Singh v. Noem et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
BALJIT SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM, In her official capacity as
Secretary of Homeland Security;
GREGORY JOHN ARCHAMBEAULT,
in his official capacity as Field Office
Director, San Diego Field Office, U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enforcement;
TODD LYONS, In his official capacity
as Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; PAMELA
BONDI, In her official capacity as
Attorney General; Warden of the Imperial
Detention Facility,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-cv-0932-GPC-MMP
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.
[ECF No. 1]
Before the Court is Petitioner Baljit Singh’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. ECF
No. 1. For the reasons outlined below, the petition is GRANTED and Respondents are
ORDERED to release Petitioner from custody IMMEDIATELY.
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BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen of India. ECF No. 1, ¶ 1. Petitioner entered the United States
on September 14, 2019, without inspection near San Luis, Arizona. Id. Petitioner was
detained and claimed asylum based upon a fear of return to India based on political
persecution. Id. Petitioner was released from custody on a $25,000 bond on October 24,
2019. Id.
Petitioner was re-detained by Respondents on January 21, 2026, at a Border Patrol
checkpoint on Interstate 10. Id. Respondents did not have a warrant for Petitioner’s
detention, and Petitioner was not given a new bond hearing. Petitioner has since been
detained at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility. Id.
On February 12, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus requesting
his immediate release from custody. Id. at 12.1 Specifically, Petitioner argues that his
current detention violates the Immigration Nationality Act (INA) and his Fifth Amendment
due process rights Id. ¶¶ 51-61.
On February 18, 2026, Respondents filed a response to the petition. ECF No. 4.
Petitioner was given until the end of February 20, 2026, to file a traverse. See ECF No. 2.
While the Court acknowledges that the time to file a traverse has not yet passed, upon
review of the Petition and Response, the Court finds that additional argument is not
necessary to inform its decision.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a writ of habeas corpus may be granted to any petitioner
who demonstrates that she is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); see Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004).
1 Page numbers are based on the CM/ECF pagination
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The writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004).
As explained by the Supreme Court, “the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a
person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the
writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484
(1973); Pinson v. Carvajal, 69 F.4th 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2023) (habeas actions limited to
challenges of the legality or duration of confinement). A petitioner bears the burden of
demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” See Espinoza v. Sabol, 558 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 2009).
DISCUSSION
Petitioner argues that his re-detention without cause violates the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. The Court agrees.
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, no person shall be “deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. Amend. V. Indeed,
“[f]reedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause
protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Due process rights apply to
noncitizens, including those whose presence in the United States is unlawful. Id. at 693.
As applied to cases like Petitioner’s: “even when ICE has the initial discretion to
detain or release a noncitizen pending removal proceedings, after that individual is released
from custody [he] has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” Pinchi v.
Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025). See also Doe v. Becerra, No. 2:25-
CV-00647-DJC-DMC, 2025 WL 691664, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2025); Padilla v. U.S.
Immigr. & Customs Enf't, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023); Ortiz Donis v.
Chestnut, No. 1:25-CV-01228-JLT-SAB, 2025 WL 2879514, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 9,
2025). In fact, the government’s initial release of an individual from custody “creates an
‘implicit promise’ that the individual’s liberty will be revoked only if they fail to abide by
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the conditions of their release.” Calderon v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-06695-AMO, 2025 WL
2430609, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2025) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482
(1972)). An initial release from ICE custody further reflects “a determination by the
government that [an individual is] neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community.”
Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1034; Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC
(EMC), 2025 WL 2637503, *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025). Thus, DHS may generally not
re-arrest a previously released noncitizen “absent a change in circumstances.” Salcedo
Aceros 2025 WL 2637503, at *1 (citing Panosyan v. Mayorkas, 854 F. App'x 787, 788 (9th
Cir. 2021); Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2017)).
Here, because Petitioner was released on bond from DHS custody in 2019, ECF No.
1, ¶ 1, he maintains a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody. The Court must
next determine “what process is due.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481.
“The constitution typically ‘requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives
a person or liberty or property.’” G.S. v. Bostock, No. 2:25-CV-01255-JNW-TLF, 2025
WL 3014274 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 8, 2025), report and recommendation adopted sub
nom. G.S. v. Bostock, No. 2:25-CV-01255-JNW-TLF, 2025 WL 3014035 (W.D. Wash.
Oct. 28, 2025) (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990)). To determine what
procedures are required by due process, the Court evaluates the three-part test set forth in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-335 (1976). See Ortiz Donnis, 2025 WL 2879514,
at *12. Under Mathews, a court must consider (1) “the private interest” at stake, (2) “the
risk of an erroneous deprivation” without additional procedures and “the probable
value . . . of additional or substitute procedural safeguards,” and (3) the “Government’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens imposed
by the additional procedures.” 424 U.S. at 335.
As to the first Mathews factor, Petitioner has a significant private interest in his
continued liberty. Thus, this factor favors Petitioner. See Salcedo 2025 WL 2637503, *12;
Ortiz Donis, 2025 WL 2879514, at *12; Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1034-35.
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Turning to the second Mathews factor, “it is clear that there is a significant risk that
the government will erroneously deprive [Petitioner] of that liberty interest if it does not
provide [him] with a pre-detention hearing.” Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1035. Where, as
here, Petitioner has not received any bond or custody hearing upon his re-detention, “‘the
risk for erroneous deprivation [of liberty] is high’ because neither the government nor
[Petitioner] has had an opportunity to determine whether there is any valid basis for [his]
detention.” Id. (quoting Singh v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00801, 2025 WL 1918679 (E.D.
