Soro v. FCA US, LLC et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
DUNYA SORO,
Plaintiff,
v.
FCA US, LLC; CARL BURGERS
DODGE CHRYSLER JEEP RAM
WORLD; and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive,
Defendants.
Case No.: 25-cv-02200-GPC-SBC
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT
FCA US, LLC’S MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS.
[ECF No. 12]
This case involves alleged vehicle defects in a 2017 Ram 1500 truck. Currently
before the Court is Defendant FCA US, LLC’s (“FCA”) motion for judgment on the
pleadings. The Court finds the matter suitable for decision on the papers under Civil Local
Rule 7.1(d)(1) and vacates the hearing set for February 20, 2026. For the reasons outlined
below, the Court grants FCA’s motion, in part, and denies the motion, in part.
//
//
//
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BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background
On February 18, 2017, Plaintiff entered a warranty contract with Defendant FCA
regarding a 2017 Ram 1500 truck (“vehicle”) equipped with a 3.6L engine. ECF No. 1-2,
¶¶ 7, 64. The vehicle was manufactured by Defendant FCA and sold to Plaintiff by a third-
party dealer. Id.
Plaintiff claims that 2017 Ram 1500s with a 3.6L engine have an engine defect that
can cause loss of power, stalling, misfires, and more, such that a driver may suddenly lose
ability to control the vehicle. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. The defect also renders the 2017 Ram 1500s
susceptible to non-collision vehicle fires. Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff alleges that her vehicle
manifested transmission defects, electrical defects, and other defects within the express
warranty period. Id. ¶¶ 12-13. Though Plaintiff alleges that such defects impaired her
vehicle’s use, value, and safety during the warranty period, she does not detail what
symptoms of the defects her vehicle actually displayed. Id. ¶ 12-13.
Plaintiff claims that FCA knew, prior to her purchase of the vehicle, that 2017 Ram
1500s equipped with the 3.6L engine had an engine defect, yet actively concealed such
information from consumers, including Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 15-16, ¶ 25. Plaintiff further alleges
that, had she known of the defect, Plaintiff would not have purchased the vehicle or would
have paid less for it. Id. ¶ 24.
Lastly, because the defect could not be known or reasonably discovered by Plaintiff
prior to purchase, id. ¶ 22, Plaintiff alleges that she discovered FCA’s alleged wrongful
conduct “shortly before” filing her complaint in this action, id. ¶ 37.
II. Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed her complaint on January 30, 2025, in San Diego Superior Court. ECF
No. 1-2, at 2. In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges four violations of the Song-Beverly
Consumer Warranty Act (“Song-Beverly”) against FCA, including: (1) failure to timely
replace the vehicle or make restitution Plaintiff pursuant to California Civil Code §
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1793.2(d); (2) failure to commence repairs of her vehicle within a reasonable time and
repair the vehicle to conform with the applicable warranties within thirty days pursuant to
California Civil Code § 1793.2(b); (3) failure to make available to its repair facilities
sufficient service literature and replacement parts to effect repairs during the express
warranty period pursuant to California Civil Code § 1793.2(a)(3); and (4) breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability pursuant to California Civil Code §§ 1791.1, 1794,
and 1795.5. ECF No. 1-2, ¶¶ 39-57. Plaintiff also alleges that FCA committed fraudulent
inducement by concealment by failing to disclose the existence of the alleged engine
defect. Id. ¶¶ 63-71. Plaintiff seeks general damages, restitution, punitive damages, and
reasonable attorneys’ fees. ECF No. 1-2, at 14.
On August 25, 2025, FCA removed the case from the superior court to this Court
based on diversity jurisdiction. ECF No. 1, at 2. That same day, FCA filed an answer to
Plaintiff’s complaint. ECF No. 2.
On November 18, 2025, FCA filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on the
grounds that (1) Plaintiff’s claims are untimely, and (2) Plaintiff has failed to adequately
plead the merits of her fraud claim.1 ECF No. 12-1, at 10-11.2 On January 12, 2026,
Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to FCA’s motion, ECF No. 18, to which FCA replied
on January 30, 2026, ECF No. 21.
LEGAL STANDARD
1 FCA concurrently filed a request for judicial notice as to five other state court complaints
against Defendant FCA filed by Plaintiff’s counsel containing “identical” allegations. ECF
No. 13. Because Plaintiff does not oppose the request for judicial notice and the publicly
filed state court pleadings are documents properly subject to such notice, the Court takes
judicial notice of the existence of the state court complaints. See Harris v. County of
Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012).
2 Page numbers reflect CM/ECF pagination.
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A party may move for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (“Rule”)3 12(c) “after pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial.”
Fed. R. Civ. P 12(c). When considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court
“must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party.” Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir.
2009) (quoting Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2004)). The movant is
entitled to judgment only where it has been “clearly established on the face of the pleadings
that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard
Feiner and Co, Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989). The “analysis under Rule 12(c)
is ‘substantially identical’ to analysis under Rule 12(b)(6) because, under both rules, ‘a
court must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint, taken as true, entitle the
plaintiff to a legal remedy.’” Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Brooks v. Dunlop Mfg. Inc., No. C 10-04341, WL 6140912 at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec.
9, 2011)).
