Uttam Galva Steels Limited v. United States

Slip Op. 21-48
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
UTTAM GALVA STEELS LIMITED,
Plaintiff,
v.
Before: Leo M. Gordon, Judge
UNITED STATES,
Court No. 19-00044
Defendant,
and
CALIFORNIA STEEL INDUSTRIES, INC.,
and STEEL DYNAMICS, INC.,
Defendant-Intervenors.
OPINION
[Commerce’s Second Remand Results sustained.]
Dated: April 29, 2021
John M. Gurley and Aman Kakar, Arent Fox LLP, of Washington, DC, for Plaintiff
Uttam Galva Steels Limited.
Mollie 	L. 	Finnan, 	Senior 	Trial 	Counsel, 	Commercial 	Litigation 	Branch, 	Civil
Division, U.S. Department of Justice of Washington, DC, for Defendant United States.
With her on the brief were Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, and Claudia Burke, Assistant Director. Of counsel on the
brief was Rachel Bogdan, Attorney, U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of the Chief
Counsel for Trade Enforcement and Compliance of Washington, DC.
Case 1:19-cv-00044-LMG Document 62 Filed 04/29/21 Page 1 of 15

Court No. 19-00044 	Page 2
Gordon, Judge: This action involves the final results of the 2016 administrative
review 	conducted 	by 	the 	U.S. 	Department 	of 	Commerce 	(“Commerce”) 	of 	the
countervailing duty (“CVD”) order of certain corrosion-resistant steel products from India.
See Certain Corrosion-Resistant Steel Products from India, 84 Fed. Reg. 11,053 (Dep’t
of Commerce Mar. 25, 2019) (final results admin. review) (“Final Results”); see also
accompanying 	Issues 	and 	Decision 	Memorandum, 	C-533-864, 	PD 1 193 	(Dep’t 	of
Commerce 	Mar. 	18, 	2019), 	available 	at
https://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/india/2019-05647-1.pdf (last visited this date)
(“Decision Memorandum”).
Before the court are Commerce’s Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to
Court Remand, ECF No. 45 2 (“Second Remand Results”), filed pursuant to the court’s
remand order in Uttam Galva Steels Ltd. v. United States, 44 CIT ___, 476 F. Supp. 3d
1387 (2020) (“Uttam Galva II”). See Plaintiff’s Comments on Remand Redetermination,
ECF No. 51 (“Pl.’s Br.”); see also Defendant’s Response to Comments on Remand
Redetermination, ECF No. 56 (“Def.’s Resp.”). 	The court has jurisdiction pursuant to
Section 	516A(a)(2)(B)(iii) 	of 	the 	Tariff 	Act 	of 	1930, 	as 	amended, 	19 	U.S.C.
1 “PD” refers to a document in the public administrative record, which is found in ECF
No. 20-3, unless otherwise noted. 	“CD” refers to a document in the confidential
administrative record, which is found in ECF No. 20-2, unless otherwise noted.
2 All citations to the Second Remand Results, the agency record, and the parties’ briefs
are to their confidential versions unless otherwise noted.
Case 1:19-cv-00044-LMG Document 62 Filed 04/29/21 Page 2 of 15

Court No. 19-00044 	Page 3
§ 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii) 3 , and 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (2018). For the reasons follow, the court
sustains the Second Remand Results.
I. Background
Although the court assumes familiarity with the procedural history and its prior
decision in this matter, some additional background will aid the reader. 	Commerce
assigned adverse facts available (“AFA”) rates totaling 588.42% to Uttam Galva Steels
Limited (“Uttam Galva” or “Plaintiff”) due to Uttam Galva’s failure to provide information
about its affiliation with Lloyds Steel Industry Limited (“LSIL”). See Final Results, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 11,054.
Uttam Galva subsequently challenged several aspects of the Final Results, and
Commerce sought a voluntary remand to correct certain errors identified by Uttam Galva.
See Uttam Galva Steels Ltd. v. United States, 44 CIT ___, 425 F. Supp. 3d 1366 (2020)
(“Uttam Galva I”); Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand, ECF
No. 35 (“First Remand Results”). In the initial remand, Commerce corrected the errors in
the calculation and application of AFA rates for the subsidy programs identified in Uttam
Galva I, but determined that it would continue to apply the same AFA rates to all of the
other remaining programs identified in the Final Results based on the adverse inference
that Uttam Galva benefitted from all initiated programs. See First Remand Results at 6–7.
3 Further citations to the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, are to the relevant provisions of
Title 19 of the U.S. Code, 2018 edition.
Case 1:19-cv-00044-LMG Document 62 Filed 04/29/21 Page 3 of 15

