Abdoulaye v. Marrero et al

3:26-cv-00767Casd24.02.2026

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MAMAH ABDOULAYE,
Petitioner,
v.
SIXTO MARRERO, Warden, Imperial
Regional Detention Facility, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-CV-767 JLS (DEB)
ORDER:
(1) GRANTING IN PART
PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS, AND
(2) GRANTING JOINT MOTION
TO SEAL PREVIOUSLY FILED
DOCUMENT
(ECF Nos. 1, 5)
Presently before the Court is Mamah Abdoulaye’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.,” ECF No. 1). 	Also before the Court are
Respondents’ Return to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Ret.,” ECF No. 4),
Petitioner’s Traverse (“Traverse,” ECF No. 6), and the Parties’ Joint Motion to Seal
Previously Filed Document (“Joint Mot.,” ECF No. 5). 	For the reasons set forth below,
the Court GRANTS IN PART the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) and
GRANTS the Joint Motion to Seal (ECF No. 5).
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BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a citizen of Togo, alleges that he has been detained by the United States
Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility since January 11, 2025, when he
entered the United States. Pet. ¶¶ 22–23. Petitioner fled Togo based on his fear of political
persecution, seeking asylum in the United States. 	Id. ¶ 23. 	On March 10, 2025, when
border officials were unable to secure a Tchamba—the only language which Petitioner is
fluent in—interpreter to conduct a credible fear interview, they directed DHS to issue a
Notice to Appear and commence removal proceedings. Id. ¶¶ 24–25. From April to June
2025, Immigration proceedings were delayed on multiple occasions due to the Immigration
Judge’s inability to obtain a Tchamba interpreter. Id. ¶¶ 26–29. On August 11, 2025, the
Immigration 	Judge 	“deemed 	Petitioner’s 	application 	abandoned 	and 	ordered 	him
removed.” 	Id. ¶ 31. Petitioner thereafter obtained pro bono counsel and timely appealed
the Immigration Judge’s decision to the BIA, which remains pending. 	Id. ¶¶ 34–36.
Petitioner alleges that his continued detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. See generally id.
MOTION TO SEAL
The Parties seek to file under seal the previously publicly filed document, Exhibit 2
of Respondents’ Return, as it includes a transcript containing sensitive asylum-related
information, specifically information about Petitioner’s “political activities, ethnicity, and
family.” Joint Mot. at 2–3; see also Ret., Ex. 2. 	A party seeking to seal a judicial record
bears the burden of overcoming the strong presumption of access. Foltz v. State Farm Mut.
Auto Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003). 	The showing required to meet this
burden depends upon whether the documents to be sealed relate to a motion that is “more
than tangentially related to the merits of the case.” 	Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp.,
LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1102 (9th Cir. 2016). 	When the underlying motion is more than
tangentially related to the merits, the “compelling reasons” standard applies. Id. at 1096–
98.
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Here, because the transcript is relevant to the claims in the Petition, it is “more than
tangentially related to the merits of the case.” See id. The Court finds compelling reasons
exist to seal the transcript, as it reveals sensitive information about Petitioner’s asylum
application, and as Petitioner submits, the “public filing of th[e] transcript would risk
exposing him and his relatives to retaliation in Togo and would unnecessarily publicize
highly personal information from ongoing protection proceedings.” 	Joint Mot. at 3; see
Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1096 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (sealing similar information
concerning an asylum application); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.6 (“Information contained in
or pertaining to any application for refugee admission, asylum, withholding of removal
under section 241(b)(3) of the Act, or protection under regulations issued pursuant to the
Convention Against Torture’s implementing legislation . . . shall not be disclosed without
the written consent of the applicant . . . .”). Accordingly, the Court finds that sealing the
transcript is appropriate and GRANTS the Joint Motion.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
I. 	Legal Standard
A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the
legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of
his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial
body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the
court of appeals. 	See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales,
418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat.
231, § 106(a)). 	However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising
independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention—
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. 	Nadarajah v. Gonzales,
443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez,
138 S. Ct. 830 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal.
2018) (citations omitted).
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II. 	Jurisdiction
Respondent argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)
because Petitioner’s claims arise from DHS’s decision to commence removal proceedings.
Ret. at 4–6. The Court disagrees.
Section 1252(g) provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or
claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney
General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any
alien under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Section 1252(g) should be read “narrowly”
as to apply “only to three discrete actions that the Attorney General may take: her ‘decision
or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’”
Ibarra-Perez v. United States, No. 24-631, 2025 WL 2461663, at *6 (9th Cir. Aug. 27,
2025) (quoting Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 482,
487 (1999)). Section 1252(g) “does not prohibit challenges to unlawful practices merely
because they are in some fashion connected to removal orders.” Id. at *7. Section 1252(g)
does not bar due process claims. Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1052–53 (9th Cir. 1998)
(finding that the petitioners’ objective was not to review the merits of their proceeding, but
rather “to enforce their constitutional rights to due process in the context of those
proceedings”).
Here, Petitioner does not challenge the decision to commence removal proceedings
or any act to adjudicate or execute a removal order. 	Traverse at 2. 	Rather, Petitioner is
challenging his prolonged detention without a bond hearing. 	Id. at 3. 	Petitioner is
enforcing 	his 	“constitutional 	rights 	to 	due 	process 	in 	the context 	of 	the 	removal
proceedings—not the legitimacy of the removal proceedings or any removal order.”