When the parties dispute the timeliness of a plaintiff’s claims, a claim should not be
dismissed under Rule 12 on the ground that it is barred by the applicable statute of
limitations “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that
would establish the timeliness of the claim.” Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at
Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 969 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. U.S., 68
F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir.1995)).
Courts have discretion in appropriate cases to grant a Rule 12(c) motion with leave
to amend, or to simply grant dismissal of the action instead of entry of judgment. See
Special Dist. Risk Mgmt. Auth. v. Munich Reinsurance Am., Inc., 562 F. Supp. 3d 989, 994
(E.D. Cal. 2021); Lonberg v. City of Riverside, 300 F. Supp. 2d 942, 945 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
3 “Rule” or “Rules” refer to the Feral Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.
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Dismissal without leave to amend is appropriate only when the Court is satisfied that an
amendment could not cure the deficiency. Harris v. Cnty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1135
(9th Cir. 2012).
DISCUSSION
FCA first argues that Plaintiffs’ Song-Beverly Act claims are time-barred under
California Code of Civil Procedure § 871.29 et seq., which was enacted on January 1, 2025,
and imposes a six-year time limitation on certain Song-Beverly claims. ECF No. 12-1, at
10. FCA also asserts the following statute of limitations arguments, arguing that (1)
Plaintiff’s express warranty Song-Beverly claims are barred by the four-year statute of
limitations outlined in California Commerce Code § 2725; (2) Plaintiff’s breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability claim is barred by the one-year statute of limitations
in California Civil Code § 1791.1(c); and (3) Plaintiff’s fraudulent inducement by
concealment claim is barred by the three-year statute of limitations under California Code
of Civil Procedure § 338(d). Id.
In addition to its timeliness arguments, FCA alleges that Plaintiff’s fraud claim is
insufficiently pled and is barred by the economic loss doctrine. ECF No. 12-1, at 20-25.
I. Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly Claims Are Not Clearly Barred by § 871.21
FCA first argues that Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly causes of action—claims one through
four—are barred by the six-year outer time limit codified in California Civil Procedure
Code § 871.21.
//
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A. Section 871.21 – Six-Year Bar
California Code of Civil Procedure § 871.21, which FCA argues is a statute of
repose, went into effect on January 1, 2025. The statute reads: “[A]n action covered
by Section 871.20 shall not be brought later than six years after the date of original delivery
of the motor vehicle.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 871.21(b). The statute goes on to state that
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the six-year time period “shall be tolled as follows”: (1) as provided by the tolling
requirements prescribed in California Civil Corde 1793.22(c), which relates to third party
dispute resolution; (2) for the time a vehicle “is out of service by reason of repair for any
nonconformity”; and (3) for the time after a pre-suit notice is provided to the manufacturer.
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code. § 871.21(c)(1)-(3).
Defendant argues that § 871.21 is a statute of repose. “Statutes of repose effect a
legislative judgment that a defendant should be free from liability after the legislatively
determined period of time.” PGA W. Residential Assn., Inc. v. Hulven Internat., Inc., 14
Cal. App. 5th 156, 176 (2017), as modified (Aug. 23, 2017) (quoting CTS Corp. v.
Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 8 (2014)). A statute of repose is, therefore, “harsher than a statute
of limitations in that it cuts off a right of action after a specified period of time, irrespective
of accrual or even notice that a legal right has been invaded.” Id. (quoting McCann v. Foster
Wheeler LLC, 48 Cal. 4th 68, 78 n.2 (2010)); see also Inco Dev. Corp. v. Superior Ct., 131
Cal. App. 4th 1014, 1020 (2005) (“A statute of repose has nothing to do with the date of
injury, but bars all suits after the expiration of a specified time from the manufacture or
delivery of a product.”). Further, unlike statutes of limitations, “substantive statutes of
repose are generally not subject to statutory equitable tolling.” PGA W. Residential Assn.,
Inc., 14 Cal. App. at 221. At this juncture, the Court need not and does not decide whether
§ 871.21 is a statute of repose or whether the six-year bar outlined therein is subject to
statutory or equitable tolling.
B. Applicability of the Six-Year Bar to Plaintiffs’ Claims
The parties make several arguments regarding the applicability of the six-year time
bar outlined in § 871.21 to Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly claims.
FCA argues that the application of the statute is simple: Section 871.21 holds that
an action for restitution or replacement of a vehicle shall not be brought later than six years
after the original delivery date of the vehicle. See ECF No. 12, at 13-14; Cal Code Civ.
Proc. § 871.21. The statute went into effect January 1, 2025. Cal Code Civ. Proc. § 871.21.
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Plaintiff filed this complaint—which seeks restitution for a vehicle purchased on February
18, 2017—on January 30, 2025. ECF No. 1-2, at 2. Thus, FCA argues, § 871.21 applies to
Plaintiff’s complaint, and Plaintiffs’ claims—brought eight years after original delivery of
the vehicle—are barred. ECF No. 12-1, at 13-14.
Plaintiff argues that, per the statutory language, the six-year time restraint would not
apply to Plaintiff’s third and fourth causes of action. Id. at 11-12. Further, Plaintiff argues
that Song-Beverly Act claims filed prior to July 1, 2025, are unaffected by § 871.21, as
applying the statute to such claims would amount to a retroactive application of the law.
Id. at 12-14.