Court No. 19-00044 	Page 4
Uttam Galva challenged the First Remand Results, contending that Commerce
failed to reasonably explain the differences in its application of AFA to Uttam Galva in the
review as compared to JSW, a mandatory respondent during the underlying investigation.
See Uttam Galva II, 44 CIT at ___, 476 F. Supp. 3d at 1391–92. The court agreed and
remanded the matter again for Commerce to explain why it chose to apply AFA differently
to Uttam Galva as compared to JSW. See Uttam Galva II, 44 CIT at ___, 476 F. Supp.
3d at 1392 (“While there may have been factual distinctions between the application of
AFA to JSW in the investigation and the application of AFA to Uttam Galva in this review,
Commerce failed to identify them and explain what distinguished Uttam Galva’s situation
from that of JSW…. The court therefore remands this issue so Commerce may provide
a reasoned explanation for the differences in its application of AFA to JSW and Uttam
Galva, and, if appropriate, reconsider its application of AFA to Uttam Galva.”).
On 	remand, 	Commerce 	provided 	the 	requested 	explanation, 	noting 	that 	it
“continue[d] to find that the facts of this review warrant application of total AFA to Uttam
Galva.” Second Remand Results at 7. Commerce reiterated that its standard practice is
to apply total AFA due to a respondent’s failure to properly report affiliates/cross-owned
companies. 	Id. at 7–8, 16 (citing First Remand Results at 5–6 and 18–21). Commerce
went on to explain that “the only remaining issue is whether a departure from this practice
is appropriate with respect to Uttam Galva given application of partial AFA to JSW for its
failure [to] timely report a cross-owned affiliate in the investigation.” Id. at 8. Like Uttam
Galva, JSW initially failed to properly report the existence of an affiliate. 	Id. at 10.
Case 1:19-cv-00044-LMG Document 62 Filed 04/29/21 Page 4 of 15

Court No. 19-00044 	Page 5
However, JSW voluntarily raised and corrected its failure at the start of the verification.
Id. 	Additionally, the late-disclosed entity was only an operational affiliate of JSW for a
short period of time, i.e. the last two months of the investigation. Id. at 11.
In contrast to JSW, Commerce explained that there were not “any factors that
would warrant a departure from our practice regarding application of total AFA” for Uttam
Galva. Id. at 11. “[T]he circumstances surrounding [Commerce’s] AFA determination for
each company were different.” Id. at 8, 20. First, despite multiple opportunities to report
its affiliation, Uttam Galva only addressed its relationship with LSIL after Commerce
directly prompted Uttam Galva for an explanation in a supplemental questionnaire. See
id. at 11. And, when Uttam Galva finally addressed its relationship with LSIL, Commerce
determined 	that 	“Uttam 	Galva mischaracterized 	its 	acquisition 	of 	Lloyds 	Steel 	by
‘provid[ing] false information that it acquired control of a single division of Lloyds Steel…
without providing any detail regarding how Lloyds Steel was in fact acquired as a
whole.…’” 	Id. 	Second, LSIL was affiliated with Uttam Galva for the entire period of
review. 	Id. 	at 10–11 (contrasting the facts in the underlying review with the fact that in
the investigation, “the affiliate JSW initially failed to report to Commerce was operational
only during the last two months of the period investigation.”).
Uttam Galva now challenges as unreasonable Commerce’s explanation and
continued determination to apply total AFA in the Second Remand Results. See Pl.’s Br.
at 5–12.
Case 1:19-cv-00044-LMG Document 62 Filed 04/29/21 Page 5 of 15

