaking,” meaning its re-
sult must be “within the scope” of its authority and
“the process” it uses to reach that outcome “must be
logical and rational.” Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743,
750 (2015). The agency must “examine the relevant
data and articulate a satisfactory explanation . . . in-
cluding a rational connection between the facts found
and the choice made.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of
U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983) (cleaned up). But courts will “uphold a
decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path
may reasonably be discerned.” Id.
II
A
Under the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, an anti-
dumping duty represents the amount by which subject
merchandise’s 	“normal 	value” 	exceeds 	its 	“export
price,” i.e., the U.S. price. 19 U.S.C. § 1673. Usually,
“normal value” is “the price at which the foreign like
product is first sold . . . for consumption in the export-
ing country.” Id. § 1677b(a)(1)(B)(i).
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Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 	Page 6
But an exception applies when the goods come from
a nonmarket-economy country 3 like China. In such
cases, the Department must assume that home-mar-
ket sales are not reliable indicators of normal value
because the economy is presumed to be under state
control. See, e.g., Taian Ziyang Food Co. v. United
States, 637 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1105 (CIT 2009).
Instead, the statute instructs Commerce to deter-
mine normal value from “the factors of production uti-
lized 	in 	producing 	the 	merchandise.” 	19 	U.S.C.
§ 1677b(c)(1). The calculation of their worth must “be
based on the best available information regarding . . .
such factors in a market economy country or countries
considered to be appropriate by” the agency. Id.
The market-economy proxies the Department uses
are known as “surrogate values.” In choosing them,
“Commerce ‘attempts to construct a hypothetical mar-
ket value of [the subject merchandise] in the [nonmar-
ket-economy country].’୻” Changzhou Trina Solar En-
ergy Co. v. United States, 975 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed.
Cir. 2020) (first alteration in original) (quoting Down-
hole Pipe & Equip., L.P. v. United States, 776 F.3d
1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
Here, Commerce found that both Turkey and Bul-
garia provided the best available information overall—
for some inputs, Turkey provided the best figures, but
3 This term means “any foreign country that [Commerce]
determines does not operate on market principles of cost or
pricing structures, so that sales of merchandise in such
country do not reflect the fair value of the merchandise.”
Id. § 1677(18)(A).
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Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 	Page 7
for others Bulgaria’s were superior. Appx1014–1015.
It chose the former country as the primary surrogate
for two reasons.
First, the Bulgarian data for domestic movement
expenses came from 2020 and the record lacked “in-
flators” 4 the agency could use to adjust the amounts to
reflect figures accurate for the period of review. The
Turkish information, on the other hand, included the
necessary inflators. Appx1015.
Second, the financial statement for Bulgarian com-
pany Dimexlift lacked explanatory material the De-
partment considered necessary, while the two Turkish
statements on the record were “detailed” and “compre-
hensive” and included the critical explanatory notes.
Appx1016–1017. But because Turkish data were una-
vailable for some inputs, Commerce also selected Bul-
garia as a “secondary surrogate country.” Appx1017.
4 This term refers to how Commerce adjusts prior years’
data that are non-contemporaneous with the relevant pe-
riod of review to reflect what the amounts would have been
during that period. The agency uses an inflator when the
record 	lacks 	contemporaneous 	figures. 	See 	Changzhou
Trina Solar Energy Co. v. United States, 255 F. Supp. 3d
1312, 1323 (CIT 2017). For example, it might use consumer
price index data as a way to estimate the extent to which
prices or costs would have changed from one year to the
next. See New Am. Keg v. United States, Slip Op. 22-106, at
5–6, 2022 WL 4363320, at *2 (CIT 2022) (rejecting agency’s
unexplained use of Brazilian consumer price index infor-
mation 	to 	adjust 	non-contemporaneous 	Mexican 	wage
rates).
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Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 	Page 8
Dingli now attacks the selection of Turkey and ar-
gues that the agency should have chosen Bulgaria in-
stead for everything.
1
The Department has “broad discretion to determine
whether information is the best available because the
statute does not define the term.” Zhejiang DunAn He-
tian Metal Co. v. United States, 652 F.3d 1333, 1341
(Fed. Cir. 2011). “This court’s duty is not to evaluate
whether the information Commerce used was the best
available, but rather whether a reasonable mind could
conclude 	that 	[it] 	chose 	the 	best 	available 	infor-
mation.” Id. (cleaned up).
Dingli, however, wrongly asserts that “this Court
must 	assert 	its 	independent 	judgment 	in 	deciding
whether Commerce’s methodology resulted in reliance
on 	the 	‘best 	available 	information.’୻” 	Case 	24-221,
ECF 52, at 19 (citing Loper Bright Enters. v. Rai-
mondo, 603 U.S. 369, 369–70, 400 (2024)). On reply,
the company doubles down, arguing that “best availa-
ble information” is a matter of statutory construction
requiring the court to decide whether the agency actu-
ally chose the best available information. Case 24-221,
ECF 49, at 4 (citing Jiangsu Dingsheng New Materials
Joint-Stock Co. v. United States, 794 F. Supp. 3d 1334,
1342 (CIT 2025), which Dingli claims relied on Loper
Bright).
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Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 	Page 9
The company’s invocation of Dingsheng violates the
chutzpah doctrine. 5 Contrary to Dingli’s characteriza-
tion, that decision quite rightly rejected the contention
(advanced by the same counsel, see 794 F. Supp. 3d
at 1337) that “the statutory requirement to select the
‘best available information’ somehow strips Commerce
of any deference to its determination of this case,” find-
ing that argument “without merit.” Id. at 1341. While
a statutory term’s meaning is a legal question, “the ap-
plication of that term to the record is a factual deter-
mination for the agency. . . . Commerce’s task is a
mixed question of law and fact requiring it to apply the
statutory term to the record information.” Id. at 1342.