1. All of Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly Claims Are Contemplated by § 871.21
Plaintiff argues that the six-year time bar outlined in § 871.21 cannot apply to her
third or fourth causes of action, because Plaintiff brings those causes of action under
statutes not identified in § 870.20. The Court disagrees.
Section 871.21 applies only to actions “covered by Section 871.20.” Cal. Code Civ.
Proc. § 871.21(a). Section 871.20 specifies that it applies to “[a]ctions . . . seeking
restitution or replacement of a motor vehicle pursuant to . . . Section 1794 of the Civil
Code.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 871.20(a).
While Plaintiffs third and fourth causes of actions allege violations of Civil Code
§ 1739.2(a)(3) and § 1792, respectively, see ECF No. 1-2, ¶¶ 53-57, in both causes of
action, Plaintiff asserts that she “brings this cause of action pursuant to Civil Code section
1794.” Id. ¶¶ 51, 57.
Section 871.20 specifically applies to actions seeking restitution or replacement of a
vehicle—which Plaintiff does—brought pursuant to the Civil Code § 1794. Cal. Code Civ.
Proc. § 871.20(a). Thus, Plaintiffs’ attempt to parse these causes of actions as independent
from those contemplated by § 871.20(a) is unavailing.
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However, that all of Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly claims are the types of claims
contemplated by § 871.20(a) is not dispositive of the issue of whether they are barred by
the six-year limitation in § 871.21.
2. Sections 871.20, 871.29, and 871.30 – Manufacturer Election
Plaintiff argues Defendant’s ability to invoke § 871.21’s six-year time-bar is
“contingent on whether it opted into” statutory coverage. ECF No. 18, at 12. The Court
will first analyze the statutory framework governing such manufacturer election. It will
then assess whether the pleadings demonstrate that FCA has made such an election.
a. Section 871.20
Section 871.21 specifically applies only to actions covered by § 871.20. Section
871.20(a) reads:
Notwithstanding any other law, this chapter applies to an action,
brought against a manufacturer who has elected under Section
871.29 to proceed under this chapter, seeking restitution or
replacement of a motor vehicle pursuant to subdivision (b) or (d)
of Section 1793.2, Section 1793.22, or Section 1794 of the Civil
Code, or for civil penalties pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section
1794 of the Civil Code, where the request for restitution or
replacement is based on noncompliance with the applicable
express warranty.
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 871.20(a) (emphasis added).
This section specifically notes that the Chapter—namely, Chapter 12 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure, Actions for Restitution for or Replacement of Certain
Motor Vehicles, hereinafter “the Chapter”—applies to certain claims seeking restitution or
replacement of a motor vehicle brought under the Song-Beverly Act, Cal. Civ. Code
§§ 1790 et seq. Section 871.20 further provides that the Chapter applies only to actions
brought against a manufacturer “who has elected under Section 871.29 to proceed under
this chapter[.]” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 871.20(a).
b. Sections 871.29-30
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Section 871.29(c), effective as of April 2, 2025, states that §§ 871.20 through 871.28
shall not apply to actions described in § 871.20 unless a manufacturer elects to be governed
by these statutes. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 871.29(c).
As applied to sales made before the statutes went into effect, § 871.30 states that “a
manufacturer may elect to be governed by this chapter for all actions described in . . .
Section 871.20 with respect to all of its motor vehicles sold in the year 2025 and in all prior
years by providing written notice . . . to the Arbitration Certification Program.” Cal. Code
Civ. Proc. § 871.30(a). Of relevance in this case, the statute continues:
Unless a manufacturer has made the election described in
subdivision (a), Sections 871.20 to 871.28, inclusive, shall not
apply to an action described in subdivision (a) of Section 871.20,
including actions already filed between January 1, 2025 and the
effective date of the act adding this section, with respect to all of
its vehicles sold new in the year 2025 and in all prior years.
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 871.30(c) (emphasis added).
i. It Is Not Clear on the Face of the Complaint that FCA Timely
Elected to Proceed under the Chapter
The parties argue at length regarding whether the applicability of § 871.20 to
Plaintiffs’ claims would constitute a retroactive or prospective application. See ECF No.
18, at 11-14l ECF No. 21, at 7-9. At this time, the Court need not resolve the limits of
§ 871.20’s applicability, because even if § 871.21 might apply to Plaintiff’s claims, the
complaint does not reveal that FCA timely elected to be governed by the statute.
Section 871.30(a) asserts that a manufacturer “may elect” to be governed by the
Chapter “with respect to all of its motor vehicles sold in the year 2025 and in all prior
years.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 871.30(a). The statute goes on to clarify that, if a
manufacturer did not elect to be covered by the Chapter by May 2, 2025, sections 871.20
through 871.28 would not apply to an action for restitution or reimbursement for a vehicle
“filed between January 1, 2025 and [April 2, 2025], with respect to all of its vehicles sold
new in the year 2025 and in all prior years.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 871.30(c).
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Thus, even if the Court found § 871.21 applies to Plaintiff’s claims, the statute’s
impact on Plaintiff’s claims is not automatic. Indeed, the six-year limitation of § 871.21
would only apply to Plaintiff’s complaint—which was “already filed between January 1,
2025 and [April 2, 2025]” and applies to a vehicle purchased prior to 2025, Cal. Code Civ.
Proc. § 871.30(c)—if FCA elected via written notice to proceed under the Chapter by May
2, 2025.
