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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
DAVID D. HARRIS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
NURSE RICHMOND; DR. BLAISDELL,
et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-cv-1574-BAS-DDL
ORDER DISMISSING FIRST
AMENDED COMPLAINT
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b)
On June 13, 2025, Plaintiff David D. Harris, a state inmate proceeding pro se, filed
a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with a motion to proceed in
forma pauperis (“IFP”). (ECF Nos. 1-2.) On July 11, 2025, the Court denied the IFP motion
and dismissed this action without prejudice to Plaintiff satisfying the filing fee requirement
on or before August 25, 2025. (Id. at 2.) On September 24, 2025, having not heard from
Plaintiff, the Court entered a judgment of dismissal for failure to satisfy the filing fee
requirement. (ECF Nos. 4-5.)
On October 2, 2025, Plaintiff submitted a certified copy of his inmate trust account
statement, which the Court accepted. (ECF No. 6.) The Court then vacated the judgment
of dismissal, reopened the case, granted Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP, and dismissed the
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Complaint with leave to amend for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff has now
filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No. 9.)
I. 	Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b)
A. 	Standard of Review
Because Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding IFP, his FAC requires a pre-Answer
screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b). The Court must sua sponte
dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails
to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. Lopez v. Smith, 203
F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v.
Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).
“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d
1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir.
2012) (noting that § 1915A screening “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the
context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”) Rule
12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009),
quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “creates a private right of action against individuals who,
acting under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux
v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of
substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere
conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quote marks
omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation of a right
secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698
F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).
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B. 	Allegations in the FAC
Plaintiff alleges that on May 10, 2025, at 1:15 p.m., while incarcerated at the R. J.
Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, in the Enhanced
Outpatient level of care, he was suffering from auditory hallucinations which caused him
to be suicidal and to cut his wrist and forearm, and he was admitted to the RJD crisis bed
unit. (ECF No. 9 at 1.) He had also attempted suicide five days earlier. (Id.) Defendant
Nurse Richmond, whose desk was located five feet away, was immediately notified but
responded 25 minutes later. (Id.) Plaintiff was in pain and still bleeding when Nurse
Richmond responded, and was given no medication “other than [at my] scheduled times”
of 7:00 a.m., noon, and 7:00 p.m. (Id.) He alleges he lost a lot of blood, and as an anemic
could have died, and that the delayed response by Nurse Richmond, during which he was
in extreme pain, showed deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation
of the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id at 2.) He asserts that the Warden and
“CEO” of RJD “are responsible for ensuring staff is properly trained in the management
of” responding to medical emergencies. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dr. Blaisdell “was deliberately indifferent to the
Plaintiff’s medical needs by not physically seeing his patient,” and instead “just wrote the
order for me to go to the hospital” based on Nurse Richmond’s assessment. (Id. at 3.)
Plaintiff states that medical staff at RJD have “retaliated against me by tak[ing] my
medication away for constantly filing complaints against staff.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff requests
a transfer back to the California Health Care Facility in Stockton, California, and monetary
damages. (Id.)
C. 	Discussion
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment creates an “obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing
by incarceration.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 101-03 (1976). “[A] prison official
violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met. First, the deprivation
alleged must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834
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(1994). Second, Plaintiff must allege the prison official he seeks to hold liable had a
“‘sufficiently culpable state of mind’ . . . [T]hat state of mind is one of ‘deliberate
indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Id. A prison official can be held liable only if he
“knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety;” he “must both be
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious
harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. “[I]ndicia of a ‘serious’
medical need include (1) the existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor would find
important and worthy of comment or treatment, (2) the presence of a medical condition
that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities, and (3) the existence of chronic or
substantial pain.” Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994).
“Deliberate 	indifference 	‘may 	appear 	when 	prison 	officials 	deny, 	delay 	or
intentionally interfere with medical treatment.’” Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066
(9th Cir. 2014), quoting Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988).
Deliberate indifference can also be shown where the chosen course of medical treatment
was “medically unacceptable under the circumstances” and chosen “in conscious disregard
of an excessive risk to the prisoner’s health.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th
Cir. 2004). However, allegations of inadequate medical treatment, medical malpractice, or
even gross negligence by themselves do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment
violation. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (“[N]egligen(ce) in diagnosing or treating a medical
condition” does not amount to deliberate indifference), quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (an
inadvertent failure to provide medical care, negligence or malpractice and differences of
opinion over what medical treatment is proper, do not state an Eighth Amendment claim).