“Thus, the Court reviews whether Commerce’s selec-
tion of . . . the primary surrogate country, because its
information is better than all other information avail-
able, is supported by substantial evidence, i.e., reason-
able on this record.” Id.
2
Dingli 	also 	takes 	issue 	with 	how 	Commerce
weighed 	the 	Turkish 	versus 	the 	Bulgarian 	infor-
mation. The company asserts that the former country’s
“hyperinflation is the single most important consider-
ation on this record” and that the problems the De-
partment found with the latter nation’s data—a lack
of 	movement 	inflators 	and 	unusable 	financial
5 See NTSF Seafoods Joint Stock Co. v. United States, Slip
Op. 22-38, at 11, 2022 WL 1375140, at **3–4 (CIT 2022)
(citing Marks v. Comm’r, 947 F.2d 983, 986 (D.C. Cir.
1991), for the “୻‘chutzpah’ doctrine”).
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Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 	Page 10
statements—“are significantly less important.” Case
24-221, ECF 49, at 5.
It is not for the court to decide what consideration
is “most important” or whether any factor is “signifi-
cantly less important.” Such questions are for the De-
partment, as “the court may not reweigh the evidence
or substitute its own judgment for that of the agency.”
Usinor v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1272
(CIT 2004).
Commerce did not contest Dingli’s assertion that
Turkey suffered from hyperinflation during the period
of review. Rather, it disagreed that hyperinflation ren-
dered the country’s data unreliable. Appx1045. 6 The
agency did acknowledge that import data reported in
Turkish lira would be unreliable due to hyperinflation,
but it disagreed that the same concern applied to fig-
ures reported in other currencies. Appx1046. And it
said the Turkish data here were in euros. Id. (citing
Appx12903–12929). 7
Dingli argues that nothing in the record establishes
that Turkish import prices were denominated in euros,
arguing that “this reasoning is impeached by Trade
Data Monitor [Turkey] import data that are officially
reported in Turkish Lira.” Case 24-221, ECF 49, at 6
6 In so doing, the agency declined to rely on an expert econ-
omist opinion proffered by the company. Id. The Depart-
ment explained that because counsel retained the expert,
his neutrality was “suspect.” Id.
7 The cited pages support the agency’s statement. See
Appx12925 (table valuing factors of production in euros).
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Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 	Page 11
(emphasis in original). The Department, however, did
not use that source. Instead, it used the Global Trade
Atlas. Appx1026.
And while the company argues that the latter’s fig-
ures are “originally reported” in lira, it cites no evi-
dence supporting that contention. Instead, it argues
that a statement to that effect in its agency brief “has
not been challenged.” Case 24-221, ECF 52, at 24 (cit-
ing Appx2840, which itself cited no evidence to support
the statement either).
“Briefs,” however, “are arguments, not evidence.”
Morgenstern v. Burton, 86 F.2d 341, 342 (CCPA 1936);
see also Estee Lauder Inc. v. L’Oreal, S.A., 129 F.3d
588, 595 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[A]rguments of counsel can-
not take the place of evidence lacking in the record.”).
Dingli overlooks that the agency’s decision is pre-
sumed to be correct unless the party challenging it
proves otherwise. 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a)(1). Because the
company cites no evidence contradicting the Depart-
ment’s finding that the Global Trade Atlas data were
denominated in euros, that argument fails. 8
Bizarrely, Dingli injects an argument about the Ca-
nadian 	government’s 	antidumping 	investigation 	of
Turkish 	rebar. 	Again 	citing 	only 	its 	own 	agency
8 Similarly, Dingli argues that Commerce’s finding that
“inflation cannot automatically preclude the consideration
of [Turkey] as a primary surrogate country,” Case 24-221,
ECF 52, at 21 (quoting Appx1044), “ignores a plethora of
record evidence” purportedly linking hyperinflation to dis-
tortion in surrogate value data and financial statements,
id. But it cites nothing to support that accusation.
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Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 	Page 12
briefing, it asserts that Commerce was involved in that
foreign proceeding. See Case 24-221, ECF 52, at 25–26
(claiming that “de-dollarization of the Turkish econ-
omy . . . was recognized by Commerce in the Canadian
AD investigation” and that “the record in this proceed-
ing does not contain any information contradicting
Commerce’s factual findings in the Canadian investi-
gation”) (emphasis added). It is unclear what “find-
ings” the company believes the Department made as
part of a foreign government’s investigation. In any
event, Dingli ignores the agency’s observation that the
Canadian government applied its own law, not U.S.
antidumping law, and compiled its own record. See
Appx1047.
Commerce also pointed out that Dingli cited no
precedent requiring consideration of a foreign govern-
ment’s findings, especially as to unrelated products
and inputs. Appx1048. The company calls that state-
ment “unpersuasive” and argues that the lack of any
rebuttal to the Canadian findings means they are the
“best available information.” Case 24-221, ECF 52,
at 31. But it should be obvious that the Department
must apply U.S. law to analyze its own record. Com-
merce reasonably explained why it deemed the Cana-
dian government’s analysis irrelevant.
The Department’s finding that hyperinflation did
not render Turkey inappropriate as a primary surro-
gate country is supported by substantial evidence.
