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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Zhiquan LIU,
Petitioner,
v.
Jeremy CASEY, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26cv720-LL-DEB
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
[ECF No. 1]
Before the Court is Petitioner Zhiquan Liu’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”)]. Also before the Court are Respondents’
Return in Opposition to the Habeas Petition [ ECF No. 5 (“Ret.”)] and Petitioner’s Traverse
[ECF No. 6 “Traverse”]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and ORDERS Petitioner’s immediate release from
custody.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner Zhiquan Liu is a 61-year-old native and citizen of the People’s Republic
of China. Pet. ¶ 15; ECF No. 5-2, Declaration of Ann I. Ferrari (“Ferrari Decl.”) ¶ 5. On or
about May 25, 1993, Petitioner entered the United States without inspection. Pet. ¶ 16;
Ferrari Decl. ¶ 7. U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) placed Petitioner in
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removal proceedings via a Notice to Appear dated August 12, 2002. Id. ¶ 8. On January 9,
2007, an immigration judge ordered Petitioner be removed to China, and Petitioner’s
appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals was dismissed on March 26, 2008. Pet. ¶ 17;
Ferrari Decl. ¶ 9. Thus, Petitioner’s order of removal became administratively final on
March 26, 2008. Ferrari Decl. ¶ 9. On April 15, 2010, ICE officers detained Petitioner and
released him on the same day on order of supervision. Pet. ¶ 18; Ferrari Decl. ¶ 11.
Petitioner attended his ICE check-in every year until he was detained at his check-in on
July 29, 2025. Pet. ¶¶ 19, 22; Ferrari Decl. ¶ 12. Petitioner was not served with a notice of
revocation of release or given an informal interview. Ferrari Decl. ¶ 12. Following his
detention, Petitioner cooperated with ICE in its efforts to remove him by providing his
fingerprints, signing documents presented to him, taking photographs, and submitting his
expired Chinese passport to ICE. Pet. ¶¶ 23, 25.
On October 26, 2025, Petitioner was transferred from Montgomery Processing
Center in Texas to Imperial Regional Detention Facility in California. Pet. ¶¶ 26, 30. About
a month later, Petitioner asked about the status of his removal, and ICE told him that the
Chinese government had refused to accept him on September 27, 2025 and that it would
continue trying. Pet. ¶ 28. Since then, Petitioner has not received any further updates and
remains detained without any bond hearing. Pet. ¶ 29. On October 15, 2025, Respondents
forwarded 	a 	written 	request 	for 	identity 	and 	nationality 	verification 	to 	National
Immigration Administration (“NIA”) at the United States Embassy in Beijing. Ferrari Decl.
¶ 15. Once NIA confirms Petitioner’s identity and Chinese nationality, Respondents will
then submit a written request for issuance of a travel document to the NIA. Id. ¶ 17.
Additionally, Respondents claim that during the fiscal year 2025, China accepted 2,138
Chinese nationals for removals from United States. Id. ¶ 18.
Petitioner argues that his prolonged detention without a bond hearing is unlawful
because it violates 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
the Immigration and Nationality Act, and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). Pet. ¶¶
31–46. Petitioner also argues that DHS did not serve him with a written notice or an
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informal interview pursuant to its regulations 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 and § 241.13. Id. ¶¶ 47–52.
Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus directing Respondents to, inter alia, release him
from custody or alternatively, order a bond hearing. Id. at 12.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl.
2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of
that custody, and [] the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of
habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates he is “in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally,
“the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive
detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” Hamdi, 542
U.S. at 536 (quoting I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001)). Accordingly, challenges
to immigration-related detention are within the purview of a district court’s habeas
jurisdiction. 	Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688 (2001) (“Section 2441 habeas
proceedings are available as a forum for statutory and constitutional challenges to post-
removal-period detention.”); see also Lopez-Marroquin v. Barr, 955 F.3d 759 (9th Cir.
2020) (“[D]istrict courts retain jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider habeas
challenges to immigration detention that are sufficiently independent of the merits of [a]
removal order.”).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner argues that (1) ICE failed to comply with its own regulations before re-
detaining Petitioner, violating 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 and § 241.13; (2) his detention violates
Zadvydas and 8 U.S.C. § 1231. Pet. ¶¶ 31–57. Respondents respond that (1) any alleged
failure to follow regulations does not violate due process; (2) ICE re-detained Petitioner to
execute his removal order to China and that it is working diligently to obtain Petitioner’s
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travel document. Ret. 2–4. The Court finds that both of Petitioner’s claims are meritorious
and each one independently justifies Petitioner’s release.
