Perkins v. The Procter & Gamble Company

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
VALERIE PERKINS, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE PROCTER & GAMBLE
COMPANY,
Defendant.
Case No.: 25-CV-1305 TWR (VET)
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS THE FIRST
AMENDED COMPLAINT
(ECF No. 18)
Presently before the Court is Defendant The Procter & Gamble Company’s Motion
to Dismiss (“Mot.,” ECF No. 18), as well as Plaintiff Valerie Perkins’ Opposition to
(“Opp’n,” ECF No. 20), and Defendant’s Reply in Support of (“Reply,” ECF No. 21) the
Motion. 	The Court held oral arguments on Thursday, February 5, 2026. 	(See ECF No.
22.) Having carefully considered the First Amended Complaint (“FAC,” ECF No. 15), the
Parties’ arguments, and the relevant law, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN
PART Defendant’s Motion.
BACKGROUND
I. 	Factual Background
Throughout 2022, Plaintiff purchased Defendant’s “ZzzQuil Pure Zzzs” sleep-aid
melatonin products (the “Products”) from various retail stores in El Cajon, California.
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(FAC. ¶ 13.) The Products prominently display the slogan “HELPS YOU FALL ASLEEP
NATURALLY” on their front labels. 	(See generally ECF No. 15-1 (“Ex. 1”).) 	For
example, “Melatonin + Chamomile & Lavender Gummies” are sold in the following
packaging:
(FAC ¶ 1.) Relying on the Products’ labels, Plaintiff contends she purchased the Products
in part because she believed the Products’ active ingredient, Melatonin, works “naturally”
and is not synthetic or artificial. (Id. ¶ 4.) But in reality, “[t]he Melatonin in the Products
is a highly synthesized chemical which does not exist in nature and is not made by nature.”
(Id.) 	Plaintiff further contends that because “the melatonin ingredient is not ‘natural,’ it
cannot ‘naturally’ help a consumer sleep.” (Id.)
II. 	Procedural Background
On October 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint
(“FAC”)1 asserting claims under California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal, Civ.
1 	Plaintiff’s initial complaint (“Compl.,” ECF No. 1-2) alleges that the Products’ labels are “false,
deceptive, and misleading” because “[a] reasonable consumer understands the representation that a
Product ‘naturally’ helps sleep to mean that none of its ingredients are synthetically created” (id. ¶¶ 2, 18).
The Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss the initial complaint for failure to state a plausible claim
of consumer deception. (See generally ECF No. 14 (“Prior Order”).)
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Code §§ 1750–1784 (the “CLRA”), and Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus & Prof. Code
§§ 17200–17210 (the “UCL”). (See generally id.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the
Products’ labels are “false, misleading, and likely to deceive reasonable consumers”
because “[a] reasonable consumer would expect that a Product branded and labeled as
‘naturally’ being capable of inducing sleep would not contain a synthetic, artificial
ingredient.” (Id. ¶ 7.) On November 25, 2025, Defendant moved to dismiss the FAC. (See
Mot.)
LEGAL STANDARD
“A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted ‘tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.’”
Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241–42 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Navarro
v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)). 	“A district court’s dismissal for failure to
state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is proper if there is a ‘lack of
a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal
theory.’” 	Id. at 1242 (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th
Cir. 1988)).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 	“A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 	Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 	“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to
infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has
not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” 	Id. at 679 (second alteration in
original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). If the court dismisses a complaint for failure to
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the “court should grant leave to amend even if no request
to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly
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be cured by the allegation of other facts.” 	Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000)
(quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)).
DISCUSSION
I. 	Plaintiff’s New Consumer Deception Theory
A. 	Legal Standard
“Claims under [both the CLRA and UCL] are governed by the ‘reasonable
consumer’ standard, which requires a plaintiff to ‘show that members of the public are
likely to be deceived’ by the defendant’s marketing claims.” Whiteside v. Kimberly Clark
Corp., 108 F.4th 771, 777 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552
F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008)). “[T]he reasonable consumer standard requires a probability
‘that a significant portion of the general consuming public or of targeted consumers, acting
reasonably in the circumstances, could be misled.’” Id. (quoting Ebner, 838 F.3d at 965).