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Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 	Page 13
3
Dingli’s next attack on the selection of Turkey as
surrogate involves the financial statements the agency
employed. “Commerce values certain factors of produc-
tion, such as selling, general, and administrative ex-
penses, factory overhead, and profit, by using financial
ratios derived from financial statements of producers
of comparable merchandise in the surrogate country.”
Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Comm. v. United States,
618 F.3d 1316, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The Department
uses multiple firms’ statements, if possible, “to nor-
malize any potential distortions that may arise from
using the statements of a single producer.” NTSF Sea-
foods Joint Stock Co. v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 3d
1310, 1318 (CIT 2020).
The Coalition provided financial statements for two
Turkish 	companies, 	Tümosan 	and 	Türk 	Traktör. 9
Appx1015. Commerce found they produce goods com-
parable to mobile access equipment. Appx1016. Dingli
submitted statements from five Bulgarian firms, but
the 	agency 	found 	that 	only 	one—Dimexlift 	Group
AD—produced similar merchandise. Id. That issue
mattered for determining whether the companies are
likely to use inputs akin to those needed for making
mobile access equipment. Id.
The 	Department 	found 	the 	Turkish 	companies’
statements “detailed” and “comprehensive” and ac-
companied by explanatory notes. Id. But Dimexlift’s
9 7PRVDQ0RWRUYH7UDNW|U6DQD\L$ûDQG7UN7UDNW|U
9H=LUDDW0DNLQHOHUL$û$SS[
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Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 	Page 14
was far less so, “comprised only of an income state-
ment, balance sheet, and a short director’s report.”
Appx1016–1017. The latter also contained a column
headed “Annex” with numerical codes referring to ex-
planatory notes, but the notes were not part of the ma-
terial Dingli submitted. Appx1017. Commerce there-
fore concluded that the two Turkish statements were
the best available information “because the sole finan-
cial statements of a Bulgarian producer of comparable
merchandise [were] incomplete.” Id.
Dingli now disputes both the Turkish statements’
usability and the Bulgarian ones’ deficiencies. As an
initial matter, on reply the company asserts that the
record in the second administrative review of the same
antidumping duty order at issue here calls the Depart-
ment’s conclusions into question. Case 24-221, ECF
49, at 12–15. Recall that this case involves the first
such review.
It is generally improper to raise an argument for
the first time in a reply brief. See, e.g., Stauffer v.
Brooks Bros. Grp., Inc., 758 F.3d 1314, 1322 (Fed. Cir.
2014). An even bigger problem is that the material
Dingli seeks to add is not part of the record here. The
company acknowledges that hurdle but shrugs it off by
suggesting the court take judicial notice. Case 24-221,
ECF 49, at 12–13. 10
10 Dingli asserts that the court has “take[n] judicial notice
of documents in other Commerce [antidumping] proceed-
ings that are publicly available on ACCESS,” the agency’s
(footnote continues on next page)
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Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 	Page 15
That workaround isn’t available. The standard of
review directs the court to review the matter on the
record that existed before the agency at the time of its
decision. 	See 	Jiaxing 	Bro. 	Fastener 	Co. 	v. 	United
States, 428 F. Supp. 3d 1364, 1379 n.29 (CIT 2020)
(“[J]udicial 	review 	of 	[Commerce’s] 	determinations
must be limited to the record before the agency that
was compiled during that segment of the proceeding.”)
(citing QVD Food Co. v. United States, 658 F.3d 1318,
1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). Not only was the second ad-
ministrative review’s record not before the agency
here, it couldn’t have been, as it didn’t exist yet. And
Dingli itself portrays the decision from the second
electronic records system. Case 24-221, ECF 49, at 13 (cit-
ing Calgon Carbon Corp. v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 3d
1312, 1327 (CIT 2016)). But Calgon says nothing about tak-
ing judicial notice. The issue there was the agency’s use of
information 	from 	a 	prior 	review 	without 	considering
whether more contemporaneous data were more accurate.
145 F. Supp. 3d at 1327.
And Dingli’s other cited case, Catfish Farmers of America
v. United States, 918 F. Supp. 2d 1381 (CIT 2013), likewise
did not involve taking judicial notice of extra-record mate-
rial. It involved the seventh administrative review of an
antidumping duty order. The plaintiffs filed a “notice of
supplemental authority” citing the results of the eighth re-
view. The court denied the government’s motion to strike,
reasoning that the plaintiffs did not purport to try to sup-
plement the record. Significantly, however, the court de-
clined to address whether the proffered “supplemental au-
thority” was relevant—all it held was that it was unneces-
sary to grant the motion to strike to ensure adherence to
the proper standard of review. Id. at 1383.
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Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 	Page 16
review as relying on information apparently generated
after the period of review here. 11
The simple fact is that, on the record that was be-
fore the Department in this first administrative re-
view and that is before the court here, the Turkish gov-
ernment had instructed companies not to adjust their
financial statements for 2022. Appx1050–1051. “In the
absence of record evidence to the contrary, Commerce
has no reason to question the Turkish accounting and
auditing standards authority’s finding” that no adjust-
ment was necessary. Appx1051 (emphasis added).
Turning to Dingli’s argument about hyperinflation,
the Department cited an earlier decision, Metal Lock-
ers from China, 12 that stated it is not enough for a
party to allege that financial statements “may be dis-
torted by significant inflation.” Rather, the party must
“provide specific evidence of any such distortion, iden-
tify any inflation adjustments that should have [been]
made, [and] identify any past instances where Com-
merce made inflation adjustments in the determina-
tion of surrogate financial ratios.” Appx1052 (quoting
I&D Memo at 14 accompanying 86 Fed. Reg. 35,737).
