Gebremdhim Hagos v. Noem et al

1
3:26-cv-150-JES-DEB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
TESFAY GEBREMDHIM HAGOS,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM; PAMELA JO BONDI;
TODD M. LYONS; JESUS ROCHA; and
CHRISTOPHER LAROSE,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:26-cv-150-JES-DEB
ORDER:
(1) GRANTING PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2241; and
(2) DENYING AS MOOT MOTION
FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER
[ECF Nos. 1, 2]
Before the Court is Petitioner Tesfay Gebremdhim Hagos’ (“Petitioner”) Petition for
a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. Petitioner concurrently
filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”). ECF No. 2. Pursuant to the
Court’s order to show cause (ECF No. 3), Respondents filed a return to the petition and
Petitioner filed a traverse. ECF Nos. 5, 6. For the reasons set forth below, the Court
GRANTS the petition and DENIES AS MOOT the TRO.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a native of Eritrea, alleges that he came to the United States around May
13, 2010 in order to seek asylum. ECF No. 1 at 2. He was determined to be inadmissible
Case 3:26-cv-00150-JES-DEB Document 8 Filed 01/27/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
1 of 10

2
3:26-cv-150-JES-DEB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
and placed into removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). ECF No. 5-2 at 7. On June
24, 2010, an immigration judge (“IJ”) issued an order denying his asylum claim. Id. at 10.
Three months later, on September 29, 2010, Petitioner was released on an Order of
Supervision (“OSUP”). Id. at 12.
Plaintiff alleges that while he was on supervision, he always reported to Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) as required, never got any criminal convictions, and
obeyed his other release conditions. ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 3. Since, he has lived in the United
States, he has married, and has two young children. Id. ¶ 11.
On November 13, 2025, Petitioner reported to ICE for a scheduled check-in pursuant
to his OSUP. Id. ¶ 4. Petitioner was detained at that check-in. Id. Petitioner alleges that he
was not given any paperwork when he was detained. Id. ¶¶ 4-6. He alleges that when he
asked why he was being detained, he was told that there was a new administration and
things were changing. Id. ¶ 4. However, in their response, Respondents included a Warrant
for Arrest of Alien dated November 13, 2025, and a Notice of Revocation of Release, dated
the same day. ECF No. 5-2 at 14, 16. The Notice of Revocation appears to have been signed
and dated by the detainee. Id. at 16. Respondents also included a document titled “Alien
Informal Interview,” stating that an interview was conducted the same day on November
13, 2025. Id. at 19.
In his Petition, Petitioner asserts three claims: (1) that Respondents violated Due
Process under the Fifth Amendment and the Administrative Procedures Act by failing to
comply with its own regulations (ECF No. 1 at 7-9); (2) that his detention has been so
prolonged to date that it violates the due process standard set in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678 (2001) (id. at 9-13); and (3) that ICE cannot remove Petitioner to another country
without adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard (id. at 13-17).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2).
“The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
Case 3:26-cv-00150-JES-DEB Document 8 Filed 01/27/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
2 of 10

3
3:26-cv-150-JES-DEB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of
habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the
Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas
corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in
that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301
(2001). Accordingly, challenges to immigration-related detention are within the purview
of a district court’s habeas jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see
also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003).
III. DISCUSSION
Respondents make several arguments in response to the petition: (1) there is no live
case or controversy regarding third-country removal because they are only seeking to
remove Petitioner to Eritrea; (2) this Court lacks jurisdiction over this case under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252; (3) Petitioner’s re-detention is lawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) and his detention
has not become prolonged under Zadvydas; and (4) ICE complied with its regulations when
re-detaining Petitioner. ECF No. 5.
A. Jurisdiction
As a threshold matter, Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claims are all
jurisdictionally barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. ECF No. 5 at 5-6. The Court has considered
and rejected this argument in its previous orders, and adopts its reasoning here. See, e.g.,
Sanchez v. LaRose, No. 25-CV-2396-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 2770629, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sept.
26, 2025); Van Tran v. Noem, No. 25-CV-2334-JES-MSB, 2025 WL 2770623, at *2 (S.D.
Cal. Sept. 29, 2025); Rios v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 3:25-CV-01796-JES-DEB,
2025 WL 3022854, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2025). Thus, the Court concludes that it has
jurisdiction to hear Petitioner’s claims on the merits.
B. Revocation of Petitioner’s OSUP
“The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the Government from
depriving individuals of their life, liberty, or property, without due process of
Case 3:26-cv-00150-JES-DEB Document 8 Filed 01/27/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
3 of 10

