Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
JOSE ALEJANDRO AGUILERA
QUIROZ,
Petitioners,
v.
CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, Warden Otay
Mesa Detention Center, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-CV-866 JLS (DEB)
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
(ECF No. 5)
Presently before the Court is Petitioner Jose Alejandro Aguilera Quiroz’s Amended
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.,” ECF No. 5). Also
before the Court is Respondents’ Return to Habeas Petition (“Ret.,” ECF No. 8) and
Petitioner’s Traverse (“Traverse,” ECF No. 9). For the reasons set forth below, the Court
GRANTS Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 5).
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Honduras, who entered the United States through
the CBP One app on November 14, 2022. Pet. at 2. Petitioner was taken into custody then
released into the United States where he moved to Virginia, applied for asylum, and
attended all check-in appointments. Id. This parole “automatically expired on November
14, 2023.” Ret. at 2. On August 3, 2025, Petitioner was arrested for a DUI where he spent
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two days in jail before being taken into ICE custody. 	Pet. at 2–3. 	Petitioner was never
convicted of the DUI, given notice of the decision to take him into immigration custody,
or given any sort of interview to contest his detention. 	Id. 	On November 26, 2025,
Petitioner was ordered removed. 	Id. 	Petitioner appealed this decision and the appeal
remains pending. Id.
LEGAL STANDARD
A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the
legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of
his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial
body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the
court of appeals. 	See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales,
418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat.
231, § 106(a)). 	However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising
independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention—
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. 	Nadarajah v. Gonzales,
443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez,
583 U.S. 281 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 2018)
(citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
Petitioner argues that the summary revocation of his parole without justification or
consideration of his individualized circumstances violates the Due Process Clause. Pet. at
4–5. The Court agrees.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 	U.S. Const. amend. V. 	“[T]he Due
Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether
their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles
aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” 	Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,
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306 (1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing before the
State deprives a person of liberty or property.” 	Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127
(1990). “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or over whose
liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their
liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (citations omitted).
Although the initial decision to detain or release an individual may be within the
government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to release an individual from custody
creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will
be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the . . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)). “Thus, even when ICE has the initial
discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending removal proceedings, after that
individual is released from custody she has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of
custody.” 	Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1032 (citing Romero v. Kaiser, No. 22-cv-20508,
2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022)).
Respondents contend that Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and is only
entitled to a bond hearing—making his other constitutional claims moot. Ret. at 3. The
Court disagrees. Petitioner has been granted humanitarian parole, granting him parole for
a year.1 Pet. at 2. 	Petitioner is not a newly arrived noncitizen seeking admission at the
border, as Petitioner has been in the United States since November 2022. Pet. at 2. Upon
1 Respondents contend that because Petitioner’s parole expired after a year, any due process arguments
are foreclosed. Ret. at 3. The Court disagrees because Petitioner’s liberty “interest did not expire along
with Petitioner’s parole agreement.” 	Ramirez Tesara v. Wamsley, 800 F. Supp. 3d 1130, 1136 (W.D.
Wash. 2025). “Once established, Petitioner’s interest in liberty is a constitutional right which may only
be revoked through methods that comport with due process, such as a hearing in front of a neutral party
to determine whether Petitioner’s re-detainment is warranted.” 	Id. (citing Padilla v. U.S. Immigr. &
Customs Enf’t, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023)). Therefore, the expiration of Petitioner’s
parole does not impact the liberty interest in his release. See, e.g., Omer G. G. v. Kaiser, No. 1:25-CV-
01471-KES-SAB (HC), 2025 WL 3254999, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2025) (finding the expiration of
petitioner’s parole did not extinguish his liberty interest); Quiroga-Chaparro v. Warden of Golden State
Annex Det. Facility, No. 1:25-CV-1731 AC, 2025 WL 3771473, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2025) (same);
Kazybayeva v. Warden of Otay Mesa Det. Ctr., No. 26-CV-0421-GPC-MMP, 2026 WL 280478, at *3
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2026) (same).
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arrival, he was determined to not be a danger to the community or a flight risk and has
attended his check-in appointments. Id. The relief Petitioner is entitled to is not limited to
a bond hearing; Petitioner has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody. See,
e.g., Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1034 (“[Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after her
initial apprehension reflected a determination by the government that she was neither a
flight risk nor a danger to the community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining
at liberty unless she no longer meets those criteria.”); Noori v. LaRose, 807 F. Supp. 3d
1146, 1164 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (“Petitioner is not an ‘arriving’ noncitizen but one that has
[been] present in our country for over a year. This substantial amount of time indicates he
is afforded the Fifth Amendment’s guaranteed due process before removal.”); Alvarenga
Matute v. Wofford, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1128 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (finding petitioner had a
protected liberty interest in his release).