Cal. July 11, 2025)). Further, courts have noted that “civil immigration detention must be
‘nonpunitive in purpose’ and bear a ‘reasonable relation’ to the authorized statutory
purposes of preventing flight and danger to the community.” G.S. v. Bostock, 2025 WL
3014274, at *8. By releasing Petitioner in 2019, immigration officers determined that he
was neither a flight risk nor a danger to his community. See id.; Ortiz Donis, 2025 WL
2879514, at *1; Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1034. Respondents have not alleged that there
has been a change in circumstance since Petitioner’s 2019 release. See ECF No. 5. Thus,
the risk of erroneous deprivation is particularly high in Petitioner’s case, as there is no
evidence of changed circumstances or that Petitioner is a danger or flight risk. Accordingly,
this factor also favors Petitioner.
Finally, the Government “has failed to show any countervailing interest against
providing a pre-detention hearing.” G.S. v. Bostock, 2025 WL 3014274, at *9; Salcedo
Aceros, 2025 WL 2637503, at *12. Indeed, “in immigration court, custody hearings are
routine and impose a minimal cost.” Singh, 2025 WL 1918679, at *8 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Further, Respondents have not indicated that a hearing will
delay or obstruct Respondents’ efforts to remove Petitioner. Overall, the Government’s
interest in detaining Petitioner without a hearing is low. Singh, 2025 WL 1918679, at *8.
Each of the Mathews factors favors Petitioner. Thus, Petitioner was entitled to a pre-
deprivation bond hearing. The Government detained Petitioner, without explanation and
without notice, despite its own prior determination that Petitioner was not a flight risk and
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posed no danger to the community. “Under these circumstances, given the government’s
conduct, the substantial liberty interests held by [Petitioner], and the fact that the
government has no evidence and does not contend that [Petitioner] presents [a] risk or flight
or to public safety, a pre-deprivation bond hearing is warranted.” Salcedo 2025 WL
2637503, *12. At such a hearing, the government must demonstrate to a neutral
decisionmaker by clear and convincing evidence that re-detention is necessary to prevent
danger to the community or flight. Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1038; see also Ortiz Donis,
2025 WL 2879514, at *15. Put simply: “since it is the government that initiated re-
detention, it follows that the government should be required to bear the burden of providing
a justification for the re-detention.” Ortiz Donis, 2025 WL 2879514, at *15. Accordingly,
the Court ORDERS Petitioner’s IMMEDIATE release.
Respondents, in their response to the petition, argue that the primary legal issues in
this case are (1) whether Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) or § 1226(a)
and (2) whether Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing. ECF No. 4, at 2. In so arguing,
Respondents acknowledge that this Court will likely be guided by previous decisions in
this District finding that § 1226(a) applies to noncitizens like Petitioner, thereby entitling
Petitioner to a bond hearing. ECF No. 4, at 3. Respondents further ask that, if this Court
grants the petition, “it should decline to address” Petitioner’s due process argument, noting
that the Court is “not required” to make findings on issues “unnecessary to the results they
reach.” Id. at 4, n.3. Respondents’ arguments fall short.
Immediate release is the appropriate remedy in this case, and Petitioner’s due
process arguments are essential to reaching this conclusion.2 For the reasons discussed
2 Indeed, having reached this conclusion on Petitioner’s due process claims, the Court need
not fully evaluate Petitioner’s INA claims regarding whether his detention is governed by
§ 1225(b) or § 1226(a). However, the Court notes that it has previously found that § 1226(a)
governs the detention and release of noncitizens like Petitioner. See, e.g., Nieto v. Casey,
No. 26-CV-0186-GPC-AHG, 2026 WL 125602, at *2-*5 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2026);
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above, an order requiring a bond hearing would be insufficient to cure the due process
violations faced by Petitioner. Respondents have failed to substantively engage with
Petitioner’s due process arguments or acknowledge that Petitioner has been re-detained
without cause after being released bond. Accordingly, the Court is not persuaded by
Respondents’ arguments and orders Petitioner’s release.
CONCLUSION
Based on the reasoning above, the Court ORDERS:
1. Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED as to Petitioner’s
requested release from custody.
2. Because the government has no evidence that Petitioner poses a flight risk or
danger to the community, Petitioner SHALL be released IMMEDIATELY
from DHS custody. Respondents SHALL NOT impose any additional
restrictions on him, such as electronic monitoring, unless that is determined to be
necessary at a later custody hearing.
3. Respondents SHALL NOT re-arrest or re-detain Petitioner absent compliance
with constitutional protections, which include, at a minimum, pre-deprivation
notice of at least seven days before a pre-deprivation hearing at which the
government will bear the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing
evidence that Petitioner is likely to flee or pose a danger to the community if not
detained.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Morales-Vichi v. Noem, No. 25-CV-3754-GPC-KSC, 2025 WL 3764699, at *2-*5 (S.D.
Cal. Dec. 30, 2025); Betanco v. Divver, No. 26-CV-0258-GPC-BJW, 2026 WL 172507,
*3-*6 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2026); Lagarda-Vega v. Noem, No. 3:25-CV-02970-GPC-DDL,
2025 WL 3558931, *4-*7 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025).
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Dated: February 18, 2026
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