Although “‘California courts have recognized that whether a business practice is deceptive
will usually be a question of fact not appropriate for decision at the pleadings stage[,]’ . . .
[d]ismissal is appropriate when ‘the advertisement itself makes it impossible for the
plaintiff to prove that a reasonable consumer is likely to be deceived.’” 	Id. (alterations
adopted) (quoting Williams, 552 F.3d at 938–39).
As the Court explained in its prior order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss
Plaintiff’s initial complaint, the Court begins by evaluating the Products’ front label. (ECF
No. 14 (“Prior Order”) at 5 (citations omitted).) If the Court finds the front label cannot
plausibly deceive a reasonable consumer in the manner alleged, the Court should dismiss
the FAC for failure to state a claim. (See id. (citations omitted).) But if the Court finds the
front label is unambiguously deceptive and could plausibly deceive a reasonable consumer
in the manner alleged, then the Court should decline to dismiss the FAC. (See id. at 5–6
(citations omitted).) Finally, if the Court finds the front label is ambiguous, the Court may
consider additional context available to the consumer (e.g., the back-label ingredient list
and knowledge of the reasonable consumer) to determine whether the label could plausibly
deceive a reasonable consumer. (See id. at 6 (citations omitted).)
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B. 	Analysis
Plaintiff argues the Products’ front labels are unambiguously deceptive because the
slogan “HELPS YOU FALL ASLEEP NATURALLY” could cause a reasonable consumer
to believe none of the Products’ active ingredients are synthetically created. (See FAC ¶¶
4, 7, 19.) Plaintiff specifically takes issue with the fact that “the Products’ active primary
ingredient, Melatonin, is an artificial and synthetic ingredient.” 	(Id. ¶ 4.) 	In response,
Defendant raises two arguments. First, Defendant argues it is implausible that a reasonable
consumer would equate the slogan “HELPS YOU FALL ASLEEP NATURALLY” with
“natural” melatonin. 	(See Mot. at 11.) 	Second, Defendant argues—assuming the front
label is ambiguous2 and additional context is considered— a reasonable consumer would
not understand the Products’ front labels to pertain only to the melatonin ingredient. (See
id.)
The Court begins by determining whether ambiguity exists regarding the definition
of the word “naturally” as used in the Products’ slogan. (See Prior Order at 6–7.) As stated
in the Prior Order, “naturally” has two relevant definitions: (1) “according to the usual
course of things; as might be expected,” and (2) “without artificial aid.” 	Naturally,
M ERRIAM -WEBSTER D ICTIONARY , https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/naturally
(last visited Feb. 2, 2026). 	As a preliminary matter, the Court MAINTAINS its prior
disposition that the first definition unambiguously supports Defendant’s interpretation of
the slogan—that is, the Products help one “fall asleep ‘according to the usual course of
things’” because the Products act upon the innate hormonal pathway by which the human
body ordinarily induces sleep. (See Prior Order at 7.)
The second definition, however, requires further inquiry. 	As stated in the Prior
Order, viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable
consumer could interpret “fall asleep ‘without artificial aid’” to mean “fall asleep ‘without
2 	In the Prior Order, the Court found the Products’ front labels were ambiguous. (See Prior Order
at 7 (citations omitted).)
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artificial or synthetic ingredients.’” (See Prior Order at 7.) Accordingly, the Court FINDS
the Products’ front labels are—for purposes of the pleading stage—ambiguous because
reasonable consumers would necessarily require more information before they could
reasonably 	conclude 	whether 	the 	Products 	contain 	“natural” 	(instead 	of 	synthetic)
melatonin. See Moore v. Trader Joe’s, 4 F.4th 874, 882 (9th Cir. 2021); see also McGinity
v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 69 F.4th 1093, 1098–99 (9th Cir. 2023).
