Rivera v. CortiCare Inc. et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
JOENATHAN RIVERA,
Plaintiff,
v.
CORTICARE INC.; and DOES 1 to100,
inclusive,
Defendants.
Case No.: 3:25-cv-01868-RBM-DEB
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S FIRST
AMENDED COMPLAINT
[Doc. 5]
Pending before the Court is Defendant CortiCare, Inc.’s (“Defendant” or the
“Company”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Joenathan Rivera’s (“Plaintiff”) First Amended
Complaint (“Motion to Dismiss”). (Doc. 5.) Along with the Motion to Dismiss, Defendant
filed the Declaration of Krista Dickerson in support of the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5-1
[“Dickerson Decl.”]), Exhibits A–E (Doc. 5-2), and a Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”)
(Doc. 5-3).
The Court finds this matter suitable for determination without oral argument
pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). 	For the reasons discussed below, the Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 5) is GRANTED.
//
//
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I. 	BACKGROUND 1
Plaintiff initiated this action against Defendant, his former employer, in the Superior
Court of California, County of San Diego (“San Diego Superior Court”) asserting various
claims related to employment discrimination, retaliation, and termination. (See generally
Doc. 1-8, First Amended Complaint [“FAC”].)
A. 	Factual Background
Plaintiff, a resident of San Diego, California, “is of Filipino national origin” with an
undisclosed “disability/medical condition.” (Id. ¶¶ 1, 8, 11(a).) 2 Plaintiff claims he suffers
from carpal tunnel and a preexisting back injury. 	(Id. ¶ 12(a).) 	Defendant is Plaintiff’s
former employer with its place of business in San Diego, California. (Id.¶ 2.)
1. 	Discrimination and Retaliation Allegations
From March 2017 until November 2023, Plaintiff was employed at the Company as
a Network Administrator. 	(Id. ¶¶ 8, 12(q).) 	During his employment, Plaintiff was
allegedly subject to harassment, discrimination, and retaliation. 	(Id. ¶¶ 12(b), (i)–(q).)
According to Plaintiff, he suffered adverse employment consequences based on his race
and disability, for which Defendant allegedly failed to provide adequate accommodations.
(Id. ¶¶ 11(a)–(d) (cleaned up).)
In 2018, Plaintiff submitted a request for an ergonomic table after he suffered a back
injury but was told that Defendant did not have a budget for it. 	(Id. ¶¶ 12(a)–(b).)
However, “[t]wo other white employees had ergonomic tables that the [C]ompany
provided.” (Id.)
“In early 2020, at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic,” Defendant allowed
1 The factual summary in this section reflects Plaintiffs’ allegations, not conclusions of
fact or law by this Court. Well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true for purposes
of this Motion. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
2 The Court cites the paragraph numbers of the FAC and the CM/ECF electronic pagination
for other citations unless otherwise noted.
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Plaintiff to work remotely. (Id. ¶ 12(d).) Defendant asked Plaintiff to return to the office
in May 2020, October 2020, and in early 2021. (See id. ¶¶ 12(f)–(h).) Defendant allowed
Plaintiff to continue working remotely, per his request, when he expressed concerns about
Defendant’s non-compliance with COVID-19 ordinances. (Id. ¶¶ 12(f)–(i).)
Shortly after Defendant allowed Plaintiff to continue working remotely in early
2021, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant began eliminating his job responsibilities and
removed his ability to earn commission as well as his department’s paid holidays. 	(Id.
¶ 12(i).) Around this time, Defendant’s CEO, Brad Wescott, allegedly had a conversation
with a newly hired IT administrator about Plaintiff’s job responsibilities and said “he
wanted to ‘break up the Rivera cartel.’” 	(Id. ¶ 12(j).) 	Wescott was referring to Plaintiff
and his brother, Nathaniel Rivera, who was also an employee at the Company. (Id.)
Plaintiff also asserts that he suffered harassment and retaliation based on his
protected complaints about several incidents of harassment by his supervisor at that time.
(Id. ¶¶ 11(c), 12(k)–(l).) 	Among other allegations of misconduct, Plaintiff claims that
Defendant failed to respond to reports of harassment and discrimination when it did not
address his request to be reassigned to a different supervisor. (Id. ¶¶ 12(k)–(m).) In early
2022, Plaintiff began reporting to a new supervisor, Kip Weatherwax, who made several
harassing, embarrassing, and demeaning comments to him. 	(Id. ¶ 12(k).) 	In February
2023, Plaintiff reported several incidents where his supervisor made harassing comments
towards him including an incident where “Weatherwax threatened his job.” (Id. ¶¶ 12(l)–
(m).) 	Plaintiff also requested that he be reassigned to another supervisor but the
Company’s HR Director, Krista Dickerson, did not address his request. (Id. ¶ 12(m).)
