Nahak v. Archambeault et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
FERDINANDUS NAHAK,
Petitioner,
v.
GREGORY J. ARCHAMBEAULT, Field
Office Director of Enforcement and
Removal Operations, San Diego Field
Office, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; JEREMY CASEY, Facility
Administrator, Imperial Regional
Detention Facility,
Respondents.
No. 26-cv-00146-BTM-SBC
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Case 3:26-cv-00146-BTM-SBC Document 8 Filed 01/29/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
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Pending before the Court is Petitioner Ferdinandus Nahak’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. For the reasons stated below, the petition is granted in part.
A. 	Background
Petitioner, a native and citizen of Indonesia, arrived in the United States in
December 2000. 	Petitioner was granted a temporary visa, which expired. 	Petitioner
remained in the United States following the expiration of his visa. 	An order of removal
was entered against Petitioner. 	On July 9, 2015, an immigration judge (IJ) granted
Petitioner withholding of removal, thus precluding his removal to Indonesia.
Petitioner has strong ties to the United States. He has lived here for about 25 years
and has two U.S. citizen children. 	Petitioner lives in California and works as a cardiac
technician. 	Petitioner was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
officers on June 15, 2025. 	Petitioner argues that his removal to a third country is not
reasonably foreseeable. He thus claims that he is entitled to immediate release or, in the
alternative, a bond hearing for an IJ to determine whether he is a flight risk or a danger to
the community.
The Government claims that the Court lacks jurisdiction and that Petitioner’s claim
fails on the merits. The Government submitted the declaration of La’Shaniece Wilson, a
Deportation Officer with the Department of Homeland Security. 	Wilson states that ICE
is in the process of finding a third country to accept Petitioner.
B. 	Discussion
In Zadvydas, the Court determined that federal courts have the power to review
whether a noncitizen’s detention is unlawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). 	Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001). 	This Court thus has jurisdiction to determine the
lawfulness of Petitioner’s detention. 	Id.; Arce v. United States, 899 F.3d 796, 800 (9th
Cir. 	2018) (“[W]e have 	limited 	[1252(g)]’s 	jurisdiction-stripping 	power 	to 	actions
challenging 	the 	Attorney 	General’s 	discretionary 	decisions 	to 	initiate 	proceedings,
adjudicate cases, and execute removal orders.”); accord Bunthoeun Kong v. United
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States, 62 F.4th 608, 617 (1st Cir. 2023) (interpreting 1252(g) to allow jurisdiction over
detention challenges).
Petitioner’s detention is limited “to a period reasonably necessary to bring about
[his] removal from the United States.” 	See 	Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689; 	see also
Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1139 (9th Cir. 2013) (recognizing that 6 months of
immigration detention is prolonged no matter the authorizing statute of detention).
Petitioner may not be detained indefinitely. 	See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (“A statute
permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious constitutional problem.”).
The Court thus must decide whether there is a “significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. at 701.
The 	Court 	finds 	the 	Government’s 	contention 	that 	Petitioner’s 	removal 	is
significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future conclusory. The Government has
not offered any real support for its conclusion, nor has it found a third country to accept
Petitioner. There is little basis for the Court to accept the Government’s position beyond
that it is working on obtaining a third country to accept Petitioner. If the Court accepted
the Government’s conclusory position here, Zadvydas would have little force. The Court
in Zadvydas required federal habeas courts to assess the accuracy of the Government’s
position that it is reasonably likely to remove a noncitizen. Id.
Because 	Petitioner’s 	removal 	is 	not 	significantly 	likely 	in 	the 	reasonably
foreseeable future, Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing at which an IJ shall determine
whether he is a flight risk or a danger to the community. 	The Court will order a bond
hearing, instead of outright release, because Zadvydas does not preclude conditions of
release from being imposed where a petitioner is found to be a flight risk or a danger to
the community.
Last, the Court rules that Petitioner may not be removed to a third country without
adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. 	See, e.g., Trump v. J.G.G.,
604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025) (per curiam) (“It is well established that the Fifth Amendment
entitles aliens to due process of law in the context of removal proceedings.” (quotation
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marks and citation omitted)); Andriasian v. INS, 180 F.3d 1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999)
(“Failing to notify individuals who are subject to deportation that they have the right to
apply for asylum in the United States and for withholding of deportation to the country to
which they will be deported violates both INS regulations and the constitutional right to
due process.”); Azzo v. Noem, No. 25-cv-03122-RBM-BJW, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
256030, *22 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2025) (ruling that the respondents “must provide
Petitioner with adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard before removing him to a
third country”).
The Court adopts the following requirements. 	Petitioner and his counsel must
receive written notice of the country of removal at least ten days before Petitioner is
removed to a third country. Petitioner must be given a minimum of ten days before being
removed to raise a claim against removal to the third country. 	If he succeeds on his
claim, Petitioner’s immigration proceedings must be reopened. If he does not succeed on
his claim, Petitioner must receive a minimum of fourteen days before removal to seek
reopening of his immigration proceedings.
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C. 	Conclusion and Order
For the reasons stated, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is granted in part.
No later than February 13, 2026, Respondents shall either (1) grant Petitioner a bond
hearing at which an IJ shall determine whether he is a flight risk or a danger to the
community or (2) grant his release from custody. 	If the IJ determines that Petitioner is
neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community, Respondents shall grant his release
from custody. The parties shall submit a status report by February 17, 2026, at 4:00 p.m.
Respondents and their officers, agents, employees, attorneys, and persons acting on
their behalf or in concert with them are PROHIBITED from removing Petitioner to a
third country without notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
Petitioner and his counsel must receive written notice of the country of removal at
least ten days before Petitioner is removed to a third country. Petitioner must be given a
minimum of ten days before being removed to raise a claim against removal to the third
country. 	If he succeeds on his claim, Petitioner’s immigration proceedings must be
reopened. 	If he does not succeed on his claim, Petitioner must receive a minimum of
fourteen days before removal to seek reopening of his immigration proceedings.
The Court retains jurisdiction to enforce this writ.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 29, 2026
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