Finding the Products’ front labels to be ambiguous, the Court must consider other
information available to reasonable consumers to determine whether the label could
plausibly deceive a reasonable consumer. 	McGinity, 69 F.4th at 1099; Moore, 4 F.4th at
882. 	“[When] a front label is ambiguous, the ambiguity can be resolved by reference to
the back label.” 	McGinity, 69 F.4th at 1099. 	As Plaintiffs point out, however, the back
label does not inform consumers what type of melatonin the Products contain. (See FAC
¶ 10.) Rather, the back label simply lists “melatonin” as an ingredient:
(Ex. 1 at 2.) Because the back label does not resolve the ambiguity regarding the type of
melatonin the Products contain, the Court CONSIDERS additional information available
to the reasonable consumer. See Moore, 4 F.4th at 882.
Supp lement Facts
Serv ing Size: 2Tablels
Serv ings Pe r Conta ine r: 30
Am ou nt Per Semng 	% 0V
Total Carbohydrate 	<19 	<1%*
Sod ium 	20 mg 	<1%
Melatonin 	2m9 	t
PURE Zzzs ™Blend 100 mg 	t
Chamomile (Matricalia 1I/Clltffa L)flower
extract, lemon balm (Melissa off/Cina/is L.)
leaf extract. valerian (Valeriana officinalis L)
root extrac~ lavender (Lavandula off/Cina/is
Chau) flower extract
• Pe rcent ~iy vus n llas8d oo a2,000 cabl elie!.
I Daily Value (DI') Id establshed
other Ingred ients:
Mi crocrystalline cellulose,
croscarrnellose sodium , ca lcium
phosphate , maltodextrin, com
starch, Less than 2% of:
Magnesium stearate , silicon
dio xide , polyviny l alcohol ,
pol yethylene glycol , titanium
dio xid e, talc, Red 40 Lake,
Bl ue 2 Lake
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Defendant contends that a reasonable consumer would not interpret the slogan
“HELPS YOU FALL ASLEEP NATURALLY” as a claim about the “natural” origin of
the melatonin ingredient. (Mot. at 11.) In support of this argument, Defendant asserts that
a reasonable consumer understands the melatonin used in the Products is not extracted from
humans or animals and thus must be produced synthetically. (Id.) In response, Plaintiff
contends that a reasonable consumer has no idea how melatonin is produced but could
nevertheless understand “naturally” to refer to the source of the melatonin (i.e., that it is
not synthetic). 	(See Opp’n at 12–13.) 	For the reasons below, the Court AGREES with
Plaintiff.
As highlighted by Plaintiff, there are at least two types of exogenous melatonin that,
if consumed, work to supplement the melatonin made by the human body: melatonin that
is produced via chemical synthesis reactions in a laboratory and melatonin that is produced
in plants (also called “phytomelatonin”). 	(See FAC ¶¶ 33, 36 (citations omitted).)
Defendant argues that because there is a “common understanding” that melatonin is
produced by the human body, and because the Products are intended to supplement
endogenous melatonin, a reasonable consumer would not conclude the Products’ melatonin
is “natural” in origin. 	(Reply at 9 (citing Moore, 4 F.4th at 883–84.) 	But the fact that
melatonin is produced by the human body does not necessarily imply that a reasonable
consumer would understand that the melatonin in the Products is chemically synthesized.