On November 29, 2023, Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment. (Id. ¶ 12(q).)
“That same day, the company terminated two other Filipino employees.” 	(Id.) 	Shortly
thereafter, Defendant terminated about 22 employees in the Philippines and no Filipino
employees remained employed at the Company. (Id. ¶ 12(r).)
2. 	The Severance Agreement
On December 24, 2023, Plaintiff executed a Separation and Release Agreement
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(“Severance Agreement”) with Defendant. 	(Id. ¶ 79; Doc. 5-2, Ex. E at 33–41.) 3 The
Severance Agreement contains a comprehensive release provision (“Release”) through
which Plaintiff released Defendant “to the fullest extent permitted by law,” from all claims
of any kind occurring on or before the date of the Severance Agreement’s execution. (Doc.
5-2, Ex. E at 36.) 	Plaintiff also specifically released Defendant from any claims arising
out of or related to Plaintiff’s employment, his termination, and any violations of
employment discrimination laws including:
[T]he California Fair Employment and Housing Act; the Age Discrimination
In Employment Act; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; the Americans
With Disabilities Act; the National Labor Relations Act; the Equal Pay Act;
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974; as well as Claims
arising out of or related to violations of the provisions of the California Labor
Code; 	the 	California 	Government 	Code; 	the 	California 	Business 	&
Professions Code, including Business & Professions Code Section 17200 et
seq.; local, state and federal wage and hour laws, including the federal Fair
Labor Standards Act; breach of contract; fraud; misrepresentation; common
counts; unfair competition; unfair business practices; negligence; defamation;
infliction of emotional distress; invasion of privacy; assault; battery; false
imprisonment; wrongful termination; and any other local, state or federal law,
rule, or regulation.
(Id. at 37.)
Additionally, Plaintiff agreed to waive his rights under California Civil Code § 1542.
(Id.) The Severance Agreement further provides that Plaintiff has five days to “consider
the terms of [the Severance Agreement] and to consult with an attorney.” (Id. at 41.).
Plaintiff 	now 	seeks 	to 	rescind 	the 	Severance 	Agreement 	because 	Defendant
exercised “duress, menace, fraud, and undue influence.” 	(FAC ¶ 80.) 	Specifically,
Plaintiff claims: (1) he was not informed that he had the right to consult an attorney in
connection with the Severance Agreement and was not provided with adequate time to do
so; (2) the Severance Agreement does not contain an explicit exception for claims not
3 As discussed 	infra, the Court considers the Severance Agreement submitted by
Defendant under the incorporation by reference doctrine.
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subject to waiver; (3) the Severance Agreement lacks required disclosures for a reduction
in force or references to an employee’s legal rights; and (4) Defendant “failed to provide
consideration as outlined in the” Severance Agreement. (Id. ¶¶ 79(a)–(d).)
B. 	Procedural History
On May 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed the FAC in San Diego Superior Court asserting nine
causes of action. 	(See FAC.) 	Six of these causes of action are for violations of the Fair
Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov’t Code § 12900 et seq. (“FEHA”). (See id. ¶¶ 18–
63.) 	Plaintiff also asserts causes of action for whistleblower retaliation in violation of
California Labor Code § 1102.5, wrongful termination, and rescission. (Id. ¶¶ 64–80.)
On July 23, 2025, Defendant removed the instant action to this Court based on
diversity jurisdiction. 	(Doc. 1 ¶ 14.) 	Defendant filed the Motion to Dismiss on July 30,
2025. 	(Doc. 5.) 	On August 18, 2025, Plaintiff inadvertently filed his Opposition to the
Motion to Dismiss (“Opposition”) in a related action brought by his brother, Nathaniel
Rivera, that is also pending before this Court. 	See Nathaniel Rivera v. CortiCare, Case
No. 3:25-cv-01875-RBM-DEB (S.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2025), ECF No. 7. 	On August 29,
2025, Defendant filed its Reply (“Reply”). (Doc. 6.)
On December 23, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Relief under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 6(b)(1)(B) (“Rule 6 Motion”) requesting leave to file his
Opposition out of time. (Doc. 7.) Because the Opposition is captioned for this action and
addresses Plaintiff’s claims separate from that of his brother’s, the Court will consider the
Opposition in resolving the instant Motion to Dismiss in the interest of justice. Plaintiff’s
Rule 6 Motion (Doc. 7) is therefore DENIED AS MOOT.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” For purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
the Court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the
pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). An action may be dismissed for
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failure to state “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 	“A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but
it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully. Id.
