Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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3:26-cv-01478-RBM-AHG
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
DUNJIE WENG,
Petitioner,
v.
JOHN RATHMAN, Warden of the
Imperial Regional Detention Facility, et
al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:26-cv-01478-RBM-AHG
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
[Docs. 1, 2]
Pending before the Court are Petitioner Dunjie Weng’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus (“Petition”) (Doc. 1) and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO
Motion”) (Doc. 2). For the reasons below, the Petition is GRANTED and the TRO Motion
is DENIED as moot.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a citizen of China, entered the United States on January 15, 2024. (Doc.
1 ¶ 14.) 	The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) detained Petitioner upon his
entry, but released him shortly thereafter under supervision pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 212.5.1
1 	A release under this regulation means “that Petitioner was granted parole pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Under section 1182(d)(5)(A), noncitizens may be temporarily
released on parole for ‘urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.’ Release
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(Id. ¶¶ 14, 25; Doc. 1-2 at 1 [Affidavit of Petitioner in Support of Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus (“Weng Decl.”)] ¶ 3.) DHS released him without requiring a bond. (Doc. 1
¶ 26; Weng Decl. ¶ 3.) Petitioner has lived in the United States since then, filing an asylum
application, obtaining a work permit, and working as a cook in a restaurant. (Doc. 1 ¶ 14;
Weng Decl. ¶ 5.) 	Since his release from DHS custody, Petitioner has complied with all
instructions provided by immigration authorities. 	(Id. ¶ 26; Weng Decl. ¶ 4.) 	On
November 1, 2025, Petitioner was re-detained during a check-in with Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) in New York. (Doc. 1 ¶ 28.)
On 	March 	9 	and 	10, 	2026, 	Petitioner 	filed 	the 	Petition 	and 	TRO 	Motion,
respectively. 	(Docs. 1, 2.) 	The Court issued an Order to Show Cause and set a briefing
schedule shortly thereafter. (Doc. 3.) On March 17, 2026, Respondents filed their Return
to Habeas Petition and Notice of Non-Opposition (“Response”). (Doc. 4.) Petitioner filed
his Reply to Respondents’ Return and Opposition to Non-Opposition to Bond Hearing as
Insufficient Relief (“Reply”) on March 19, 2026. (Doc. 6.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2).
“The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may
be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the
burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3).
under this section requires a determination that the noncitizen poses neither ‘a security risk
nor a risk of absconding.’” E.M.M.O. v. Wofford, No. 1:26-cv-00585-DJC-CSK, 2026 WL
279894, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2026) (quoting § 212.5).
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III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner claims that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, and that he is entitled to immediate release under the test set forth in Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 	(Doc. 1 ¶¶ 31–74; Doc. 6 at 4–7.) 	Respondents do not
respond substantively to any of Petitioner’s claims, indicating only that they “submit their
Notice of Non-Opposition to a bond hearing for Petitioner in this matter, subject to
supervision during his removal proceedings.” (Doc. 4 at 1.)
The Court has granted petitions filed by similarly-situated petitioners. 	See, e.g.,
Velasquez-Chinga v. Noem, Case No.: 3:26-cv-00105-RBM-KSC, 2026 WL 311507, at
*2–3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2026). In Velasquez-Chinga, the Court summarized the regulations
governing 	parole 	and 	revocation 	of 	parole—8 	C.F.R. 	§ 	212.5 	and 	8 	U.S.C. 	§
1182(d)(5)(A)—and found that the lack of written notice and a pre-deprivation hearing
before revoking the petitioner’s parole violated due process. 	Id. at *3 (citations omitted).
The Court incorporates its reasoning from Velasquez-Chinga and finds that, here too,
“because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking [his] parole in violation of the Due
Process Clause, [his] detention is unlawful.” Salazar v. Casey, Case No.: 25-CV-2784 JLS
(VET), 2025 WL 3063629, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025); accord Araujo v. LaRose, No.
25cv2942-BTM-MMP, 2025 WL 3278016, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2025) (granting
petition and ordering immediate release because “[t]he revocation of [the petitioner’s]
parole is thus neither consistent with 8 U.S.C. 	1182(d)(5)(A) nor the demands of due
process”).
The Court also finds that immediate release, rather than a further bond hearing, is
the appropriate remedy. Accord Velasquez-Chinga, 2026 WL 311507, at *3; E.A. T.-B. v.
Wamsley, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1324 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 19, 2025) (“Although the
Government notes that Petitioner may request a bond hearing while detained, such a post-
deprivation hearing cannot serve as an adequate procedural safeguard because it is after the
fact and cannot prevent an erroneous deprivation of liberty.”) 	The Petition is therefore
GRANTED.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION2
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED. Accordingly:
1. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody,
subject to the conditions of his preexisting parole.
2. The Court ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner shall
receive a hearing before an immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) to
determine whether detention is warranted. Respondents shall bear the burden of
establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to
the community or a risk of flight.3
3. The TRO Motion (Doc. 2) is DENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: March 25, 2026
____________________________________
HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
2 In light of the disposition herein, the Court declines to address the Petition’s remaining
grounds for relief.
3 This relief has been granted in similar matters. 	See E.A. T.-B, 795 F. Supp. 3d at1324;
Duong v. Kaiser, 800 F. Supp. 3d 1030, 1044 (N.D. Cal. 2025); Lepe v. Andrews, 801 F.
Supp. 3d 1104, 1119–20 (E.D. Cal. 2025).
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