Trujillo v. Noem et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
BENITO AGUILAR TRUJILLO,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No. 26-cv-00268-BAS-VET
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
(ECF No. 1)
Petitioner Benito Aguilar Trujillo filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, claiming he was improperly detained without bond. (ECF No. 1.) He
requests that he be released or, alternatively, granted a bond hearing within 7 days. (Id.)
The Government responded, acknowledging that Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing
pursuant to a ruling in the Central District of California in Maldonado Bautista v. Noem,
__ F. Supp. 3d __, 2025 WL 3678485 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025), but requesting 14 days to
hold the hearing. (ECF No. 4.) For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS the
Petition and orders that Petitioner be given a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge
within 14 days of today’s date.
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I. LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004). “The traditional function of the
writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484
(1973). A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates he or
she is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
The writ is available to non-citizens detained within the United States. Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). Since Petitioner is in custody, and since he is seeking release
from custody, he has standing to pursue this Petition.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioner has lived in the United States since the late 1980s when he was issued an
agriculture and employment authorization to enter the United States. (Petition ¶ 60, ECF
No. 1.) He has no criminal record, has been legally employed, has a valid Social Security
number, and has consistently paid taxes. (Id. ¶ 32.) He has two adult United States citizen
children and lives with his partner who is a legal permanent resident. (Id.) He was arrested
by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) in the interior of the United States, not
at the border or a Port of Entry. (Id. ¶ 68.) Petitioner has been denied a bond hearing
pursuant to Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). (Id. ¶ 64.)
Petitioner requests that he be immediately released or alternatively granted a bond hearing
before an Immigration Judge. (Id.)
The Central District of California has certified a class of which Petitioner is a
member and essentially overruled Yajure Hurtado. See Maldonado Bautista, 2025 WL
3678485. This Court agrees with the Central District of California, with respect to this
Petitioner, and finds that application of Yajure Hurtado violates federal law.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdiction
In the past, the Government has argued that 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g) and 1252(b)(9) strip
this Court of jurisdiction. Section 1252(g) states that “no court shall have jurisdiction to
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hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by
the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal
orders against any alien under this chapter.”
The general rule is to “‘resolve any ambiguities in a jurisdiction-stripping statute
[such as Section 1252(g)] in favor of the narrower interpretation,’ and by the ‘strong
presumption in favor of judicial review.’” Ibarra-Perez v. United States, 154 F.4th 989,
995 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Arce v. United States, 899 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2018)).
Thus, the Supreme Court has ruled Section 1252(g) applies only to three discrete actions:
commencing proceedings, adjudicating cases, or executing removal orders. Reno v. Am.-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999). “Instead of ‘sweep[ing] in
any claim that can technically be said to arise from the three listed actions,’ the provision
‘refers to just those three specific actions themselves.’” Ibarra-Perez, 154 F.4th at 995
(alteration in original) (quoting Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018)). “There
are of course many other decisions or actions that may be part of the deportation
process . . .” that are not one of these three. See Reno, 525 U.S. at 482 (listing possibilities).
Section 1252(g) “does not prohibit challenges to unlawful practices merely because they
are in some fashion connected to removal orders.” Ibarra-Perez, 154 F.4th at 997.
In this Petition, Petitioner is not contesting the commencement or adjudication of
removal proceedings against him, nor is he raising an issue with respect to the execution
of removal. His detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) may be during, but is
nonetheless independent of, the removal proceedings. Thus, this Court is not stripped of
jurisdiction by Section 1252(g).
Section 1252(b)(9) states, “[j]udicial review of all questions of law and fact,
including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising
from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United
States . . . shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.”
“[C]laims that are independent of or collateral to the removal process do not fall
within the scope of § 1252(b)(9).” J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1032 (9th Cir. 2016).
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Thus, in Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392 (2019), the Supreme Court held Section 1252(b)(9)
inapplicable when the petitioners were not asking for review of an order of removal, were
not challenging the decision to detain them in the first place or to seek removal, and were
not challenging any part of the process by which removability would be determined. Id. at
402 (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 294).
Here, Petitioner does not challenge the Government’s authority to remove him from
the United States in this Petition. Instead, he challenges his classification under Section
1225(b)(2) instead of Section 1226(a) and the BIA’s decision that Immigration Judges lack
authority to provide a bond under Section 1225(b)(2). Thus, Section 1252(b)(9) does not
provide a jurisdictional bar.
B. Applicability of Section 1225(b)(2) Versus Section 1226(a)
In Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, the BIA ruled that an individual such as
Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). However,
this Court agrees with the multitude of cases that have concluded that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
is the appropriate standard for bond in Petitioner’s circumstance and that applying Section
1225 “(1) disregards the plain meaning of section 1225(b)(2)(A); (2) disregards the
relationship between sections 1225 and 1226; (3) would render a recent amendment to
section 1226(c) superfluous; and (4) is inconsistent with decades of prior statutory
interpretation and practice.” Lepe v. Andrews, 801 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1112 (E.D. Cal. 2025)
(citing cases).
“We begin, as always, with the text.” Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 581 U.S. 385,
391 (2017). Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to an applicant “seeking admission” to the
United States, whereas Section 1226(a) applies to individuals who have been arrested “on
a warrant issued by the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(2)(A), 1226(a).
