Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

3:26-cv-01508Casd12.03.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

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3:26-cv-01508-RBM-AHG
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
JERRY OSAZEE OSARETIN,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, Warden, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:26-cv-01508-RBM-AHG
ORDER:
(1) DENYING WITHOUT
PREJUDICE MOTION TO
APPOINT COUNSEL; AND
(2) DISMISSING HABEAS
PETITION ON SCREENING
On March 6, 2026, Petitioner Jerry Osazee Osaretin (“Petitioner”), proceeding pro
se, filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”).
(Doc. 1.) Petitioner represents that he was ordered removed to Uganda at his merits hearing
on February 2, 2026, and that he has appealed this decision. (Id. at 6.) He also represents
that on December 31, 2025, he had a bond hearing where the immigration judge denied
bond upon a finding that Petitioner was a danger to the community. (Id.) He also “would
like to know . . . if [he] would be entitled to representation by a public defender.” (Id. at
7.) The Court construes this as a Motion to Appoint Counsel.
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I. 	MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL
“Whenever the United States magistrate judge or the [C]ourt determines that the
interests of justice so require, representation may be provided for any financially eligible
person who . . . (B) is seeking relief under section 2241, 2254, or 2255 of title 28.”
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2). A “financially eligible person” is one who is “financially unable
to obtain adequate representation in accordance with this section.” 	Id. § 3006A(a). 	“In
deciding whether to appoint counsel in a habeas proceeding, the district court must evaluate
the likelihood of success on the merits as well as the ability of the petitioner to articulate
his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” 	Weygandt v.
Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted).
Here, Petitioner attests that he has “limited financial resources,” but also that it is
“extremely difficult to contact [his] attorneys.” (Doc. 1 at 7.) It is thus unclear whether he
is financially unable to obtain adequate representation. 	Accordingly, the Motion to
Appoint Counsel is DENIED without prejudice.
II. 	SCREENING
The Court is required to screen habeas corpus petitions to determine whether they
are subject to summary dismissal. See Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.
Summary dismissal is appropriate where “it plainly appears from the face of the petition
and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court,”
id., or “where the allegations in the petition are vague or conclusory.” 	Kourteva v. INS,
151 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (citation omitted).
The Court finds that Petitioner’s claims are vague or conclusory in that they do not
state grounds for relief, such as violations of a statute, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, the Immigration and Nationality Act, or the Administrative Procedure Act. 	The
Petition also appears to challenge the merits of Petitioner’s removal order or other
determinations by an immigration judge. For example, Petitioner disagrees that he can be
sent to Uganda (see Doc. 1 at 5; Doc. 1-4 at 1–2 (appeal of the immigration judge’s order
of removal)), or that he should have been denied bond (see Doc. 1 at 6).
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The Court does not have jurisdiction over such claims. 	See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)
(precluding jurisdiction over the Attorney General’s decision “to commence proceedings,
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any [noncitizen]”); Singh v. Bowen,
Case No. 5:26-cv-00486-MCS-PVC, 2026 WL 485760, at *4 (“To the extent Petitioner
seeks release during the pendency of his appeal simply because he disagrees with the merits
of the immigration judge’s decision, the Court lacks the authority to enter such an order.”);
Valenzuela v. Semaia, Case No. 5:25-cv-02853-SSS-RAO, 2025 WL 4041920, at *2 (C.D.
Cal. Dec. 10, 2025) (“Although Petitioner may disagree with the outcome of the
[immigration judge’s] determination at the bond hearing, this Court does not have
jurisdiction to sit as an appellate body over this issue.”). Therefore, summary dismissal of
the Petition is required.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Petition (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice and the
Motion to Appoint Counsel is DENIED without prejudice.
On or before April 3, 2026, Petitioner may file an amended Petition and an amended
Motion to Appoint Counsel addressing the issues identified above.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: March 12, 2026
___________________________________
HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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