Naseif v. LaRose et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
YOUSSEF NASEIF,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, Senior Warden,
Otay Mesa Detention Center, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-cv-30-RSH-BJW
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
On January 4, 2026, petitioner Youssef Naseif filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the “Petition”). ECF No. 1.
Petitioner, a citizen of Egypt, is detained by U.S. Customs and Immigration
Enforcement (“ICE”) at the Otay Mesa Detention Center in San Diego, California. Id. ¶¶
3, 4. As set forth below, the Court grants the Petition.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On November 29, 2024, Petitioner crossed the U.S.-Mexico border and was
apprehended by DHS. Id. ¶ 18; ECF No. 5 at 2. He was taken into immigration custody.
ECF No. 1 ¶ 18. Thereafter, he was interviewed by an asylum officer, who determined that
Petitioner had a credible fear of persecution if returned to Egypt. ECF No. 5 at 2. Petitioner
was issued a notice to appear and placed in removal proceedings. Id.
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Although Petitioner has had individual merits hearings scheduled five times, his
hearings have been cancelled or reset by the court, and he has not yet received an individual
merits hearing on his claims for relief. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 19-21. His individual merits hearing
is currently scheduled for March 30, 2026. ECF No. 5 at 2.
Petitioner alleges that his continued detention for approximately 14 months without
a bond hearing violates his right to due process. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 40-47. Respondents have
filed a return. ECF No. 5.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Title 28 of the U.S. Code, Section 2241, provides that “[w]rits of habeas corpus may
be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). A detainee bears the
burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
III. 	ANALYSIS
Petitioner is currently detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), which
provides that noncitizens found to have a credible fear of persecution are subject to
mandatory detention pending consideration of an asylum application. See 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (“If the officer determines at the time of the interview that an alien has a
credible fear of persecution … the alien shall be detained for further consideration of the
application for asylum.”). The issue presented here is whether, in the circumstances of this
case and at this point in time, applying this mandatory detention regime violates
Petitioner’s due process rights.
A. 	Jurisdiction
Respondents first challenge this Court’s jurisdiction to hear the Petition, relying on
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). That provision states that, except as otherwise provided in Section
1252, and notwithstanding any other provision of law including 8 U.S.C. § 2241, “no court
shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from
the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases,
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or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.” Respondents argue that
because Petitioner challenges his detention during removal proceedings, that detention
“arises from” the Attorney General’s decision to commence such proceedings. ECF No. 5
at 4.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the jurisdiction-stripping provision in Section
1252(g) provisions narrowly, limiting it to “three discrete actions”: the “‘decision or action’
to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” Reno v. Am.–
Arab Anti–Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)).
The Supreme Court noted that “[t]here are of course many other decisions or actions that
may be part of the deportation process.” Id. In a later decision, the Court explained that it
did not interpret Section 1252(g) “to sweep in any claim that can technically be said to
“arise from” the three listed actions of the Attorney General. Instead, we read the language
to refer to just those three specific actions themselves.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S.
281, 294 (2018).
Here, Petitioner is seeking to review the legality of his detention, arguing that the
length of time he has been detained here violates due process—rather than challenging the
decision to commence proceedings, the adjudication of his removal case, or an action to
execute his removal order. He does not seek to litigate in this Court questions of whether
he is removable or whether he is entitled to relief from removal. The relief he seeks here is
release from custody or a bond hearing at which his release may be considered by an
immigration judge. The Court concludes that Petitioner’s claim is not barred by Section
1252(g).
B. 	Whether Petitioner Has a Due Process Claim
Respondents argue that under the Supreme Court’s decision in Department of
Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020), Petitioner has no due process
rights beyond those that Congress has provided, and that his due process claim therefore
fails. ECF No. 5 at 6-8.
