Haile v. Marrero et al

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3:26-cv-00944-RBM-MMP
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
ANGOSOM HAILE,
Petitioner,
v.
SIXTO MARRERO, in his official capacity as
Warden of Imperial Regional Adult Detention
Facility, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:26-cv-00944-RBM-MMP
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
[Docs. 1, 2]
Before the Court are Petitioner Angosom Haile’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”) (Doc. 1) and Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (“TRO Motion”) (Doc. 2). For
the reasons below, the Petition is GRANTED and the TRO Motion is DENIED as moot.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen of Eritrea who entered the United States on or about April 5,
2023. 	(Doc. 1 ¶¶ 24, 26.)1 He was immediately apprehended by the Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) and initially processed under the Immigration and Nationality
Act’s (“INA”) expedited removal procedures. (Id. ¶¶ 26–27.) After Petitioner received a
1 The Court cites the paragraph numbers of the Petition and the CM/ECF electronic
pagination for other filings unless otherwise noted.
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positive credible fear determination, DHS vacated his expedited removal order and placed
him into full removal proceedings under INA § 240. 	(Id. ¶ 28.) 	DHS then “released
Petitioner from immigration custody and permitted him to enter the United States pending
adjudication of his removal case.” (Id. ¶ 29.) Since then, Petitioner has “complied with
all conditions imposed upon him.” (Id.) On February 7, 2026, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) re-detained Petitioner and placed him back into immigration custody.
(Id. ¶ 31.) He is currently detained at Imperial Regional Adult Detention Facility. (Id.)
On February 13, 2026, Petitioner filed the Petition (Doc. 1) and TRO Motion
(Doc. 2). 	The Court issued an Order to Show Cause and set a briefing schedule shortly
thereafter. (Doc. 3.) On February 23, 2026, Respondents filed their Response to Petition
(“Response”). (Doc. 4.) Petitioner was authorized to file a reply on or before February 27,
2026 (Doc. 3), but did not file one.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2).
“The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may
be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the
burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner claims that his detention violates the INA, the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause, and the Administrative Procedure Act. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 33–61.) Respondents
argue that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) “because
Petitioner was present in the Untied States without being admitted or paroled.” (Doc. 4 at
2 (citations omitted).) Respondents also “acknowledge[ ] that [c]ourts in this District have
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repeatedly reached the opposite conclusion,” and “that this District’s prior decisions would
control the result here if the Court adheres to its prior decision[s], as the facts are not
materially distinguishable.” 	(Id. at 2–3 (citations omitted).) 	For the reasons below, the
Court finds that Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C § 1226 and entitled to immediate
release.
Petitioner was apprehended upon his arrival in the United States in April 2023 and
was soon thereafter released by DHS into the interior of the country; since then, he has
“complied with all conditions imposed upon him.” 	(Doc. 1 ¶ 29.) 	The Court “has
previously held that where a petitioner is apprehended at the border, paroled into the
country, and had been residing in the country when he was re-detained, his detention is
governed by § 1226.” 	Ayinder v. LaRose, Case No.: 26-cv-0566-JES-MSB, 2026 WL
296658, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2026) (collecting cases). 	See also Ortega-Cervantes v.
Gonzalez, 501 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007) (“It is apparent that the [Immigration and
Naturalization Service] used the phrase ‘release on recognizance’ as another name for
‘conditional parole’ under § 1226(a).”) 	Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner’s
detention is governed by § 1226.
The Due Process Clause prohibits deprivations of life, liberty, and property without
due process of law. 	U.S. Const. amend. V. 	“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all
‘persons’ within the United States, including [noncitizens], whether their presence here is
lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).
To determine which procedures are constitutionally sufficient to satisfy the Due Process
Clause, the Court applies the three-part test in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
The Court must consider: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official
action;” (2) the “risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and
(3) “the Government’s interest including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.” Id. at 335.
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The Court has granted several habeas petitions filed by similarly situated petitioners.
For example, in Faizyan v. Casey, the Court applied the Mathews test and found that the
respondents’ summary revocation of the petitioner’s “conditional parole without an
opportunity to be heard deprived [him] of his due process rights.” 	Case No.: 3:25-cv-
02884-BM-JLB, 2025 WL 3208844, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025); accord C.A.R.V. v.
Wofford, Case No. 1:25-CV-01395, JLT SKO, 2025 WL 3059549, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov.
3, 2025) (finding due process violation where the petitioner was originally released on an
order of release on own recognizance). Here, like in Faizyan, Petitioner was released by
DHS after being apprehended and lived in the United States for over two years before being
re-detained. (Doc. 1 ¶ 28.) The Court thus adopts its reasoning in Faizyan and applies it
here. 	For those same reasons, ICE’s re-detention of Petitioner without providing him a
pre-deprivation hearing violates his due process rights and renders his detention unlawful.
The Court thus concludes that due process requires Petitioner to be released from
custody and receive a bond hearing before an immigration judge before he can be re-
detained. To the extent Respondents argue that Petitioner is entitled only to a bond hearing,
this argument “misapprehend[s] the purpose of a pre-detention hearing: if Petitioner is
detained, he will already have suffered the injury he is now seeking to avoid.” Jorge M.F.
v. Jennings, 534 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2021); see also E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley,
795 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1324 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“Although the Government notes that
Petitioner may request a bond hearing while detained, such a post-deprivation hearing
cannot serve as an adequate procedural safeguard because it is after the fact and cannot
prevent an erroneous deprivation of liberty.”); Domingo v. Kaiser, Case No. 25-cv-05893
(RFL), 2025 WL 1940179, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2025) (“Even if Petitioner[ ] received
a prompt post-detention bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and was released at that
point, he will have already suffered the harm that is the subject of his motion; that is, his
potentially erroneous detention.”).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED. Accordingly:
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1. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody under
the same conditions of release that existed immediately prior to his February 7, 2026
re-detention.
2. The Court ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner shall
receive notice of the reasons for his re-detention and a hearing before an immigration
judge to determine whether detention is warranted. 	Respondents shall bear the
burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence,2 that Petitioner poses a
danger to the community or a risk of flight.
3. The TRO Motion (Doc. 2) is DENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: March 3, 2026
____________________________________
HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
2 See Sadeqi v. LaRose, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 3154520, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 12,
2025) (“Petitioner is entitled to a prompt and individualized bond hearing, at which
Respondents must justify her continued detention by a showing of clear and convincing
evidence that Petitioner would likely flee or pose a danger to the community if released.”)
(citing Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011), abrogated on other grounds
by Jennings, 583 U.S. 281 (explaining that “the substantial liberty interest at stake”
warranted placing the burden on the government to “prove by clear and convincing
evidence that [a noncitizen] is a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify denial
of bond”)).
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