Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

1
3:26-cv-1447-JES-AHG
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
JAVIER TREVINO CHAUTLA,
Petitioner,
v.
JOHN DOE, WARDEN, OTAY MESA
DETENCION CENTER; ALEJANDRO
MAYORKAS, SECRETARY OF
HOMELAND SECURITY; U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT (ICE), A
COMPONENT OF DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:26-cv-1447-JES-AHG
ORDER GRANTING THE
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §
2241
[ECF NO. 1]
Before the Court is Petitioner Javier Trevino Chautla’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for a
Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1, (“Pet.”). Pursuant to the
Court’s Order to Show Cause, Respondents (the “Government”) filed the Response. ECF
Nos. 2; 6, (“Res.”). The Court then took the matter under submission. For the reasons set
forth below, the Court GRANTS the Petition.
Case 3:26-cv-01447-JES-AHG Document 7 Filed 03/23/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
1 of 5

2
3:26-cv-1447-JES-AHG
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a Mexican citizen who illegally entered the United States without
inspection on some unknown date. Res. at 1; ECF No. 6-1 at 1. On February 1, 2025,
following his second arrest for driving under the influence (“DUI”), Respondents took
Petitioner into custody, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), in Tampa, Florida. Res. at 1.
Respondents 	then 	determined 	Petitioner 	to 	be 	inadmissible 	and 	initiated 	removal
proceedings, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), against him. Id. On April 8, 2025, Petitioner
requested a custody redetermination hearing, but Petitioner withdrew his request for a bond
hearing on April 25, 2025. ECF No. 6-1 at 14; id. at 11.
To date, Petitioner has not filed an asylum or CAT claim. However, Petitioner
applied 	for 	Cancellation 	of 	Removal 	for 	Nonpermanent 	residents, 	under 	INA §
240A(b)(2). Id. at 24-25. On March 12, 2026, an immigration judge (“IJ”) found Petitioner
removable and denied his Cancellation of Removal application. Id. at 25. Petitioner has
until April 13, 2026, to appeal the IJ's decision, therefore, the removal order is not yet
administratively final. Id. at 27; Res. at 1. Thus, Petitioner is currently being detained by
Respondents under Section 1225, not Section 1231. Id. Petitioner seeks habeas relief based
on the contention that his continued detention, without being provided a bond hearing,
constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of liberty in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
II. 	DISCUSSION
The Court finds that the Petition’s issues are identical to those raised in the Court’s
decision in Velazquez-Beltran v. Noem, No. 3:26-CV-959-JES-MSB, 2026 WL 524056
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2026). The Court, therefore, elects to follow the reasoning it stated in
Velazquez-Beltran and incorporates it by reference. Id.
A. 	Jurisdiction
Although it raises no arguments to support such a request, the Government asks the
Court to deny the Petition for lack of jurisdiction. The Court will do no such thing.
Based on the facts of this Petition, the Court finds that Section 1252's jurisdiction
stripping provisions do not bar it from considering Petitioner's habeas petition. Further, the
Case 3:26-cv-01447-JES-AHG Document 7 Filed 03/23/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
2 of 5

