Camacho Cabrera v. Larose et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
JUAN MANUEL CAMACHO
CABRERA,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, SENIOR
WARDEN OF OTAY MESA
DETENTION CENTER, ET AL.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26cv863-LL-MSB
ORDER GRANTING IN PART
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2241
[ECF No. 1]
Pending before the Court is Petitioner Juan Manuel Camacho Cabrera’s Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”). Also before the
Court is Respondents’ Response to Petition [ECF No. 4] and Petitioner’s Traverse [ECF
No. 3]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART Petitioner’s Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner Juan Manuel Camacho Cabrera is a Venezuelan citizen who came to the
United States in September 2023 to seek asylum. Pet. ¶¶ 1, 16. Petitioner arrived in the
United States at the El Paso crossing and immediately surrendered to border officials who
processed him for entry into the United States. Id. Petitioner was detained for three days,
but then released on his own recognizance with a Notice to Appear in San Diego,
California, on December 12, 2023. Id. ¶¶ 2, 62. In granting his release, the Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) determined that he posed little, if any risk of flight or danger
to the community. Id. ¶ 62; see also Exh. A, Notice to Appear. Since Petitioner has been
in the United States, he has fully complied with the government’s orders and has no
criminal history. Id. ¶ 64. The Notice to Appear dated November 7, 2023 and issued by
DHS states that Petitioner is “subject to removal from the United States” pursuant to the
“212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, in that you are an
alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrived in the
United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General.” Exh.
A at 2.
Petitioner has lived in the United States since his release, following the requirements
placed upon him as an asylum seeker. Id. ¶ 3. He received his work authorization and has
been fully employed since he was authorized to work. 	Id. Petitioner appeared for
approximately “one dozen court appearances” in connection with his asylum case, when
on August 18, 2025, he was arrested at his immigration court hearing in San Diego. Id. ¶
4. He was detained and has remained at the Otay Mesa Detention facility since then. Id.
Petitioner states that:
[R]e-detention without a pre-deprivation hearing violated his due process
rights. Nearly two years after deciding to release Petitioner on his own
recognizance, 	Respondents 	re-detained 	Petitioner 	with 	no 	notice, 	no
explanation of the justification and no opportunity to contest his detention
before a neutral adjudicator before he was taken into custody.
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Pet. ¶ 82. On February 11, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant Petition, alleging that his re-
detention without notice or a hearing violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
Id. ¶¶ 75-90. He seeks a writ of habeas corpus directing Respondents to order his immediate
release. Id. at Prayer for Relief.
On February 19, 2026, Petitioner filed a Traverse in support of his Writ of Habeas
Corpus on the basis that Respondents failed to file their Return by the court-ordered
deadline. ECF No. 3. Respondents filed a late Return on February 21, 2026, that failed to
address why their Return was late (four days beyond the Court-ordered deadline of
February 17, 2026). ECF Nos. 2, 4. Instead, Respondents’ argued that Petitioner’s claims
are jurisdictionally barred under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), that he is an “arriving alien” and
inadmissible 	under 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1182(a)(6)(A)(i), 	and 	that 	his 	detention 	is 	not
unconstitutionally prolonged. ECF No. 4.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus when a petitioner “is in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c); Magana-Pizano v. I.N.S., 200 F.3d 603, 609 (9th Cir. 1999) (“28 U.S.C. § 2241
expressly permits the federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus to aliens when those
aliens are ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.’”). In federal habeas proceedings, the petitioner bears the burden of proving his case
by a preponderance of evidence. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 970 n.16 (9th Cir.
2004); Bellew v. Gunn, 532 F.2d 1288, 1290 (9th Cir. 1976) (citations omitted).
III. 	DISCUSSION
a. Late-Filed Return
As an initial matter, the Court addresses that Respondents failed to abide by the
Court-ordered deadline of February 17, 2026 to file their Return. Notwithstanding this
failure, the Court will still rule on the Petition on its merits, but reminds Respondents that
failure to do so in the future may result in a waiver of their arguments.
/ / /
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b. Jurisdiction
Respondents argue that this Court lacks jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).
Response at 2–4. Section 1252(g) provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear
any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the
Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders
against any alien under this chapter.” 	8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). 	Respondents argue that
Petitioner’s 	claims arise from DHS’s 	decision 	to 	commence removal 	proceedings.
Response at 3. The Court disagrees.
Section 1252(g) should be read “narrowly” as to apply “only to three discrete actions
that the Attorney General may take: her ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings,
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” Ibarra-Perez v. United States, No. 24-631,
2025 WL 2461663, at *6 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2025) (quoting Reno v. American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 482, 487 (1999)). 	Section 1252(g) “does not
prohibit challenges to unlawful practices merely because they are in some fashion
connected to removal orders.” Id. at *7. Section 1252(g) does not bar due process claims.
Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1052–53 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that the petitioners’
objective was not to review the merits of their proceeding, but rather “to enforce their
constitutional rights to due process in the context of those proceedings”).
Here, Petitioner does not challenge the decision to commence removal proceedings
or any act to adjudicate or execute a removal order. Rather, Petitioner is challenging his
re-detention 	without 	notice 	or 	justification. 	Pet. 	¶ 	82. 	Petitioner 	is 	enforcing 	his
“constitutional rights to due process in the context of the removal proceedings—not the
legitimacy of the removal proceedings or any removal order.” 	Garcia v. Noem, No. 25-
CV-2180-DMS-MMP, 2025 WL 2549431, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025). 	Therefore, §
1252(g) does not strip the Court of jurisdiction.
c. 	Due Process
Petitioner argues that his re-detention without a pre-deprivation hearing violated his
due process rights. Pet. ¶ 82. The Court agrees.
