Fuentes Guevara v. Larose et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MANUEL ALEXANDER FUENTES
GUEVARA,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No. 26-cv-00342-BAS-DDL
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
(ECF No. 1)
Petitioner Manuel Alexander Fuentes Guevara filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 that seeks release from immigration custody. (ECF
No. 1.) Respondents filed a Return (ECF No. 5), and Petitioner filed a Traverse (ECF No.
6). For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES the Petition.
I. 	STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 14, 2005, Petitioner, a national and citizen of El Salvador, entered the
United States illegally as an unaccompanied minor and was arrested. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 18;
ECF No. 5-1 at ¶ 3.) 	The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) served Petitioner
with a Notice to Appear and released him on his own recognizance to his mother. (ECF
No. 1 at ¶ 18; ECF No. 5-1 at ¶ 4.) Petitioner failed to appear for his immigration hearing
on November 7, 2005, and was ordered removed from the United States in absentia. (ECF
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No. 5 at ¶ 5.) According to Petitioner, he never received notice of this hearing. (Id. at ¶
21.)
Petitioner continued to live in the United States for the next twenty years without
any court appearances. He is now married to an individual with temporary protected status
and has two United States citizen children. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 24.) On November 7, 2025,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) arrested Petitioner and began to make
arrangements to repatriate him to El Salvador. (ECF No. 5-1 at ¶ 6.) Petitioner moved to
reopen his removal, which was denied by an Immigration Judge. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 35; ECF
No. 5-1 at ¶ 9.) 	Petitioner has now appealed this denial to the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”).
Petitioner argues in the Petition that he is being held without bond in violation of
both substantive and procedural due process; that his arrest twenty years after he was
released on his own recognizance is “arbitrary and capricious” and thus violates the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”); that his continued detention violates Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); and that the ultra vires action of his arrest violates the Accardi
doctrine.
II. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Standing
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” 	Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004). 	“The traditional function of the
writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484
(1973). A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates he or
she is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
The writ is available to noncitizens detained within the United States. Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). Since Petitioner is in custody, and since he is seeking release
from custody, he has standing to pursue this Petition.
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B. 	Jurisdiction
Respondents argue that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Petitioner’s claim under
8 U.S.C. § 1252. (ECF No. 5.) Section 1252(g) states that “no court shall have jurisdiction
to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action
by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases or execute removal
orders against any alien under this chapter.”
The general rule is to “‘resolve any ambiguities in a jurisdiction-stripping statute
[such as Section 1252(g)] in favor of the narrower interpretation,’ and by the ‘strong
presumption in favor of judicial review.’” 	Ibarra-Perez v. United States, 154 F.4th 989,
995 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Arce v. United States, 899 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2018)).
Thus, the Supreme Court has ruled Section 1252(g) applies only to three discrete actions:
commencing proceedings, adjudicating cases, or executing removal orders. 	Reno v. Am.-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999). 	“Instead of ‘sweep[ing] in
any claim that can technically be said to arise from the three listed actions,’ the provision
‘refers to just those three specific actions themselves.’” 	Ibarra-Perez, 154 F.4th at 995
(alteration in original) (quoting Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018)). “There
are of course many other decisions or actions that may be part of the deportation
process . . .” that are not one of these three. See Reno, 525 U.S. at 482 (listing possibilities).
Section 1252(g) “does not prohibit challenges to unlawful practices merely because they
are in some fashion connected to removal orders.” Ibarra-Perez, 154 F.4th at 997.
In this Petition, Petitioner is not contesting the commencement or adjudication of
removal proceedings against him, nor is he raising an issue with respect to the execution
of removal. His detention may be during, but is nonetheless independent of, the removal
proceedings. Thus, this Court is not stripped of jurisdiction by Section 1252(g).
Relatedly, Section 1252(b)(9) states, “[j]udicial review of all questions of law and
fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions,
arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United
States . . . shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.”
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“[C]laims that are independent of or collateral to the removal process do not fall
within the scope of § 1252(b)(9).” J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1032 (9th Cir. 2016).
Thus, in Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392 (2019), the Supreme Court held Section 1252(b)(9)
inapplicable when the petitioners were not asking for review of an order of removal, were
not challenging the decision to detain them in the first place or to seek removal, and were
not challenging any part of the process by which removability would be determined. Id. at
402 (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 294).
Here, Petitioner does not challenge the Government’s authority to remove him from
the United States in this Petition. 	Instead, he challenges his re-detention without bond.
Thus, Section 1252(b)(9) does not provide a jurisdictional bar.
C. 	Mandatory Detention Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231
By statute, after entry of a final removal order, noncitizens must be held in custody.
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 683. 	Congress “has recognized detention
during deportation proceedings as a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation
process.” 	Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). 	Although a noncitizen ordered
removed shall be removed within 90 days of the order of removal, he “may be held in
confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal
in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 	Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701; see also 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(1)(A).
Once DHS had a final order of removal ordering that Petitioner be removed to his
native country of El Salvador, it was no longer required to allow him to be released on his
own recognizance. At this point, it was not a violation of due process, either substantive
or procedural, for Respondents to detain Petitioner without notice so that the removal order
could be carried out. See Lin v. Francis, No. 25 Civ. 10001 (PAE), 2025 WL 3751855, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2025) (reasoning that petitioner fails to “offer case law supporting
the improbable proposition that—with his not having appeared at his removal hearing or
evidently had any contact in the ensuing 12 years with ICE—ICE was required either (1)
to give him advance notice . . . before detaining him, or (2) to release him on supervisory
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conditions after it encountered him”). 	Nor was such action “arbitrary and capricious”
under the Administrative Procedure Act because it violated the 90-day deadline set by 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) for removal. 	Id. at *4 (reasoning this 90-day deadline is “self-
evidently addressed to noncitizens accessible to ICE,” not to individuals like petitioner who
failed to show for his immigration hearing). The detention was pursuant to an order that
allowed Respondents to detain and remove Petitioner from the country.
Nor is Petitioner’s detention a violation of Zadvydas. 	The Zadvydas Court was
concerned with indefinite detention where a noncitizen was not able to be removed from
the United States such that his detention in immigration custody was “potentially
permanent.” 533 U.S. at 690–91. The Supreme Court concluded that “once removal is no
longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.” Id.
at 699.
Such is not the case for Petitioner. 	The Government provides evidence that
individuals may be rapidly removed to El Salvador. 	(ECF No. 5-1 at ¶¶ 12–13.) 	Once
Petitioner has exhausted his appeal, travel documents can be obtained in two to three days.
(Id.) 	The only reason this removal has not yet been effectuated is to give Petitioner a
chance to appeal the denial of his request to reopen his removal proceedings. 	Hence,
removal is reasonably foreseeable, Petitioner is not indefinitely detained, and his detention
in immigration custody is not potentially permanent. See Pelich v. I.N.S., 329 F.3d 1057,
1060–61 (9th Cir. 2003) (providing a petitioner cannot simultaneously take steps to prevent
his removal while seeking a writ of habeas corpus on the basis that he has not yet been
removed).
Finally, because the Court finds Respondents did not violate any procedural rules or
instructions, their actions were not ultra vires, and the Accardi doctrine is inapplicable.
See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266–68 (1954) (providing
the Accardi doctrine applies when an administrative agency fails to follow its own
established rules and procedures).
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III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED.
(ECF No. 1.) The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 13, 2026
Hon. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge
United States District Court
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