Mitchell Taylor Button et al v. Craig Lopresti

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MITCHELL TAYLOR BUTTON;
DUSTY BUTTON,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CRAIG LOPRESTI,
Defendant.
Case No.: 25-cv-00867-DMS-BJW
ORDER:
(1) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF No. 16];
(2) DENYING DEFENDANT’S
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
[ECF No. 22]; and
(3) DENYING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION TO STRIKE [ECF No. 23]
Pending before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint
(“Motion to Dismiss”). (MTD, ECF No. 16). Plaintiffs Mitchell and Dusty Button,
proceeding pro se, filed a response in opposition (“Opposition”). (Opp’n, ECF No. 20).
Defendant filed a reply (“Reply”), (Reply, ECF No. 21), and a request for judicial notice,
(Req., ECF No. 22). Also pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion to strike
Defendant’s Reply and request for judicial notice, or in the alternative, to file a sur-reply
(“Motion to Strike”). (Mot. to Strike, ECF No. 23). Defendant did not respond to the
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Motion to Strike. This matter is suitable for resolution without oral argument pursuant to
Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). (ECF No. 24). For the following reasons, the Court grants
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss; denies Defendant’s request for judicial notice; and denies
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Parties
The Court accepts Plaintiffs’ allegations as true for purposes of resolving the Motion
to Dismiss. Dusty Button was a world-renowned and well-known ballet dancer. (See
Compl. ¶¶ 24–26). She accumulated nearly half a million followers and subscribers on
Instagram up until December 2021, when she deleted her social media account “after
succumbing to trauma from severe cyber bullying and harassment.” (Id. ¶ 28). Mitchell
Button was a part of “Button Built,” a team and brand for automotive design, builds, and
work in the automotive industry. (Id. ¶ 29). Mitchell Button also had nearly half a million
followers and subscribers on his Instagram account, “@button_built.” (Id. ¶ 32). He also
deleted his social media account in 2021 after “succumbing to trauma from severe cyber
bullying and harassment.” (Id. ¶ 35). Plaintiffs’ businesses, goods, and services were
“directly sourced and provided from their good names, talent, expertise, reputations, skills,
manufacturing and marketing capabilities, which were completely destroyed in 2021 by
false allegations in a civil lawsuit” described below. (Id. ¶ 37 (emphasis omitted)).
Defendant operates a YouTube channel, “@TheCraig909,” with nearly two hundred
and thirty thousand subscribers and an Instagram page, “@thecraig909,” with nearly one
hundred and fifty thousand followers. (Id. ¶ 3). Defendant was a former competitor of
Mitchell Button in the automotive industry, and was aware of Plaintiffs’ reputation in the
industry. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 53).
B. The Nevada Lawsuit
In July 2021, Plaintiffs were sued in the United States District Court of Nevada for
$131,000,000 (“Nevada Lawsuit”). (Id. ¶ 4). The Nevada Lawsuit involved allegations of
sexual assault. (See id. ¶ 9). The Nevada Lawsuit was publicized in thousands of articles,
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televised on news and media outlets such as Good Morning America, and published on
social media pages and channels. (Id. ¶ 5). The coverage of the Nevada Lawsuit states
that Plaintiffs were sued in a civil action. (Id.). The Nevada Lawsuit does not state that
Plaintiffs were arrested, charged, or incarcerated for the related allegations or any other
crime. (Id. ¶ 6). Notably, Plaintiffs were not charged with any crime and never arrested.
(Id. ¶¶ 6, 45). Further, publicly available filings in the Nevada Lawsuit state that multiple
police departments refused to “entertain the factual allegations” against Plaintiffs because
the “allegations were ‘inconsistent’ with evidence provided, that the statements made to
the police . . . were unfounded and that even the Buttons themselves, had filed reports
against themselves to prove that the allegations against them were false.” (Id. ¶ 6). On
January 6, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment in the Nevada Lawsuit.
(Id. ¶ 7). Plaintiffs uploaded a redacted version of the motion for summary judgment to
their Instagram page, “@WeTheButtons,” which is “solely dedicated to providing anyone
who follows the Buttons with accurate information about the [Nevada Lawsuit].” (Id.).
Defendant followed Plaintiffs’ Instagram page. (Id.).
