Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CHENGHONG XIE,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, in his official
capacity as Warden of Otay Mesa Detention
Center, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:26-cv-01116-RBM-MMP
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
[Doc. 1]
Pending before the Court is Petitioner Chenghong Xie’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”). 	(Doc. 1.) 	For the
reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Petition.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Factual Background
Petitioner, a citizen of China, entered the United States on December 13, 2024.
(Doc. 4 at 4 (citing Doc. 4-1 at 2, 7).) He was immediately apprehended by Customs and
Border Patrol, determined to be inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), and
taken into Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b). (Id.) He was initially processed for expedited removal, but was issued a Notice
to Appear on January 31, 2025, which initiated full removal proceedings. (Id. at 4–5.)
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Petitioner’s initial master calendar hearing was set for February 18, 2025. (Id. at 5
(citing Doc. 4-1 at 9).) Petitioner obtained five continuances to prepare or otherwise perfect
his applications for relief. 	(Id.) 	Petitioner’s individual merits hearing was set for
November 24, 2025, but “there appears to have been delay due to the scheduling of a
priority case” on that date. 	(Id.) 	Petitioner had another master calendar hearing on
December 4, 2025, where the immigration judge continued Petitioner’s merits hearing to
April 22, 2026. (Id.)
B. 	Procedural Background
Petitioner filed his Petition on February 20, 2026. (Doc. 1.) The Court set a briefing
schedule shortly thereafter. (Doc. 2.) Respondents filed their Return to Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus (“Response”) on March 2, 2026. (Doc. 4.) Petitioner filed his Traverse
to Government Return (“Reply”) on March 6, 2026. 	(Doc. 5.) 	In the Reply, Petitioner
noted that he had been transferred from Otay Mesa Detention Center (in the Southern
District of California) to California City Detention Facility (in the Eastern District of
California). (Id. at 7.) The Court then ordered further briefing regarding whether it still
had jurisdiction and venue was still appropriate. (Doc. 6.)
The Parties filed a Joint Status Report on March 25, 2026, agreeing that Petitioner’s
transfer does not impact the Court’s jurisdiction. (Doc. 7.) The Court agrees. See Johnson
v. Gill, 883 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 2018) (explaining that, despite a transfer of custody,
“habeas jurisdiction was proper in the district court [where the petitioner was originally
detained] because [the petitioner] filed his petition while incarcerated [in that district]”)
(citing Brown v. United States, 610 F.2d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 1980)).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2).
“The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may
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be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the
burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3).
III. 	DISCUSSION
The Parties agree that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b). 	(See Doc. 1 ¶ 33; Doc. 4 at 8.) 	Accordingly, the issue before the Court is
whether, under the circumstances of this case, applying the mandatory detention provisions
of § 1225(b) violates Petitioner’s due process rights. Petitioner argues that, even though
he is mandatorily detained, such detention violates the Due Process Clause when it
becomes unreasonably prolonged. (Doc. 1 at 19–23; Doc. 5 at 2–7.) Respondents argue
that Petitioner’s detention is mandated by § 1225(b) until the conclusion of his removal
proceedings, and that “[e]ven if the Court infers a constitutional right against prolonged
mandatory detention, Petitioner’s claim still fails.” (Doc. 4 at 8–18.)1 The Court agrees
with Petitioner that an unreasonably prolonged detention without a bond hearing violates
due process, and that Petitioner’s detention has become unreasonably prolonged.
A. 	Due Process
Respondents argue that “inadmissible arriving noncitizens seeking initial entry into
the United States . . . have no due process rights ‘other than those afforded by statute.’”
(Doc. 4 at 10 (quoting Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 107
(2020).)
1 Respondents also argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the Petition under
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). (Doc. 4 at 6–7.) The Court has consistently rejected this argument,
see Constantinovici v. Bondi, 806 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1161–62 (S.D. Cal. 2025), and does
so again here for the same reasons. 	Petitioner challenges his detention as unreasonably
prolonged under the Fifth Amendment. 	(Doc. 5 at 2.) 	He is thus enforcing his
“constitutional rights to due process in the context of the removal proceedings—not the
legitimacy of the removal proceedings or any removal order.” 	Garcia v. Noem, 803 F.
Supp. 3d 1064, 1074 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (emphasis in original).
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“Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Thuraissigiam, some district courts
have adopted Respondents’ reasoning to dismiss or deny habeas petitions in the context of
arriving aliens subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(1).” Gao v. LaRose,
805 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1110 (S.D. Cal. 2025); see Mendoza-Linares v. Garland, Case No.:
21-cv-1169-BEN (AHG), 2024 WL 3316306, at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 10, 2024) (“Petitioner
has no Fifth Amendment right to a bond hearing pending his removal proceedings.”);
St. Charles v. Barr, 514 F. Supp. 3d 570, 579 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) (same); Petgrave v.