Court No. 19-00044 	Page 6
II. Standard of Review
The court sustains Commerce’s “determinations, findings, or conclusions” unless
they are “unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). More specifically, when reviewing
agency determinations, findings or conclusions for substantial evidence, the court
assesses whether the agency action is reasonable given the record as a whole. Nippon
Steel Corp. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1345, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 	Substantial
evidence has been described as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” DuPont Teijin Films USA v. United States,
407 F.3d 1211, 1215 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S.
197, 229 (1938)). Substantial evidence has also been described as “something less than
the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions
from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being
supported by substantial evidence.” 	Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620
(1966).
Fundamentally, though, “substantial evidence” is best understood as a word
formula connoting reasonableness review. 3 Charles H. Koch, Jr. Administrative Law and
Practice § 9.24[1] (3d ed. 2021). 	Therefore, when addressing a substantial evidence
issue raised by a party, the court analyzes whether the challenged agency action “was
reasonable given the circumstances presented by the whole record.” 	8A West’s Fed.
Forms, National Courts § 3.6 (5th ed. 2020).
Case 1:19-cv-00044-LMG Document 62 Filed 04/29/21 Page 6 of 15

Court No. 19-00044 	Page 7
III. Discussion
In the investigation segment of the underlying proceeding, Commerce selected two
mandatory respondents: Uttam Galva and JSW. See Certain Corrosion-Resistant Steel
Products from India, 81 Fed. Reg. 35,323 (Dep’t of Commerce June 2, 2016) (final affirm.
determ.), and accompanying Issues and Decision Memorandum at 1, available at
https://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/india/2016-12967-1.pdf (last visited on this
date). 	Commerce found that JSW failed to submit a response for a cross-owned input
supplier (“Affiliate X”) and determined that the application of AFA was appropriate. See
id. at 8–9. 	In applying AFA in calculating JSW’s subsidy rate, Commerce did not apply
adverse inferences to all programs initiated upon during the investigation. 	See id. at 9.
(“[W]e made an adverse inference that Affiliate X benefitted from all of the programs used
by the other entities within the JSW group of companies that did properly submit
questionnaire responses.”); see also First Remand Results at 18 (“we acknowledge that
we did not countervail all programs initiated upon when determining the subsidy rate for
JSW”); Second Remand Results at 9 (“We acknowledge that, in select instances, such
as in the case of JSW in the investigation in this proceeding, Commerce has deviated
from [the application of total AFA] due to mitigating factors.”). In the administrative review
here, Commerce similarly found that Uttam Galva had failed to report the existence of an
affiliate, LSIL, providing the basis for the application of AFA. See Decision Memorandum
at 24. 	In calculating Uttam Galva’s subsidy rate, however, Commerce applied adverse
inferences for all programs initiated upon with respect to LSIL. 	Remand Results at 18
Case 1:19-cv-00044-LMG Document 62 Filed 04/29/21 Page 7 of 15

Court No. 19-00044 	Page 8
(“while we acknowledge that we did not countervail all programs initiated upon when
determining the subsidy rate for JSW in the investigation, as we explain below, this does
not require us to deviate from our standard practice where companies fail to report all of
their cross-owned entities in this segment of the proceeding…”).
In the Second Remand Results, Commerce reiterated that it “has a practice of
applying total AFA where a company does not timely report its affiliations.” 	Second
Remand Results at 16. 	Commerce explained that the difference in its application of
adverse inferences to Uttam Galva and JSW was reasonable “because the circumstances
surrounding [the] AFA determinations for each company were different.” 	Id. at 8.
Commerce noted that there were several factual distinctions between its application of
AFA to Uttam Galva and JSW, including significant “mitigating factors,” which Commerce
found to justify its more lenient application of AFA to JSW as compared to Uttam Galva.
See id. at 9.
Specifically, Commerce emphasized the differing levels of cooperation on the part
of JSW and Uttam Galva, noting that “a full explanation of Uttam Galva’s affiliation/cross-
ownership with LSIL was only obtained because of Commerce’s inquiry into the issue.”
Id. at 10–11. Commerce also points to Uttam Galva’s failure to comment in response to
Commerce’s placing of LSIL’s financial statement on the record, and highlights the
prodding required to elicit any information from Uttam Galva regarding its relationship with
LSIL. See id. at 8–9 (“Only after Commerce issued a third supplemental questionnaire to
Uttam 	Galva 	specifically, 	seeking 	additional 	clarification 	regarding 	the 	relationship
Case 1:19-cv-00044-LMG Document 62 Filed 04/29/21 Page 8 of 15

