Santos Zelaya v. Brightman et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE MATTER OF YONATHAN
DONALDO SANTOS ZELAYA,
Petitioner,
v.
DANIEL A. BRIGHTMAN, in his official
capacity as Field Office Director of the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Enforcement and Removal Operations San
Diego Field, Office, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 25cv3489-LL-DDL
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION
AND DENYING PETITIONER’S
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
[ECF Nos. 1, 2]
Presently before the Court is Petitioner Yonathan Donaldo Santos Zelaya’s Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 8 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF No. 1). Also before the Court is
Petitioner’s Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 2). For the
reasons set forth below, the Court DISMISSES the Petition (ECF No. 1) and DENIES AS
MOOT the TRO (ECF No. 2).
I. 	Background
Petitioner, a citizen of Honduras, brings this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
against Respondents arising from the imposition of “more restrictive custody conditions
on Petitioner without providing any justification, despite there being no change in
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circumstances.” Pet. ¶ 5. Petitioner also contends that Respondents “continued custody of
Petitioner, and the conditions thereof, violate the Fifth Amendment because the conditions
constitute punishment, or alternatively, are excessive relative to their regulatory purpose.”
Id. ¶ 6. Specifically, Petitioner contends:
[He] was released on bond on or about November 18, 2015 and from that date
to present he has been constructively detained through his OSUP [Order of
Supervision]. He has been living in the San Diego county, complying with his
annual check-ins. No issues surrounding Petitioner’s check-ins have occurred
and none have been alleged.
On November 14, 2025, Petitioner was placed in an ATD ISAP [Alternatives
to Detention, Intensive Supervision Appearance Program], and, as delineated
in ‘Section VI. Factual Allegations,’ the conditions of his custody drastically
intensified. On November 17, 2025, ICE agents went to Petitioner’s house to
take his photo. On November 19, 2025, Petitioner attended his ICE check-in
appointment 	with 	undersigned 	counsel. 	On 	November 	25, 	2025 	and
December 3, 2025, Petitioner attended his ICE office check-ins. Between
November 14 and December 3, 2025, he was required to attend four check-
ins, including an in-home visit, a sudden and dramatic escalation from his
prior annual check-in, with all events occurring in just sixteen days.
Respondents have scheduled Petitioner for two check-ins before the New
Year, two in January, two in February and one in March, alternating between
office and home visits. For the home visits, Petitioner must be at home from
7 am to as late as 6 pm to wait for the ICE officers to come to his home.
Respondent’s increased custody conditions are unwarranted because there has
been no change in circumstances. The increased conditions are therefore
punitive and excessive in relation to their purpose. There are less harsh
methods that were previously in place and that functioned well from his
release on November 18, 2015 to present, totally over ten years. Accordingly,
the increase in custody conditions violates the Fifth Amendment because it
does not serve a purpose other than to punish Mr. Santos Zelaya. Any attempt
to return Petitioner to physical custody would violate the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process clause as well as 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) post-final order custody
limits, especially if it for the purpose of removing him to Mexico without any
safeguards in place. Arbitrary or punitive re-detention is unlawful under the
Due Process Clause and controlling precedent.
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Pet. ¶¶ 40-45.
Accordingly, Petitioner requests his immediate release without any Order of
Supervision 	and 	enjoining 	re-detention 	absent 	a 	“constitutionally 	adequate” 	pre-
deprivation hearing. Pet. at Prayer for Relief ¶ 2. Alternatively, Petitioner seeks an Order
to Show Cause directing Respondents to justify any continued placement under an Order
of Supervision and any threatened re-detention. Id. ¶ 3. Finally, Petitioner seeks that the
Court “[d]eclare that any continued or threatened deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty –
including re-detention after his grant of withholding of removal under the Convention
Against Torture – violates 8 U.S.C. § 1231, its implementing regulations and the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” Id. ¶ 4.
Respondents oppose on the basis that Petitioner’s claims are barred by 8 U.S.C. §
1252. ECF No. 6 at 4 (hereinafter “Oppo.”). Respondents also argue that Petitioner fails to
establish entitlement to injunctive relief under the Winter factors. Id. Respondents also
contend that the issue giving rise to Petitioner’s requested relief is not ripe because:
[I]t would be premature at this stage to declare any potential re-detention or
third country removal of Petitioner to arise to a constitutional violation.