III. 	REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
“Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), and the incorporation-by-reference
doctrine,” Defendant requests that the Court judicially notice the Severance Agreement
(Doc. 5-2, Ex. E at 33–41), which Plaintiff executed on December 4, 2023. (RJN [Doc. 5-
3] at 2.) 4 Plaintiff does not oppose Defendant’s RJN or otherwise contest the Severance
Agreement’s authenticity.
As a general rule, a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings
in ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250
F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). 	Courts “may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to
reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial
jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned.” 	Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). 	Under the incorporation by
reference doctrine, courts may also consider “documents whose contents are alleged in a
complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached
to the pleading” without converting a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) into a motion
for summary judgment. Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on
other grounds by Galbraith v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002). “[T]he
4 Defendant attached four additional exhibits, Exhibits A–D (Doc. 5-2 at 1–32), to the
Dickerson Declaration. (See Doc. 5-1 ¶¶ 3–5.) However, Defendant did not request that
the Court take judicial notice of such documents. 	The Court therefore does not consider
Exhibits A–D in reaching its decision.
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district court may treat such a document as part of the complaint, and thus may assume that
its contents are true for purposes of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” 	United
States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003).
“A well-established application of [the incorporation by reference] doctrine is a
settlement agreement that, if valid, would bar claims alleged by the plaintiff in his or her
complaint.” 	Advanced Cleanup Techs., Inc. v. BP Am. Inc., Case No. 2:14-cv-09033-
CAS(AJWx), 2015 WL 13841820, at *2 n. 2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2015) (citing cases); see
Bamforth v. Facebook, Inc., Case No. 20-cv-09483-DMR, 2021 WL 4133753, at *10 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 10, 2021) (“Courts have held that release agreements that may bar a plaintiff’s
claims can be considered under the incorporation by reference doctrine.”).
Although Plaintiff did not attach the Severance Agreement, his Ninth Cause of
Action seeks its rescission. 	(See FAC ¶¶ 78–80.) 	Plaintiff disputes the Severance
Agreement’s validity but admits that he signed it. 	(FAC ¶ 79.) 	See Advanced Cleanup
Techs., Inc. 2015 WL 13841820, at *2 n. 2 (“[W]here a plaintiff admits that it signed a
release of claims, courts have incorporated the release agreement even where the plaintiff
disputes whether the agreement is enforceable.”) (citing Birdsong v. AT & T Corp., No.
C12–6175 TEH, 2013 WL 1120783, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2013)). The Release (see
Doc. 5-2, Ex. E at 36–37) is “clearly an integral part of Plaintiff’s allegations because he
has no valid claim if the Release is found to be valid.” 	See Young v. AmeriGas Propane,
Inc., No. 14–cv–00583–BAS(RBB), 2014 WL 5092878, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2014).
Accordingly, the Court considers the Severance Agreement (Doc. 5-2, Ex. E at 33–
41) under the incorporation by reference doctrine. Defendant’s RJN (Doc. 5-3) is therefore
DENIED AS MOOT. See Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1998).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s rescission claim fails as a matter of law because it
is not a remedy and “is otherwise insufficiently pled as a remedy.” (Doc. 5 at 9.) Defendant
further argues that the Severance Agreement bars Plaintiff’s remaining causes of action
because they “all arise from his employment with and termination of that employment from
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Defendant, and are within the scope of the Agreement he executed.” (Id. at 14.) Plaintiff
opposes, arguing “[t]he FAC provides a factual basis to support a finding that Plaintiff’s
consent was obtained through ‘duress, menace, fraud, and undue influence.’” (Doc. 7 at 3
(citing Cal. Civ. Code § 1689(b)(1); and FAC ¶¶ 79–80).)
For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible basis for rescission
of the Severance Agreement. 	The Court also finds the Severance Agreement bars
Plaintiff’s remaining claims.
A. 	Rescission—Ninth Cause of Action
Plaintiff seeks to rescind the Severance Agreement on the grounds of duress,
menace, 	fraud, 	undue 	influence, 	and 	failure 	of 	consideration. 	(FAC 	¶¶ 79–80.)
Specifically, Plaintiff claims: (1) he was not informed of his right to consult an attorney
and was not provided adequate time to do so; (2) the Severance Agreement does not contain
an explicit exception for claims not legally subject to waiver; (3) the Agreement lacks
required disclosures for reduction in force and employees’ rights; and (4) Defendant “failed
to provide consideration as outlined in the” Agreement. (Id. ¶¶ 79(a)–(d).)