A. Agency Regulations
Petitioner challenges his detention as unlawful because ICE failed to provide the
required notice and opportunity to be heard before re-detaining him, in violation of the
Fifth Amendment and 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 and § 241.13. Pet. ¶¶ 47–52. The Court agrees.
The detention and release of noncitizens that are subject to a final order of removal
are governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231. This statute provides that “when [a noncitizen] is ordered
removed, the Attorney General shall remove the [noncitizen] from the United States within
a period of 90 days.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). However, once that time passes and
“removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized
by statute,” and the noncitizen must be released on supervised release. Zadvydas, 533 U.S.
at 699–700; see 28 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3) (“If the [noncitizen] does not leave or is not
removed within the 90-day removal period, the [noncitizen], pending removal, shall be
subject to supervision under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General.”).
Once ICE releases a noncitizen on supervised release, “ICE’s ability to re-detain that
noncitizen is constrained by its own regulations.” Nouri v. Herrera, SA CV 25-1905-
JFW(DBT), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171809, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025) (citation
omitted). Code of Federal Regulations sections 241.4 and 241.13 govern the release and
the revocation of such release of noncitizens who are subject to a final removal order. Diaz
v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01079 JLT EPG, 2025 WL 2581575, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 5,
2025). If ICE chooses to re-detain a noncitizen after they have been released, the noncitizen
must “be notified of the reasons for revocation” and be afforded “an initial informal
interview promptly after his or her return to [ICE] custody to afford the [noncitizen] an
opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification.” 8 C.F.R. §
241.4 (l)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3). Thereafter, the noncitizen may “submit any evidence
or information that [] [he] believes shows there is no significant likelihood [he may] be
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removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, or that [he] has not violated the order of
supervision.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3).
Here, Respondents do not appear to suggest that Petitioner violated the terms of his
supervised release [see generally Ret.], ruling out § 241.4(l)(1) or § 241.13(i)(1) as the
source of his revocation. Rather they appear to rely on either § 241.4(l)(2) or § 241.13(i)(2).
According to Respondents, “ICE re-detained Petitioner to execute his removal order to
China.” Ret. at 3. In other words, Respondents decided to revoke Petitioner’s release
because it was “appropriate to enforce a removal order.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2)(iii).
Accordingly, § 241.4(l)(2)(iii) applies here.
However, ICE still failed to provide notice and informal interview before detaining
Petitioner, thereby violating his due process rights. The requirements for notice and an
initial informal interview are not explicitly required in § 241.4(l)(2), but courts have held
that the same requirements constrain revocation of release under this provision as well. See
Diaz, 2025 WL 2581575, at *5 (citing various district court cases that have rejected the
government’s 	arguments 	that 	these 	provisions 	do 	not 	apply 	to 	§ 	241.4(l)(2));
Constantinovici v. Bondi, No. 3:25-CV-02405-RBM-AHG, 2025 WL 2898985, at *4 (S.D.
Cal. Oct. 10, 2025) (“District courts have consistently . . . held that § 241.4(l)(1)’s
procedural requirements apply equally to revocation of a noncitizen’s release pursuant to
§ 241.4(l)(2)”; collecting cases). Here, Respondents concede ICE did not serve Petitioner
a notice of revocation of release when ICE re-detained Petitioner on July 29, 2025. Ret. at
2. Even if it had served a notice of revocation of release, courts have found them to be
insufficient to provide notice under the statute. See, e.g., Sargsyan v. Noem, No. 25-CV-
3857 JLS (JLB), 2026 WL 92044, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2026) (finding a generic form
revocation letter insufficient to provide notice); Xayakesone v. Noem, No. 25-CV-2995-
JES-BJW, 2025 WL 3229102, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2025) (finding notice insufficient
when it stated that the “decision has been made based on a review of your official
[noncitizen] file and a determination that there are changed circumstances in your case”);
Tran v. Noem, No. 25-cv-2391 BTM (BLM), 2025 WL 3005347, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27,
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2025) (holding that this “notice must be in writing and contain all the reasons for the
revocation of the [noncitizen’s] release”); Nouri, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171809 at *14
(“Petitioner cannot be expected to ‘respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the
notification’ when the [n]otice does not actually state any reasons for revocation.”) (citation
omitted). The Court finds that Respondents failed to provide Petitioner a written notice as
required by 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 (l) and 8 C.F.R. § 241. 13.