Aleman, 529 F. Supp. 3d 665, 667 (S.D. Tex. 2021) (same).
“Most courts have ruled otherwise.” Gao, 805 F. Supp. 3d at 1110 (collecting cases);
accord Abdul-Samed v. Warden of Golden State Annex Det. Facility, Case No. 1:25-cv-
00098-SAB-HC, 2025 WL 2099343, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 25, 2025) (“Although the Ninth
Circuit has yet to take a position on whether due process requires a bond hearing for citizens
detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), . . . essentially all district courts that have considered
the issue agree that prolonged mandatory detention pending removal proceedings, without
a bond hearing, will—at some point—violate the right to due process.”); A.L. v. Oddo,
761 F. Supp. 3d 822, 825 (W.D. Pa. 2025) (“Nowhere in [Thuraissigiam] did the Supreme
Court suggest that arriving aliens being held under § 1225(b) may be held indefinitely and
unreasonably with no due process implications, nor that such aliens have no due process
rights whatsoever.”). 	The Court thus “joins the majority of courts across the country in
concluding that an unreasonably prolonged detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) without an
individualized bond hearing violates due process.” Kydyrali v. Wolf, 499 F. Supp. 3d 768,
772 (S.D. Cal. 2020).
Respondents also argue that Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S.
206 (1953), establishes that arriving noncitizens subject to a mandatory detention scheme,
regardless of the length of their detention, never become entitled by the Due Process Clause
to a bond hearing. (Doc. 4 at 9–13.) The Court disagrees. 	Mezei involved a noncitizen
who had been “permanently excluded from the United States on security grounds but [who
was] stranded in his temporary haven on Ellis Island because other countries [would] not
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take him back.” 345 U.S. at 207. “In 1950, the Attorney General determined, pursuant to
emergency regulations [ ] based on certain confidential information, [that] the noncitizen
should be excluded from the United States ‘for security reasons.’” Lastin v. Warden, Case
No.: 26-cv-974-RSH-DDL, 2026 WL 575902, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2026) (discussing
Mezei). 	The Supreme Court rejected the noncitizen’s constitutional challenge, citing
“considerations” of “danger to the national security.”
Thus we do not think that respondent's continued exclusion deprives him of
any statutory or constitutional right. It is true that resident aliens temporarily
detained pending expeditious consummation of deportation proceedings may
be released on bond by the Attorney General whose discretion is subject to
judicial review. By that procedure aliens uprooted from our midst may rejoin
the community until the Government effects their leave. 	An exclusion
proceeding grounded on danger to the national security, however, presents
different considerations; neither the rationale nor the statutory authority for
such release exists. Ordinarily to admit an alien barred from entry on security
grounds nullifies the very purpose of the exclusion proceeding . . . .
Mezei, 345 U.S. at 215 (citations omitted and emphasis added).
The Court agrees with those courts that distinguish the constitutional holding in
Mezei as addressing the national security considerations presented in that case. 	See
Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 413–14 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he Mezei Court
explicitly grounded its decision in the special circumstances of a national emergency and
the determination by the Attorney General that Mezei presented a threat to national
security.”); Lett v. Decker, 346 F. Supp. 3d 379, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Mezei may compel
the conclusion that arriving aliens already excluded on national security grounds are not
entitled to a bond hearing prior to their arranged deportation. 	However, Mezei does not
compel the categorical conclusion that all arriving aliens may be subject to prolonged
confinement without a bond hearing.”); Kydyrali, 499 F. Supp. 3d at 772 (finding Mezei
inapposite to the issue of whether prolonged detention without a bond hearing violates due
process); Rash v. LaRose, Case No.: 26-cv-00008-LL-DEB, 2026 WL 249324, at *4 (S.D.
Cal. Jan. 30, 2026) (same). “Here, in contrast, neither the Attorney General nor any other
government component has made a determination that Petitioner should be excluded on
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grounds of national security; Petitioner is not seeking to circumvent such a determination.
Petitioner is instead seeking a bond hearing.” Lastin, 2026 WL 575902, at *3. The Court
thus 	concludes 	that 	it 	may 	consider 	whether 	Petitioner’s 	detention 	has 	become
unconstitutionally prolonged.
B. 	Prolonged Detention
To 	determine 	whether 	Petitioner’s 	detention 	has 	become 	unconstitutionally
prolonged under § 1225(b), the Court applies the six-factor balancing test set forth in
Kydyrali. See 499 F. Supp. 3d at 773. Under this test, the Court considers:
(1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future
detention; (3) conditions of detention; (4) delays in the removal proceedings
caused by the detainee; (5) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the
government; and (6) the likelihood that the removal proceedings will result in
a final order of removal.