In Thuraissigiam, the Supreme Court rejected a habeas petitioner’s argument that
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the due process clause conferred rights to challenge his expedited removal beyond those
established by Congress, stating that “an alien at the threshold of initial entry cannot claim
any greater rights under the Due Process Clause.” 591 U.S. at 107. The petitioner in that
case had “attempted to enter the country illegally and was apprehended just 25 yards from
the border.” Id. The Supreme Court determined that the “political department of the
government” had plenary authority to admit or exclude aliens seeking initial entry, and thus
“an alien in respondent’s position has only those rights regarding admission that Congress
has provided by statute.” Id. at 139–40.
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Thuraissigiam, some district courts have
adopted Respondents’ reasoning to dismiss or deny habeas petitions in the context of
arriving aliens subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(1). See Petgrave v.
Aleman, 529 F. Supp. 3d 665, 679 (S.D. Tex. 2021) (“As far as Petitioner is concerned,
whatever procedure Congress has authorized is sufficient due process.”); Gonzales Garcia
v. Rosen, 513 F. Supp. 3d 329, 536 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) (“Petitioner is on the threshold of
initial entry into the United States and . . . he accordingly is not entitled to procedural
protections beyond those provided by statute.”).
Most courts have ruled otherwise. See Abdul-Samed v. Warden of Golden State
Annex Det. Facility, No. 25-cv-98-SAB-HC, 2025 WL 2099343, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 25,
2025) (“Although the Ninth Circuit has yet to take a position on whether due process
requires a bond hearing for noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) … ‘essentially
all district courts that have considered the issue agree that prolonged mandatory detention
pending removal proceedings, without a bond hearing, will—at some point—violate the
right to due process.’”) (quoting Martinez v. Clark, No. C18-1669-RAJ-MAT, 2019 WL
5968089, at *6 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2019)); Kydyrali v. Wolf, 499 F. Supp. 3d 768, 772
(S.D. Cal. 2020) (“[T]he Court joins the majority of courts across the country in concluding
that 	an 	unreasonably 	prolonged 	detention 	under 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1225(b) 	without 	an
individualized bond hearing violates due process.”). This Court agrees with the majority
position that a person detained under Section 1225(b)(1) may assert a due process challenge
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to prolonged mandatory detention without a bond hearing. This Court likewise agrees with
those district courts that interpret Thuraissigiam as circumscribing an arriving alien’s due
process rights to admission, rather than limiting that person’s ability to challenge detention.
See A.L. v. Oddo, 761 F. Supp. 3d 822, 825 (W.D. Pa. 2025) (“Nowhere in [Thuraissigiam]
did the Supreme Court suggest that arriving aliens being held under § 1225(b) may be held
indefinitely and unreasonably with no due process implications, nor that such aliens have
no due process rights whatsoever.”); Hernandez v. Wofford, No. 25-cv-986-KES-CDB
(HC), 2025 WL 2420390, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2025) (“Although the Supreme Court
has described Congress’s power over the ‘policies and rules for exclusion of aliens’ as
‘plenary,’ and held that this court must generally ‘defer to Executive and Legislative
Branch decisionmaking in that area,’ it is well-established that the Due Process Clause
stands as a significant constraint on the manner in which the political branches may
exercise their plenary authority’—through detention or otherwise.”) (citations omitted);
Padilla v. ICE, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1171–72 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (“The holding in
Thuraissigiam does not foreclose Plaintiffs’ due process claims which seek to vindicate a
right to a bond hearing with certain procedural protections.”).
C. 	Whether Petitioner’s Detention is Prolonged in Violation of Due Process
In arguing that his detention has become prolonged, Petitioner cites a case from this
district that analyzes the issue in terms of a six-factor balancing test used by some district
courts. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 40; Kydyrali, 499 F. Supp. 3d at 773–74 (citing Banda v.
McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1106 (W.D. Wash. 2019)). That test considers: (1) the
total length of detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future detention; (3) conditions
of detention; (4) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the detainee; (5) delays in
the removal proceedings caused by the government; and (6) the likelihood that the removal
proceedings will result in a final order of removal. See Kydyrali, 499 F. Supp. 3d at 773–
74.