The agency found that Dingli failed to satisfy any of
those requirements here.
11 The period of review ran from April 13, 2022, to March
31, 2023. See Appx1001. Dingli wants to expand the record
to include the Turkish companies’ full 2023 financial state-
ments. See Case 24-221, ECF 49, at 15.
12 86 Fed. Reg. 35,737.
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Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 	Page 17
While the company argues that the record shows
that the Turkish statements were distorted, it offers
no serious response to the Department’s observation
that Metal Lockers from China held “that hyperinfla-
tion is not one of the agency’s considerations in select-
ing surrogate financial statements, much less surro-
gate countries.” Appx1052. The company simply says
that is not a reason to reject its argument. Case
24-221, ECF 52, at 42. But it cites no authority to over-
come the Department’s practice. 13
Dingli 	alternatively 	challenges 	Tümosan’s—but
not Türk’s—financial statements by alleging that they
may be distorted by countervailable subsidies from
two 	Turkish 	government 	programs. 	See 	Appx1052
(agency’s summary of argument). The Department re-
jected that theory because the company did not cite
“any explicit evidence” in Tümosan’s statement or the
accompanying explanatory notes. Id. The agency said
its practice is “to disqualify surrogate financial state-
ments when they indicate evidence of subsidies found
by Commerce to be countervailable.” Appx1053. It ex-
plained that the programs in question are not ones it
has found countervailable. Id.
13 And while, on reply, Dingli asserts that the government’s
arguments in support of Commerce’s decision are “unsup-
ported by substantial evidence,” Case 24-221, ECF 49, at 6,
that theory inverts the standard of review. It is not the gov-
ernment’s obligation to support its own arguments with
substantial evidence, nor must it prove that the Depart-
ment’s decision is so supported. The burden of proving that
the agency decision lacks evidentiary support falls on the
party challenging it—Dingli. See 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a)(1).
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Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 	Page 18
The company responds by citing case law, and leg-
islative history, 14 it describes as requiring the Depart-
ment to reject financial statements when there is “rea-
son to believe or suspect” that receipt of countervaila-
ble 	subsidies 	distorted 	the 	information. 	It 	argues,
“Commerce was only required to determine if there
was a reason to believe or suspect that Tümosan’s fi-
nancial statement was distorted by subsidies.” Case
24-221, ECF 52, at 42 (citing Shenzhen Xinboda Indus.
Co. v. United States, 976 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1374 (CIT
2014)).
But contrary to Dingli’s characterization, Xinboda
supports the agency’s conclusion here. First, that deci-
sion observed that “where Commerce has ‘reason to be-
lieve or suspect’ that a potential surrogate may have
benefited from subsidies that the agency has previ-
ously found to be countervailable, it is [its] practice to
disregard the financial statements of that company if
there is other useable data on the record.” 976 F. Supp.
2d at 1368 (emphasis added). As noted above, Dingli
cited no evidence that any subsidies Tümosan may
have received were ones the agency had previously
14 Peculiarly, Dingli argues that “Congress expressly in-
structs Commerce” through the legislative history. Case
24-221, ECF 52, at 43. The court disagrees. The First
Branch directs agencies through statutes. The company
fails to cite any statutory language.
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Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 	Page 19
found to be countervailable, and it cites no such evi-
dence before this court, either. 15
Second, Xinboda also stated, as the agency did
here, that in considering whether there is “reason to
believe or suspect” receipt of countervailable subsi-
dies, “Commerce relies on information in financial
statements on an ‘as is’ basis, and does not look beyond
a company’s financial statements to consider other in-
formation on the administrative record.” 976 F. Supp.
3d at 1368 (cleaned up). The Department reasonably
invoked 	that 	principle 	to 	reject 	an 	opinion 	from
Dingli’s paid expert that Tümosan “likely” received
subsidies. Appx1053. 16
Dingli then argues that Dimexlift’s financial state-
ment was superior. Id. at 47–48. It contends the state-
ment “breaks out expenses for all ‘vital’ cost and ex-
pense categories.” Id. at 48 (citing Appx2857). But the
only citation it offers in support is to a single page of
its agency case brief, which, again, is not evidence.
More importantly, Commerce explained that without
15 One of the programs Dingli flags is Turkey’s “Exemp-
tions on Banking and Insurance Transaction Tax.” Case
24-221, ECF 52, at 44. Commerce found that program is
not a countervailable subsidy because it is not specific. See
Kaptan Demir Celik Endustrisi ve Ticaret A.S. v. United
States, 803 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1280 (CIT 2025), appeal pend-
ing, No. 26-1229 (Fed. Cir.).
16 The company presumably agrees that rejection was ap-
propriate because it admits—elsewhere in its brief—that
when Commerce has a routine practice, it must apply it.
See Case 24-221, ECF 52, at 6 (citing Save Domestic Oil,
Inc. v. United States, 357 F.3d 1278, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
Case 1:24-cv-00221-MMB Document 59 Filed 09/23/26 Page 19 of 34

Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 	Page 20
the explanatory notes, it cannot confirm whether the
statement’s 	breakout 	of 	expenses 	“is 	sufficient.”
Appx1060. The company does not respond to that con-
cern. The Department’s issue was not that the state-
ment does not “break[ ] out expenses.” Its problem was
that it could not verify that the statement did so
properly. That explanation is also reasonable and con-
stitutes substantial evidence.
