Bess v. Bess

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26-CV-362 JLS (SBC)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CURTIS LEE BESS,
Plaintiff,
v.
AUDREY IRENE LIBSON BESS, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No.: 26-CV-362 JLS (SBC)
ORDER:
(1) GRANTING APPLICATION TO
PROCEED IN DISTRICT COURT
WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES OR
COSTS; AND
(2) SCREENING COMPLAINT
(ECF Nos. 1, 2).
Presently before the Court are pro se 	Plaintiff Curtis Lee Bess’s Complaint
(“Compl.,” ECF No. 1) and Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying
Fees or Costs (“IFP Appl.,” ECF No. 2). Having carefully considered Plaintiff’s Complaint
and the law, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP Application and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s
Complaint WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
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/ / /
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IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION
All parties instituting a civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the
United States, other than a petition for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $405.1
28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to pay the filing fee
only if the party is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(1).
Section 1915(a)(1) provides:
[A]ny 	court 	of 	the 	United 	States 	may 	authorize 	the
commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or
proceeding . . . without prepayment of fees or security therefor,
by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of
all assets such [person] possesses that the person is unable to pay
such fees or give security therefor.
As § 1915(a)(1) does not itself define what constitutes insufficient assets to warrant
IFP status, the determination of indigency falls within the district court’s discretion. 	See
Cal. Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Section 1915 typically
requires the reviewing court to exercise its sound discretion in determining whether the
affiant has satisfied the statute’s requirement of indigency.”), reversed on other grounds
by, 506 U.S. 194 (1993). “An affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where
it alleges that the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.”
Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Adkins v. E.I. Du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)). “One need not be absolutely destitute to
obtain benefits of the [IFP] statute.” Jefferson v. United States, 277 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir.
1960). 	“Nevertheless, a plaintiff seeking IFP status must allege poverty ‘with some
particularity, definiteness[,] and certainty.’” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234.
1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $55. See
28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff.
Dec. 1, 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed
in forma pauperis. Id.
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In Plaintiff’s IFP Application, Plaintiff states that his monthly income is $1,756.00—
all from disability payments. IFP App. at 1. Plaintiff lists no assets, employer, or savings
and states his monthly expenses total $3,445.00. 	See generally id. 	The Court is satisfied
that Plaintiff has adequately demonstrated that paying the $405 filing fee would result in
his inability to afford the necessities of life. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s
IFP Application.
SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
I. 	Legal Standard
Because Plaintiff seeks to proceed IFP, his Complaint requires a pre-answer
screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 	See, e.g., Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845,
845 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (holding “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are
not limited to prisoners”); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000)
(en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an
[IFP] complaint that fails to state a claim.”). Under this statute, the Court sua sponte must
dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim,
or seeks damages from immune defendants. 	See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126–27. 	“The
purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not
bear the expense of responding.’” 	Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir.
2014) (citations omitted).
“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” 	Watison v. Carter,
668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). 	Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 	A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 	Id. 	Plausibility requires pleading facts
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supporting a claim for relief, as opposed to conclusory allegations or the “formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” 	Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 	The “mere
possibility 	of 	misconduct” 	or 	“unadorned, 	the 	defendant-unlawfully-harmed 	me
accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79;
see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).
Independently, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires pleadings to state “a short
and 	plain 	statement 	of 	the 	claim 	showing 	that 	the 	pleader 	is 	entitled 	to 	relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Id. 8(d)(1).
Rule 8 “applies to good claims as well as bad, and is a basis for dismissal independent of
Rule 12(b)(6).” McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
A complaint which is “argumentative, prolix, replete with redundancy, and largely
irrelevant” does not meet Rule 8’s requirement of simplicity, directness, and clarity. 	Id.
at 1177–78.
Further, courts have a duty to construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally. 	See
Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). 	A district court
should grant leave to amend if it appears “at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the
defect.” 	Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130 (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d
696, 701 (9th Cir. 1988)).
II. 	Discussion
Plaintiff lists his claims for relief as: (1) “Stolen Federal Checks”; (2) “Assets on
Computer”; (3) “Assets 2018–2026; (4) “I-9 Foundations”; (5) “All Above”; (6) “All Old
Equity of Assets”; and (7) “Bank Account in Illinois and Ohio.” 	See generally Compl.
Plaintiff provides little detail in his Complaint, but it seems Plaintiff is alleging that
Defendants Audrey Bess, Leonard Bess, and Donald Trump have stolen checks and other
“assets” from 2018 to 2026. Id.
Plaintiff’s allegations lack the requisite clarity to provide Defendants “fair notice of
what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” 	Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
(quotation and alteration omitted); see also McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1178 (explaining that a
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complaint lacking “simplicity, conciseness and clarity as to whom [a plaintiff is] suing for
what wrongs, fails to perform the essential functions of a complaint”). Moreover, to the
extent Plaintiff relies on criminal statutes and seeks criminal punishment, there is no private
right of action for violation of a criminal statute. 	See Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464
F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal of claims under “criminal statutes that
do not give rise to civil liability”); Keyter v. McCain, 207 F. App’x 801, 802 (9th Cir. 2006)
(“The district court properly dismissed [plaintiff’s] claims based on federal criminal
statutes because statutes that provide for punishment by fine or imprisonment do not create
privately enforceable rights or give rise to civil liability.”). As the Complaint fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court must sua sponte dismiss it pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
The Court also notes that while Plaintiff indicates subject matter jurisdiction exists
based on diversity of citizenship and a federal issue of “Democracy and Diplomacy in
Action,” the Complaint states that Defendants are residents of an “Indian Reservation” but
does not provide information about what state the Defendants reside in, how the amount in
controversy is satisfied, or allegations concerning a federal claim. See Compl. at 2; Great
Nature v. Ewing Bros., Inc., No. 20-CV-2064-JAD-EJY, 2022 WL 575745, at *3 (D. Nev.
Feb. 25, 2022) (“[A] member of an American Indian tribe is treated like any other citizen
for jurisdictional purposes; so she is a citizen of the state in which she resides or her tribe’s
reservation is located.”). 	Thus, based on the allegations provided—the Court does not
appear to have subject matter jurisdiction.
However, as the nature of Plaintiff’s claims is not fully comprehensible by the Court
at this time, the Court cannot rule out the possibility that Plaintiff can plausibly allege facts
addressing the deficiencies described in this Order. 	Thus, the Court will grant Plaintiff
leave to amend his complaint.
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CONCLUSION
In light of the above, the Court:
1) 	GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP Application (ECF No. 2).
2) 	DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) WITHOUT PREJUDICE
for its failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2). Given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the dismissal is WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
Plaintiff thus has forty-five (45) days’ leave from the date of this Order to file an amended
complaint curing the pleading deficiencies noted above. 	Plaintiff is advised that an
amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. 	Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693
F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). Any amended complaint must be complete in and of itself
without reference to Plaintiff’s original Complaint or FAC; claims not realleged in the
amended complaint will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Lacey, 693 F.3d
at 928 (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend that are not realleged in an
amended pleading may be “considered waived”). 	If Plaintiff fails to amend within the
time provided, the Court will enter a final order dismissing this civil action. See Lira v.
Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage of
the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the
complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 19, 2026
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