Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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26-CV-3454 JLS (AHG)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
ALEKSANDR SOSNOVSKII,
Petitioner,
v.
JEREMY CASEY, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 	26-CV-3454 JLS (AHG)
ORDER GRANTING IN PART
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS
(ECF No. 10)
Presently before the Court is Petitioner Aleksandr Sosnovskii.’s First Amended
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.,” ECF No. 10).
Also before the Court are Respondents’ Return (“Ret.,” ECF No. 11) and Petitioner’s
Traverse (ECF No. 12). Also before the Court is the Parties’ Joint Status Report (“Report,”
ECF No. 14). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART Petitioner’s
First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and ORDERS Petitioner’s release.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner was born in Belarus but left for Russia when he was a baby. Pet. at 1. He
alleges he has been detained since August 8, 2024. 	Id. at 2. 	An Immigration Judge (IJ)
ordered Petitioner removed to Belarus and Russia but granted withholding of removal to
Russia. Ret. at 1. After an appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”) finalized Petitioner’s removal on April 8, 2026. Pet. at 2; Ret. at 1.
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DHS initially attempted to remove Petitioner to Belarus. On August 11, 2026, the
Embassy of Belarus denied the travel document request, stating there was no proof
Petitioner ever had or currently has citizenship there. 	Report at 1. 	On October 5, 2026,
the government indicated it was looking for a third country for removal. Id.
Petitioner claims that their continued detention violates Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678 (2001), 8 U.S.C. § 1231.
LEGAL STANDARD
A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the
legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of
his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial
body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the
court of appeals. 	See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez-Barajas v. Gonzales,
418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat.
231, § 106(a)). 	However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising
independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention—
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. 	Nadarajah v. Gonzales,
443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez,
138 S. Ct. 830 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal.
2018) (citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
When an alien is denied asylum, granted withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. §
1231(b)(3), and ordered removed, they must be detained for ninety days (90) pending the
government’s efforts to secure their removal to a third country. See 28 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2).
This ninety-day period is referred to as the “removal period.” § 1231(a)(1)(A). After the
removal period, this statute “limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period
reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States” and “does
not permit indefinite detention.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689. A six-month period of post-
removal detention constitutes a “presumptively reasonable period of detention.” Id. at 701.
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After this six-month period passes, the petitioner has the burden to “provide[] good reason
to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future.” 	Id. 	If petitioner satisfies their initial burden, it then shifts to the Government to
rebut that showing. Id. “[F]or detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior post-
removal confinement grows, what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ conversely
would have to shrink.” Id. “[O]nce removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued
detention is no longer authorized by statute.” 	Id. at 699. In that case, the alien’s release
may be conditioned on any of the various forms of conditioned release. Id. at 700.
“[T]he removal period begins when an alien is ‘ordered removed,’ and the removal
order becomes ‘administratively final.’” 	Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 534
(2021).
Section 1231(a)(1)(B) states that:
The removal period begins on the latest of the following:
(i) The date the order of removal becomes administratively
final.
(ii) If the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court
orders a stay of the removal of the alien, the date of the court’s
final order.
(iii) If the alien is detained or confined (except under an
immigration process), the date the alien is released from
detention or confinement.
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B).
The Court finds that Petitioner has satisfied their initial burden. 	Petitioner argues
that “he has already been detained for six months after the April 8, 2026, final order or
removal” and has been detained for over two years in total. 	Report at 2. 	Nor has the
government provided documentation as to removal to a third country. Id.; see PenaGil v.
Lyons, No. 25-CV-03268-PAB-NRN, 2025 WL 3268333, at *3 (D. Colo. Nov. 24, 2025)
(granting petition where government “produced no documentation regarding petitioner’s
deportation to a third country and were twice unsuccessful in deporting petitioner to
Mexico”). Because Petitioner has shown good reason to believe they will not be removed
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in the reasonably foreseeable future, the burden now shifts to Respondents to rebut
Petitioner’s showing. Zadvydas, 533 at 701.
Respondents argue that there is significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future because ERO is seeking a third country for removal. 	Report at 1.
Respondents, however, do not point to any evidence that they have selected a third country
or taken any action to effectuate removal since attempting to remove Petitioner to Belarus.
See generally Report; see also Grishchenko v. Noem, No. 25-CV-3514-JES-JLB, 2025 WL
3675070, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2025) (“Respondents do not identify any potential
countries which might accept Petitioner’s third country removal, or any factors related to
Petitioner or people like him which might make a future removal attempt successful when
others have failed.”). 	The Court concludes that Respondents have failed to rebut
Petitioner’s showing that there is no significant likelihood of removal. 	Accordingly, the
Court GRANTS IN PART the Amended Petition.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART Petitioner’s First Amended
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 10), and 	ORDERS 	Respondents to
immediately 	release 	Petitioner 	from 	custody, 	subject 	to 	appropriate 	conditions 	of
supervision to be determined by immigration authorities and in accordance with applicable
statutory and regulatory procedures. 	The Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status
Report no more than seven (7) days after the electronic docketing of this order, confirming
that Petitioner has been released. As this concludes the litigation in this case, Petitioner’s
Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis is DENIED AS MOOT and the Clerk of
Court SHALL CLOSE the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 8, 2026
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