Manuel Sebastian et al v. Casey et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
JORGE LUIS MANUEL SEBASTIAN;
EVARISTO JOSE QUIRINO; AND
YUXING GAO,
Petitioners,
v.
JEREMY CASEY, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No. 26-cv-00306-BAS-AHG
ORDER:
(1) 	GRANTING PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
WITH RESPECT TO
PETITIONERS JORGE LUIS
MANUEL SEBASTIAN AND
EVARISTO JOSE QUIRINO;
AND
(2) 	DENYING PETITION WITH
RESPECT TO PETITIONER
YUXING GAO
This habeas petition, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, claims all three Petitioners
were improperly detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) without
bond. (ECF No. 1.) The Petition requests that all three either be released immediately or
be granted a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge within seven days. (ECF No. 1.)
The Government responded and acknowledged that Petitioners Sebastian and
Quirino are entitled to a bond hearing pursuant to a ruling in the Central District of
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California in Maldonado Bautista v. Noem, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2025 WL 3678485 (C.D.
Cal. Dec. 18, 2025). 	(ECF No. 4.) 	However, the Government provides evidence that
Petitioner Gao was ordered removed from the United States to China on October 17, 2025,
and, therefore, is not entitled to a bond hearing and is not a member of the Maldonado
Bautista class. (Id.)
For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS the Petition with respect to
Petitioners Sebastian and Quirino and DENIES the Petition with respect to Petitioner Gao.
I. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” 	Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004). 	“The traditional function of the
writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484
(1973). A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates he or
she is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
The writ is available to non-citizens detained within the United States. Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 	Since Petitioners are in custody and since they are seeking
release from custody, they have standing to pursue this Petition.
II. 	STATEMENT OF FACTS
Sebastian. 	Petitioner Sebastian is a national and citizen of Guatemala who was
arrested by ICE outside his home in the United States. 	(Petition ¶ 13, ECF No. 1.) 	He
originally entered the United States without inspection and has lived in the United States
for over four years. (Id. ¶¶ 23, 25.) He has no criminal record, has applied for asylum, and
is pending removal proceedings. (Id. ¶¶ 27, 29–30.) He has not been allowed to post bail
and has been informed that he is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2) as confirmed in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).
(Id. ¶¶ 33–34.)
Quirino. Petitioner Quirino is a national and citizen of Mexico. (Pet. ¶ 14.) He has
lived in the United States for over twenty-eight years. (Id. ¶ 26.) He has no criminal record,
has applied for asylum, and is pending removal proceedings. (Id. ¶¶ 27, 29–30.) He, too,
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has been denied bail and told he is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). (Id.
¶¶ 33–34.)
Gao. 	Petitioner Gao is a national and citizen of China. 	(Pet. ¶ 15.) 	She was
apprehended at the Tecate Port of Entry on December 22, 2023, and then released on her
own recognizance pending her immigration hearing. (Government’s Response, ECF No.
4, Ex. 3.) On July 26, 2025, ICE rearrested her at the home address she provided to them.
(Id.) 	Although she claims in the Petition that she has applied for asylum and is pending
removal proceedings (Pet. ¶¶ 29–30), the Government provides documentation that on
October 17, 2025, an Immigration Judge found her asylum claim had been abandoned, and
she has since been ordered removed from the United States to China (Government’s
Response, Ex. 3).
III. 	ANALYSIS
The Central District of California has recently certified a class of which Petitioners
Sebastian and Quirino are members and which essentially overruled Yajure Hurtado.
Maldonado Bautista, 2025 WL 3678485. 	Although Petitioner Gao also claims she is a
member of the class certified in Maldonado Bautista, that class only applies to individuals
who were not apprehended upon arrival and not subject to a final order of removal. 	Id.
Because Petitioner Gao was apprehended at the time of arrival into the United States and
is now subject to a final order of removal, she is not a member of the class.
This Court agrees with the Central District of California, with respect to Petitioners
Sebastian and Quirino, and finds that application of Yajure Hurtado violates federal law.
Because Petitioner Gao has been ordered removed, the Court finds she is subject to
mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231.
A. 	Jurisdiction
In the past, the Government has argued that 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g) and 1252(b)(9) strip
this Court of jurisdiction. Section 1252(g) states that “no court shall have jurisdiction to
hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by
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the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal
orders against any alien under this chapter.”
The general rule is to “‘resolve any ambiguities in a jurisdiction-stripping statute
[such as Section 1252(g)] in favor of the narrower interpretation,’ and by the ‘strong
presumption in favor of judicial review.’” 	Ibarra-Perez v. United States, 154 F.4th 989,
995 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Arce v. United States, 899 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2018)).