Further, after re-detaining a noncitizen who is out on supervision, ICE must
“promptly” 	conduct 	“an 	initial 	informal 	interview” 	to 	“afford 	the 	[noncitizen] 	an
opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification.” 8 C.F.R. §
241.4(l)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3). Here, Respondents again concede that ICE did not
conduct an initial informal interview at the time of re-detention. Ret. at 2. As other courts
have found, ICE’s failure to provide an informal interview after the revocation of release
constitutes a due process violation. See Constantinovici v. Bondi, No. 3:25-CV-02405-
RBM-AHG, 2025 WL 2898985, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025) (due process violation
where “[n]othing in the record indicates that Petitioner was provided with an interview in
connection with the revocation of his release or otherwise afforded an opportunity to
respond to the reasons for his re-detention.”); Ceesay, 781 F. Supp. 3d at 164 (“ICE’s
failure to afford [petitioner] an interview violated his right to due process”); M.S.L. v.
Bostock, No. 6:25-CV-01204-AA, 2025 WL 2430267, at *11 (D. Or. Aug. 21, 2025)
(holding that informal interview was not sufficiently “prompt” where it took place twenty-
seven days after revocation and collecting cases); Order Granting Habeas Corpus Petition,
Sayvongsa v. Noem, No.: 3:25-cv-02867-AGS-DEB (S.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2025), ECF No. 10
(granting petition where petitioner did not receive an informal interview for twenty-one
days after being re-detained). The Court finds that Respondents failed to provide Petitioner
an informal interview as required by 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l) and 8 C.F.R.§ 241.13(i).
Respondents argue that even assuming ICE violated agency regulations, “any
alleged failure to follow regulations does not violate due process.” Ret. at 4. “[T]here are,
for present purposes, two types of regulations: (1) those that protect fundamental due
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process rights, and (2) [] those that do not.” United States v. Raya-Vaca, 771 F.3d 1195,
1205 (9th Cir. 2014), 	abrogated on other grounds by Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v.
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020). “A violation of the first type of regulation, however,
implicates due process concerns even without a prejudice inquiry. Id. (holding that where
“the regulation violation … constituted a denial of [the defendant’s] right to notice and an
opportunity to respond, no showing of prejudice [was] necessary to establish a due process
violation”). “There can be little argument that ICE’s requirement that noncitizens be
afforded an informal interview … derives from the fundamental constitutional guarantee
of due process.” Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer, 781 F. Supp. 3d 137, 165 n.26 (W.D.N.Y. 2025).
Accordingly, Respondents’ violation “implicates due process concerns even without a
prejudice inquiry.” Raya-Vaca, 771 F.3d at 1205.
Even if that were not the case, Petitioner suffered sufficient prejudice. In the
immigration 	context, 	“violation 	of 	a 	regulation 	does 	not 	invalidate 	a 	deportation
proceeding unless the regulation serves a purpose of benefit to the [noncitizen],” i.e., the
violation 	“prejudiced 	interests 	of 	the 	[noncitizen] 	which 	were 	protected 	by 	the
regulation.” United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir. 1979). ICE’s
failure to comply with the requirements of § 241.4 and § 241.13 “prejudiced interests of
[Petitioner] 	which 	were 	protected 	by 	the 	regulation[s].” Id. Both § 	241.4 and §
241.13 were intended “to provide due process protections to [noncitizens] following the
removal period as they are considered for continued detention, release, and then possible
revocation of release.” Orellana v. Baker, Civil Action No. 25-1788-TDC, 2025 WL
2444087, at *6 (D. Md. Aug. 25, 2025). ICE deprived Petitioner of these due process
protections when it failed to provide him with a prompt interview to respond to the reasons
for revocation of his release. “It is well established that the deprivation of constitutional
rights unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990,
1002 	(9th 	Cir. 	2012) (quoting Elrod 	v. 	Burns, 	427 	U.S. 	347, 	373 	(1976); see
also Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 995, 1000 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that
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“[u]nlawful detention” by immigration officials constituted “irreparable harm”). Therefore,
Petitioner was prejudiced by ICE’s failure to comply with its own regulations.