Petitioner states that on November 19, 2025, he attended an appointment with
ICE with his attorney, during which time the ICE officer stated that ‘it was
the intention of the officer in charge of Petitioner’s case to take Petitioner into
custody at the next check-in date, December 3, 2025.’ ECF No. 1 at ¶ 29. Yet,
during 	his 	next 	check-in 	with 	ICE, 	on 	December 	3, 	2025, 	Petitioner
acknowledges that he was not detained. Id. at ¶ 30.
Petitioner is not yet detained. It would therefore be speculative to determine
what ICE will or will not do in the future, when and how re-detention will
occur, and the circumstances under which any potential re-detention will
occur.
Oppo. at 4-14. (internal citations omitted).
II. 	Legal Standard
District courts may exercise jurisdiction over habeas petitions pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 where the petitioner “is in custody in violation of the Constitution and laws or
treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (“The writ of habeas corpus shall not
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extend to a prisoner unless [h]e is in custody.”); see also Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S.
236, 240 (1963) (“History, usage, and precedent can leave no doubt that, besides physical
imprisonment, there are other restraints on a man’s liberty, restraints not shared by the
public generally, which have been thought sufficient in the English-speaking world to
support the issuance of habeas corpus.”). “The party seeking relief bears the burden of
establishing jurisdiction.” Pinson v. Carvajal, 69 F.4th 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2023). “[T]he
Ninth Circuit has long held that [ ] ‘the writ of habeas corpus is limited to attacks upon the
legality or duration of confinement.’ ” Pinson, 69 F.4th at 1065 (citing Crawford v. Bell,
599 F.2d 890, 891 (9th Cir. 1979)), cert. denied sub nom. Sands v. Bradley, 144 S. Ct. 1382
(2024); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) (“It is clear ... from the
common-law history of the writ ... that the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person
in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional function of the writ is
to secure release from illegal custody.”).
III. 	Discussion
The Court finds that the threshold question here is whether Petitioner’s claim is ripe
for the Court’s review. Article III of the Constitution requires district courts to adjudicate
only actual cases or controversies. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. No case or controversy
exists if a plaintiff lacks standing or if a case is not ripe for adjudication, see, e.g., Thomas
v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), and
consequently a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., White v. Lee, 227
F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000)
The Court finds that Petitioner’s request for relief is not ripe for review, and the
Court thus lacks subject matter jurisdiction. “For a case to be ripe, it must present issues
that are definite and concrete, not hypothetical or abstract.” Bishop Paiute Tribe v. Inyo
Cnty., 863 F.3d 1144, 1153 (9th Cir. 2017). “If a case is not ripe for review, then there is
no case or controversy, and the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.” Principal Life Ins.
Co. v. Robinson, 394 F. 3d 665, 669 (9th Cir. 2005).
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Here, Petitioner fails to sufficiently allege an injury or threat of injury because
Petitioner’s alleged threat of future injury is too speculative and unripe. For example,
Petitioner alleges that “[o]n November 19, 2025, he attended his ICE check-in appointment
with [his attorney]” and “the ICE officer stated that it was the intention of the officer in
charge of Petitioner’s case to take Petitioner into custody at the next check-in date,
December 3, 2025.” Pet. ¶ 29. However, Petitioner states that on December 3, 2025, he
attended his ICE check-in appointment with his attorney, and “he was not physically
detained.” Id. ¶ 30. Petitioner alleges that he has upcoming appointments with ICE on
January 6, 2026, January 20, 2026, February 3, 2026, February 17, 2026, and March 3,
2026. Id. ¶ 31. To the extent Petitioner challenges his future detention and/or arrest at
another physical appointment, the Court finds Petitioner fails to present sufficient
allegations or evidence of the threat of future injury to confer subject matter jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Yesica L. Boza v. Pamela Bondi, et al., 25-cv-3526-AGS-SBC, ECF No. 6 at 1–
2 (denying motion for temporary restraining order in connection with petitioner’s
scheduled adjustment of status interview because petitioner “fail[ed] to establish that she
is likely to suffer imminent harm”). De Anda v. Ford Motor Co., Inc., 668 F. Supp. 3d 976,
985 (C.D. Cal. 2023) (“If a case is not ripe for adjudication, then courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction and should dismiss on that basis.”); Temple v. Abercrombie, 903 F. Supp. 2d
1024, 1030 (D. Haw. 2012) (stating “[n]o case or controversy exists if a plaintiff lacks
standing or if a case is not ripe for adjudication ... and consequently a federal court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction”).
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Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES the Petition (ECF No. 1) and DENIES AS
MOOT the TRO (ECF No. 2). The Clerk of Court shall close the case file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 6, 2026
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