Aquino de la Cruz v. LaRose et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
NATIVIDAD AQUINO DE LA CRUZ,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, Senior
Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, et
al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 25-cv-3770-LL-MSB
ORDER GRANTING IN PART
PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS
(ECF No. 1)
Presently before the Court is Petitioner Natividad Aquino de la Cruz’s Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1 (hereinafter “Pet.”). Also
before the Court is Respondents Christopher J. LaRose’s (Senior Warden, Otay Mesa
Detention Center), Gregory J. Archambeault’s (Field Office Director for the San Diego
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Office), Todd Lyons’s (Acting Director, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement), Kristi Noem’s (Secretary of the Department of
Homeland 	Security) and 	Pamela 	Bondi’s 	(Attorney 	General 	of 	the United 	States)
(collectively, “Respondents”) Response to Petition (ECF No. 4) and Petitioner’s Traverse
(“Traverse,” ECF No. 5). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART
Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
/ / /
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I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner, an asylum seeker from the Dominic Republic, alleges that she has been
detained by the United States Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and
Customs Enforcement division at the Otay Mesa Detention Center August 25, 2025, when
she was arrested at a hearing at the San Diego Immigration Court. Pet. ¶¶ 8-9. Petitioner
entered the United States on February 13, 2024, to seek asylum, withholding of removal,
and 	protection under the Convention 	Against Torture, after fleeing persecution in
Dominican Republic. 	Id. ¶¶ 2, 3, 40. Petitioner was processed for admission and served
with a Notice to Appear for removal proceedings. Id. ¶ 41. Upon admission, Petitioner was
issued a Form I-94 and granted parole pursuant to the Immigration and Naturalization Act
(“INA”) 212(d)(5), which allowed her to apply for benefits including a driver’s license. Id.
Petitioner has almost two years of presence in the United States, including “family ties,
work authorization, and was in the midst of extensive medical treatment for serious medical
conditions.” Id. ¶ 60. On August 25, 2025, Petition had a “routine” court appearance at the
downtown San Diego Immigration Court. Id. ¶ 8. At the hearing, the attorney representing
the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) moved to dismiss Petitioner’s asylum
proceedings,1 and then immediately upon exiting the courtroom, she was arrested and
detained. Id. ¶¶ 8, 9. Petitioner alleges that she “has complied with all terms of her parole
by attending court hearings, timely filing for asylum, and remaining law abiding.” Id. ¶ 14.
Petitioner now argues her detention without notice or an opportunity to be heard violates
the Due Process Clause and the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. at ¶¶ 56-73.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the
legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of
his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial
1 Petitioner states that DHS has since reinstated her asylum proceedings and they remain ongoing. Pet. ¶
10.
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body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the
court of appeals. 	See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales,
418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat.
231, § 106(a)). 	However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising
independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention—
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. 	Nadarajah v. Gonzales,
443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez,
138 S. Ct. 830 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal.
2018) (citations omitted).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Due Process
Petitioner argues that the summary revocation of her parole without notice or a
hearing violates the Due Process Clause. Pet. ¶ 11, 14, 33, 56-70. The Court agrees.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 	U.S. Const. amend. V. 	“[T]he Due
Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether
their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles
aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” 	Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,
306 (1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing before the
State deprives a person of liberty or property.” 	Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127
(1990). “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or over whose
liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their
liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-5632-PCP, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July
25, 2025) (citations omitted). 	Although the initial decision to detain or release an
individual may be within the government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to
release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that
individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the
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. . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)).
“Thus, even when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending
removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody [he] has a protected
liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” 	Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (citing
Romero v. Kaiser, No. 22-cv-20508, 2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022)).
Respondents in their Response acknowledge that in light of Maldonado Bautista,
Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and is entitled to a bond hearing. See
Response at 2. However, the Court finds that the relief Petitioner is entitled to is not limited
to a bond hearing. Prior to Petitioner being granted parole, she was determined to not be a
danger to the community or a flight risk and was released. 	Pet. ¶ 70. 	Petitioner has
complied with all conditions of her release. 	Id. ¶ 69. Petitioner has obtained a work
authorization, developed community ties, and was undergoing extensive medical treatment
for serious medical conditions. Id. Accordingly, Petitioner has a protected liberty interest
in remaining out of custody. 	See, e.g., Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *4 (“[Petitioner’s]
release from ICE custody after her initial apprehension reflected a determination by the
government that she was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community, and
[Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining at liberty unless she no longer meets those
criteria.”); Noori, 2025 WL 2800149, at *10 (“Petitioner is not an ‘arriving’ noncitizen but
one that has [been] present in our country for over a year. This substantial amount of time
indicates he is afforded the Fifth Amendment’s guaranteed due process before removal.”);
Matute v. Wofford, No. 25-cv-1206-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2817795, at *5 (E.D. Cal.