3
3:26-cv-1447-JES-AHG
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
prudential administrative exhaustion requirement for Section 2241 claims is excused.
Imposing this requirement would be futile due to the BIA’s precedential decision in Matter
of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N 216 (BIA 2025). Thus, the Court finds that it has jurisdiction
to hear the Petition.
B. 	Section 1226 Governs Petitioner’s Detention
The Government’s substantive response argues that the Petition should be denied
because: (1) Petitioner is mandatorily detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2); and (2) his
detention is not unconstitutionally prolonged. Res. at 3-10.
The first argument squarely conflicts with the overwhelming number of courts, not
only from this Circuit but across the nation, that have come to the opposite conclusion. See,
e.g., Hasan v. Crawford, No. 1:25-CV-1408, 2025 WL 2682255, at *9 (E.D. Va. Sept. 19,
2025) (“For all these reasons, ... Hasan's detention is governed by § 1226(a)’s discretionary
framework, not § 1225(b)’s mandatory detention procedures.”); Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779
F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1261 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“Rodriguez has shown that the text of Section
1226, canons of interpretation, legislative history, and longstanding agency practice
indicate that he is governed under Section 1226(a)’s ‘default’ rule for discretionary
detention. The Court is persuaded that Rodriguez is likely to succeed on the merits that he
is unlawfully detained under Section 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory detention provision.”);
Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Sept.
19, 2025) (“The BIA's decision to pivot from three decades of consistent statutory
interpretation and call for Pizarro Reyes’ detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) is at odds with
every District Court that has been confronted with the same question of statutory
interpretation. 	At 	least 	a 	dozen 	federal 	courts 	concur 	generally 	with 	this 	Court's
interpretation of the statutory language as applied in this context.”); Barrera v. Tindall, No.
3:25-CV-541, 2025 WL 2690565, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 19, 2025) (“Courts across the
country have been faced with similar questions of law and fact presented by the United
States. And every court who has examined this novel interpretation of Section 1225 by the
United States has rejected their theory and adopted Petitioner's. This includes courts within
Case 3:26-cv-01447-JES-AHG Document 7 Filed 03/23/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
3 of 5

4
3:26-cv-1447-JES-AHG
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
the Sixth Circuit, and across the country.”); Vazquez v. Feeley, No. 2:25-CV-01542, 2025
WL 2676082, at *16 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025) (“In sum, the Court finds that the text and
canons of statutory interpretation, including the legislative history, regulations, and long
history of consistent agency practice, as well as the doctrine of constitutional avoidance,
demonstrate that Petitioner is likely to succeed in establishing he and similarly situated
noncitizens are subject to detention under § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations, not
§ 1225(b)(2)(A).”).
Here, 	Petitioner 	entered 	the 	United 	States 	without 	inspection, 	he 	was 	not
apprehended upon arrival but had been living in the country for well over five years prior
to this detention. The length of Petitioner’s residency is evidenced by the date that
Petitioner was first arrested for DUI (i.e., July 15, 2018). See ECF No. 6-1 at 4. These facts
support the Court’s finding that Section 1226(a)—and not Section 1225(b)(1) or Section
1231—governs Petitioner’s detention. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288
(2018).
Having established that Petitioner’s detention is governed by Section 1226(a), the
Court further finds that Petitioner is a member of the Maldonado Bautista Bond Eligible
Class. See Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F.Supp.3d ---, 2025
WL 3713987, at *32 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025), judgment entered sub nom. Maldonado
Bautista v. Noem, 2025 WL 3678485 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025) (defining the class as “All
noncitizens in the United States without lawful status who (1) have entered or will enter
the United States without inspection; (2) were not or will not be apprehended upon arrival;
and (3) are not or will not be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1),
or § 1231 at the time the Department of Homeland Security makes an initial custody
determination.”).
Petitioner is, therefore, entitled to the declaratory relief entered by the Central
District of California; that his current detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225, is unlawful. See
Hernandez v. Otay Mesa Detention Center, 2025 WL 3724913, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 24,
2025) (noting that Respondents conceded that because petitioner was a member of the bond
Case 3:26-cv-01447-JES-AHG Document 7 Filed 03/23/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
4 of 5

5
3:26-cv-1447-JES-AHG
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
eligible class he was considered detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), pursuant to the final
judgment entered in Maldonado Bautista); see also Mohammadi v. Larose, 2025 WL
3731737, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 26, 2025) (holding that the final judgment issued in
Maldonado Bautista provided independent support for why petitioner was not subject to
mandatory detention).
Accordingly, the Court holds that Petitioner is entitled to, and will order Respondent
to provide her with, a bond hearing under Section 1226(a).
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing:
(1) The Court ORDERS Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond
determination hearing, under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), within seven (7) days
of this Order, or otherwise release him from custody, under the same
conditions that existed before his detention;
(2) At the bond hearing, Respondents may not deny Petitioner bond, on the
basis that he is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2);
(3) Respondents are ORDERED to FILE a Notice of Compliance within five
(5) days of providing Petitioner with a bond redetermination hearing; and
(4) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to CLOSE this suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 23, 2026
Case 3:26-cv-01447-JES-AHG Document 7 Filed 03/23/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
5 of 5