Here, Petitioner has been detained for approximately 14 months. Respondents argue
that “[i]n general, as detention continues past a year, courts become extremely wary of
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permitting continued custody absent a bond hearing.” ECF No. 5 at 8 (quoting Sibomana
v. LaRose, No. 22-cv-933-LL-NLS, 2023 WL 3028093, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2023)).
This proposition, applied to Petitioner’s length of detention, favors a bond hearing. The
fact that courts have granted habeas relief in some other cases involving longer periods of
detention does not indicate that Petitioner is ineligible for such relief; still other courts have
granted habeas relief in cases involving shorter periods of detention.1
The 	reasons 	for 	the 	delays 	to 	date 	favor 	Petitioner. 	Petitioner 	argues, 	and
Respondents do not dispute, that he has had individual merits hearings calendared five
times, but that no hearing has taken place yet because the immigration court has cancelled
or reset hearings; and that his case has been re-assigned to a new immigration judge four
times. ECF No. 1 ¶ 20. There is no indication in the record that Petitioner himself is
responsible for these delays. The conditions of confinement also favor Petitioner; courts in
this 	district 	have 	found 	that 	conditions 	at 	the 	Otay 	Mesa 	Detention 	Center 	are
“indistinguishable from penal confinement,” and that this factor weighs in favor of
petitioners’ due process arguments of prolonged detention. Kydyrali, 499 F. Supp. 3d at
773; see Hoyos Amado, 2025 WL 3079052, at *6. The likely duration of future detention
also favors Petitioner. His first scheduled merits hearing has yet to occur; even if the
hearing goes forward as scheduled on March 30, 2026, and the immigration judge
1 See, e.g., Hoyos Amado v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 25-cv-2687-LL-DDL, 2025 WL
3079052, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025) (“Courts have found detention over seven months
without a bond hearing weighs toward a finding that it is unreasonable.”) (collecting cases);
Tanoyan v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00815-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3013684, at *4 (E.D. Cal.
Oct. 28, 2025) (“Petitioner has been detained approximately 11 months. This period …
qualifies as prolonged.”); Gao v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-2084-RSH-SBC, 2025 WL 2770633,
at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025) (“The Court finds that Petitioner’s detention for over 10
months without a bond hearing, in the context of the specific circumstances described
above, has become unreasonable and violates due process.”); Lopez v. Garland, 631 F.
Supp. 3d 870, 879 (E.D. Cal. 2022) (“Petitioner has been in immigration detention …
approximately one year. District courts have found shorter lengths of detention … without
a bond hearing to be unreasonable.”) (collecting cases).
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adjudicates Petitioner’s case on the merits and finds him removable without granting any
relief, Petitioner is entitled to appeal that order. The Parties do not address the likelihood
that the removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal, and the Court treats
this factor as neutral. On balance, the Court determines that the applicable factors indicate
that Petitioner’s detention without a bond hearing has become unreasonable and violates
due process.
Petitioner is entitled to a prompt and individualized bond hearing, at which
Respondents must justify his continued detention by a showing of clear and convincing
evidence that Petitioner would likely flee or pose a danger to the community if released.
See Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011), abrogated on other grounds by
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018) (explaining that “the substantial liberty interest
at stake” warranted placing the burden on the government to “prove by clear and
convincing evidence that an alien is a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify
denial of bond”); see also Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 785–86 (9th Cir. 2024) (stating
that “the BIA properly noted that the government bore the burden to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that Martinez is a danger to the community” with respect to a bond
hearing for a noncitizen detained under § 1226(c)).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is GRANTED. Respondents are directed to
arrange 	an 	individualized 	bond 	hearing 	for 	petitioner 	Youssef 	Naseif 	before 	an
immigration court within fourteen (14) days of this order as described above. The Court
VACATES the hearing date set for January 29, 2026.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 21, 2026
____________________
Hon. Robert S. Huie
United States District Judge
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