4
3:26-cv-150-JES-DEB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
law.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). “[T]he Due Process Clause
applies to all persons within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence is
lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 679. “Freedom from
imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—
lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Id. at 690. A person at risk of a suffering
a serious loss being given notice and an opportunity to be heard, in a meaningful manner
and at a meaningful time, is the essence of procedural due process. Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
The detention and release of noncitizens that are subject to a final order of removal
is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231. This statute provides that “when an alien is ordered
removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a
period of 90 days.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). “If the alien does not leave or is not removed
within the removal period, the alien, pending removal, shall be subject to supervision under
regulations prescribed by the Attorney General.” Id. § 1231(a)(3).
Supervised release and any revocation of such release thereafter is governed by
either 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 or 8 C.F.R. § 241.13. Diaz v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01079 JLT
EPG, 2025 WL 2581575, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2025). Here, Respondents include a
document titled “Notice of Revocation of Release”, dated on November 13, 2025. ECF No.
5-2 at 16. In this notice, ICE states that Petitioner’s re-detention is pursuant to § 241.13.
Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.13).
The Court previously addressed what this provision requires in Van Nguyen v. Noem,
No. 3:25-CV-3062-JES-VET, 2025 WL 3251374, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2025). For
revocation of supervised released under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i), the Court found that this
provision requires the following: (1) ICE to determine that “on account of changed
circumstances, the Service determines that there is a significant likelihood that the alien
may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future;” (2) that the alien “will be notified
of the reasons for revocation of his or her release;” and (3) after the alien’s re-detention,
that a prompt initial informal interview be conducted at which the alien could respond to
Case 3:26-cv-00150-JES-DEB Document 8 Filed 01/27/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
4 of 10

5
3:26-cv-150-JES-DEB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
the reasons for revocation. Id. Violation of any these procedures may form the basis of a
Due Process violation. Id. The Court adopts the full reasoning of Van Nguyen here.
Petitioner was provided a Notice of Revocation at the same time as his re-detention.
No. 5-2 at 16. Thus, timing of the notice is not at issue. The Notice provided the following
reasons:
This letter is to inform you that your order of supervision has been revoked,
and you will be detained in the custody of U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) at this time. This decision was made based upon a review
of your official alien file and a determination that there are changed
circumstances in your case.
ICE has determined that you can be expeditiously removed from the United
States pursuant to an outstanding order of removal against you. ICE is now
able to obtain valid travel documents for removal to Eritrea and will be
working on obtaining travel documents and a removal flight to Eritrea.
Id. ICE then conducted an informal interview the same day. ECF No. 5-2 at 19. It stated
that Petitioner did not provide a written statement or provide any documents, but that he
did make an oral response. Id. His oral response focused on why he did not want to be
detained due to his family obligations and circumstances. Id.
The language in the Notice is relatively conclusory. The language “ICE has
determined that you can be expeditiously removed from the United States pursuant to an
outstanding order of removal against you” is similar to language from other notices that
courts within this Circuit have held to be not sufficient. See, e.g., McSweeney v. Warden of
Otay Mesa Det. Facility, No. 3:25-CV-02488-RBM-DEB, 2025 WL 2998376, at *5 (S.D.
Cal. Oct. 24, 2025) (holding that language in notice stating that “ICE has determined that
you can be expeditiously removed from the United States pursuant to an outstanding order
of removal” was “conclusory and unclear” and failed to provide adequate notice of the
basis of the revocation decision); J.L.R.P., v. Wofford et al., No. 1:25-CV-01464-KES-
SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3190589, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2025) (holding that same
language in the notice of revocation of release “did not provide any specific changed
circumstance applicable to petitioner”). Petitioner’s Notice does include the additional
Case 3:26-cv-00150-JES-DEB Document 8 Filed 01/27/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
5 of 10