Gao, 805 F. Supp. 3d at 1111.
As to the first factor, which has been described as “the most important,” Banda v.
McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1118 (W.D. Wash. 2019), Petitioner has been detained
for about 14 months. (See Doc. 4 at 4.) Respondents argue that “Petitioner’s detention of
fourteen months falls significantly short of the length courts have found to raise due process
concerns.” (Doc. 4 at 14 (collecting cases finding detention unreasonably prolonged after
two to three years).) As another court in this District noted, though, “[c]ourts have found
detention over seven months without a bond hearing weighs toward a finding that it is
unreasonable.” Abdul Kadir v. Larose, Case No.: 25cv1045-LL-MMP, 2025 WL 2932654,
at *5 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2025) (collecting cases and finding that a nearly 13-month
detention weighed in favor of the petitioner); see also Sibomana v. LaRose, Case No.: 3:22-
cv-933-LL-NLS, 2023 WL 3028093, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2023) (“In general, as
detention continues past a year, courts become extremely way of permitting continued
custody absent a bond hearing.”). The Court finds that this factor favors Petitioner.
As to the second factor, Petitioner’s merits hearing is scheduled for April 22, 2026,
and the outcome of that hearing, along with the amount of time it would take to resolve
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any appeal, is unknown. (Doc. 4 at 5.) The Court finds that the “undetermined, but likely
significant, period of mandatory detention through the appeals process” weighs in favor of
Petitioner. Gao, 805 F. Supp. 3d at 1111; accord Abdul Kadir, 2025 WL 2932654, at *5;
Masood v. Barr, Case No. 19-cv-07623-JD, 2020 WL 95633, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2020)
(“The BIA appeal . . . [is a] perfectly legitimate proceeding[] he is legally entitled to
pursue,” and the respondents “cannot predict with any degree of confidence when the BIA
appeal will be resolved,” which “could lead to further proceedings that might take up many
more months, or even years.”).
As to the third factor, “[t]he more that the conditions under which the [noncitizen]
is being held resemble penal confinement, the stronger his argument that he is entitled to a
bond hearing.” 	Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1119 (citation omitted). Petitioner spent most
of the 14 months of his immigration detention at Otay Mesa Detention Center, and was
transferred to California City Detention Facility days after filing his Petition. (See Doc. 7-
1 [Declaration of Deportation Officer Daniel Negrin] ¶ 4.) As multiple courts have found,
detention at Otay Mesa Detention Center is “indistinguishable from penal confinement.”
Kydyrali, 499 F. Supp. 3d at 773 (citation omitted). 	Courts have considered evidence
suggesting the same is true of California City Detention Facility. See Doe v. Chestnut, 810
F. Supp. 3d 1169, 1200–1201 (E.D. Cal. 2025). 	Therefore, this factor weighs in
Petitioner’s favor.
The fourth and fifth factors are neutral because both Petitioner and Respondents have
caused delays in the removal proceedings. (See supra Section I.A). The sixth factor is also
neutral because Petitioner’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
under the Convention Against Torture have not yet been adjudicated. (See Doc. 4 at 5.)
Three factors, including “the most important one,” weigh in Petitioner’s favor, and
none weigh against him. 	Therefore, the Court finds that Petitioner’s detention under
§ 1225(b) has become unreasonably prolonged and that due process requires that he be
provided with a bond hearing. 	In light of this finding, the Court declines to reach the
remaining grounds for relief raised in the Petition.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is GRANTED. Respondents are ORDERED
to arrange an individualized bond hearing for Petitioner before an immigration judge within
fourteen (14) days of entry of this Order to determine whether his continued detention is
warranted. 	Respondents shall bear the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing
evidence,2 that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a risk of flight. If no hearing
occurs within fourteen (14) days of entry of this Order, Petitioner shall be released from
Respondents’ custody. On or before April 16, 2026, Respondents SHALL FILE a status
report indicating whether and when Petitioner received a bond hearing, and the outcome of
that bond hearing.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: March 26, 2026
___________________________________
HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
2 See Sadeqi v. LaRose, 809 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1095 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (“Petitioner is entitled
to a prompt and individualized bond hearing, at which Respondents must justify her
continued detention by a showing of clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner would
likely flee or pose a danger to the community if released.”) (citing Singh v. Holder, 638
F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez,
583 U.S. 281 (2018) (explaining that “the substantial liberty interest at stake” warranted
placing the burden on the government to “prove by clear and convincing evidence that [a
noncitizen] is a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify denial of bond”).
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