Garcia v. Noem, No. 25-CV-2180-DMS-MMP, 2025 WL 2549431, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept.
3, 2025). Therefore, § 1252(g) does not strip the Court of jurisdiction.
III. 	Merits
“Neither the Ninth Circuit nor the Supreme Court have provided guidance regarding
the point at which an immigration detainee’s prolonged mandatory detention becomes
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unconstitutional.” Amado v. United States Dep’t of Just., No. 25CV2687-LL(DDL), 2025
WL 3079052, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025). 	However, “[n]early all district courts that
have considered [the constitutionality of prolonged mandatory detention] agree that
prolonged mandatory detention pending removal proceedings, without a bond hearing,
will—at some point—violate the right to due process.” 	Singh v. Barr, 400 F. Supp. 3d
1005 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (cleaned up)
(collecting cases). 	In determining whether detention has become unreasonable, courts
evaluate factors including “the total length of detention to date, the likely duration of future
detention, and the delays in the removal proceedings caused by the petitioner and the
government.” Lopez v. Garland, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870, 879 (E.D. Cal. 2022). Some courts
also consider the conditions of detention and the likelihood that the removal proceedings
will result in a final order of removal. See, e.g., Sadeqi v. LaRose, No. 25-CV-2587-RSH-
BJW, 2025 WL 3154520, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025).
The Court finds that Petitioner has established he is entitled to a bond hearing.
Petitioner’s length of detention without a bond hearing, now over thirteen months, weighs
in Petitioner’s favor. Courts have found detention of similar lengths without a bond hearing
weighs towards a finding that detention has become unreasonable. 	See, e.g., Guatam v.
Corr. Corp of Am., No. 3:25-CV-3600-JES-DEB, 2026 WL 25846, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 5,
2026) (finding that one-year detention weighed in favor of granting a bond hearing); Sadeqi
v. LaRose, No. 25-CV-2587-RSH-BJW, 2025 WL 3154520, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 12,
2025) (finding that eleven month detention without a bond hearing “absent meaningful
rebuttal by [r]espondents” was unreasonable and violated due process). 	The length of
detention therefore favors Petitioner.
As to the likely duration of future detention, Petitioner argues that “there is no
definite end to [his] detention in sight” since his detention may “last several more months
or even years during the adjudication of his appeal to the BIA and, if unfavorable,
Petitioner’s appeal to the Ninth Circuit.” 	Pet. ¶ 70 (citing Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F.
Supp. 3d 1099, 1119 (W.D. Wash. 2019)). The Court agrees, since Respondents, despite
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their assertion that a BIA decision can “generally [be] expect[ed] within a few months,”
Ret. at 14 (citing an online study about BIA appeals), “cannot predict with any degree of
confidence when the BIA appeal will be resolved”—nor the timeline for the resolution of
any potential appeal to the Ninth Circuit. 	Masood v. Barr, No. 19-CV-07623-JD, 2020
WL 95633, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2020). Therefore, the likely duration of future detention
weighs in Petitioner’s favor.
Delay in removal proceedings is closer. Petitioner argues that delay is attributable
to Respondents given their inability to obtain an interpreter, and that Petitioner has not
otherwise caused any delay. Pet. ¶¶ 72–73. Petitioner also notes that the BIA took until
January 30, 2026, to issue a briefing schedule for his appeal, which was filed in September
2025. 	Id. ¶ 73. 	Respondents argue that delay is attributable to Petitioner, as Petitioner
allegedly requested extensions to gather additional evidence for this asylum application,
finish the application, or find an attorney each time he appeared before the Immigration
Judge. Ret. at 14–15. 	The Immigration Judge ultimately “deemed Petitioner’s application
abandoned after he could not satisfactorily explain how he could verify the contents of his
asylum application and documentary evidence if they were translated from languages he
claimed he could not read.” Id. at 15. Petitioner responds that “the record reflects repeated
hearing continuances due to the government’s inability to secure a Tchamba interpreter,
and once Petitioner obtained pro bono counsel, he timely filed his Notice of Appeal.”
Traverse at 10. As it appears the delay in proceedings largely centered around the inability
of the Immigration Judge to secure an interpreter, the Court finds that this factor is neutral.
See Rash v. LaRose, No. 26V0008-LL-DEB, 2026 WL 249324, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 30,
2026).
In balancing these factors and affording greater weight to the length of Petitioner’s
detention, the Court finds that Petitioner’s allegations establish that his detention is
unreasonably prolonged. 	See id. at *4 (“The total length of detention is considered the
most important factor.” (citing Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1118)).
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus 	(ECF 	No. 	1), 	and 	ORDERS 	Respondents 	to 	provide 	Petitioner 	with 	an
individualized bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within fourteen (14) days before a
neutral immigration judge in which the government bears the burden of establishing by
clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a danger to the community or a flight risk
if released. 	If no hearing occurs within fourteen days of this Order, Petitioner shall be
released from Respondents’ custody. The Parties SHALL FILE a Joint Status Report by
March 16, 2026, informing the Court of the outcome of the hearing.
The Court GRANTS the Parties’ Joint Motion to Seal Previously Filed Document
(“Joint Mot.,” ECF No. 5). The Clerk of the Court SHALL FILE under seal the previously
filed document Exhibit 2 of Respondents’ Return (ECF No. 4, Ex. 2). 	As this concludes
the litigation in this matter, the Clerk of the Court SHALL CLOSE the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 24, 2026
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