Sanchez et al v. Fay Servicing LLC et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
RUBEN SANCHEZ and
LILIANA SANCHEZ,
Plaintiffs,
v.
FAY SERVICING LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No.: 25-CV-3589 JLS (MMP)
ORDER:
(1) GRANTING APPLICATIONS TO
PROCEED IN DISTRICT COURT
WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES OR
COSTS,
(2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT
WITH LEAVE TO AMEND,
(3) DENYING PLAINTIFFS’
EMERGENCY MOTION FOR
MANDATORY AND PROHIBITORY
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF TO
PREVENT WASTE, DESTRUCTION,
AND MOOTNESS, AND
(4) DENYING AS MOOT
PLAINTIFFS’ EMERGENCY
MOTION TO EXEDITE RULING ON
APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN
FORMA PAUPERIS AND ISSUANCE
OF SUMMONS
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(ECF Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
Presently before the Court are pro se Plaintiffs Ruben Sanchez’s and Liliana
Sanchez’s Complaint (“Compl.,” ECF No. 1), Liliana Sanchez’s Application to Proceed in
District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (“Liliana IFP Appl.,” ECF No. 2), Ruben
Sanchez’s Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs
(“Ruben IFP Appl.,” ECF No. 3), Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Mandatory and
Prohibitory Injunctive Relief (“TRO Mot.,” ECF No. 4), and Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion
to Expedite on Ruling on Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis and Issuance of
Summons (“Mot. to Expedite,” ECF No. 5). 	Having carefully considered Plaintiffs’
Complaint and the law, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ IFP Applications, DISMISSES
Plaintiffs’ Complaint WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiffs’
TRO Motion, and DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiffs’ Motion to Expedite.
IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATIONS
All parties instituting a civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the
United States, other than a petition for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $405.1
28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to pay the filing fee
only if the party is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(1).
Section 1915(a)(1) provides:
[A]ny 	court 	of 	the 	United 	States 	may 	authorize 	the
commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or
proceeding . . . without prepayment of fees or security therefor,
by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of
all assets such [person] possesses that the person is unable to pay
such fees or give security therefor.
1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $55. See
28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff.
Dec. 1, 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed
in forma pauperis. Id.
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As § 1915(a)(1) does not itself define what constitutes insufficient assets to warrant
IFP status, the determination of indigency falls within the district court’s discretion. 	See
Cal. Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Section 1915 typically
requires the reviewing court to exercise its sound discretion in determining whether the
affiant has satisfied the statute’s requirement of indigency.”), reversed on other grounds
by, 506 U.S. 194 (1993). “An affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where
it alleges that the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.”
Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Adkins v. E.I. Du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)). “One need not be absolutely destitute to
obtain benefits of the [IFP] statute.” Jefferson v. United States, 277 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir.
1960). 	“Nevertheless, a plaintiff seeking IFP status must allege poverty ‘with some
particularity, definiteness[,] and certainty.’” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234 (quoting United
States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir.1981)).
In Plaintiff Liliana Sanchez’s IFP Application, she states that her monthly income is
$2,000.00. Liliana IFP Appl. at 1. Plaintiff is an IHSS care giver, has savings of $1,800,
and has monthly expenses totaling $619.00. Id. at 2–5. In Plaintiff Ruben Sanchez’s IFP
Application, he states that his monthly income is $1,200.00. 	Ruben IFP Appl. at 1.
Plaintiff is self-employed, has savings of $1,200, and has monthly expenses totaling
$359.00. 	Id. at 2–5. 	The Court is satisfied that Plaintiffs have adequately demonstrated
that paying the $405 filing fee would result in their inability to afford the necessities of life.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ IFP Applications.
SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
I. 	Legal Standard
Because Plaintiffs seek to proceed IFP, their Complaint requires a pre-answer
screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 	See, e.g., Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845,
845 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (holding “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are
not limited to prisoners”); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en
banc) overruled, in part on other grounds by, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir.