6
3:26-cv-150-JES-DEB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
language that “ICE is now able to obtain travel documents for removal to Eritrea.” ECF
No. 5-2 at 16. The Court is still wary of whether this provides sufficient notice because the
statement remains conclusory and no further reasons or details are provided in the Notice
that substantiate the statement.
However, the Court finds that Respondents violated the other provisions of 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.13(i) requiring a prompt initial informal interview where the alien could respond to
the reasons for revocation and that ICE sufficiently established changed circumstances that
now make the likelihood of removal more likely.
1. Prompt Informal Interview
The regulations not only require that ICE conducts a prompt informal interview, but
the regulations also provide the purpose for this requirement: “to afford the alien an
opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.13(i)(3). This purpose is essential to comport with what is required under Due
Process—namely, that “the fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to
be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333
(internal citation omitted). Indeed, the regulations further elaborate that at this informal
interview, “the alien may submit any evidence or information that he or she believes shows
there is no significant likelihood he or she be removed in the reasonably foreseeable
future.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3). Then, the revocation review “will include an evaluation
of any contested facts relevant to the revocation and a determination whether the facts as
determined warrant revocation and further denial of release.” Id.
Here, Petitioner was provided an informal interview the same day that he was re-
detained. The Court previously found an interview conducted on such a timeline is a
violation of this regulation because it “essentially bars the noncitizen from being able to
submit any evidence or information that may show that the revocation of their release is
unlawful.” Kiwana v. LaRose et al., No. 3:25-CV-3678-JES-SBC, 2026 WL 102661, at *6
(S.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2026) (finding same day interview did not comport with 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.13(i)(3)).
Case 3:26-cv-00150-JES-DEB Document 8 Filed 01/27/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
6 of 10

7
3:26-cv-150-JES-DEB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
The Court adopts its prior reasoning, and holds the same here. When a noncitizen is
detained without any advanced notice and the interview is conducted the same day, it is
difficult to see how the noncitizen can respond in a meaningful manner. And indeed, here,
the notes from the informal interview reflects the results of these circumstances. Petitioner
was not able to submit any written statement or documents. While he did give an oral
response, it was not responsive to the reason provided in the Notice. Thus, the Court finds
that the informal interview given here failed to comport with the meaningful opportunity
to be heard required under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3) and Due Process.
2. Changed Circumstances
8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2) further requires that ICE determine that there is a “significant
likelihood that the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future” and that this
determination is “on account of changed circumstances.” This determination must be made
before the noncitizen’s order of supervised release is revoked. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Noem,
No. 25CV2792-LL-VET, 2025 WL 3101979, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2025); Tran v. Noem,
No. 25-cv-2391-BTM-BLM, 2025 WL 3005347, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025). While
“[t]he plain language of the regulation . . . does not allow a court in the first instance to
make the required individualized finding [of changed circumstances making removal
significantly likely] . . . [t]o the extent ICE claims that it made such a determination, the
court should review that claim in light of the regulations instructing ICE on how it should
make such a determination.” Kong v. United States, 62 F.4th 608, 620 (1st Cir. 2023)
(citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.13(f), (i)(2))1; Morales Sanchez v. Bondi, No. 5:25-CV-02530-AB-
DTB, 2025 WL 3651899, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2025) (“Courts do not independently
1 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(f) outlines the factors to be considered in determining whether there is a significant
likelihood of removing an alien: “The HQPDU shall consider all the facts of the case including, but not
limited to, the history of the alien’s efforts to comply with the order of removal, the history of the Service’s
efforts to remove aliens to the country in question or to third countries, including the ongoing nature of
the Service’s efforts to remove this alien and the alien’s assistance with those efforts, the reasonably
foreseeable results of those efforts, and the views of the Department of State regarding the prospects for
removal of aliens to the country or countries in question.”
Case 3:26-cv-00150-JES-DEB Document 8 Filed 01/27/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
7 of 10