Court No. 19-00044 	Page 9
between itself and FIIPL, MEEL, and LSIL, did Uttam Galva provide the information.”). In
contrast, Commerce states that JSW “voluntarily reported” Affiliate X following the
conclusion of the period of review. See id. at 10, 11 (“JSW raised this issue at the start
of 	verification 	as 	a 	‘minor 	correction’ 	to 	its 	affiliation 	questionnaire 	response.”).
Commerce also emphasized that Uttam Galva, unlike JSW, misrepresented the facts
surrounding its acquisition of an affiliate. See id. at 10 (quoting finding in Post-Preliminary
Analysis that Uttam Galva “provided false information that it acquired control of a single
division of Lloyds Steel as a corporate entity, without providing any detail regarding how
Lloyds Steel was in fact acquired as {a} whole, and only during the POR effectively divided
into two affiliated companies, UVSL and LSIL.”).
A. Comparison of Application of AFA to Uttam Galva and JSW
Uttam Galva contends that “Commerce’s explanations in the Second Remand
Redetermination are not satisfactory and do not offer sufficient reasons for treating similar
situations differently.” See Pl.’s Br. at 6; see also id. at 12 (“There is no factual distinction
of significance that would support differing treatment for JSW and Uttam Galva.”). Uttam
Galva argues that Commerce improperly distinguished Uttam Galva from JSW based on
an unreasonable view of the differing “confluence of facts.” 	See id. at 2 (“[E]ach
proceeding before Commerce will present a unique set of facts, Commerce should not
treat similarly situated respondents different because the same confluence of facts does
not exist in different proceedings.”). 	Uttam Galva maintains that the underlying facts
surrounding the application of AFA to Uttam Galva were largely the same as those for
Case 1:19-cv-00044-LMG Document 62 Filed 04/29/21 Page 9 of 15

Court No. 19-00044 	Page 10
JSW, and therefore, it should be treated the same as JSW. 	Id. at 11–12. 	In particular,
Uttam 	Galva 	contends 	that 	Commerce’s 	reliance 	on 	“mitigating 	factors” 	as 	the
distinguishing consideration as to the application of AFA to JSW as compared to Uttam
Galva is unreasonable. Id. at 9. Uttam Galva argues that Commerce was in fact “better
positioned” to investigate Uttam Galva’s unreported affiliate, LSIL, because the record
remained open at the time of Commerce’s discovery of the affiliate, whereas the record
was 	closed 	when 	Commerce 	discovered 	the 	undisclosed 	affiliate 	of 	JSW 	in 	the
investigation segment of the proceeding. See id.
Commerce rejected Uttam Galva’s arguments that JSW and Uttam Galva were
similarly situated meriting the same application of AFA. 	See Second Remand Results
at 18–20. As Commerce explained:
Uttam Galva contends that Commerce’s analysis indicates
that the factual distinctions between JSW’s and Uttam Galva’s
reporting 	are 	not 	meaningful. 	Uttam 	Galva 	misstates
Commerce’s position, as laid out in the draft remand. 	In the
draft remand, we explicitly noted that it was the confluence of
mitigating factors that led to partial application of AFA for
JSW. We emphasized that the particular facts of that case –
e.g., where an unreported affiliate was operational for only a
portion of the period of investigation/review, or where the
respondent attempted to self-correct its response unprompted
by Commence – may not, when viewed alone, render total
AFA inappropriate. Rather, we emphasized that those facts,
taken together, guided our approach to selecting a (partial)
AFA rate for JSW.
Id. at 18. 	Commerce also dismissed Uttam Galva’s argument as to the timing of its
reporting of its affiliation with LSIL, noting that:
Case 1:19-cv-00044-LMG Document 62 Filed 04/29/21 Page 10 of 15