At the hearing, Defendant argued that plant-based melatonin is not “natural” because
it is made in a laboratory. (See ECF No. 22.) While Defendant is technically correct that
plant-based melatonin can be produced in a laboratory, the extraction of plant-based
melatonin is distinct from the chemical synthesis of melatonin. 	Compare Methods for
Extracting Melatonin and Compositions Thereof, U.S. Patent Pub. No. 2025/0255923A1,
Abstract (explaining “methods for extracting a purifying melatonin from natural melatonin
sources” include “extracting melatonin from Hypericum perforatum [(i.e., St. John’s wort)]
or from tomatoes”), with Synthesis Method of Melatonin, CN113214133A, Abstract
(describing “a method for synthesizing melatonin” comprising “the steps of taking 5-
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hydroxytryptamine hydrochloride as a raw material, carrying out methylation reaction on
hydroxyl by a one-pot feeding method to obtain 5-methoxytryptamine, carrying out
acetylation reaction on amino to prepare a melatonin crude product, and finally carrying
out one-step refining and purification to obtain a finished product melatonin”). 	The
primary distinction between these processes is that the former involves extracting already-
made melatonin from a natural source (e.g., a plant or plant derivative), whereas the latter
involves combining materials to create melatonin. In other words, in extraction, melatonin
is both a starting material and the end product. 	But in chemical synthesis, melatonin is
only the end product.3
As in the Prior Order, the Court again finds Gonzalez v. Chattem, Inc., No. 23-CV-
00102-HSG, 2023 WL 8101923 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2023) instructive. 	As previously
explained, the plaintiffs in Gonzalez brought consumer deception claims based on the
defendant’s melatonin products, which bore labels displaying the phrase “GET A GOOD
NIGHT’S SLEEP, NATURALLY.” 	Id. at *1. 	Ruling on the defendant’s motion to
dismiss, the Gonzalez court explained that “[w]hile the Product certainly makes no
affirmative promise of being all-natural, viewing the allegations in the light most favorable
to plaintiffs, a reasonable consumer might conclude that for a product to work ‘naturally’
with one's sleep cycle, the product's components must themselves be natural.” 	Id. at *5.
The Gonzalez court thus held, based on the allegations, it could not determine as a matter
of law that “it would be implausible for a reasonable consumer to be misled into wrongly
concluding . . . that the challenged ingredients were ‘natural.’” 	Id. at *6. 	It further
explained the plaintiffs’ claims would “likely rise or fall based on their ability to prove that
a reasonable consumer would not understand the challenged ingredients to be [‘natural,’]”
which it found was “a separate question to be resolved at a later stage of litigation.” Id.
3 	The Court takes notice of these facts pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. See Anderson v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 570 F. App’x 927, 932 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus.,
Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 954 n. 27 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“It is [] well-established that a court may take judicial notice
of patents or patent applications.”)
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If Defendant does not understand the distinction between the extraction of melatonin
from plants and the chemical synthesis of melatonin, the Court is not persuaded that a
reasonable consumer would understand that distinction, either.4 The Court therefore
REJECTS Defendant’s assertion that a reasonable consumer necessarily understands the
melatonin used in the Products “must be produced synthetically” (see Mot. at 11), and
FINDS it is plausible that a reasonable consumer could be misled into wrongfully
concluding that the slogan “HELPS YOU FALL ASLEEP NATURALLY” implies the
Products’ melatonin is “natural” (i.e., not artificial or synthetic) in origin. 	See Gonzalez,
2023 WL 810923, at *5–6.
Defendant further argues Plaintiff’s consumer deception theory is implausible
because 	of 	the 	“significant 	price 	differential” 	between 	synthetic 	melatonin 	and
phytomelatonin. (MTD at 15.) Specifically, Defendant contends that one article cited in
the FAC shows that phytomelatonin is “about 2000 times more expensive than chemical
melatonin.” (Id. at 14 (quoting Marino B. Arnao et al., Melatonin from Microorganisms,
Algae, and Plants as Possible Alternatives to Synthetic Melatonin, 13(1) METABOLITES 72
(2023)) (emphasis in original).) 	Problematically, Defendant removes this quote from its
context. The article cited in the FAC states, in relevant part:
[S]ome comments should be made about the costs and prices of products
containing chemical/synthetic melatonin or phytomelatonin. Melatonin from
chemical synthesis is currently very cheap, with the possibility of obtaining
an acceptable quality at 95% purity for around EUR 0.25–0.3 per gram (or
even cheaper). On the other hand, phytomelatonin requires the use of
considerable amounts of raw material, plants, or algae, thus, having to process
several kg of raw material to obtain a few mg. For example, if raw plants
contain 5 μg of phytomelatonin·g DW −1 (a considerable amount, see Table 2)
from 1 kg of plants, we can obtain five pills of 1 mg of phytomelatonin.