It is not plain on the face of the complaint whether FCA timely elected to proceed
under the Chapter. Thus, there exists a set of facts where Plaintiff’s claims are not subject
to the six-year bar outlined in § 871.21. Accordingly, dismissal on the grounds that
Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred under § 871.21 is unwarranted.
3. Plaintiff’s Claims May Be Tolled Under § 871.20
Even applying § 871.21 to Plaintiff’s claims, Plaintiff’s claims are still not clearly
barred.
As noted above, the parties dispute the applicability of equitable tolling doctrines to
the six-year period outlined in § 871.21. ECF No. 18, at 14; ECF No. 21, at 10-11.
However, at minimum, § 871.21 is subject to the tolling provisions enumerated within the
statute itself, including tolling “[f]or the time the motor vehicle is out of service by reason
of repair for any nonconformity.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 871.21(c)(2).
Plaintiff has alleged that she sought multiple services and repairs of her vehicle. See,
e.g., ECF No. 1-2, ¶ 37 (“[T]he Vehicle continued to exhibit symptoms of defects following
FCA’s unsuccessful attempts to repair them”); Id. ¶ 40 (“FCA and its representatives . . .
have been unable to service or repair the Vehicle to conform to the applicable express
warranties after a reasonable number of repair opportunities.”). Thus, the complaint
indicates that there were periods of time during which the vehicle was out of service by
reason of repair for a nonconformity, thereby tolling the six-year period.
While it seems unlikely that the vehicle would have been “out of service by reason
of repair” for two years—the amount of time necessary to bring Plaintiff’s claim within the
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six-year period prescribed by § 871.21—it is not impossible. Given Plaintiff’s allegations,
the court cannot say that there is no set of facts which would render Plaintiff’s claims
timely. See Von Saher, 592 F. 3d at 969.
Accordingly, the Court will not dismiss Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly claims—claims
one through four—on the grounds that they are barred by the six-year period outlined in
California Code of Civil Procedure § 871.21.
II. Timeliness of Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly Act Claims – Claims I-IV
In addition to arguing that Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly claims are barred under § 871.21,
FCA also alleges that Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly claims are barred by the applicable statutes
of limitations. Federal courts sitting in diversity apply state statutes of limitations,
including tolling rules, see Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110
(1945), but federal pleading standards, see Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097,
1102–03 (9th Cir. 2003).
The Court remains mindful of the fact that, when a defendant seeks Rule 12 dismissal
on the grounds that a claim is time-barred, a court should do so only when there is no set
of facts that would establish the timeliness of plaintiff’s complaint. Von Saher, 592 F. 3d
at 969.
A. Statute of Limitations
Plaintiff’s claims under the Song-Beverly Act allege violations of the Act’s express
warranty provisions—claims one through three—and the implied warranty of
merchantability—claim four. “The Song–Beverly Act does not include its own statute of
limitations.” Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc., 174 Cal. App. 4th 1297, 1305–06 (2009).
“Accordingly, ‘California courts have held that the statute of limitations for an action for
breach of warranty under the Song-Beverly Act is governed by . . . section 2725 of the
Uniform Commercial Code.’” Dale, 2025 WL 2912627, at *2 (quoting Mexia, 174 Cal.
App. 4th at 1306). Thus, Song-Beverly claims “are subject to a four-year statute of
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limitations period that commences when the action accrues.” Schick v. BMW of N. Am.,
LLC, 801 F. App'x 519, 520 (9th Cir. 2020).
1. Express Warranty Claims – Claims I-III
FCA argues that Plaintiff’s express warranty claims are untimely because they were
made more than four years after delivery of the vehicle. ECF No. 12-1, at 15-17.
Generally, a cause of action for breach of a contract for sale “accrues when the
breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party’s lack of knowledge of the breach. A
breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made[.]” Cal. Com. Code. § 2725(2).
However, an exception provides that, “where a warranty explicitly extends to future
performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such
performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been
discovered.” Id.
The warranties at issue here provide for repair of Plaintiff’s vehicle for five years
after delivery. See ECF No 1-2, at 18; ECF No. 12, at 16. California courts have held that
“[a] promise to repair defects that occur during a future period is the very definition of
express warranty of future performance” under both the Song-Beverly Act and the
California Uniform Commercial Code. Krieger v. Nick Alexander Imports, Inc., 234 Cal.
App. 3d 205, 217 (1991)4; see also Paplekaj v. FCA US, LLC, No. 24-CV-1717-MMA-
VET, 2025 WL 863472, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2025).
4 FCA argues that Plaintiff misreads Krieger by stating that the warranty at issue here—
which provides for “cost of all parts and labor needed to repair a powertrain [i.e. engine]
component . . . that is defective in workmanship and materials” for a period of five years
or 60,000 miles, ECF No. 102, at 25—is a warranty of future performance. The Court
disagrees. In Krieger, the defendant specifically argued, as FCA does here, that “it did not
promise that its automobiles would perform satisfactorily during the warranty period.
Instead, it claims that it only promised to repair any defects which occurred.” 234 Cal. App.
3d, at 217. The Court responded as follows:
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Plaintiff took delivery of the vehicle on February 18, 2017. ECF No. 1-2, ¶ 7. As
such, Plaintiff’s cause of action under the Song-Beverly Act for violation of the express
warranty accrued no later than February 18, 2022, the last day of the applicable warranty.