4
Dingli’s remaining challenges to Commerce’s selec-
tion of Turkey invite the court to re-weigh the evi-
dence. The company gives the game away with its as-
sertion that “Commerce improperly rejected Bulgaria
based on deficiencies that are minor relative to the un-
reliability of Turkey’s data.” Case 24-221, ECF 52,
at 47.
First, Dingli objects to Commerce’s finding that the
Bulgarian data lacked necessary inflators for adjust-
ing expenses. Id. (citing Appx1059). The company con-
tends that “movement expenses are not major” factors
of production, such that the inflators’ absence “does
not support rejection of Bulgaria” as the primary sur-
rogate country. Id. It doubles down on reply, insisting
that hyperinflation “is the single most important con-
sideration” and that “the alleged ‘record-based limita-
tions of Bulgaria’s dataset (movement inflators and
unusable financial statements)’ are significantly less
important.” Case 24-221, ECF 49, at 5 (citation omit-
ted) (quoting Case 24-221, ECF 55, at 27). But that de-
cision is the agency’s—not the court’s—to make.
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Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 	Page 21
Second, on reply the company asserts that the Bul-
garian inflator data were on the record after all. See
id. 	at 	18 	(citing 	Appx10051–10052, 	Appx10346–
10355). Its explanation appears to be that both it and
the Department overlooked the information because
the record was “voluminous.” See id. at 18 n.1. That is
effectively an admission that even if the inflators were
on the record, Dingli never called them to the Depart-
ment’s attention, 17 which in turn means it failed both
to exhaust its administrative remedies and to carry its
burden of building an adequate record. “The law does
not require Commerce to build the record on the plain-
tiffs’ behalf.” Linyi City Kangfa Foodstuff Drinkable
Co. v. United States, Slip Op. 16-89, at 8–9, 2016 WL
5122648, at *3 (CIT 2016) (citing QVD Food, 658 F.3d
at 1324).
Third and finally, the company attacks the Depart-
ment’s rejection of a financial statement from Bulgar-
ian 	firm 	Balkancar. 	Recall 	that 	Dingli 	submitted
statements from five Bulgarian companies, but Com-
merce found that only one—Dimexlift—produced rele-
vant merchandise. Appx1015. The company disagrees,
asserting that Balkancar makes trucks and other lift-
ing and transport equipment, as well as components
17 Dingli actually says the inflators “were not noticed by [it]
or Commerce during” the second administrative review “on
account of the voluminous [surrogate value] record.” Id.
(emphasis added). Recall that the court has rejected the
company’s effort to import information from that (later)
proceeding.
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Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 	Page 22
for them. Case 24-221, ECF 52, at 52 (citing Appx7106,
Appx7114, Appx7126).
But the Department rejected Balkancar’s data for
other reasons as well. It found that the absence of an
auditor’s opinion rendered the statement unusable.
Appx1063. The agency emphasized that without such
an opinion, it “cannot ascertain whether the financial
statements present financial information fairly in all
material respects.” Id. It said that alone is disqualify-
ing, citing a general practice of not using financial
statements that lack an auditor’s opinion if the record
contains other usable ones. Id. (citing I&D Memo,
Cmt. 1B, accompanying 85 Fed. Reg. 58,333).
Dingli objects that the Bulgarian government did
not require audited financial statements, and it con-
tends that this court has “approved” Commerce’s use
of such documentation that was suitable aside from
the lack of an auditor’s opinion. Case 24-221, ECF 52,
at 54 (citing Dingsheng, 794 F. Supp. 3d at 1343). But
Dingsheng 	noted that the Department treated the
statement as audited “based on the existence of an au-
ditor’s fee.” 794 F. Supp. 3d at 1343. The court did not
“approve” the use of unaudited statements or other-
wise address that issue. For its part, Dingli cites no
evidence to establish that Balkancar’s information
was in fact audited, nor does it dispute that the Turk-
ish statements on the record were. Under agency prac-
tice as explained by Commerce, that rendered the lat-
ter superior.
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Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 	Page 23
* 	* 	*
The court holds that the Department’s selection of
Turkey as the primary surrogate country is supported
by substantial evidence and therefore sustains it.
B
The next issue in Dingli’s case involves how the
agency compares normal value with export price. The
Department usually compares “the weighted average
of the normal values with the weighted average of the
export prices,” a process known as the “average-to-av-
erage method.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.414(b)(1), (c)(1). In
some cases, however, it instead compares the weighted
average of the normal values to the export prices for
individual transactions—the “average-to-transaction
method.” Id. § 351.414(b)(3). The former is the default
unless the agency finds a different procedure more ap-
propriate in a particular case. Id. § 351.414(c)(1).
Here, Commerce used a test known as Cohen’s d to
assess whether the alternative “average-to-transac-
tion” method was more appropriate, but it concluded
in the negative. Appx1080. Dingli attacks the agency’s
use of that test as unlawful. Case 24-221, ECF 52, at
55–56 (citing Marmen Inc v. United States, 134 F.4th
1334, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2025)).
Both the government and the Coalition observe
that the Department found the test results did not
warrant a departure from the default “average-to-av-
erage” method that Dingli wanted the agency to use.
Case 	24-221, 	ECF 	55, 	at 	57 	(government); 	Case
24-221, ECF 51, at 8 (Coalition). They urge the court
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Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 	Page 24
to dismiss the company’s claim on this issue for lack of
standing because the company cannot show either an
injury in fact or that the court can provide redress.
Case 24-221, ECF 55, at 57–58; Case 24-221, ECF 51,
at 9–11.
