Singh v. Casey et al

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26-cv-1061-JES-DEB
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
JATINDER SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
JEREMY CASEY; DANIEL A.
BRIGHTMAN; KRISTI NOEM; and
PAMELA BONDI,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-cv-1061-JES-DEB
ORDER:
(1) GRANTING PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2241; and
(2) DENYING AS MOOT MOTION
FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER
[ECF Nos. 1, 2]
Before the Court is Petitioner Jatinder Singh’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. Petitioner also concurrently filed
a motion for temporary restraining order (“TRO”). ECF No. 2. Pursuant to the Court’s
order to show cause, Respondents filed a return to the petition. ECF No. 5. For the reasons
set forth below, the Court GRANTS the petition.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a native of India, originally entered the United States on January 24, 2014
in Arizona to claim asylum. ECF No. 1 ¶ 13. He was served with a Notice to Appear and
placed into removal proceedings. Id. ¶¶ 14-15; ECF No. 1-2 at 6. He was released on
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February 6, 2014 on a $10,000 bond. ECF No. 1 ¶ 15; ECF No. 1-2 at 29, 31-42. Petitioner
alleges that since his release on bond, he has complied with all the conditions of his release
and continued to appear for his immigration removal proceedings. Id. ¶ 16. Petitioner was
re-detained in February 2026, and has been held at Imperial Regional Detention Facility.
Id. ¶ 17.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2).
“The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of
habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the
Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas
corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in
that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301
(2001). Accordingly, challenges to immigration-related detention are within the purview
of a district court's habeas jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see
also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003).
III. DISCUSSION
In his petition, Petitioner brings three claims: (1) Violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment; (2) Violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act; and
(3) Violation of the Administrative Procedures Act. Id. ¶¶ 36-59. He requests release from
custody or alternatively, a bond hearing. Id. at 20-21. In their return, Respondents state
that, pursuant to Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F.
Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025), Petitioner is detained under 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a) and is entitled to a bond hearing. ECF No. 4. Respondents do not address
the claim Petitioner brings regarding due process.
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A. Bond Hearing
As a threshold issue, the Court will first address whether a bond hearing is an
appropriate remedy. As noted above, Petitioner does raise a due process claim, specifically
claiming that Petitioner’s release on bond and his subsequent ability to establish a life in
the United States gives rise to a liberty interest cognizable under the Due Process Clause.
ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 40, 41. Once established, this liberty interest cannot be revoked by the
government with minimal procedural safeguards. Id. ¶¶ 42, 43
Given the arguments Petitioner raised in the petition, coupled with Petitioner’s
request for release, the Court finds that a bond hearing alone is not sufficient relief. Indeed,
in several cases within this district where the petitioner raised a due process violation
regarding re-detention after having been released on parole, the courts have rejected the
same argument made by Respondents that the petitioner is only entitled to a bond hearing
based on Maldonado Bautista. See Naveen v. LaRose, No. 25-CV-3689 JLS (AHG), 2025
WL 3771900, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2025) (rejecting Respondents’ argument that
petitioner is a class member under Maldonado Bautista and therefore only entitled to a
bond hearing, rendering his other constitutional arguments moot); Lozada v. Larose et al.,
No. 25CV3614-LL-KSC, 2026 WL 184205, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2026) (rejecting same
argument and releasing petitioner on due process violation); Garcia v. Noem et al., No.
25CV3759-LL-BLM, 2026 WL 194745 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2026) (same); Xie v. LaRose,
No. 3:25-CV-03649-RBM-MSB, 2026 WL 92066, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2026) (same).
Thus, despite Respondents’ concession regarding a bond hearing, the Court finds it
appropriate to address the constitutional violations raised in the petition.
B. Due Process
Petitioner argues that his re-detention violates procedural due process because he
was given no process when he was re-detained in February 2026. ECF No. 1 at 15-16. As
stated above, Respondents do not meaningfully address the procedural due process issue
in their return. See generally ECF No. 5.