Plaintiff was instructed in the Court’s prior dismissal Order that if he wished to
proceed with an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against either Nurse
Richmond or Dr. Blaisdell, he must set forth factual allegations which plausibly suggest
they knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his health and safety by showing they
were “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn” that he faced “a substantial
risk of serious harm” in the manner in which they provided medical care. (ECF No. 8 at 6,
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citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.) Plaintiff has not done so. He alleges in the FAC that he
was admitted to the crisis bed unit five feet from Nurse Richmond’s desk, who was
immediately notified of his condition, but that Nurse Richmond delayed 25 minutes before
treating his injury, during which he was in pain and bleeding, which, being anemic, posed
a risk. (ECF No. 9 at 1.) However, there are no allegations that his injury was not treated
immediately by someone else when he was admitted to the crisis bed unit, for example, or
whether he had been stabilized and was under observation by Nurse Richmond or other
medical staff during the delay. Even assuming the allegation that he was bleeding and had
lost a lot of blood presented a substantial risk, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged Nurse
Richmond was aware of facts from which an inference could be drawn that he faced a
substantial risk of serious harm from her delay, because there are no allegations suggesting
he was not being treated or observed or stabilized by medical staff during the delay.
The allegation that Dr. Blaisdell made the decision to send him to the hospital based
on Nurse Richmond’s assessment rather than examining Plaintiff personally, does not
plausibly allege Dr. Blaisdell was aware of facts from which he could have drawn an
inference that failing to examine Plaintiff in person prior to ordering him sent to a hospital
presented a substantial risk to his health and, knowing of that risk, deliberately disregarded
it, or constituted inadequate medical treatment or caused any harm. See Colwell, 763 F.3d
at 1068 (“A difference of opinion between a physician and the prisoner - or between
medical professionals - concerning what medical care is appropriate does not amount to
deliberate indifference.”); Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (a disagreement over the necessity or
extent of medical treatment does not show deliberate indifference); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(the “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting the plausibility standard).
Plaintiff alleges that medical staff at RJD have “retaliated against me by tak[ing] my
medication away for constantly filing complaints against staff.” (ECF No. 9 at 4.) Such a
conclusory allegation fails to state a retaliation claim. “Within the prison context, a viable
claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a
state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s
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protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First
Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional
goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (2005). Plaintiff must allege a causal
connection between the adverse action and the protected conduct. Watison, 668 F.3d at
1114. Plaintiff’s allegations of retaliation are entirely conclusory, as there are no factual
allegations plausibly indicating that any person took any action because of his protected
conduct. See Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding that, in the
absence of factual allegations to the contrary, it would be “sheer speculation” to assume
that prison officials retaliated on the basis of an inmate’s First Amendment activity).
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the Warden and “CEO” of RJD “are responsible for
ensuring 	staff 	is 	properly 	trained 	in 	the 	management 	of” 	responding 	to 	medical
emergencies. (ECF No. 9 at 2.) “A supervisory official is liable under § 1983 so long as
there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or
(2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the
constitutional violation.” Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 798 (9th Cir.
2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). A supervisor may “be liable in his individual
capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of
his subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that
showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d
1228, 1243 (9th Cir. 2018), quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011). In
addition to the discussion above regarding Plaintiff’s failure to plausibly allege that a
constitutional violation arose from the manner in which any Defendant responded to his
medical emergency, the conclusory assertion that these Defendants are responsible for
ensuring staff is properly trained in handling medical emergencies is insufficient to state a
claim. Id.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“[C]onclusory statements, do not suffice [to
state a § 1983 claim].”).
The FAC is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b) for failure to
state a claim. Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. In light of his pro se
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status, the Court grants Plaintiff a final opportunity to amend. See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791
F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint
without leave to amend unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint
could not be cured by amendment.”) (internal quote marks omitted).
II. 	Conclusion and Order
The Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint for failing to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii),
1915A(b)(1) and GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order
in which to file a Second Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading
noted, due on or before April 17, 2026. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint must be
complete by itself without reference to his original pleading. Defendants not named and
any claim not re-alleged in his Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See S.D.
CAL. CIVLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542,
1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v.
Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave
to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be “considered waived if
not repled.”).
If Plaintiff fails to timely file a Second Amended Complaint, the Court will enter a
final Order dismissing this civil action based both on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1),
and his failure to prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring amendment. See
Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage
of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the
complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 3, 2026
Hon. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge
United States District Court
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