The court disagrees that the company lacks stand-
ing. Dingli has indisputably suffered injury in fact
from Commerce’s imposition of antidumping duties on
its products. In this suit, it seeks to have the agency
reconsider its calculation of those duties and thereby
reduce them, if not eliminate them altogether.
If the court were to remand the selection of a pri-
mary surrogate country for purposes of that calcula-
tion, the company could conceivably suffer a negative
result from the Department’s use of Cohen’s d—after
all, the use of Bulgarian data would change the under-
lying information and thus Dingli’s margin. The poten-
tial for obtaining relief from that potentially adverse
outcome suffices for constitutional standing purposes.
“Where Congress has accorded a procedural right to a
litigant, such as the right to appeal an administrative
decision, certain requirements of standing—namely
immediacy and redressability, as well as prudential
aspects that are not part of Article III—may be re-
laxed.” 	Dalian Meisen Woodworking Co. v. United
States, 571 F. Supp. 3d 1364, 1380 (CIT 2021) (cleaned
up) (quoting Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Rsch.
Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
But the court is not remanding the primary surro-
gate country issue (nor any other), so even if the
agency’s use of Cohen’s d was error, it was harmless in
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Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 	Page 25
this context. Thus, there is no need for the court to
take up that question, much less remand it to the
agency for reconsideration. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (provid-
ing that when a court hears a challenge to an agency
action, “due account shall be taken of the rule of prej-
udicial error”); Suntec Indus. Co. v. United States, 85
F.3d 1363, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that § 706
“requires application of a traditional harmless-error
analysis and . . . the person seeking relief from the er-
ror has the burden of showing prejudice caused by” it).
C
Dingli argues that it was “unlawful” for Commerce
to deduct Section 301 duties 18 from its U.S. sales
prices. By statute, the Department must adjust the
U.S. price (the export price) by deducting
the amount, if any, included in such price, at-
tributable to any additional costs, charges, or ex-
penses, and United States import duties, which
are incident to bringing the subject merchandise
from the original place of shipment in the ex-
porting country to the place of delivery in the
United States.
19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
18 Section 301 duties are meant to combat certain trade
practices in foreign countries. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (author-
izing such duties); Appx1081–1083 (agency explanation).
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Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 	Page 26
Dingli 	acknowledges 	four 	cases 19 	in 	which 	this
court has held that Section 301 levies are deductible
as “import duties,” but says that it “respectfully disa-
grees with [all of them] and requests that this Court
find that Section 301 duties are special duties and
therefore are not deductible.” Case 24-221, ECF 52,
at 57. It argues that they are “special duties” because
their purpose is to convince the Chinese government
to eliminate unfair trade practices. Id. at 61.
The company’s opening brief conspicuously ignores
the Federal Circuit’s decision in Borusan Mannes-
mann Boru Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S. v. United States, 63
F.4th 25 (Fed. Cir. 2023), which affirmed a CIT ruling
sustaining the Department’s deduction of Section 232
duties 20 from U.S. prices. The court of appeals defined
the question as “whether a duty is to be imposed on top
of the amount of antidumping duties that would be due
without the [Section 232] duty or, instead, is to partly
or wholly substitute for such duties.” Id. at 34.
To answer that question, the court held it is neces-
sary to examine the document imposing the levy. If it
is in addition to any other duties, it is a “United States
19 Shanghai Tainai Bearing Co. v. United States, Slip Op.
24-143, 2024 WL 5154030 (CIT 2024); Shanghai Tainai
Bearing Co. v. United States, Slip Op. 24-142, 2024 WL
5154032 (CIT 2024), appeal pending, No. 25-1405 (Fed.
Cir.); Jinko Solar Imp. & Exp. Co. v. United States, 701 F.
Supp. 3d 1367 (CIT 2024); and Neimenggu Fufeng Biotechs.
Co. v. United States, 741 F. Supp. 3d 1354 (CIT 2024).
20 The term “Section 232 duties” refers to levies imposed
under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19
U.S.C. § 1862. See 63 F.4th at 27.
Case 1:24-cv-00221-MMB Document 59 Filed 09/23/26 Page 26 of 34

Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 	Page 27
import duty.” Id. “[I]n addition to any other duties”
means “that, when applied to an article covered by an-
tidumping duties, the [additional] and antidumping
duties must together result in a full imposition of both
duties.” Id. at 35. “Producing that result requires the
antidumping duty to be calculated as if the [Section
232] duty did not exist”—that is, by subtracting the
latter from the U.S. price. Id. Otherwise, the anti-
dumping duty would decrease “(through an increase in
the U.S. price and therefore a decrease in the dumping
margin), defeating the evident ‘in addition to’ prescrip-
tion.” Id.
The U.S. Trade Representative’s notice imposing
the Section 301 duties states that relevant Chinese
products “will be subject to an additional ad valorem
duty of 25 percent. The rates of duty . . . apply in ad-
dition to all other applicable duties, fees, exactions, and
charges.” 	83 	Fed. 	Reg. 	40,823, 	40,824 	(emphasis
added). Under Borusan, that language resolves the is-
sue. The Section 301 duties must be deducted from the
U.S. price.
On reply, Dingli responds that Borusan does not
apply because Section 232 duties address national se-
curity, whereas the Section 301 levies “serve a trade-
related, 	remedial 	purpose.” 	Case 	24-221, 	ECF 	49,
at 26. That argument is frivolous.