8
3:26-cv-150-JES-DEB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
determine whether changed circumstances exist; rather, they review ICE’s determination
for compliance with the statutory and regulatory framework.”); Phan v. Beccerra, No.
2:25-CV-01757-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993735, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025) (“[T]o the
extent ICE claims that it made such a determination, the court should review that claim in
light of the factors set out in 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(f).”).
The Notice Petitioner was provided on the day of his re-detainment only contains
the statement that “ICE is now able to obtain valid travel documents for removal to Eritrea,”
and provides no further explanation or support. ECF No. 5-2 at 16. Such conclusory
statements make it difficult for a court to understand, let alone evaluate, how this
determination was made prior to his re-detention.
In its return to the petition, Respondents include the declaration of a Deportation
Officer with ICE who declares the following:
9. To effectuate Petitioner’s removal to Eritrea, ERO must acquire a travel
document and schedule a flight for Petitioner. Since Petitioner was re-
detained, ERO has worked expeditiously to effectuate Petitioner’s removal to
Eritrea. These removal efforts remain ongoing. ERO is in the process of
making a request for a Travel Document to the Eritrea embassy. ERO plans
to submit the Travel Document request to the Eritrea embassy by January 19,
2026. Processing times vary, but ERO expects to obtain a Travel Document
within about a month from submission of the request.
10. ICE routinely obtains travel documents for Eritrean citizens.
11. ICE has flights to Eritrea, and ICE has removed several Eritrean citizens
to Eritrea as recently as December 2025.
12. I am aware of no barrier to the consulate’s issuance of a travel document
for Petitioner.
13. Once a travel document is issued for Petitioner, his removal can be
effected promptly.
ECF No. 5-1 at ¶¶ 9-13. First, nothing in this declaration helps to clarify what ICE
determined before Petitioner was actually re-detained on November 13, 2025. By its own
admission, at that time, ICE had not yet begun the process of obtaining a travel document
Case 3:26-cv-00150-JES-DEB Document 8 Filed 01/27/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
8 of 10

9
3:26-cv-150-JES-DEB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
for Petitioner. Id. ¶ 9; see, e.g., Sun v. Noem, No. 3:25-CV-02433-CAB-MMP, 2025 WL
2800037, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2025) (statements that government is “preparing” travel
documents and once the travel document is received, it will begin to secure a flight are not
sufficient to meet this requirement); Huynh v. Noem, No. 25CV3601-LL-AHG, 2026 WL
35973, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2026) (noting that government did not submit request for
travel documents until weeks after re-detention and this did not suffice as evidence as “an
actual determination of changed circumstances that justified the initial revocation of . . .
release”); Hoac v. Becerra, No. 2:25-CV-01740-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993771, at *4 (E.D.
Cal. July 16, 2025) (“The fact that Respondents intend to complete a travel document
request for Petitioner does not make it significantly likely he will be removed in the
foreseeable future.”). Further, whether ICE has been removed Eritrean citizens as recently
as December 2025 does not speak to the situation on or before November 13, 2025. Id. ¶
11. Second, even if the Court ignores the temporal issues with the declaration, the
statements still fall short of establishing changed circumstances that make removal
significantly likely for Petitioner. Nothing in the declaration appears to be an individual
finding for Petitioner. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Warden of Golden State Mcfarland Det. Facility,
No. 2:25-CV-03297-SKO (HC), 2026 WL 72110, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2026) (“And, to
the extent that the Government advances an argument that this kind of determination may
be supported by evidence showing a general change in a country’s policy of accepting
removable aliens on a case-by-case basis, such arguments have been repeatedly rejected.”).
Further, courts have rejected such similar “blanket assertion[s] of personal knowledge”
where the underlying support has not also been submitted to the court. See Rokhfirooz v.
Larose, No. 25-CV-2053-RSH-VET, 2025 WL 2646165, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2025)
(declining to consider blanket statements in declaration where foundation for the
statements was not provided).
In summary, the Court concludes that Respondents failed to follow their own
regulations in re-detaining Petitioner by at least: (1) failing to provide him with an informal
interview where he could meaningfully respond to the reasons for revocation; and (2)
Case 3:26-cv-00150-JES-DEB Document 8 Filed 01/27/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
9 of 10

10
3:26-cv-150-JES-DEB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
failing to establish that, at the time of his re-detention, ICE determined that there was a
significant likelihood that Petitioner could be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future
on account of changed circumstances. Like many other district courts within this circuit,
the Court finds that these failures constitute a violation of Petitioner’s due process rights
and justify his release. See, e.g., Kiwana , 2026 WL 102661; Rokhfirooz, 2025 WL
2646165; Huynh, 2026 WL 35973.
Accordingly, Petitioner’s habeas petition is GRANTED on this ground.
C. Zadvydas Claim and Third Country Removal
Having granted the petition on the ground above, the Court declines to reach the
remainder of the claims in the petition, namely the Zadvydas argument and the third
country removal argument.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s writ of habeas
corpus. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody,
subject to the conditions of his preexisting Order of Supervision. Having granted the
petition, the Court DENIES AS MOOT the motion for TRO. ECF No. 2. The Parties are
ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report no later than January 30, 2026, confirming that
the Petitioner has been released. The Clerk of Court is ORDERED to CLOSE this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 27, 2026
Case 3:26-cv-00150-JES-DEB Document 8 Filed 01/27/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
10 of 10