Thus, the Supreme Court has ruled Section 1252(g) applies only to three discrete actions:
commencing proceedings, adjudicating cases, or executing removal orders. 	Reno v. Am.-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999). 	“Instead of ‘sweep[ing] in
any claim that can technically be said to arise from the three listed actions,’ the provision
‘refers to just those three specific actions themselves.’” 	Ibarra-Perez, 154 F.4th at 995
(alteration in original) (quoting Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018)). “There
are of course many other decisions or actions that may be part of the deportation
process . . .” that are not one of these three. See Reno, 525 U.S. at 482 (listing possibilities).
Section 1252(g) “does not prohibit challenges to unlawful practices merely because they
are in some fashion connected to removal orders.” Ibarra-Perez, 154 F.4th at 997.
In this Petition, Petitioners are not contesting the commencement or adjudication of
removal proceedings against them, nor are they raising an issue with respect to the
execution of removal. Their detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) may be during,
but is nonetheless independent of, the removal proceedings. Thus, this Court is not stripped
of jurisdiction by Section 1252(g).
Section 1252(b)(9) states, “[j]udicial review of all questions of law and fact,
including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising
from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United
States . . . shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.”
“[C]laims that are independent of or collateral to the removal process do not fall
within the scope of § 1252(b)(9).” J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1032 (9th Cir. 2016).
Thus, in Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392 (2019), the Supreme Court held Section 1252(b)(9)
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inapplicable when the petitioners were not asking for review of an order of removal, were
not challenging the decision to detain them in the first place or to seek removal, and were
not challenging any part of the process by which removability would be determined. Id. at
402 (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 294).
Here, Petitioners do not challenge the Government’s authority to remove them from
the United States in this Petition. Instead, they challenge their classification under Section
1225(b)(2) instead of Section 1226(a) and the BIA’s decision that Immigration Judges lack
authority to provide a bond under Section 1225(b)(2). Thus, Section 1252(b)(9) does not
provide a jurisdictional bar.
B. 	Applicability of Section 1225(b)(2) Versus Section 1226(a)
1. 	Petitioners Sebastian and Quirino
In Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, the BIA ruled that individuals such as
Petitioners Sebastian and Quirino are subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2)(A). However, this Court agrees with the multitude of cases that have concluded
that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) is the appropriate standard for bond in Petitioners Sebastian’s and
Quirino’s circumstances and that applying Section 1225 “(1) disregards the plain meaning
of section 1225(b)(2)(A); (2) disregards the relationship between sections 1225 and 1226;
(3) would render a recent amendment to section 1226(c) superfluous; and (4) is inconsistent
with decades of prior statutory interpretation and practice.” Lepe v. Andrews, 801 F. Supp.
3d 1104, 1112 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (citing cases).
“We begin, as always, with the text.” Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 581 U.S. 385,
391 (2017). 	Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to an applicant “seeking admission” to the
United States, whereas Section 1226(a) applies to individuals who have been arrested “on
a warrant issued by the Attorney General.” 	8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(2)(A), 1226(a).
“Seeking,” as noted by other courts, “means ‘asking for’ or ‘trying to acquire or gain.’”
Lepe, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 1113 (citing Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/seeking). 	“And 	the 	use 	of 	a 	present 	participle, 	‘seeking,’
necessarily implies some sort of present-tense action.” Id. (citation modified).
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Respondents point to Section 1225(a)(1), which states, “[a noncitizen] present in the
United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States . . . shall be
deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission.” However, if Section 1225
was intended to apply to all applicants for admission, “there would be no need to include
the phrase ‘seeking admission’ in the statute.” 	Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d
475, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2025); accord Castanon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161
F.4th 1048, 1061 (7th Cir. 2025) (reasoning “while a noncitizen arrested in the Midwest
might qualify as ‘an alien present in the United States who had not been admitted,’” he is
not “an ‘applicant for admission’ who is ‘seeking admission’”).
Furthermore, Respondents’ interpretation ignores the statutory scheme. 	“It is a
fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their
context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Lepe, 801 F. Supp.
3d at 1114 (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)). “Section
1225 ‘authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission into the
country,’ whereas section 1226 ‘authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already
in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.’” Id. (quoting Jennings, 583
U.S. at 287). 	This is reinforced by the title of Section 1225: “Inspection by immigration
officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225. “‘Inspection’ is a process that occurs at the border or other ports of entry.” Lepe,
801 F. Supp. 3d at 1114 (citing Posos-Sanchez v. Garland, 3 F.4th 1176, 1183 (9th Cir.
2021)).
Petitioner Sebastian has been living in the United States for over four years.
Petitioner Quirino has been living in the United States for over twenty-eight years. Neither
was arrested at the border or a Port of Entry seeking admission to the United States. Hence,
Section 1226(a) is the applicable statute for their cases.
To the extent the addition of Section 1225(a) renders the two statutes ambiguous or
unclear as to which section applies, the Court turns to principles of statutory construction.
See Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1256 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“[E]ven when
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a statute is ambiguous or internally contradictory, courts must ‘use every tool at their
disposal to determine the best reading of the statute.’” (quoting Loper Bright Enters. v.
Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 400 (2024))). “[A] statute should be construed so that effect is
given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or
insignificant.” 	Rodriguez, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1258 (quoting Corley v. United States, 556
U.S. 303, 314 (2009)).
Section 1226 carves out a statutory category of non-citizens who, despite being
arrested while already in the country, may not be released because of their criminal or
terrorist activities. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). If, as Respondents argue, all non-citizens arrested
while already in this country are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225, there would
be no need to carve out an exception for those who had committed criminal or terrorist
activities. 	See Rosado v. Figueroa, No. CV 25-2157-DHX-DLR (CDB), 2025 WL
2337099, at *9 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025) (reasoning that if Section 1225’s “mandatory
detention provisions apply to all noncitizens present in the United States who have not been
admitted, it would render superfluous provisions of § 1226 that apply to certain categories
of inadmissible noncitizens”); Rodriguez, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1258 (noting that if the court
were to adopt a reading of Section 1225 advanced by the BIA, it would render significant
portions of Section 1226(c) meaningless). To avoid rendering Section 1226(c) completely
meaningless, the Court finds non-citizens arrested on a warrant in the interior of the United
States are subject to discretionary release on bond under Section 1226(a), not mandatory
detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A).
In 	addition, 	“the 	longstanding 	practice 	of 	the 	government—like 	any 	other
interpretive aid—can inform a court’s determination of what the law is.” 	Rosado, 2025
WL 2337099, at *10 (citation modified) (quoting Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 386). “Until
this year, DHS has applied section 1226(a) and its regime of discretionary release and
review of detention to the vast majority of noncitizens allegedly in this country without
valid documentation—a practice codified by regulation.” Valencia Zapata v. Kaiser, 801
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F. Supp. 3d 919, 929 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (citation modified); see also Inspection & Expedited
Removal of Aliens, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997).
Against this backdrop, Congress adopted the Laken Riley Act, adding Section
1226(c)(1)(E), which mandates detention for additional categories of criminal aliens.
“When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its amendment to have real
and substantial effect.” 	Rodriguez, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1259 (quoting Stone v. I.N.S., 514
U.S. 386, 397 (1995), abrogated on other grounds by Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259, 261
(2025)). 	“When Congress adopts a new law against the backdrop of a ‘longstanding
administrative construction,’ courts ‘generally presume the new provision should be
understood to work in harmony with what has come before.’” Id. (quoting Monsalvo
Velazquez v. Bondi, 604 U.S. 712, 725 (2025)).
The longstanding practice of DHS applying Section 1226 to those arrested in the
interior of the United States supports the finding that this practice was the best reading of
the 	statute. 	This 	conclusion 	is 	particularly 	true 	because 	adopting 	Respondents’
interpretation would result in the recently enacted Laken Riley Act being completely
meaningless and unnecessary.
Statutory interpretation supports that Section 1226(a), not Section 1225(b)(2)(A),
applies to Petitioner Sebastian’s and Quirino’s immigration detention. Because the BIA’s
decision binding Immigration Judges incorrectly provides that Petitioners are subject to
mandatory detention with no individualized bond determination, Petitioners Sebastian and
Quirino are being held in violation of federal law. Hence, their Petition is GRANTED.
2. 	Petitioner Gao
Section 1226 applies “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from
the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Petitioner Gao is situated differently than the other
two Petitioners because she has already been ordered removed. Hence, Section 1226 is no
longer applicable to her situation.
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Instead, Section 1231 applies to noncitizens ordered removed. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a).
Noncitizens who have been ordered removed “shall” be detained by the Attorney General.
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A).
Furthermore, Petitioner Gao is not a member of the certified Maldonado Bautista
class that applies to noncitizens who are not subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231.
2025 WL 3713982, at *1. Petitioner Gao is subject to mandatory detention under § 1231
given her order of removal. 	See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701 (holding it is presumptively
reasonable to detain a noncitizen for six months to effectuate an order of removal).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Petitioners Jorge Luis Manuel Sebastian’s and Evaristo
Jose Quirino’s Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus are GRANTED (ECF No. 1). 	The
Court issues the following writs:
The Court ORDERS a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge for Jorge
Luis Manuel Sebastian (A#240-500-178) within 14 days of the date of this
Order. 	His bond hearing shall be governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not
§ 1225(b)(2).
The Court ORDERS a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge for Evaristo
Jose Quirino (A#208-612-821) within 14 days of the date of this Order. His
bond hearing shall be governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2).
However, because Petitioner Yuxing Gao has already had her asylum petition denied
and has been ordered removed, her Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED. The
Clerk of Court shall close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 10, 2026
Hon. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge
United States District Court
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