As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires
procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Matthews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally sufficient
to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court must apply the Matthews factors. 	See
Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. 	Courts must consider: (1) “the private interest that will be
affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.” Id.
The Court finds that all three factors support a finding that the Government’s
revocation of Petitioner’s parole without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be
heard, denied Petitioner of his due process rights. First, as discussed above, Petitioner has
a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to his parole. “Freedom
from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects.” Zadvydas, 533
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U.S. at 690. Petitioner has an interest in remaining with and providing for his family and
continuing the asylum process. 	See Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 at 482 (“Subject to the
conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family and
friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life.”).
Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as Petitioner’s
parole was revoked without providing him a reason for revocation or giving him an
opportunity to be heard. Pet. at 6. Since DHS’s initial determination that Petitioner should
be paroled because he posed no danger to the community and was not a flight risk, there is
no evidence that these findings have changed. 	See Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d
1168, 1760 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“Release reflects a determination by the government that the
noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.”). “Once a noncitizen has been
released, the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting him merely because he is subject
to removal proceedings. 	Rather, the federal agents must be able to present evidence of
materially changed circumstances—namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in fact
dangerous or has become a flight risk. . . .” Saravia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 1760. Respondents,
failing to address Petitioner’s Due Process argument in their response, do not point to any
material circumstances that have changed that would warrant reconsideration of his
parole.2 See generally Ret. “Where as here, ‘the petitioner has not received any bond or
custody hearing,’ ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty is high’ because neither
the government nor [Petitioner] has had an opportunity to determine whether there is any
2 Respondents fail to provide any legal authority “in support of the proposition that [P]etitioner’s DUI
arrest justifies re-detaining him without prior notice or a pre-detention hearing.” 	Vargas Monsalve v.
Chestnut, 26-CV-626-DAD-CKD, 2026 WL 242066, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2026). 	“[T]he record is
silent as to whether [P]etitioner was even charged after his arrest,” but “it is undisputed that he was not
convicted.” Rodriguez Cruz v. Warden of the Golden State Annex, No. 26-CV-348 DAD SCR, 2026 WL
453561, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2026). 	Further, it is undisputed that Petitioner did not receive prior
notice or a hearing before his re-detention. See id.; Pet. at 4–5. Therefore, the Court follows others in the
Ninth Circuit in concluding that “re-detaining an individual for a pending DUI charge without prior notice
or a hearing violates due process.” Marquez v. Chestnut, 26-CV-988-DAD-CSK, 2026 WL 326811, at
*1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2026).
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valid basis for [his] detention.” Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1035 (quoting Singh v. Andrews,
803 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1047 (E.D. Cal. 2025)) (cleaned up).
Third, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning,
and a hearing is “low.” 	See Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1036; Matute, 807 F. Supp. 3d at
1130; Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) (“If the
government wishes to re-arrest [Petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps
toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.”). Respondents fail
to point to any burdens on the Government if it were to have provided proper notice,
reasoning, and a pre-deprivation hearing. See generally Ret.
Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking his parole in
violation of the Due Process Clause, his detention is unlawful. See, e.g., Alegria Palma v.
Larose et al., No. 25-cv-1942 BJC (MMP), slip op. 14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2025) (granting
a TRO based on a procedural due process challenge to a revocation of parole without a pre-
deprivation hearing); Sanchez v. LaRose, No. 25-CV-2396-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 2770629,
at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025) (granting a writ of habeas corpus releasing petitioner from
custody to the conditions of her preexisting parole on due process grounds).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 5). The Court ORDERS Respondents to immediately release
Petitioner from custody subject to the conditions of his preexisting parole. 	The Court
ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner is entitled to notice of the
reasons for revocation of his parole and a hearing before a neutral decision maker to
determine whether detention is warranted. 	The Government shall bear the burden of
establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to the
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community or a risk of flight.3 The Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report by
March 16, 2026, confirming that Petitioner has been released. The Clerk of Court SHALL
close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 10, 2026
3 This relief has been granted in similar matters. See, e.g., Matute, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 1133; Pinchi, 792
F. Supp. 3d at 1038; Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1097 (E.D. Cal. 2025); Martinez Hernandez
v. Andrews, No. 25-CV-1035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025).
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