Oct. 3, 2025) (finding petitioner had a protected liberty interest in his release).
As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires
procedural protections before she can be deprived of that interest. 	See Matthews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally
sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court must apply the Matthews factors.
See Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. Courts must consider: (1) “the private interest that will be
affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
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through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the [g]overnment’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.” Id.
The Court finds that all three factors support a finding that the government’s
revocation of Petitioner’s parole without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be
heard, denied Petitioner of her due process rights. First, as discussed above, Petitioner has
a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to her parole. “Freedom
from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects.” Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 690. Petitioner has an interest in remaining with her community, working, getting
the appropriate medical care that she needs for her and continuing the process of seeking
asylum. 	See Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 at 482 (“Subject to the conditions of his parole, he
can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family and friends and to form the other
enduring attachments of normal life.”).
Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as Petitioner’s
parole was revoked without providing her a reason for revocation or giving her an
opportunity to be heard. Pet. ¶ 11. Since the initial determination that Petitioner should
be paroled because she posed no danger to the community and was not a flight risk, there
is no evidence that these findings have changed. See Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d
1168, 1760 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“Release reflects a determination by the government that the
noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.”). Petitioner has no criminal
record, has not been arrested or otherwise in criminal trouble, has an established
community, and is working towards asylum status. Pet. ¶¶ 14, 25. “Once a noncitizen has
been released, the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting him merely because he is
subject to removal proceedings.” 	Saravia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 1760. “Rather, the federal
agents must be able to present evidence of materially changed circumstances—namely,
evidence that the noncitizen is in fact dangerous or has become a flight risk. . . .” Id.
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Respondents, failing to address Petitioner’s Due Process argument in their response,
do not point to any material circumstances that have changed that would warrant
reconsideration of her parole. 	See generally Response. 	“Where, as here, ‘the petitioner
has not received any bond or custody hearing,’ ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
liberty is high’ because neither the government nor [Petitioner] has had an opportunity to
determine whether there is any valid basis for [his] detention.” Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921,
at *5 (quoting Singh v. Andrews, No. 25-cv-801-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 1918679, at
*7 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2025)).
Third, the government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning,
and a hearing is “low.” See Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *5; Matute, 2025 WL 2817795,
at *6; Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) (“If the
government wishes to re-arrest [Petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps
toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.”). Respondents fail
to point to any burdens on the government if it were to have provided proper notice,
reasoning, and a pre-deprivation hearing. See generally Response
Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking her parole in
violation of the Due Process Clause, her detention is unlawful. See, e.g., Alegria Palma v.
Larose et al., No. 25-cv-1942 BJC (MMP), slip op. at 14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2025)
(granting a TRO based on a procedural due process challenge to a revocation of parole
without a pre-deprivation hearing); Navarro Sanchez, 2025 WL 2770629, at *5 (granting
a writ of habeas corpus releasing petitioner from custody to the conditions of her
preexisting parole on due process grounds).2
2 The Court need not address Petitioner’s claim arising under the APA because the Petition can be resolved
on due process grounds. However, the Court notes that other courts have found violations of the APA
based on similar grounds. See, e.g., Navarro Sanchez, 2025 WL 2770629, at *4 (finding revocation of
petitioner’s parole arbitrary and capricious because respondents did not state any reasons for the
revocation); Noori, 2025 WL 2800149, at *3 (“Petitioner’s parole was revoked without an individualized
determination or provided reasoning, which violated the APA.”). Similarly, the Court declines to rule on
Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim because this case can be resolved on due process grounds.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART Petitioner’s Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1), and ORDERS Respondents to immediately release
Petitioner from custody subject to the conditions of her preexisting parole. 	The Court
ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner is entitled to notice of the
reasons for revocation of her parole and a hearing before a neutral decision maker to
determine whether detention is warranted. 	The government shall bear the burden of
establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to the
community or a risk of flight.3 The Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report by
January 12, 2026, confirming that Petitioner has been released. 	Lastly, Petitioner’s
attorney is directed to submit an attorney fee application and corresponding billing records
within thirty (30) days of this Order, and Respondents are instructed to file any opposition
within fourteen (14) days of Petitioner’s attorney fee application.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 9, 2026
3 This relief has been granted in similar matters. See, e.g., Matute, 2025 WL 2817795, at *8; Pinchi, 2025
WL 2084921, at *5; Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1097 (E.D. Cal. 2025); Martinez Hernandez
v. Andrews, No. 25-CV-1035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025).
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