Court No. 19-00044 	Page 11
[w]hether 	Uttam 	Galva 	reported 	LSIL 	in 	response 	to
Commerce’s placement of information on the record or in
response to Commerce’s subsequent questionnaire, the end
result is the same: It was approximately a year after issuance
of the initial CVD questionnaire that Uttam Galva reported its
relationship with LSIL, and, unlike in the investigation where
JSW voluntarily informed Commerce of its affiliate, Uttam
Galva did not volunteer information regarding LSIL until after
Commerce placed the LSIL financial statement on the record
and issued supplemental questions regarding LSIL to Uttam
Galva.
Id. Commerce further explained that:
[the 	agency] 	only 	discovered 	Uttam 	Galva’s 	and 	LSIL’s
affiliation after placing affiliation/cross-ownership information
on the record upon discovering an unreported relationship
between Uttam Galva and LSIL and soliciting additional
information from Uttam Galva on this issue. We find this fact
relevant to our decision to apply total AFA to Uttam Galva in
the administrative review as compared with our application of
partial AFA to JSW in the investigation. 	Also relevant is the
fact that JSW’s affiliate was only operational during the final
two months of the POR, while LSIL was operational during the
entirety of the POR.
Id. at 19 (footnotes omitted).
Plaintiff also argues that Commerce was better positioned to investigate and
collect information as to Uttam Galva’s affiliation with LSIL. 	Commerce rejected this
argument highlighting that it was previously addressed by the court and that Uttam Galva
“‘ignore[d] 	the 	importance 	that 	Commerce 	places 	on 	receiving 	affiliated 	company
information early in the proceeding.’” Id. at 19 (citing Uttam Galva I). Commerce further
emphasized that the affiliation only became apparent after placing affiliation/cross-
ownership 	information 	on 	the 	record 	upon 	discovering 	an 	unreported 	relationship
Case 1:19-cv-00044-LMG Document 62 Filed 04/29/21 Page 11 of 15

Court No. 19-00044 	Page 12
between Uttam Galva and LSIL and soliciting additional information from Uttam Galva on
this issue. Id. This combined with the fact that LSIL was operational during the entirety
of the POR as compared to JSW’s affiliate that was operational for only the last two
months of the investigation provides a reasonable basis for Commerce’s determination.
See id. 	In sum, given this analysis and explanation, the court is not persuaded by
Plaintiff’s 	contentions 	that 	Commerce’s 	determination 	to 	apply 	total 	AFA 	was
unreasonable.
B. Comparison of Application of AFA in other Proceedings
Alternatively, Uttam Galva maintains that even if Commerce has reasonably
distinguished its treatment of Uttam Galva as compared to JSW, Commerce has still failed
to address its application of partial AFA in other proceedings with similar circumstances.
See Pl.’s Br. at 6–10 (citing Carbon and Alloy Steel Threaded Rod from the People’s
Republic of China, 85 Fed. Reg. 8833 (Dep’t of Commerce Feb. 18, 2020) (final. determ.
CVD investigation) (“CASTR from China”), and Certain Plastic Ribbon from the People's
Republic of China, 84 Fed. Reg. 1064 (Dep’t of Commerce Feb. 1, 2019) (final determ.
CVD 	investigation) 	(“Plastic 	Ribbon 	from 	China”). 	Uttam 	Galva 	contends 	that
Commerce’s decision to apply partial AFA to similarly situated respondents in other
proceedings demonstrates that Commerce’s application of total AFA to Uttam Galva here
is unreasonable. See Pl.’s Br. at 6.
Uttam Galva maintains that “Commerce’s recounting of the CASTR from China
case and the facts surrounding the partial AFA application seek to minimize the similarity
Case 1:19-cv-00044-LMG Document 62 Filed 04/29/21 Page 12 of 15