See Ngo v. BMW of N. Am. LLC, No. CV 20-06197-MWF (GJSX), 2025 WL 819568, at*5
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2025) (quoting 2 The Law of Product Warranties § 11:4 (2024))
(“Where an express warranty guarantees performance for a defined term . . . ‘the four-year
clock begins to tick when the breach is discovered or should have been discovered, or when
the explicit time period expires, whichever occurs first.’”). Thus, February 18, 2022, is the
latest that the four-year Song-Beverly statute of limitations began to run, subsequently
expiring no later than February 18, 2026. See, e.g., Flat v. Ford Motor Co., 678 F. Supp.
3d 1138, 1140 (N.D. Cal. 2023); Yetter v. Ford Motor Co., No. 19-CV-00877-LHK, 2019
WL 3254249, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2019). Because Plaintiff filed this complaint within
that window, her express warranty causes of action are not time-barred on their face.
a. Delayed Discovery Tolling
A promise to repair defects that occur during a future period is
the very definition of express warranty of future
performance, not only under the [Song-Beverly] Act (Civ.Code,
§ 1791.2), but also in the California Uniform Commercial Code
section 2313. Civil Code section 1791.2 defines an express
warranty under the [Song-Beverly] Act to include “[a] written
statement arising out of a sale to the consumer of a consumer
good pursuant to which the manufacturer, distributor, or retailer
undertakes to preserve or maintain the utility or performance of
the consumer good or provide compensation if there is a failure
in the utility or performance[.]” The promise to repair in this case
is plainly within this definition.
Thus, a plain reading of Krieger leads the Court to find that the warranty at issue here is an
express warranty of future performance.
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Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to invoke the “discovery
rule” and toll the accrual of her claims past tender of delivery. ECF No. 12-1. Defendant is
correct that, “[g]enerally, to invoke [the delayed discovery exception] to the statute of
limitations, the plaintiff must specifically plead facts which show (1) the time and manner
of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable
diligence.” Yumul v. Smart Balance, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1141 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
However, such a pleading standard is only required “when the ‘complaint shows on its face
that [the] claim would be barred without the benefit of the discovery rule.’” Balanzar v.
Fid. Brokerage Servs., LLC, 654 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1083 n.4 (S.D. Cal. 2023) (quoting
Harrison v. Great HealthWorks, Inc., 2017 WL 2554448, at *3 (S.D. Cal. June 13, 2017)).
Here, the face of the complaint shows that Plaintiff’s claim may have accrued as late as
February 18, 2022, thereby triggering the four-year statute of limitations. Thus, the express
warranty claims—claims one through three—are not untimely on their face. But see
Paplekaj, 2025 WL 863472, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2025) (requiring Plaintiff to satisfy
requirements of “discovery rule” to take advantage of later date of accrual based on an
express warranty for future performance).
Plaintiff’s complaint could certainly be more precise about exactly how and when
Plaintiff discovered the defect and what the symptoms of the defect were. Indeed, Plaintiff
does not allege any dates other than the date of sale. Down the line, Plaintiff will be
required to provide additional evidence in support of the timeliness of her claims. However,
at this point, Plaintiff’s express warranty claims are not clearly barred by the statute of
limitations and will not be dismissed as such. See Von Saher, 592 F. 3d at 969.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES FCA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to
Plaintiff’s express warranty claims—claims one through three.
2. Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability – Claim IV
FCA argues that Plaintiff’s claim for breach of implied warranty of merchantability
is untimely because Plaintiff brought her claim more than one year after purchase. ECF
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No. 12-1, at 17 (citing Civil Code § 1791.1(c)). Plaintiff argues that the statute of
limitations did not begin to run until she discovered the defect. ECF No. 18, at 18.
A cause of action for a breach of implied warranty accrues when the breach occurs.
Cal. Com. Code. § 2725(2). “Typically, a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability
occurs at the date of sale,” Flat, 678 F. Supp. 3d at 1141, and implied warranty claims must
be brought within four years of the date when the breach occurred, Clenney v. FCA US
LLC, No. 22-CV-00547-VC, 2022 WL 2197074 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2022) (citing Cal.
Com. Code § 2725(1)). However, the Song-Beverly Act provides that—when accompanied
by an express warranty of future performance spanning one year or longer—the duration
of the implied warranty of merchantability may extend to a period of not more than one
year after purchase. Cal. Civ. Code § 1791.1(c); See also Flat, 678 F. Supp. 3d at 1141.
This provision has been held to extend an implied warranty to future performance, such
that “the implied warranty of merchantability may be breached by a latent defect
undiscoverable at time of sale.” Mexia, 174 Cal. App. 4th at 1308. While such breach must
occur within the one-year time limit set forth in § 1791.1(c), it need not be discovered or
reported within such a period. Flat, 678 F. Supp. 3d at 1141; Mexia, 174 Cal. App 4th at
1297 (noting that while the duration provision of § 1791.1(c) provides that an implied
warranty of merchantability may not extend longer than one year, “[t]here is nothing that
suggests a requirement that the purchaser discover and report to the seller a latent defect
within that time period.”). “In the case of a latent defect . . . the warranty of merchantability
is breached, by the existence of the unseen defect, not by its subsequent discovery.” Mexia,
174 Cal. App. 4th at 1305.
Here, the express warranty was five years, so the implied warranty was extended to
its outer limit of one year per § 1791.1(c). See Flat, 678 F. Supp. 3d at 1141. Thus, any
breach of the warranty must have occurred on or before February 18, 2018—whether
Plaintiff discovered the breach during that period or after—and the four-year statute of
limitations period on the implied warranty claim expired no later than February 18, 2022.