4 	As Plaintiff explains, exogenous melatonin can also be obtained by consuming melatonin-
containing foods, such as cherries, grapes, walnuts, and tomatoes. 	(See FAC ¶ 20 (citations omitted).)
The Court finds these facts more akin to the “basic understanding” of a reasonable consumer. 	See
Whiteside v. Chosen Foods, LLC, 796 F.Supp.3d 667, 677 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (citing Moore, 4 F.4th at 881–
85) (explaining reasonable consumers should have a “basic understanding” of the how the product they
choose to purchase is produced).
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Assuming a price of about EUR 3 per kg of dried plant, the cost of 1 mg of
phytomelatonin would be EUR 0.6, about 2000 times more expensive than
chemical melatonin, all without taking into account the costs of handling
plants and the extraction and concentration processes necessary to obtain
appropriate richness in the extracts.
Melatonin from Microorganisms, Algae, and Plants as Possible Alternatives to Synthetic
Melatonin, 13(1) METABOLITES 72 (2023). The article then states, “[s]urprisingly, we can
find cheaper phytomelatonin pills on the market than chemical melatonin pills.” Id.
The Court FINDS Defendant’s reliance on this article to support its “significant
price differential” argument unpersuasive.5 Cf. Moore, 4 F.4th at 881–85 (finding the
relatively inexpensive cost of the product in comparison to the cost of the ingredient at
issue warranted the conclusion that the product’s label was not misleading as a matter of
law). Accordingly, the Court REJECTS Defendant’s assertion that the “significant price
differential” alone would inform a reasonable consumer that they are not purchasing
“natural” melatonin. (Mot. at 15 (citing Moore, 4 F.4th at 884).)
In light of the foregoing, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that it is
implausible a reasonable consumer would be misled into wrongfully concluding the
Products contain melatonin that is “natural” (i.e., not artificial or synthetic) in origin. See
5 	Defendant also contends that “one of the products identified in the article sells for $54.90 per
bottle, while the FAC alleges that the purchase price for the Products is about $15.00 per bottle.” (Mot.
at 14–15.) 	In response, Plaintiff contends there are some commercially available “natural” melatonin
supplements similar in price to the Products. 	(See Opp’n at 20). 	For example, Plaintiff explains that
Solaray®, a plant-based melatonin supplement advertised as “non-synthetic” and “nature-derived,” is
available for purchase on Amazon for $14.99. (See id.)
Both arguments, however, rely on facts outside of the FAC. No where in the FAC (or the article
cited therein) is there any mention of specific product pricing. There is also no mention of the existence
of Solaray®, at least until Plaintiff’s Opposition. The Court’s “[r]eview is limited to the complaint” and
“evidence outside of the pleadings . . . cannot normally be considered in deciding a [Rule] 12(b)(6)
motion.” 	Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1274 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations and internal
quotations omitted). Moreover, “factual challenges to a plaintiff’s complaint have no bearing on the legal
sufficiency of the allegations under Rule 12(b)(6).” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th
Cir. 2001). For these reasons, the Court DECLINES to address the Parties’ arguments regarding specific
product pricing at this stage in litigation.