“Government agencies are required to follow their own regulations.” Hoac v.
Becerra, No. 25-cv-1740-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993771, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025)
(citing United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 US. 260, 268 (1954)). Petitioner
had a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody, and thus, ICE was required to
follow its regulations before re-detaining the Petitioner. “[W]hen ICE fails to follow its
own regulations in revoking release, the detention is unlawful, and the petitioner’s release
must be ordered.” Truong v. Noem, No. 25-cv-2597-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 2988357, at *6
(S.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2025) (collecting cases).
In sum, the Court finds that because ICE did not follow its own regulations when it
re-detained Petitioner, these failures constitute a violation of Petitioner’s due process rights
and justifies his release from unlawful detention. See, e.g., Tran, 2025 WL 3005347, at *3–
4 (granting a habeas petition where ICE failed to follow § 241.13(i)(3) procedures); Bui v.
Warden of the Otay Mesa Det. Facility, No. 25-CV-2111-JES-DEB, 2025 WL 2988356
(S.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2025) (granting a habeas petition where ICE failed to follow § 241.4(l)
procedures).
B. Zadvydas
When a noncitizen has been found to be unlawfully present in the United States and
a final order of removal has been entered, they must be detained for 90 days pending the
government’s efforts to secure their removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). This 90-day
period is referred to as the “removal period.” Id. After the removal period, this statute
“limits [a noncitizen’s] post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to
bring about that [noncitizen’s] removal from the United States” and “does not permit
indefinite detention.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689. A six-month period of post-removal
detention constitutes a “presumptively reasonable period of detention.” Id. at 701. After
this six-month period passes, the petitioner has the burden to “provide[ ] good reason to
believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
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future.” Id. If the petitioner satisfies their initial burden, then the burden shifts to the
Government to rebut that showing. Id. “[F]or detention to remain reasonable, as the period
of prior post-removal confinement grows, what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable
future’ conversely would have to shrink.” Id. “[O]nce removal is no longer reasonably
foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.” Id. at 699. In that case,
the noncitizen’s release may be conditioned on any of the various forms of conditioned
release, including an order of supervised release. Id. at 700.
In Petitioner’s case, Petitioner’s removal order became administratively final on
March 26, 2008. Ferrari Decl. ¶ 9. It has been well over six months since Petitioner was
detained on July 29, 2025. Pet. ¶ 22; Ferrari Decl. ¶ 12. Thus, the Court finds Petitioner’s
current detention is no longer “presumptively reasonable.”
The Petitioner now has the initial burden of showing “good reason to believe that
there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. “Good reason to believe does not place a burden upon the
detainee to demonstrate no reasonably foreseeable, significant likelihood of removal or
show that his detention is indefinite; it is something less than that.” Senor v. Barr, 401 F.
Supp. 3d 420, 430 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) (cleaned up). However, Petitioner must offer more
than “conclusory statements suggesting that he will not” be removed. Andrade v. Gonzalez,
459 F.3d 538, 543 (5th Cir. 2006); Quassani v. Killian, Case No. 2:17-cv-01678-APG-
PAL, 2017 WL 3396506, at *2 (D. Nev. Aug. 4, 2017) (“question[ing] whether petitioner
can meet his initial burden” given that he “has offered nothing more than conclusory
statements with respect to the likelihood of his removal in the foreseeable future”).
Here, Petitioner has met his burden. Petitioner notes that his removal is not
foreseeable 	“due 	to 	the 	lack 	of 	travel 	documents 	and 	the 	fifteen-year 	history 	on
supervision.” Traverse at 3–4. Despite this, he has “provided fingerprints,” “signed
documents presented to him,” took photographs, “submitted his expired Chinese passport
to ICE” to cooperate with Respondents’ efforts to remove him. Pet. ¶¶ 23, 25. Moreover,
Petitioner claims that ICE told him that the Chinese government had refused to accept him
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on September 27, 2025. Id. ¶ 28. Respondents do not dispute this and fail to address this at
all. Accordingly, Petitioner meets the initial burden of demonstrating that removal is not
significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.