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2014) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP]
complaint that fails to state a claim.”). 	Under this statute, the Court sua sponte must
dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim,
or seeks damages from immune defendants. 	See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126–27. 	“The
purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not
bear the expense of responding.’” 	Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir.
2014) (citations omitted).
“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” 	Watison v. Carter,
668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). 	Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 	A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 	Id. 	Plausibility requires pleading facts
supporting a claim for relief, as opposed to conclusory allegations or the “formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” 	Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 	The “mere
possibility 	of 	misconduct” 	or 	“unadorned, 	the 	defendant-unlawfully-harmed 	me
accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79;
see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).
Independently, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires pleadings to state “a short
and 	plain 	statement 	of 	the 	claim 	showing 	that 	the 	pleader 	is 	entitled 	to 	relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 	“Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” 	Id. at
8(d)(1). 	Rule 8 “applies to good claims as well as bad, and is a basis for dismissal
independent of Rule 12(b)(6).” McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996). A
complaint which is “argumentative, prolix, replete with redundancy, and largely irrelevant”
does not meet Rule 8’s requirement of simplicity, directness, and clarity. Id. at 1177–78.
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Further, courts have a duty to construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally. 	See
Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). 	A district court
should grant leave to amend if it appears “at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the
defect.” 	Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting
Breier v. N. Cal. Bowling Proprietors’ Ass’n, 316 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1963)).
II. 	Discussion
Plaintiffs appear to bring claims for: (1) procedural discrimination; (2) fraud and
concealment; (3) discrimination wrongful foreclosure; (4) wrongful foreclosure practice;
(5) FHA & ECOA retaliation; (6) conspiracy and joint enterprise; (7) aiding and abating
lawyers title and fidelity; (8) title companies and quite title; (9) violation of due process;
(10) violation of bankruptcy stay; (11) declaratory and injunctive relief; and (12) non-core.
Compl. at 1. Yet, the Complaint’s “Statement of Claim” section is left completely blank,
providing no context as to the facts of this dispute or the nature of the claims. See Compl.
at 3–4. Further, Plaintiffs provide no clarity as to which of the several Defendants are the
subject of which specific claims and why. See generally id.
Plaintiffs’ allegations lack the requisite clarity to provide Defendants “fair notice of
what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” 	Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
(quotation and alteration omitted); see also McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1178 (explaining that a
complaint lacking “simplicity, conciseness and clarity as to whom [a plaintiff is] suing for
what wrongs, fails to perform the essential functions of a complaint”). As the Complaint
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court must sua sponte dismiss
it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 	The Court therefore DISMISSES AS MOOT
Plaintiffs’ TRO Motion and Motion to Expedite.
However, as the nature of Plaintiffs’ claims are not fully comprehensible by the
Court at this time, the Court cannot rule out the possibility that Plaintiffs can plausibly
allege facts addressing the deficiencies described in this Order. Thus, the Court will grant
Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint.
/ / /
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CONCLUSION
In light of the above, the Court:
1. 	GRANTS Plaintiffs’ IFP Applications (ECF Nos. 2, 3).
2. 	DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ Complaint (ECF No. 1) WITHOUT PREJUDICE
for its failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2). Given Plaintiffs’ pro se status, the dismissal is WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
Plaintiffs thus have forty-five (45) days’ leave from the date of this Order to file an
amended complaint curing the pleading deficiencies noted above. 	Plaintiffs are advised
that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. Lacey v. Maricopa County,
693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). Any amended complaint must be complete in and of
itself without reference to Plaintiffs’ original Complaint; claims not realleged in the
amended complaint will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Lacey, 693 F.3d
at 928 (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend that are not realleged in an
amended pleading may be “considered waived”). 	If Plaintiffs fail to amend within the
time provided, the Court will enter a final order dismissing this civil action. See Lira v.
Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage of
the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the
complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”).
3. 	DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Mandatory and
Prohibitory Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 4).
4. 	DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion to Expedite on Ruling on
Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis and Issuance of Summons (ECF No. 5).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 26, 2026
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