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See id. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim for the breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability is untimely on its face.
a. Delayed Discovery Tolling
Plaintiff argues that the discovery rule applies to her implied warranty claim, such
that the statute of limitations began to run at her discovery of the breach, not at tender nor
at some other point within durational limit of § 1791.1(c). ECF No. 18, at 18-21. Courts in
California “are split on whether the delayed discovery rule applies to implied warranty
claims.” Flat, 174 Cal. App. 4th at 1141. Compare Clenney v. FCA US LLC, No. 22-CV-
00547-VC, 2022 WL 2197074, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2022) (“[T]he statute of
limitations for implied warranty claims does not run at tender. It runs at
discovery.”), with Covarrubias v. Ford Motor Co., No. 19-CV-01832-EMC, 2019 WL
2866046, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 3, 2019) (concluding the delayed discovery rule is
inapplicable to implied warranty claims). See also Paplekaj, 2025 WL 863472, at *5 n.10
(discussing split and comparing California state court cases); Cavale v. Ford Motor Co.,
No. 18-CV-00680-LJO-BAM, 2018 WL 3811727, at *3 n.5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2018)
(discussing split and comparing California federal court cases).
Assuming without deciding that the delayed discovery rule applies to Plaintiff’s
implied warranty claim, Plaintiff has failed to properly invoke the rule. “For the discovery
rule to apply, the plaintiff ‘must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner
of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable
diligence.’” Flat, 678 F. Supp. 3d at 1140 (quoting Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 35
Cal. 4th 797, 807 (2005)). Here, Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of factual allegations
indicating the time or manner of discovery of the engine defect, other than asserting that
Plaintiff discovered FCA’s wrongdoing “shortly before” filing this complaint. ECF No. 1-
2, ¶ 37. The complaint also does not plead facts showing that Plaintiff exercised due
diligence in discovering the defect and was not negligent in failing to discover it sooner.
See generally ECF No. 1-2. Thus, Plaintiff is unable to invoke the discovery rule, and her
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claim is untimely on its face. Plaintiff’s cause of action for breach of the implied warranty
of merchantability is DISMISSED without prejudice and with leave to amend.
Though the claim is dismissed on timeliness grounds, the Court notes that FCA—
relying on Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 695 (1954)—also argues that
Plaintiff’s implied warranty claim fails because there is no privity of contract between
Plaintiff and FCA. ECF No. 12-1, at 17. This argument has been regularly rejected by
California federal courts as applied to Song-Beverly claims. See, e.g., Pirtle v. FCA US,
LLC, No. 2:25-CV-03257-JAK (MARX), 2025 WL 4058236 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2025);
Dale v. FCA US, LLC, No. 2:25-CV-00868 WBS JDP, 2025 WL 2912627 (E.D. Cal. Oct.
14, 2025); Ehrlich v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 801 F. Supp. 2d 908, 921 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
This Court joins others in finding that the privity requirement FCA invokes in citing Burr
applies to a provision of California’s Civil Code not at issue here. See Dale, 2025 WL
2912627, at *4; Pirtle, 2025 WL 4058236, at *7. Further, the plain language of the Song-
Beverly Act does not impose a vertical privity requirement. Id. The weight of authority
finds that “[t]he privity requirement is not required for an implied warranty of
merchantability claim brought under California's Song–Beverly Act.” Allen v. Similasan
Corp., 96 F. Supp. 3d 1063 (S.D. Cal. 2015). Thus, FCA’s privity argument is
unpersuasive.
III. Fraudulent Inducement by Concealment – Claim VI
FCA asserts that Plaintiff’s fraud claim is both untimely and inadequately pled. ECF
No. 12-1, at 18-25. The Court agrees.
A. Statute of Limitations
FCA argues that Plaintiff’s fraud claim is barred by the three-year statute of
limitations of California Code of Civil Procedure § 338(d). ECF No. 12, at 9. Plaintiff
counters that the fraud statute of limitations did not begin to run until Plaintiff discovered
the facts constituting fraud. ECF No. 18, at 21.
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The statute of limitations for fraud is three years. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 338(d). See
also Kline v. Turner, 87 Cal. App. 4th 1369, 1373 (2001) (“An action for relief on the
grounds of fraud or mistake must be commenced within three years.”). In California, “[t]he
discovery rule is applied to fraud actions by statute.” Cansino v. Bank of America, 224 Cal.