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Gonzalez v. Chattem, Inc., 2023 WL 8101923, at *5–6. Because the FAC states a plausible
theory of consumer deception, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
II. 	Standing for Injunctive Relief
A. 	Legal Standard
To have standing to seek injunctive relief, a plaintiff must “demonstrate a real and
immediate threat of repeated injury in the future.” Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc.,
631 F.3d 939, 946 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted). A wronged plaintiff will
be entitled to injunctive relief only if they can show they face a “real or immediate threat
… that [they] will again be wronged in a similar way.” Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d
964, 970 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations and internal quotations omitted). As explained by the
Ninth Circuit, “a previously deceived consumer may have standing to seek an injunction
against false advertising or labeling, even though the consumer now knows or expects that
the advertising was false at the time of the original purpose.” Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark
Corp., 889 F.3d 956, 969 (9th Cir. 2018). There are two ways a plaintiff can establish the
required risk of future harm: “the consumer’s plausible allegations that [they] will be
unable to rely on the product’s advertising in the future, and so will not purchase the
product even though [they] would like to”; or “the consumer’s plausible allegations that
[they] might purchase the product in the future, despite the fact it was once marred by false
advertising or labeling, as [they] may reasonably, but incorrectly, assume the product was
improved.” Id. at 969–70.
B. 	Analysis
Defendant argues Plaintiff lacks standing to seek injunctive relief because she cannot
allege a likelihood of future injury. 	(See Mot. at 10 (citing Davidson, 889 F.3d at 966–
72).) 	Specifically, Defendant contends that because Plaintiff is now aware that the
Products’ melatonin is synthetically manufactured and that the slogan “HELPS YOU
FALL ASLEEP NATURALLY” refers to the body’s process, as opposed to the origin, of
the melatonin, Plaintiff cannot be “wronged in the similar way” in the future. (Id. (citing
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983)).) In response, Plaintiff argues she
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has sufficiently established the required risk of future harm such that she has standing to
seek injunctive relief. 	(See Opp’n at 27–28 (citing Davidson, 889 F.3d at 970).) 	In
particular, Plaintiff pleads:
[She] would continue to purchase the Products at issue if they in fact contained
only natural ingredients that, by definition, could work to “naturally” help her
fall asleep. 	However, she is unable to rely on the Product’s advertising or
labeling in the future, and so will not purchase the Product although she would
like to. 	Additionally, [she] may purchase [Defendant’s] ZzzQuil Pure Zzzs
“naturally” labeled Products in the future as she would still like to purchase a
product that truthfully “naturally” helps with sleep, and she may reasonably,
but incorrectly, assume the Product was improved.
(FAC ¶ 30.) For the reasons below, the Court AGREES with Defendant.
Once again, the Court finds Gonzalez instructive. 2023 WL 8101923, at *7–9. In
Gonzalez, the plaintiffs argued their continued desire to purchase a sleep-aid supplement
that works “naturally” as represented, but their inability to rely on the defendant’s
“naturally” advertising when deciding whether to purchase the product in the future, was
sufficient to confer standing for injunctive relief under Davidson. 	See id. at 7. 	The
Gonzalez court rejected the argument, finding it would be unreasonable for the plaintiffs
to purchase the product as labeled in the future and assume the product was improved to
deliver sleep “naturally,” as the plaintiffs claimed they understood the term.6 Id. at 9. The
Court FINDS that the same analysis applies to Plaintiff’s claim here.
In encountering the Products in the future, Plaintiff cannot “reasonably, but
incorrectly” assume the Products have been “improved” because Plaintiff does not need to
purchase the Products again to know whether the Products contain “natural” melatonin.
See Davidson, 889 F.3d at 970–72; see also Jackson v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 2020 WL 5106652,
6 	In Gonzalez, the plaintiffs alleged that they understood the modifier “NATURALLY” to indicate
that at least the ingredients listed on the front label (i.e., melatonin) were “natural,” meaning not synthetic
or artificial. See 2023 WL 8101923, at *1. In contrast, the defendant argued, inter alia, that a reasonable
consumer would understand “naturally” to mean “without the aid of drugs,” and not assume any
correlation between how the Product works and the character of the ingredients that comprise it. Id. at *5.