The burden thus shifts to Respondents to “respond with evidence sufficient to rebut
that showing.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Respondents argue that they have been “diligent
in seeking to obtain a travel document” from the Chinese government and China accepted
2,138 Chinese nationals in 2025. Ferrari Decl. ¶ 18. However, without the total number of
Chinese nationals with final orders of removals pending, this figure does not demonstrate
whether Petitioner’s removal is reasonably foreseeable. See Dipraseuth v. Noem, No. 25-
CV-3471 JLS (BJW), 2025 WL 3677674, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025) (rejecting similar
argument that “ICE had been routinely obtaining travel documents for Laotian citizens and
effectuating removal flights to Laos” because there is “‘no evidence regarding the
percentage of successful requests to’” a particular country, and “the fact that others have
been removed to a country alone cannot constitute changed circumstances in an individual
Petitioner’s case”). Moreover, Respondents have not submitted a request for travel
document yet because they have not received a response regarding their request for identity
and national verification from the United States Embassy in Beijing, which they filed over
four months ago on October 15, 2025. Id. ¶ 15. In fact, “general indications that U.S.
agencies have been in discussions with target country regarding repatriation efforts do not
indicate that those discussions will result in the timely removal of Petitioner, as it is unclear
whether those efforts will be successful.” Lopez-Cacerez v. McAleenan, No. 19-CV-1952-
AJB-AGS, 2020 WL 3058096, at *6 (S.D. Cal. June 9, 2020) (quoting Zhao v. Kelly, No.
CV 17-777-BRO (KES), 2017 WL 1591818, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2017)). Respondents
have not provided any “specific information regarding how or when they expect to obtain
the necessary documentation or cooperation” from the Chinese government. Mohamed v.
Ashcroft, No. C01-1747P, 2002 WL 32620339, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 15, 2002) (finding
that a letter dated three months prior stating that meetings between [respondents] and the
Ethiopian Embassy “appear to have resulted” in an agreement to issue travel documents
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was insufficient to meet respondents’ burden and granting relief); see also Souvannaseng
v. Noem, No. 3:25-CV-3473-CAB-DEB, 2025 WL 3641180, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 16,
2025) (a “vague assertion that ‘ICE has worked diligently to effectuate Petitioner’s removal
to Laos. These removal efforts remain ongoing’” and that “they removed 177 Laotian
nationals in fiscal year 2025, up from 0 Laotian nationals in fiscal year 2024” was not
sufficient to show there is a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future”); 	Islam v. Kane, No. CV-11-515-PHX-PGR, 2011 WL 4374226, at *4 (D. Ariz.
Aug. 30, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV-11-0515-PHX-PGR, 2011
WL 4374205 (D. Ariz. Sept. 20, 2011) (“Repeated statements from the Bangladesh
Consulate that the travel document request is pending does not provide any insight as to
when, or if, that request will be fulfilled.”). Therefore, “an unsubstantiated possibility” that
the Chinese government will eventually approve Petitioner’s travel document request
“does 	not 	satisfy 	Respondent’s 	burden.” 	Lawrikow 	v. 	Kollus, 	No.
CV081403PHXGMSLOA, 	2009 	WL 	2905549, 	at 	*13 	(D. 	Ariz. 	July 	27, 	2009);
Andreasyan v. Gonzales, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1189 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (finding that the
petitioner’s case was “still under review and pending a decision” from the Uzbekistani
Consular did not meet respondents’ burden); Singh v. Gonzales, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1214,
1220 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (ICE did not meet its burden where it “merely assert[ed] that it
has followed up on its request for travel documents” but could not provide any “substantive
indication regarding how or when it expect[ed] to obtain the necessary travel document
from the Indian government.”) Thus, Respondents have not shown there is a significant
likelihood that Petitioner will be removed to China in the reasonably foreseeable future.
Therefore, Petitioner’s continued detention is no longer authorized by statute or under
Zadvydas.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus [ECF No. 1]. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from
custody subject only to the conditions of his preexisting Order of Supervision. As this
concludes the litigation in this case, the Clerk of Court SHALL close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 20, 2026
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