App. 4th 1462, 1472 (2014) (citing Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 338(d)). Thus, a fraud cause of
action “is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the
facts constituting the fraud or mistake.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 338(d). “The courts interpret
discovery in this context to mean not when the plaintiff became aware of the specific wrong
alleged, but when the plaintiff suspected or should have suspected that an injury was caused
by wrongdoing. The statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff has information
which would put a reasonable person on inquiry. Wrong and wrongdoing in this context
are understood in their lay and not legal senses.” Kline v. Turner (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th
1369, 1374 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, if an action is brought more than three years after the commission of a
fraud, a plaintiff must plead (1) that she did not make the discovery until within three years
prior to the filing of the complaint, (2) that she was not negligent in failing to discover the
fraud sooner, and (3) facts showing the time and surrounding circumstances of the
discovery and what the discovery was. Cansino, 224 Cal. App. 4th at 1472; see also Hobart
v. Hobart Est. Co., 26 Cal. 2d 412, 437 (1945) (“[A] plaintiff must affirmatively excuse
her failure to discover the fraud within three years after it took place, by establishing facts
showing that he was not negligent in failing to make the discovery sooner and that he had
no actual or presumptive knowledge of facts sufficient to put him on inquiry”).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that FCA’s fraud occurred at the time of sale, which is more
than three years before Plaintiff filed this complaint. See ECF No. 1-2, ¶ 64. Thus, the cause
of action is untimely on the face of the complaint and, for Plaintiff’s claim to survive, some
tolling doctrine must apply. See, e.g., Perez v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 19-cv-00038, 2019
WL 3766613, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2019) (concluding that the running of the statute
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was “apparent on the face of the complaint” where the plaintiff alleged fraud at the time of
purchase but filed a complaint more than three years later); Yetter v. Ford Motor Co., 428
F. Supp. 3d 210, 221 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (noting that the fraud claim “appear[ed] to have
expired” three years after the vehicle's purchase).
1. Delayed Discovery Tolling
Plaintiff alleges that delayed discovery tolling applies to her fraud claim. ECF No.
18, at 22. However, as discussed above, Plaintiff does not provide any facts relating to the
time or surrounding circumstances of her discovery of the defect or FCA’s alleged fraud.
She alleges only that she discovered FCA’s wrongdoing “shortly before” filing this
complaint. ECF No. 1-2, ¶ 37. She also does not plead any facts demonstrating that she
exercised due diligence in uncovering the alleged defect and fraud such that she was not
negligent in failing to discover it earlier. As with her implied warranty claim, Plaintiff has
failed to plead facts sufficient to invoke the delayed discovery rule. The majority of
California federal courts to consider nearly identical complaints have also found such
allegations insufficient to toll the fraud statute of limitations. See Pirtle v. FCA US, LLC,
No. 2:25-CV-03257-JAK (MARX), 2025 WL 4058236, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2025);
Irish v. FCA US, LLC, No. 5:24-CV-02726-AB-DTB, 2026 WL 252490, at *4 (C.D. Cal.
Jan. 16, 2026); Vanella v. Ford Motor Co., No. 3:19-CV-07956-WHO, 2020 WL 887975,
at *4-*5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2020); Sarkesian v. Ford Motor Co., No. 22-CV-00966-AJB-
MDD, 2022 WL 20033381, at *3-*4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2022); Morse v. Ford Motor Co.,
No. 22-CV-03041-SSS-JCX, 2023 WL 3150097, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2023); Yetter,
428 F. Supp. 3d at 222-25. But see Dale, 2025 WL 2912627, at *2; Meneses, 2025 WL
2994998, at *2.
2. Class Action Tolling
Plaintiff next alleges that, pursuant to American Pipe Construction Co. v. Utah, 414
U.S. 538 (1974), class-action tolling applies to her fraud claim. ECF No. 18, at 22-23.
However, Plaintiff pled such tolling without identifying what action allegedly tolls her
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claim. See, e.g., ECF No. 1-2, ¶ 36 (“[T]he limitation periods have been tolled by . . . class
action tolling.”). In her opposition, Plaintiff identifies the class action allegedly meriting
tolling as Maugain v. FCA, Case No. 1:22-cv-00116 (D. Del.), filed Jan. 28, 2022. ECF
No. 18, at 23-24. To the extent Plaintiff relies on this case to toll her fraud claim, the Court
notes that Maugain was filed more than three years after the fraud allegedly occurred.
Further, California federal courts have held that, “under controlling Ninth Circuit
precedent, California has not recognized ‘cross-jurisdictional’ American Pipe tolling.”
Yetter, 428 F. Supp. 3d at 225 (quoting Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017
(9th Cir. 2008)). Thus, class-action tolling also fails to preserve Plaintiff’s fraud claim.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s fraud claim is barred by the statute of limitations and is
DISMISSED without prejudice and with leave to amend.
//
//
B. Plaintiff’s Fraud Claim Is Insufficiently Pled
While the Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s fraudulent inducement by concealment
claim on timeliness grounds alone, the Court also notes that Plaintiff’s fraud allegations
fail to satisfy the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b). ECF No. 12-1, at 20-22.
In California, the elements of fraud are “(1) misrepresentation (false representation,
concealment, or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity (or scienter); (3) intent to defraud,
i.e., to induce reliance; (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage.” Robinson
Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp., 34 Cal. 4th 979, 990 (2004).
When alleging fraud, a plaintiff must meet the higher pleading standard of Rule 9(b),
which requires that a party “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or
mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). “The ‘circumstances’ required by Rule 9(b) are the ‘who,
what, when, where, and how;’ of the fraudulent activity.” Rahimian v. FCA US, LLC, No.