The company ignores Borusan’s ratio decidendi—
its reasoning “that allows it to have life and effect in
the disposition of future cases.” AM/NS Calvert LLC
v. United States, 654 F. Supp. 3d 1324, 1345 (CIT
2023) (quoting Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83, 104
Case 1:24-cv-00221-MMB Document 59 Filed 09/23/26 Page 27 of 34

Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 	Page 28
(2020)). The Federal Circuit did not rely on what sub-
ject the duties addressed. Instead, it emphasized that
the words of the proclamation or other notice imposing
the duty control. Borusan, 63 F.4th at 34. The court
also emphasized that it was not grounding its decision
in Chevron deference because its analysis reflected
“[t]he best interpretation of the statute.” Id. at 36.
This court, in turn, is bound by the Federal Cir-
cuit’s construction of 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(A). For
that reason, Dingli’s assertion that the court should
“decline Defendants’ invitations to extend Borusan
and endorse Shanghai Tainai . . . and the other rulings
of this Court,” Case 24-221, ECF 49, at 25–26, com-
pletely misses the point.
None 	of 	the 	CIT 	opinions 	Dingli 	criticizes
“extended” Borusan. They faithfully applied its ratio
decidendi 	and 	rejected 	the 	same 	arguments 	the
company makes here. See Jinko, 701 F. Supp. 3d at
1392 (“Although Jinko contends that Borusan . . .
involved 	Section 	232 	duties 	concerning 	national
security, 	[that 	case] 	rejects 	such 	statute-wide
distinctions. Rather, it is the text of the order imposing
the duty that controls.”) (emphasis added); Fufeng, 741
F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	1381 	(rejecting 	argument 	that
Borusan’s rationale is limited to Section 232 duties
and finding it “suggests a much wider sweep” because
of its “implementing instrument–specific approach”);
Shanghai Tainai, 658 F. Supp. 3d at 1294 (stating that
the 	principle 	of 	examining 	the 	implementing
instrument to ascertain whether duties are in addition
to other levies, “as elucidated in Borusan, extends
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Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 	Page 29
beyond 	Section 	232 	duties 	and 	applies 	to 	other
statutory duties”).
The court therefore sustains Commerce’s deduction
of Section 301 duties from Dingli’s U.S. sales price.
* 	* 	*
Dingli’s numerous attacks on Commerce’s determi-
nation fail across the board. In Case 24-221, the court
therefore denies the company’s motion for judgment on
the agency record (ECF 52) and sustains the agency’s
decision. A separate judgment will enter. See USCIT
R. 58(a).
III
Turning to the Coalition’s case, it attacks two as-
pects of Commerce’s final decision. The court considers
these points in turn.
A
The Department used Bulgarian Harmonized Tar-
iff 	Schedule 	(HTS) 	codes 	to 	value 	three 	inputs.
Appx1083–1084. It explained that only those codes
provided appropriate values. Appx1083.
The Coalition disputes that characterization, argu-
ing that for every input, it identified a Turkish 12-digit
HTS code that was specific, while Dingli “identified
more general, 6- or 8-digit Bulgarian HTS codes.” Case
24-219, ECF 52, at 14–15 (citing Appx2641). The group
contends that the agency’s use of Bulgarian data is un-
supported by substantial evidence and unlawful.
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Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 	Page 30
The Coalition’s argument is essentially the same
for all three inputs. Dingli proposed a six- or eight-
digit Bulgarian code and the group responded by pro-
posing a 12-digit Turkish code that ended in “0000.”
See id. at 15–16 (citing Appx12912–12913, the Coali-
tion’s agency submission). The Coalition explains that
Turkey and Bulgaria both use the European Union’s
Integrated Tariff system, which it says means their
subheadings are identical down to the eight-digit level.
Id. at 16. It also argues that “a code ending in ‘00.00’
represents a subheading that does not get any more
specific.” Id. As a result, the group contends, the sub-
headings were the same, so Commerce erred by not us-
ing data from the primary surrogate country—Turkey.
Id.
Dingli argued that the record was unclear about
whether the Turkish codes ending in -.0000 were in
fact the only 12-digit codes corresponding to their
shorter 	parents. 	Id. 	(citing 	Appx1085–1086). 	Com-
merce agreed and found no record evidence proving
that the Coalition had provided every 12-digit Turkish
code for the relevant six- or eight-digit subheadings.
Appx1086.
The group now contends that finding was wrong be-
cause it “expressly represented to Commerce” that it
had provided data for “every HS subheading at the 12-
digit 	level 	comprising” 	the 	Turkish 	equivalents 	to
Dingli’s six-digit Bulgarian headings. Case 24-219,
ECF 	52, 	at 	17 	(emphasis 	in 	original) 	(citing
Appx12655–12695). “Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1001,
which subjects parties to criminal penalties for know-
ingly making material false statements to the U.S.
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Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 	Page 31
Government, that representation was presumptively
true.” Id.
The court disagrees. Section 1001 does not obligate
the agency to accept on faith an interested party’s rep-
resentations concerning factual matters.
The Department’s (reasonable) point was that the
Coalition offered no evidence supporting its claim. The
group submitted an Excel spreadsheet it claimed was
exhaustive. As the government notes, however, “the
Coalition could have provided relevant excerpts from
the Turkish tariff schedule containing the entire 12-
digit HS breakouts under the six-digit HS but failed to
do 	so.” 	Case 	24-219, 	ECF 	56, 	at 	38–39 	(citing
Appx1084). And Dingli asserts that “instead of self-
created Excel sheets, the Coalition should have sub-
mitted 	‘relevant 	excerpts 	[in 	PDF] 	. 	. 	. 	.’୻” 21 	Case
24-219, ECF 51, at 5 (brackets in original) (quoting
Case 24-219, ECF 56, at 39).
