Gu v. Jimenez

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
FAYEE GU,
Plaintiff,
v.
SERGIO JIMENEZ,
Defendant.
Case No.: 25-cv-02326-RBM-AHG
ORDER:
(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA
PAUPERIS
(2) SCREENING COMPLAINT
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)
(3) DISMISSING COMPLAINT
WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
[Doc. 2]
On September 5, 2025, pro se Plaintiff Fayee Gu (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint
against Sergio Jimenez. (Doc. 1.) The same day, Plaintiff filed an Application to Proceed
in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (“IFP Motion”). 	(Doc. 2.) 	For the
reasons below, the Court 	GRANTS 	Plaintiff’s IFP Motion and 	DISMISSES 	their
Complaint with leave to amend.
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I. 	LEGAL STANDARD
The IFP Motion presents two issues. 	First, the Court must determine whether
Plaintiff properly shows an inability to pay the $4051 civil filing fee required by this Court.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(a). 	To that end, Plaintiff must provide the Court with a
signed affidavit “that includes a statement of all assets which shows inability to pay initial
fees or give security.” 	Civ. L.R. 3.2(a). 	Second, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires
the Court to evaluate whether Plaintiff’s Complaint sufficiently states a claim upon which
relief may be granted. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (“section
1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that
fails to state a claim.”). The Court addresses each issue in turn.
II. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Plaintiff’s IFP Application
An applicant need not be completely destitute to proceed IFP, but he must adequately
prove his indigence. 	Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339–40
(1948). An adequate affidavit should “allege[] that the affiant cannot pay the court costs
and still afford the necessities of life.” 	Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th
Cir. 2015) (citing Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339); see also United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d
938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that an adequate affidavit should state supporting facts
“with some particularity, definiteness and certainty”) (citation omitted). No formula is “set
forth by statute, regulation, or case law to determine when someone is poor enough to earn
IFP status.” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1235. Consequently, courts must evaluate IFP requests
on a case-by-case basis. See id. at 1235–36 (declining to implement a general benchmark
of “twenty percent of monthly household income”).
1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an administrative fee of $55.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); United States Courts, District Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule
§ 14 (effective Dec. 1, 2023), https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/fees/district-court-
miscellaneous-fee-schedule. 	The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply to
persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.
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Here, Plaintiff declares that their household’s average monthly income is $2,000 and
their average monthly expenses are $2,150. (Doc. 2 at 1–2, 5.) Plaintiff declares that they
have $40 in a checking account and no other assets. (Id. at 2–3.) Additionally, under the
section requesting Plaintiff “[p]rovide any other information that will help explain why you
cannot pay the costs of these proceedings,” Plaintiff writes “I owed $143,015 court
judgment.” (Id. at 5.) 	Considering that Plaintiff’s expenses exceed their income, and that
Plaintiff appears to have a significant financial obligation in the court judgment, the Court
finds that Plaintiff “cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.”
Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234. Therefore, Plaintiff’s IFP Motion is GRANTED.
B. 	Screening Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
As discussed above, every complaint filed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is subject to
mandatory screening by the Court under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127. Under
this provision, the Court must dismiss complaints that are (1) frivolous or malicious, (2) fail
to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or (3) seek monetary relief from defendants
who are immune from such relief. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff’s Complaint
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d
1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6)
requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Although the Court must construe pro se pleadings liberally and
“afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th
Cir. 2010) (citation omitted), it may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not
initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
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The Complaint does not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 	The Complaint is
five sentences:
1. The current owner of the apartment where Plaintiff resides is Re/Max, as
the former owner Raymond Chan claimed in his sworn affidavit,
2. 	Hong Yi Zeng conspired with Re/Max agent and fabricated a criminal
charge against Plaintiff,
3. 	Defendant conspired with Hong Yi Zeng in violating Plaintiff’s due
process.
4. 	This Court has jurisdiction under RICO Act.
Plaintiff demands $1 Billion against Defendant.
(Doc. 1 at 1.)
The allegations are conclusory and lack any meaningful detail. 	Although the
Complaint references RICO and states that there was a conspiracy between certain
individuals, the Complaint “does not contain any allegations explaining what these acts
were,” nor any “details regarding Defendant[’s] actions or how [Defendant’s] actions
violated” that statute. 	Marcos-Chavela v. Graham, Case No. C22-1035-RAJ, 2023 WL
2890363, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 11, 2023); Walton v. Murray, No. 2:08-CV-01347-RLH
(VPC), 2009 WL 1530682, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 29, 2009) (dismissing complaint where
the plaintiff “provided no detail as to the circumstances of his due process violation against
defendant”). 	Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state any claims, and
Plaintiff’s Complaint must be DISMISSED with leave to amend.
The Court is also concerned that venue may be improper in the Southern District of
California. Venue is proper in:
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are
residents of the State in which the district is located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions
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giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the
subject of the action is situated; or
(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as
provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject
to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
Plaintiff alleges no facts about Defendant Sergio Jimenez except that he conspired
to violate Plaintiff’s due process rights. (Doc. 1 at 1.) But the alleged conspiracy appears
to relate to the “current owner of the apartment where Plaintiff resides.” (Id.) And from
both the IFP Motion (Doc. 2 at 5) and the envelope of the Complaint (Doc. 1-2 at 1),
Plaintiff appears to reside in New York. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, they must
also allege facts establishing that venue is proper in the Southern District of California.
III. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s IFP Motion (Doc. 2) is 	GRANTED 	and
Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. Plaintiff may file an amended
complaint which cures the deficiencies noted in this Order on or before February 27,
2026. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint by that deadline, the Court will enter
a final order dismissing this action based both on failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and failure to prosecute in
compliance with a court order requiring amendment. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164,
1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage of the opportunity to fix his
complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the
entire action.”)
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: January 21, 2026
________________________________
HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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