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“The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the Government from
depriving individuals of their life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). “[T]he Due Process Clause
applies to all persons within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence is
lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 679. “Freedom from
imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—
lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Id. at 690. A person at risk of suffering
a serious loss being given notice and an opportunity to be heard, in a meaningful manner
and at a meaningful time, is the essence of procedural due process. Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
Courts have identified various ways that a petitioner may be granted some form of
release. The choice is “discretionary and is made on a case-by-case basis.” J.S.H.M v.
Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01309 JLT SKO, 2025 WL 2938808, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16,
2025). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), the government may release a noncitizen in two ways:
(A) on a bond in the amount of at least $1,500 and with conditions; or (B) on conditional
parole. Thus, petitioner’s release here appear to be under § 1226(a)’s bond provision.
Addressing § 1226(a), the court in Pinchi explained procedural due process rights
that attach once a noncitizen is released under this provision:
[Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after her initial apprehension reflected
a determination by the government that she was neither a flight risk nor a
danger to the community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining
at liberty unless she no longer meets those criteria. The regulations
authorizing ICE to release a noncitizen from custody require that the
noncitizen “demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such release
would not pose a danger to property or persons” and that the noncitizen is
“likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8). “Release
[therefore] reflects a determination by the government that the noncitizen is
not a danger to the community or a flight risk.” Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F.
Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff'd sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v.
Sessions, 905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2018). [Petitioner] was apprehended by ICE
officers when she crossed the border into the United States . . . ICE then
released her on her own recognizance. As ICE was not authorized to release
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[Petitioner] if she was a danger to the community or a flight risk, the Court
must infer from [the] release that ICE determined she was neither.
[Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody constituted an “implied promise” that
her liberty would not be revoked unless she “failed to live up to the conditions
of her release.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). The
regulatory framework makes clear that those conditions were that she remain
neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk. . . . Accordingly,
[Petitioner’s] private interest in retaining her liberty is significant.
Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1034-35. Courts have treated the due process analysis similarly
whether release was under either provision of § 1226(a). See, e.g., Kaur v. Chestnut, No.
1:26-CV-00916-DC-DMC (HC), 2026 WL 373612, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2026)
(finding same requirements to apply to “bond or conditional parole under 8 U.S.C. §
1226(a), or humanitarian parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)”).
In cases where the noncitizen petitioner had previously been released on bond, like
Petitioner has here, courts have applied the Mathews v. Eldridge framework to hold that
those petitioner have a “liberty interest in his continued release on bond.” Guillermo M. R.
v. Kaiser, 791 F. Supp. 3d 1021, 1030 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (noting that petitioner was only
granted bond after a hearing in front of a neutral immigration judge and had been free on
bond more than two years, during which he held a job and participated in his community);
Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1094 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (finding “substantial liberty
interest” where petitioner had been out of custody on bond for five years, during which he
was employed and an active member of his community). Having established the liberty
interest, courts further hold that petitioners are entitled to the protections of procedural
safeguards, including at a minimum notice and a pre-deprivation hearing. Guillermo, 791
F.3d at 1036; Kaur, 2026 WL 373612, at *2 (“[I]n order for the government to re-detain a
noncitizen who has been previously released on bond or conditional parole under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a), or humanitarian parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5), the government must
provide a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter at which the noncitizen’s
eligibility for bond must be considered.”).
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The Court agrees with all the foregoing courts and similarly holds that Petitioner has
procedural due process rights arising from his prior release on bond. In their briefing,
Respondents provide no evidence that Petitioner was afforded any notice or opportunity to
be heard regarding the revocation of said bond. See generally ECF No. 5. Accordingly, the
Court joins these courts and finds that Respondents violated Petitioner’s due process rights
when they re-detained him in February 2026 without any procedural safeguards.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s writ of habeas
corpus. Because the Court grants the petition on the Due Process ground and concludes
that Respondents’ revocation of Petitioner’s previously granted bond violates procedural
due process, Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody,
subject to any conditions of his preexisting bond that existed at the time he was re-detained.
The Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report by March 5, 2026, confirming
that Petitioner has been released. Petitioner’s motion for TRO is DENIED AS MOOT.
The Clerk of Court is ORDERED to CLOSE this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 27, 2026
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