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at *5 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2020) (“[W]here a plaintiff learns information during litigation
that enables her to evaluate product claims and make appropriate purchasing decisions
going forward, an injunction would serve no meaningful purpose as to that plaintiff.”).
Because Plaintiff is now aware that the melatonin in Defendant’s Products is not “natural”
as she understands it to be, it would be unreasonable for Plaintiff to rely on the Products’
use of “naturally” again in the future. 	See Gonzalez, 2023 WL 8101923, at *8–9. Thus,
the Court FINDS that Plaintiff does not have standing to pursue injunctive relief.
Plaintiff further argues that, if the Court finds she lacks standing to pursue injunctive
relief, her injunctive relief claim should be remanded to the California Superior Court. (See
Opp’n at 28 (citing White v. BP Products N. Am., Inc., No. 5:24-CV-01827, 2024 WL
5247959, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 26, 2024)).) 	Defendant responds that because it has
affirmatively waived an adequate-remedy-at-law objection (see Mot. at 20), the Court
cannot remand Plaintiff’s injunctive relief claim. 	(Reply at 14 (citing Ruiz v. Bradford
Exch., Ltd., 153 F.4th 907, 915–17 (9th Cir. 2025)).) Specifically, Defendant argues Ruiz
stands for the proposition that, where a defendant does not present an adequate-remedy-at-
law objection (or affirmatively waives it), a court is foreclosed from remanding a plaintiff’s
injunctive claim. (See Reply at 14; ECF No. 22.) But Ruiz is limited to instances in which
“a plaintiff files a lawsuit in state court seeking only equitable relief and the case is properly
removed to federal court.” 153 F.4th at 918 (emphasis added). Indeed, “[w]hen a case is
removed from state court and the district court concludes it lacks equitable jurisdiction, the
court has the authority to remand the case to state court. 	The Court is not required to
dismiss the case.” Id. at 913 (emphasis added). Here, Plaintiff does not seek only equitable
relief. (See FAC at 34.) Accordingly, it is within this Court’s discretion as to whether to
remand Plaintiff’s injunctive claim. See Ruiz, 153 F.4th at 916.
/ / /
/ / /
/ / /
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In deciding whether remand is appropriate, the Court considers whether Plaintiff
would be barred from seeking injunctive relief in state court.7 See, e.g., Nixon v.
Vegas.com, LLC, No. 25-CV-05688-CRB, 2025 WL 3719885, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23,
2025). 	(denying partial motion to remand when the plaintiffs had time to refile in state
court). Because Plaintiff expresses no concern to this effect (see Opp’n at 29), the Court
DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s injunctive claim. See White v. BP
Prods. N. Am., Inc., No. 5:24-CV-01827-SPG-SK, 2024 WL 5247959, at *4 (C.D. Cal.
Dec. 26, 2024) (explaining dismissal is appropriate where the court otherwise retains
jurisdiction over some part of the complaint because “piecemeal remand in diversity cases
is inappropriate”) (quoting Utne v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 16-CV-01854-RS, 2022
WL 1443339, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022)).
CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS IN PART Defendant’s Motion and DISMISSES WITHOUT
PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s injunctive claim. 	The Court DENIES IN PART Defendant’s
Motion to the extent it seeks dismissal on grounds that Plaintiff does not plead a plausible
theory of consumer deception.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 5, 2026
7 	Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief pursuant to the UCL. 	(See FAC ¶¶ 58, 95.) 	The statute of
limitations for a claim brought under the UCL is four years from the date of violation. See Cal. Bus &
Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq. Plaintiff alleges she purchased Defendant’s products “[t]hroughout 2022.”
(FAC ¶ 13; see also ECF No. 24 at 2 (citing a declaration by Plaintiff stating she purchased the Products
“near the end of the year 2022.”).)
-,;'s) 	¼~Honorable Todd 'lv. Robinson
United States District Judge
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