Court No. 19-00044 	Page 13
between the underlying administrative review” and the proceeding in CASTR from China.
Pl.’s Br. at 7. Commerce addressed Uttam Galva’s proposed comparison of its situation
to that in CASTR from China, explaining that:
Commerce’s approach in CASTR from China is inapposite,
however, 	because 	the 	facts 	are 	dissimilar 	to 	the 	facts
surrounding Uttam Galva’s reporting failure in this case.
There, 	the 	respondent, 	Junyue, 	timely 	identified 	two
companies 	as 	affiliated 	parties, 	but 	did 	not 	accurately
describe 	the 	companies’ 	operations. 	Subsequently, 	at
verification, Commerce learned that the two affiliates provided
processing and manufacturing services; these facts were
relevant to Commerce’s attribution analysis and, in turn,
relevant to Commerce’s decision as to whether to solicit a
questionnaire response from the affiliates. 	Thus, there, the
question was not whether affiliates were identified as such in
the first instance. 	Rather, the reporting deficiency related to
whether Junyue provided complete information regarding the
affiliates. 	Similar to identifying a confluence of mitigating
factors that distinguished application of partial AFA to JSW in
the investigation, under the circumstances in CASTR from
China, 	Commerce 	determined 	that 	total 	AFA 	was 	not
warranted. Here, in contrast, Uttam Galva’s relationship with
LSIL went unreported until Commerce placed information on
the 	record 	and 	solicited 	a 	response 	on 	the 	matter.
Additionally, as noted below, we determined that Uttam Galva
provided certain information that did not accurately reflect its
relationship to LSIL. Thus, we find that the facts of this review
are distinct from those surrounding Junyue’s reporting in
CASTR from China.
Second Remand Results at 16–17.
Uttam 	Galva 	further 	challenges 	Commerce’s 	determination 	that 	the 	affiliate
information belatedly provided in CASTR from China was “voluntary.” 	See id. 	Uttam
Galva’s 	conclusory 	assertions 	that 	Commerce 	is 	arbitrarily 	distinguishing 	the
Case 1:19-cv-00044-LMG Document 62 Filed 04/29/21 Page 13 of 15

Court No. 19-00044 	Page 14
circumstances in CASTR from China do not persuade the court that Commerce acted
unreasonably in applying total AFA to Uttam Galva. Uttam Galva fails to cite any evidence
to support its premise that, in CASTR from China, the respondent Junyue did not disclose
the affiliate information voluntarily. 	See id. (arguing that “[g]iven that the information
regarding the two affiliates was only disclosed at verification, it is unlikely that the
disclosure was voluntary.”). 	Commerce also explained that Junyue’s reporting violation
was categorically less severe than that of Uttam Galva, as Junyue had at least
acknowledged the existence of the affiliate whereas Uttam Galva did not. See id. at 17.
Given the totality of the circumstances, the court cannot conclude that Commerce acted
unreasonably by refusing to find its application of AFA in CASTR from China to be
comparable to the application of AFA to Uttam Galva in this matter.
As for Plastic Ribbon from China, Uttam Galva explains that “Commerce applied
partial AFA to the mandatory respondent because it failed to report a predecessor
company 	that 	operated 	during 	the 	average 	useful 	life 	period 	in 	its 	questionnaire
responses and was disclosed at verification. Commerce determined that the mandatory
respondent impeded the investigation regarding whether the mandatory respondent could
have used nonrecurring programs.” 	Pl.’s Br. at 8 (internal citations omitted). 	Plaintiff’s
reliance on Plastic Ribbon from China is also misplaced as Uttam Galva did not fail to
report 	a 	predecessor 	company. 	See 	generally 	Plastic 	Ribbon 	from 	China, 	and
accompanying Issues and Decision Memorandum at cmt. 12; see also Def.’s Resp. to
Comments On [First] Remand Redetermination at 14, ECF No. 41 (citing Commerce’s
Case 1:19-cv-00044-LMG Document 62 Filed 04/29/21 Page 14 of 15

Court No. 19-00044 	Page 15
analysis in Plastic Ribbon from China and explaining why the circumstances are not
comparable). 	Accordingly, the court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that
Commerce acted unreasonably by not treating Uttam Galva the same as the mandatory
respondent in Plastic Ribbon from China.
IV. Conclusion
In sum, Commerce has provided a reasoned explanation for the differences in its
application of AFA to JSW and Uttam Galva. Uttam Galva’s alternative arguments about
Commerce’s determinations in CASTR from China and Plastic Ribbon from China
implicitly concede that Commerce reasonably explained its application of partial AFA to
JSW 	and 	total 	AFA 	to 	Uttam 	Galva 	(searching 	for 	alternative 	grounds 	of
unreasonableness). Commerce, though, reasonably explained why CASTR from China
and Plastic Ribbon from China are distinguishable here given the underlying facts in each
of those proceedings compared to the underlying facts justifying 	total AFA for Uttam
Galva.
For the foregoing reasons, the court sustains the Second Remand Results.
Judgment will enter accordingly.
/s/ Leo M. Gordon
Judge Leo M. Gordon
Dated: April 29, 2021
New York, New York
Case 1:19-cv-00044-LMG Document 62 Filed 04/29/21 Page 15 of 15