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The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 	U.S. Const. amend. V. 	“[T]he Due
Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether
their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles
aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” 	Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,
306 (1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing before the
State deprives a person of liberty or property.” 	Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127
(1990). “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or over whose
liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their
liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-5632-PCP, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July
25, 2025) (citations omitted). 	Although the initial decision to detain or release an
individual may be within the government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to
release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that
individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the
. . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)).
“Thus, even when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending
removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody she has a protected
liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” 	Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (citing
Romero v. Kaiser, No. 22-cv-20508, 2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022)).
Respondents contend that as an “applicant for admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225
Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention and therefore his alleged statutory and
constitutional violations fail. 	Response at 4-8. 	The Court disagrees. 	Petitioner was
released on his own recognizance and has been living in the United States for the past two
years. 	Pet. ¶¶ 2, 3, 62. Petitioner is not a newly arrived noncitizen seeking admission at
the border, as Petitioner has been in the United States since September 2023. Id. ¶ 1. Upon
arrival, he was determined to not be a danger to the community or a flight risk and has
attended his court hearings. 	Id. ¶¶ 3, 4, 62. Petitioner is not merely an “applicant for
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admission” at the border with minimal due process rights; Petitioner has a protected liberty
interest in remaining out of custody. 	See, e.g., Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *4
(“[Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after her initial apprehension reflected a
determination by the government that she was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the
community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining at liberty unless she no
longer meets those criteria.”); Noori, 2025 WL 2800149, at *10 (“Petitioner is not an
‘arriving’ noncitizen but one that has [been] present in our country for over a year. This
substantial amount of time indicates he is afforded the Fifth Amendment’s guaranteed due
process before removal.”); Matute v. Wofford, No. 25-cv-1206-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL
2817795, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2025) (finding petitioner had a protected liberty interest
in his release).
As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires
procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Matthews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally sufficient
to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court must apply the Matthews factors. 	See
Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. Courts must consider:
(1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official
action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the
Government’s interest including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.”
Id.
The Court finds that all three factors support a finding that the Government’s re-
detention without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be heard, denied Petitioner
of his due process rights. 	First, as discussed above, Petitioner has a significant liberty
interest in remaining out of custody after his initial release on his own recognizance.
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects.”
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Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. Petitioner has an interest in remaining with and providing for
his family and continuing the asylum process. 	See Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 at 482
(“Subject to the conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free to be
with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life.”).
Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as Petitioner was
re-detained without providing him a reason giving him an opportunity to be heard. Pet. ¶
62. Since DHS’s initial determination that Petitioner should be released because he posed
no danger to the community and was not a flight risk, there is no evidence that these
findings have changed. 	See Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1760 (N.D. Cal.
2017) (“Release reflects a determination by the government that the noncitizen is not a
danger to the community or a flight risk.”). Petitioner has no criminal record, has not been
arrested or otherwise in criminal trouble, has work authorization, and has filed an asylum
application. 	Pet. ¶¶ 3, 64, 72. “Once a noncitizen has been released, the law prohibits
federal agents from rearresting him merely because he is subject to removal proceedings.
Rather, the federal agents must be able to present evidence of materially changed
circumstances—namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in fact dangerous or has become a
flight risk. . . .” 	Saravia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 1760. Respondents in their Response do not
point to any material circumstances that have changed that would warrant Petitioner’s re-
detention without notice or a hearing. 	See generally Response. 	“Where as here, ‘the
petitioner has not received any bond or custody hearing,’ ‘the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of liberty is high’ because neither the government nor [Petitioner] has had an
opportunity to determine whether there is any valid basis for her detention.” Pinchi, 2025
WL 2084921, at *5 (quoting Singh v. Andrews, No. 25-cv-801-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL
1918679, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2025)).
Third, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning,
and a hearing is “low.” See Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *5; Matute, 2025 WL 2817795,
at *6; Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) (“If the
government wishes to re-arrest [Petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps
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toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.”). Respondents fail
to point to any burdens on the Government if it were to have provided proper notice,
reasoning, and a pre-deprivation hearing. See generally Response.
Therefore, because Respondents re-detained Petitioner without notice or a hearing
in violation of the Due Process Clause, his detention is unlawful. See, e.g., Alegria Palma
v. Larose et al., No. 25-cv-1942 BJC (MMP), slip op. 14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2025)
(granting a TRO based on a procedural due process challenge to a revocation of parole
without a pre-deprivation hearing); Navarro Sanchez, 2025 WL 2770629, at *5 (granting
a writ of habeas corpus releasing petitioner from custody to the conditions of her
preexisting parole on due process grounds).
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART Petitioner’s Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1), and ORDERS Respondents to immediately release
Petitioner from custody subject to the conditions of previous release on recognizance. The
Court ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner is entitled to notice
of the reasons for his re-detention and a hearing before a neutral decision maker to
determine whether detention is warranted. 	The government shall bear the burden of
establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to the
community or a risk of flight.1 As this concludes the litigation in this case, the Clerk of
Court SHALL CLOSE the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 23, 2026
1 This relief has been granted in similar matters. See, e.g., Matute, 2025 WL 2817795, at *8; Pinchi, 2025
WL 2084921, at *5; Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1097 (E.D. Cal. 2025); Martinez Hernandez
v. Andrews, No. 25-CV-1035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025).
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