Ruiz Diaz v. Larose et al

1
26-cv-427-JO-BLM
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
JUAN RUIZ DIAZ,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-cv-427-JO-BLM
ORDER GRANTING THE
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS [DKT. 1]
Petitioner Juan Ruiz Diaz filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Dkt. 1. The
Court held oral argument on February 9, 2026. For the reasons stated on the record, the
Court GRANTS Petitioner’s habeas petition [Dkt. 1]. Respondents are ORDERED to
release Petitioner by 5 p.m. on February 10, 2025 and file an affidavit attesting to
Petitioner’s release by 5 p.m. on February 11, 2025.
The Court finds that it has jurisdiction to review Petitioner’s constitutional
challenges to his detention for the same reasons stated in its prior decision in Pacheco v.
LaRose, No. 3:25-CV-2421-JO-AHG, 2026 WL 242300, *2–*3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2026).
Case 3:26-cv-00427-JO-BLM Document 10 Filed 02/09/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
1 of 3

2
26-cv-427-JO-BLM
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
The Court has also considered whether additional relief, aside from ordering
release, is appropriate in this case. While habeas relief commonly includes reprieve from
physical imprisonment, “release need not be the exclusive remedy.” Boumediene v.
Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779–80 (2008) (“depending on the circumstances, more [relief] may
be required”). Habeas orders also extend to defining the parameters of a petitioner's
freedom when needed to provide complete relief from unlawful detention. See Rodriguez
v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that petitioner's release—
revocable at the government's discretion—did not provide complete relief where
petitioner sought a legal ruling that he could only be redetained upon a bond hearing);
Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 376 n.3 (2005) (despite release, petitioner's habeas
claim challenging the statutory authority for his detention “continue[d] to present a live
case or controversy” because the court could provide relief to prevent redetention on the
same allegedly unlawful basis). Despite Petitioner’s liberty interest, the government
detained him without notice or any consideration of his flight risk or danger to the public.
And despite myriad court orders like this one, the government continues to assert its §
1225 authority to detain countless noncitizens and subject them to the same wrongful
deprivation of their liberty interests.1 Consequently, Petitioner remains exposed to
immediate redetention and a repetition of the same harm he has just endured, even after
this Court's release order. The Court therefore concludes that specific injunctive relief
1 	See, e.g., Lopez v. Warden, Otay Mesa Det. Ctr., No. 25-CV-2527-RSH-SBC, 2025 WL
3005346 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025); Beltran v. Noem, No. 25CV2650-LL-DEB, 2025 WL 3078837 (S.D.
Cal. Nov. 4, 2025); Calel v. LaRose, No. 3:25-CV-02883-GPC-JLB, 2025 WL 3171898 (S.D. Cal. Nov.
13, 2025); Faizyan v. Casey, No. 3:25-CV-02884-RBM-JLB, 2025 WL 3208844 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17,
2025); Sanchez v. Noem, No. 25-CV-3068 JLS (MMP), 2025 WL 3214987 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2025);
Ruiz v. LaRose, No. 25-CV-02714-BAS-SBC, 2025 WL 3214975 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2025). The
government has continued this practice even after Bautista v. Noem, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM,
2025 WL 3678485, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025), which declared as unlawful the DHS policy of
classifying noncitizens arrested in the United States as subject to § 1225(b)(2). To this day, the
government continues to mandatorily detain these noncitizens pursuant to its purported § 1225 authority.
See, e.g., Azizi v. LaRose, et al., No. 26-cv-0049-JO-BJW, Dkt. 1 (Habeas Pet.) (S.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2026);
Dkt. 5 (Reply to Habeas Pet.) (S.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2026) (government acknowledging that petitioner was
detained on December 31, 2025—after the Bautista decision—under its § 1225 authority).
Case 3:26-cv-00427-JO-BLM Document 10 Filed 02/09/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
2 of 3

3
26-cv-427-JO-BLM
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
prohibiting further detention based on this wrongful assertion of statutory authority is
necessary and ORDERS as follows:
1. Respondents are ENJOINED from redetaining Petitioner without a pre-
deprivation hearing before an immigration judge, at which the Government
bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that
circumstances have materially changed, rendering Petitioner a danger to the
community or a flight risk.2 See Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1996, 1203 (9th
Cir. 2011). The immigration judge must consider Petitioner’s financial
circumstances and alternatives to bond as necessary in setting conditions of
release. See Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 1000 (9th Cir. 2017).
2. Respondents shall file a declaration attesting to full compliance with these
obligations. Respondents are ENJOINED from redetaining Petitioner until
48 hours after filing the declaration.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 9, 2026
2 	While § 1226 allows the government to hold a noncitizen in custody while it decides whether to
initially grant release, a pre-deprivation hearing is the more appropriate remedy for individuals like
Petitioner who already enjoy a liberty interest. In order to prevent an erroneous deprivation of that
existing liberty interest and therefore satisfy due process requirements, this hearing must take place
prior to any detention. Other courts in this circuit have likewise found that enjoining further detention
without first providing a bond hearing is necessary to justify any continued deprivation of a petitioner’s
liberty interest. See, e.g., Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC (EMC), 2025 WL 2637503, at *12
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025); Valencia Zapata v. Kaiser, 801 F. Supp. 3d 919, 938 (N.D. Cal. 2025); O.G.
v. Albarran, No. 1:26-CV-00010-TLN-DMC, 2026 WL 19105, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2026).
Case 3:26-cv-00427-JO-BLM Document 10 Filed 02/09/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
3 of 3