Section 1689 of the California Civil Code states the grounds upon which a party may
rescind a contract. As relevant here, a party may seek to rescind the contract based on: (1)
improper consent “obtained through duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence,” or (2)
failure of consideration “through the fault of the party as to whom he rescinds” or “in a
material respect for any cause.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1689(b)(1)–(4).
First, this claim fails as a matter of law because “[r]escission is not a cause of action,
but a common-law remedy on the contract.” Direct Techs., LLC v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 525 F.
App’x 560, 562 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted); see Nakash v. Super. Ct., 196 Cal. App.
3d 59, 70 (1987) (“Rescission is not a cause of action; it is a remedy.”). The Ninth Cause
of Action is therefore DISMISSED on this basis.
Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations fail to establish a basis
for rescission as a remedy. (Doc. 5 at 12–13.) In the FAC, Plaintiff references the language
of § 1689(b)(1) for rescission based on improper consent, (see FAC ¶ 80), but does not
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clearly link his allegations to any of his asserted grounds for duress, menace, fraud, or
undue influence. 	Nor does Plaintiff allege facts amounting to any of these asserted
grounds. 	“[A]lthough Plaintiff alleges that he suffered ongoing harassment, retaliation,
and discrimination in the workplace (conduct which may indeed constitute wrongful acts),
Plaintiff fails to identify any coercive act on the part of Defendant[ ] that would have caused
or induced him to sign the [Severance] Agreement.” See Tanner v. Kaiser Found. Health
Plan, Inc., No. C 15-02763-SBA, 2015 WL 7770216, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2015)
(emphasis in original). In fact, Plaintiff does not assert any facts about the circumstances
surrounding his execution of the Severance Agreement.
Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s allegations concerning the lack of disclosures
do not form a basis for rescission because they are contradicted by the Severance
Agreement itself. (Doc. 5 at 12 n.1; Doc. 6 at 9–10.) “[A]llegations of misrepresentations
directly contrary to the specific and unambiguous terms of a written . . . agreement do not,
as a matter of law, state a claim for fraud.” 	Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841
F.2d 282, 288 (9th Cir. 1988), overruled on other grounds Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int’l,
Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 941 (9th Cir. 2001) (interpreting arbitration clause and finding the
petitioner’s reliance on the “alleged misrepresentations was unreasonable in light of the
clear and explicit language of the contract.”). 	The Severance Agreement provides that
Plaintiff may “consult with an attorney” regarding its terms. (Doc. 5-2, Ex. E at 41.) And
Plaintiff does not “allege that ‘anything prevented him from reviewing the agreement . . .
or consulting with an attorney.’” 	Tanner v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., No. C 15-
02763-SBA, 2016 WL 4076116, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2016) (quoting Robison v. City
of Manteca, 78 Cal. App. 4th 452, 458 (2000)); see also Cohen, 841 F.2d at 287 (noting
there is “no unfairness in expecting parties to read contracts before they sign them”). The
Release also contains several statements qualifying that Plaintiff releases his claims “to the
fullest extent permitted by law.” (See Doc. 5-2, Ex. E at 36–37.) Plaintiff’s allegations on
improper consent are therefore an insufficient basis for rescission.
Plaintiff also seeks rescission under § 1689(b)(2) and alleges that Defendant “failed
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to provide consideration as outlined in” the Severance Agreement. 	(FAC ¶ 79(d).) 	But
Plaintiff does not identify the consideration that allegedly failed, let alone plausibly allege
that such failure was material or that Defendant was at fault. 	See Tain v. Hennessey, No.
03-CV-1481-IEG (NLS), 2009 WL 4544130, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2009) (“[A] failure
of consideration must be ‘material,’ or go to the ‘essence’ of the contract before rescission
is appropriate.”) (quoting Wyler v. Feuer, 85 Cal. App. 3d 392, 403–04 (1978)).
Because rescission is not a cause of action and Plaintiff has not alleged facts
supporting an entitlement to such a remedy, the Ninth Cause of Action is DISMISSED.
Plaintiff, however, is not barred from pursuing rescission as a remedy in connection with
an appropriately pleaded claim for relief. 	See Moreno v. Citibank, N.A., No. C 09–5339
CW, 2010 WL 1038222, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2010) (“If Plaintiff intends to seek
rescission of the [contract], he must state a claim for which rescission could be granted and
plead for such relief as a remedy for that claim.”).
B. 	Remaining Causes of Action are Barred by a Release
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s remaining claims are barred by the Severance
Agreement because they “all arise from his employment with and termination of that
employment from Defendant.” (Doc. 5 at 14.) Plaintiff does not respond substantively to
this argument but instead relies solely on his argument that the Severance Agreement was
invalid and subject to rescission. (Doc. 7 at 7.)