“Seeking,” as noted by other courts, “means ‘asking for’ or ‘trying to acquire or gain.’”
Lepe, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 1113 (citing Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/seeking). “And the use of a present participle, ‘seeking,’
necessarily implies some sort of present-tense action.” Id. (citation modified).
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Respondents point to Section 1225(a)(1), which states, “[a noncitizen] present in the
United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States . . . shall be
deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission.” However, if Section 1225
was intended to apply to all applicants for admission, “there would be no need to include
the phrase ‘seeking admission’ in the statute.” Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d
475, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2025); accord Castanon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161
F.4th 1048, 1061 (7th Cir. 2025) (reasoning “while a noncitizen arrested in the Midwest
might qualify as ‘an alien present in the United States who had not been admitted,’” he is
not “an ‘applicant for admission’ who is ‘seeking admission’”).
Furthermore, Respondents’ interpretation ignores the statutory scheme. “It is a
fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their
context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Lepe, 801 F. Supp.
3d at 1114 (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)). “Section
1225 ‘authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission into the
country,’ whereas section 1226 ‘authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already
in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.’” Id. (quoting Jennings, 583
U.S. at 287). This is reinforced by the title of Section 1225: “Inspection by immigration
officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225. “‘Inspection’ is a process that occurs at the border or other ports of entry.” Lepe,
801 F. Supp. 3d at 1114 (citing Posos-Sanchez v. Garland, 3 F.4th 1176, 1183 (9th Cir.
2021)).
Petitioner has been living in the United States since the late 1980s. He is not at the
border or a Port of Entry seeking admission to the United States. Hence, Section 1226(a)
is the applicable statute.
To the extent the addition of Section 1225(a) renders the two statutes ambiguous or
unclear as to which section applies, the Court turns to principles of statutory construction.
See Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1256 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“[E]ven when
a statute is ambiguous or internally contradictory, courts must ‘use every tool at their
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disposal to determine the best reading of the statute.’” (quoting Loper Bright Enters. v.
Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 400 (2024))). “[A] statute should be construed so that effect is
given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or
insignificant.” Rodriguez, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1258 (quoting Corley v. United States, 556
U.S. 303, 314 (2009)).
Section 1226 carves out a statutory category of non-citizens who, despite being
arrested while already in the country, may not be released because of their criminal or
terrorist activities. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). If, as Respondents argue, all non-citizens arrested
while already in this country are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225, there would
be no need to carve out an exception for those who had committed criminal or terrorist
activities. See Rosado v. Figueroa, No. CV 25-2157-DHX-DLR (CDB), 2025 WL
2337099, at *9 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025) (reasoning that if Section 1225’s “mandatory
detention provisions apply to all noncitizens present in the United States who have not been
admitted, it would render superfluous provisions of § 1226 that apply to certain categories
of inadmissible noncitizens”); Rodriguez, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1258 (noting that if the court
were to adopt a reading of Section 1225 advanced by the BIA, it would render significant
portions of Section 1226(c) meaningless). To avoid rendering Section 1226(c) completely
meaningless, the Court finds non-citizens arrested on a warrant in the interior of the United
States are subject to discretionary release on bond under Section 1226(a), not mandatory
detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A).
In addition, “the longstanding practice of the government—like any other
interpretive aid—can inform a court’s determination of what the law is.” Rosado, 2025
WL 2337099, at *10 (citation modified) (quoting Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 386). “Until
this year, DHS has applied section 1226(a) and its regime of discretionary release and
review of detention to the vast majority of noncitizens allegedly in this country without
valid documentation—a practice codified by regulation.” Valencia Zapata v. Kaiser, 801
F. Supp. 3d 919, 929 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (citation modified); see also Inspection & Expedited
Removal of Aliens, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997).
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Against this backdrop, Congress adopted the Laken Riley Act, adding Section
1226(c)(1)(E), which mandates detention for additional categories of criminal aliens.
“When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its amendment to have real
and substantial effect.” Rodriguez, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1259 (quoting Stone v. I.N.S., 514
U.S. 386, 397 (1995), abrogated on other grounds by Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259, 261
(2025)). “When Congress adopts a new law against the backdrop of a ‘longstanding
administrative construction,’ courts ‘generally presume the new provision should be
understood to work in harmony with what has come before.’” Id. (quoting Monsalvo
Velazquez v. Bondi, 604 U.S. 712, 725 (2025)).
The longstanding practice of DHS applying Section 1226 to those arrested in the
interior of the United States supports the finding that this practice was the best reading of
the statute. This conclusion is particularly true because adopting Respondents’
interpretation would result in the recently enacted Laken Riley Act being completely
meaningless and unnecessary.
Statutory interpretation supports that Section 1226(a), not Section 1225(b)(2)(A),
applies to Petitioner’s immigration detention. Because the BIA’s decision binding
Immigration Judges incorrectly provides that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention
with no individualized bond determination, Petitioner is being held in violation of federal
law. Hence, his Petition is GRANTED.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Petitioner Benito Aguilar Trujillo’s Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED. The Court issues the following writ:
The Court ORDERS a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge for Benito
Aguilar Trujillo (A#221-420-389) within 14 days of the date of this Order.
His bond hearing shall be governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2).
The Clerk of the Court shall close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 30, 2026
Hon. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge
United States District Court
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