5:24-CV-02406-SSS-SSCX, 2025 WL 3718393, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2025) (quoting
Vess v. Ciba–Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003)). While claims
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involving fraudulent concealment typically do not require the same level of specificity as,
for example, a fraudulent misrepresentation claim, Plaintiff must still plead fraudulent
concealment with particularity to the extent that the facts are available to
him. See Epperson v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 706 F. Supp. 3d 1031, 1039 (S.D. Cal. 2023). For
example, a plaintiff should plead the content of the omission and where it should or could
have been revealed. See Tappana v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 609 F. Supp. 3d 1078, 1088
(C.D. Cal. 2022).
Here, Plaintiff’s allegations do not meet this bar. Plaintiff does not allege the specific
issues she experienced with her vehicle. She vaguely alleges that “nonconformities”
manifested “including but not limited to, engine defects, transmission defects, electrical
defects, among other defects and non-conformities.” ECF No. 1-2, ¶ 12. Plaintiff further
alleges that the purported defect had the potential to “suddenly affect the driver’s ability to
control the vehicle or cause a non-collision vehicle fire,” id. ¶ 17, but does not indicate
which symptoms Plaintiff’s vehicle actually displayed. See, e.g., Clark v. Am. Honda
Motor Co., Inc., 528 F. Supp. 3d 1108, 1115 (C.D. Cal. 2021) (“[D]istrict courts in the
Ninth Circuit have often held that a complaint provides fair notice of the defect if it (1)
identifies the particular part or system affected by the defect, and (2) describes the problems
allegedly caused by the defect.”). Additionally, Plaintiff does not state when she
experienced issues with her vehicle, instead vaguely alleging that nonconformities
manifested “within the applicable express warranty period.” Id. ¶ 12.
Further, Plaintiff has not alleged facts describing when or where FCA made
representations to induce purchase or conceal the defect. Plaintiff generally alleges that she
“interacted with FCA’s sales representatives,” “reviewed materials disseminated by FCA,”
and “considered FCA’s advertisement” materials. ECF No. 1-2, at ¶ 21, 69. But she does
not say when or where she spoke with representatives or reviewed materials, what the
representatives and materials said, or how Plaintiff relied on such information. See
Meneses, 2025 WL 2994998, at *3.
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Lastly, Plaintiff does not provide any specificity regarding FCA’s knowledge of the
defects. Plaintiff alleges that, upon information and belief, FCA knew of the defect through
pre-production and post-production testing data, early consumer complaints, warranty data,
and repair data. ECF No. 1-2, ¶ 19. However, Plaintiff does not allege what tests FCA
conducted or what they revealed. Further, the Plaintiff does not specify how many
consumer complaints FCA received, when they were received, or their specific content.
California federal courts considering similar allegations have largely found them
insufficient to meet the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b). See, e.g., Meneses, 2025
WL 2994998, at *3-*4 (finding similar allegations failed to satisfy the pleading standards
of Rule 9(b)); Dale, 2025 WL 2912627, at *4-*5 (same); Pirtle, 2025 WL 4058236, *10
(same); Yetter, 428 F. Supp. 3d at 232-35 (same). But see Ladanowsky v. FCA US LLC,
No. 24-CV-07197-JST, 2024 WL 5250357, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2024) (finding that
similarly pled facts sufficiently stated a claim for fraud by omission). This Court finds the
same, further warranting DISMISSAL of Plaintiff’s fraud claim.5
5 Because the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s fraud claim as untimely, it need not address FCA’s
arguments that (1) FCA, as a matter of law, lacked a duty to disclose the alleged omission
to Plaintiff because there was no transactional relationship between them, or (2) that
Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the Economic Loss Doctrine. ECF No. 12-1, at 25-31.
However, the Court notes that multiple California federal courts have considered and
rejected both arguments as applied to similar complaints. See Ladanowsky v. FCA US LLC,
No. 24-CV-07197-JST, 2024 WL 5250357, at *3-*5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2024) (holding
(1) duty to disclose applied to manufacturer defendant and was adequately pled and (2)
economic loss doctrine did not bar plaintiff’s fraudulent concealment claim); Pirtle v. FCA
US, LLC, No. 2:25-CV-03257-JAK (MARX), 2025 WL 4058236, at *10-*13 (C.D. Cal.
Dec. 8, 2025) (both (1) rejecting manufacturer defendant’s argument that it lacked duty to
disclose as a matter of law, but finding that such duty was insufficiently pled, and (2)
finding economic loss doctrine did not bar plaintiff’s fraudulent inducement by
concealment claim); Meneses, 2025 WL 2994998, at *4-*5 (same); Yetter v. Ford Motor
Co., No. 19-CV-00877-LHK, 2019 WL 3254249, at *7 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2019)
(economic loss doctrine did not bar similar fraudulent inducement by concealment claim);
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows:
• The Court DENIES FCA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff’s
express warranty Song-Beverly claims—claims one through three.
• The Court GRANTS FCA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff’s
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability claim—claim four—as barred by
the statute of limitations. The claim is DISMISSED without prejudice and with
leave to amend.
• The Court GRANTS FCA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff’s
fraudulent inducement by concealment claim—claim six—as barred by the statute
of limitations and insufficiently pled under the pleading standards of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 9(b). The claim is DISMISSED without prejudice and with leave
to amend.
If Plaintiff wishes to file an amended complaint, she should do so within twenty
(20) days of this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 19, 2026
Sarkesian v. Ford Motor Co., No. 22-CV-00966-AJB-MDD, 2022 WL 20033381, at *8
(S.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2022) (same).
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