Finally, the Coalition also argues that the Depart-
ment had to give preference to Turkish data because
that country was the primary surrogate. Case 24-219,
ECF 52, at 15, 28–29 (opening brief); Case 24-219,
ECF 53, at 3, 10–11, 19–20 (reply). But the statute al-
lows for the use of multiple surrogate countries when
the 	agency 	finds 	it 	necessary. 	See 	19 	U.S.C.
§ 1677b(c)(1) (allowing use of data from “a market
21 Dingli also contends that, in the agency proceedings, the
Coalition was untimely in asserting that its Excel submis-
sions were comprehensive. It calls that claim “new factual
information” and says it “should be rejected.” Case 24-219,
ECF 51, at 5. That is an issue for Commerce, not this court.
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Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 	Page 32
economy country or countries” Commerce considers
appropriate) (emphasis added). That’s what happened
here. Contrary to the Coalition’s argument, it was not
unlawful for the agency to use Bulgaria as a secondary
source.
B
The Coalition’s other data-quality argument in-
volves the Turkish HTS codes the Department used to
value brakes, steel forearm articles, and circuit break-
ers. It again complains that it identified 12-digit Turk-
ish subheadings specific to the inputs, but the agency
instead selected Dingli’s “more general” six-digit Turk-
ish codes. The group calls that finding unsupported by
substantial evidence and not in accordance with law.
Case 24-219, ECF 52, at 29.
As it did with the “Bulgarian versus Turkish head-
ings” issue, the agency rejected the Coalition’s offer-
ings because there was no record evidence that the
subheadings the group listed represented the entire
universe 	of 	potential 	codes. 	See, 	e.g., 	Appx1093
(brakes) (“There is no record evidence that five Turk-
ish 12-digit breakouts comprise parent HS 8708.30.”).
While 	the 	group 	argues 	that 	“Commerce’s 	factual
premise was incorrect because all Turkish 12-digit
subheadings were on the record,” Case 24-219, ECF
52, at 32, it again fails to cite actual evidence substan-
tiating its claim.
In urging the court to reject the Coalition’s argu-
ments, Dingli cites a decision memorandum in which
the Department explained that an HTS category with
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Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 	Page 33
more digits might be too specific, “overly-narrow rela-
tive to the input used by the respondent.” Case 24-219,
ECF 51, at 22 (quoting I&D Memo, Cmt. I.C., accom-
panying 78 Fed. Reg. 28,803).
That point is valid. Commerce’s role in an anti-
dumping duty case is not to “engage in a classification
analysis to determine which HTS subheading con-
tained the relevant input.” Mobile Access I, Slip Op.
24-66, at 21, 2024 WL 2796654, at *7 (cleaned up) (cit-
ing Downhole Pipe, 776 F.3d at 1379). Its task instead
is “to determine which of the competing sub-headings
constituted the best available information for valuing
[the] input.” Id. (quoting 776 F.3d at 1379). That is
what the Department did here for brakes and steel
forearm articles. It explained that, absent actual rec-
ord evidence proving that the Coalition’s 12-digit pro-
posals were in fact specific, the six-digit categories
Dingli offered were “sufficiently specific to the inputs
in question.” Appx1093 (brakes); Appx1094 (forearm
articles).
Finally, 	Commerce 	rejected 	the 	Coalition’s 	pro-
posed circuit-breaker code for a different reason. The
group argued that the 12-digit subcategories’ applica-
tion depended on whether the breaker is a “household
miniature” unit and that the amperage of Dingli’s in-
put 	meant 	only 	one 	subheading 	could 	apply.
Appx1104. The Department responded that it was un-
clear whether the devices’ functionality differed in any
substantial way from the “household miniature” type,
even recognizing the different settings for their use,
and it found no record evidence showing the amperage
rating for Dingli’s breakers. Appx1105.
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Ct. Nos. 24-00219, 24-00221 	Page 34
The Coalition responds by asking the court to weigh
the evidence. It contends the agency credited Dingli’s
“unsupported assertion that its circuit breakers could
be similar to household circuit breakers (with no evi-
dence to that effect) over Petitioner’s facially reasona-
ble deduction that they are not.” Case 24-219, ECF 52,
at 40 (emphasis in original). It is not this court’s role,
however, to decide whether a “deduction” is “reasona-
ble,” much less whose claim deserves credit.
The group also attacks the finding that Dingli’s re-
porting of its input as “circuit breaker—20 A, 125/220
V,” was insufficient, by itself, to establish that it could
not fall within HTS subcategories covering higher-
rated breakers because nothing in the record showed
they were definitively excluded from such broader
headings. 	Id. 	at 37–38. Commerce 	found that the
stated amperage related only to one part, not neces-
sarily to the entire circuit breaker, Appx1104–1105,
such that there was “no record evidence to determine
whether Dingli’s circuit breaker should be rated above
or below 63 amps.” Appx1105. Again, for the court to
disagree, it would have to weigh the evidence.
* 	* 	*
The Coalition’s limited challenge to Commerce’s de-
termination fails. In Case 24-219, the court therefore
denies the group’s motion for judgment on the agency
record (ECF 52) and sustains the agency’s decision. A
separate judgment will enter. See USCIT R. 58(a).
Dated: 	September 23, 2026 	/s/ M. Miller Baker
New York, NY 	Judge
Case 1:24-cv-00221-MMB Document 59 Filed 09/23/26 Page 34 of 34