“However, ‘a settlement agreement is presumptively valid, and the plaintiff remains
bound by the bargain he made until he actually rescinds it.’” Ruonavaara v. Harris Corp.,
No. CV 2:17-2463 WBS CKD, 2018 WL 746498, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2018) (quoting
Myerchin v. Family Benefits, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 4th 1526, 1535 (2008), disapproved of on
other grounds by Vill Northridge Homeowners Ass’n v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 50
Cal. 4th 913 (2010)). 	As previously discussed (see Sec.III.B), Plaintiff fails to assert a
claim on which rescission may be based. 	And “the mere filing of a claim for rescission
does not enable plaintiff to seek the relief explicitly barred under the contract for which
rescission is sought.” 	Ruonavaara, 2018 WL 746498, at *1. As such, all claims covered
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under the Release are barred.
The Severance Agreement contains a comprehensive release as well as specific
reference to the release of claims for violations of California’s FEHA, the California Labor
Code, and wrongful termination, among others. (RJN [Doc. 5-2], Ex. E at 36–37.) Under
the Release, Plaintiff released “any and all rights, claims, demands, liabilities, actions and
causes of action . . . of whatever nature whatsoever, known or unknown, . . . that [he] now
[has], or may ever have, against [Defendant] for any acts or omissions. . . occurring on or
prior to the Effective Date of [the] Agreement.” 	(Id. 	at 36.) 	He also expressly
“underst[ood] and agree[d], except as otherwise prohibited by law,” to release any claims
“aris[ing] out of or . . . relat[ing] to: (1) [Plaintiff’s] employment by [Defendant] . . . ; and
(2) the termination of [Plaintiff’s] employment with” Defendant. 	(Id.) 	By its terms, the
release therefore precludes Plaintiff’s remaining causes of action. See Bamforth, 2021 WL
4133753, at *11-12 (finding the plain terms of the release barred plaintiff’s claims);
Birdsong, 2013 WL 1120783, at *6 (finding the release barred all state law claims).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s First through Eighth Causes of Action are DISMISSED.
C. 	Leave to Amend
If a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, the Court may grant leave to
amend. 	Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). When assessing
whether leave to amend is proper, courts consider “the presence or absence of undue delay,
bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments,
undue prejudice to the opposing party and futility of the proposed amendment.” 	U.S. ex
rel. Lee v. SmithKline Beecham, Inc., 245 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001) (cleaned up).
Here, Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege a basis for rescission of the Severance
Agreement and therefore fails to state a claim as to all causes of action barred by the
Severance Agreement. 	Because rescission is not a standalone claim, amendment of
Plaintiff’s Ninth Cause of Action would be futile. 	See Ctr. for Bio. Diversity v. United
States Forest Serv., 80 F.4th 943, 956 (9th Cir. 2023) (“Amendment is futile when ‘it is
clear . . . that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.’”) (quoting Armstrong
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v. Reynolds, 22 F.4th 1058, 1071 (9th Cir. 2022)). The Ninth Cause of Action is therefore
DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
Plaintiff may, however, seek rescission as a remedy in an amended pleading. 	The
Court therefore GRANTS Plaintiff leave to pursue rescission as a remedy and state a
cognizable underlying claim for which it can be granted. 	See Melcher v. Fried, No. 16-
CV-02440-BAS(BGS), 2018 WL 2411747, at *6 (S.D. Cal. May 29, 2018); Hanna v.
Sierra Network, Inc., No. CV 19-211 DSF (FFMx), 2019 WL 12361302, at *4 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 1, 2019). Because amendment of the remaining claims is not futile at this stage, the
Court also GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend the First through Eighth Causes of Action.
V. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows :
1. 	Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5) is GRANTED.
a. 	The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Causes
of Action are DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
b. The Ninth Cause of Action is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO
AMEND. 	However, Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE TO AMEND to
pursue 	rescission 	as 	a 	remedy 	provided 	he 	can 	state 	a 	cognizable
underlying claim. See Vizio, Inc. v. LeEco V. LTD., Case No. SA CV 17-
1175-DOC (JPRx), 2018 WL 5303078, at *15 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2018).
2. 	Defendant’s RJN (Doc. 5-3) is DENIED AS MOOT.
3. 	Plaintiff’s Rule 6 Motion (Doc. 7) is DENIED AS MOOT.
Plaintiff may file a second amended complaint on or before January 30, 2026.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: January 5, 2026
____________________________________
HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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