C. The Alleged Defamation
A third-party Instagram page, “@trail.huntr,” posted to Instagram a photo of
Mitchell Button’s automotive work. (Id. ¶¶ 54, 55). On January 27, 2025, Defendant
posted a comment on the Instagram post, stating the Buttons were “locked up for some
f*cked up stuff” and that it was a “shame they weren’t good people.” (Id. ¶¶ 8, 54). This
post was “shared” at least three hundred and twenty two times. (Id. ¶ 56). Defendant’s
comments were posted to hundreds of thousands of people who follow him on social media.
(Id. ¶ 8). At the time Defendant made his Instagram comments, Plaintiffs were “finally
able to put the destruction of horrendous, false allegations behind them and continue
business relationships with third parties which were previously broken due to those false
allegations.” (Id. ¶ 8 (emphasis added)). According to Plaintiffs, Defendant knew that his
comments were “entirely and utterly false and defamatory” and he acted with “actual
malice.” (Id. ¶¶ 9, 39). Defendant soon after deleted his comments and blocked Plaintiffs
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on social media. (See id. ¶ 49). “Defendant has deleted related evidence which would
prove that . . . Defendant further defamed . . . Plaintiffs on other platforms including his
YouTube channel which has nearly two hundred and thirty thousand subscribers.” (Id. ¶
50).
Additionally, Defendant’s comments “encouraged others to make false and
defamatory statements about the Buttons including but not limited to a statement made by
one of [Defendant’s] followers which stated the Buttons were ‘locked up for human
trafficking.’” (Id. ¶ 57). Defendant’s statements were made “for the purpose of
intentionally misleading former sponsors, former employers and former business affiliates
of the Buttons, and to prevent them from securing prospective contractual agreements,
agreements which were already in place and which had been formerly broken due to the
defamatory global media campaign waged against them in 2021 but were repaired.” (Id. ¶
58). Defendant intentionally interfered with contracts of Plaintiffs. (Id. ¶ 59). Because of
Defendant’s statements, Plaintiffs have been “deprived of work, prospective contracts and
repaired business relationships.” (Id. ¶ 61). Additionally, Defendant’s “power and
influence online” intentionally prevented Plaintiffs from repairing their reputations after
they were “completely destroyed by a false and defamatory global media campaign waged
against them in May and July of 2021.” (Id. ¶ 11).
D. Procedural History
Plaintiffs allege (1) defamation per se and (2) tortious interference with contract and
prospective economic advantage. (Id. at 13–15). Defendant moves to dismiss the entire
action under facial and factual challenges pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1). (MTD 3–4).
II. DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
A. Legal Standard
Plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject-matter jurisdiction by a preponderance
of the evidence. Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014). Under Rule
12(b)(1), a party may move to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R.
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Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A federal court must dismiss an action if it “determines . . . that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional challenges can be either facial or factual. Safe Air for
Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). “A ‘facial’ attack accepts the
truth of the plaintiff’s allegations but asserts that they ‘are insufficient on their face to
invoke federal jurisdiction.’” Leite, 749 F.3d at 1121 (quoting Safe Air for Everyone, 373
F.3d at 1039). When a motion to dismiss makes a facial challenge, the court assumes the
factual allegations in the complaint are true and draws all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff’s favor. Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2009). Conversely, “in
a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves,
would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. “In
resolving a factual attack on jurisdiction, the district court may review evidence beyond
the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary
judgment.” Id. (citation omitted). “The court need not presume the truthfulness of the
plaintiff’s allegations.” Id. (citation omitted). “Once the moving party has converted the
motion to dismiss into a factual motion by presenting affidavits or other evidence properly
brought before the court, the party opposing the motion must furnish affidavits or other
evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.” Id.
(citation omitted).
B. Discussion
Federal jurisdiction over this case is based on diversity pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a). (Compl. ¶¶ 18–20). Under § 1332(a), jurisdiction exists in cases of complete
diversity—where each of the plaintiffs is a citizen of a different state from each of the
defendants—and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); see
also Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). Because the parties do no dispute
that there is complete diversity, the only issue is whether the amount in controversy
requirement is met.
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“The amount in controversy alleged . . . controls so long as the claim is made in good
faith.” Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Est. of Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1106
(9th Cir.2010) (citation omitted). “To justify dismissal, it must appear to a legal certainty
that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount.” Id. (citation omitted).
Under this standard, the good faith allegations in the complaint as to the amount in
controversy “suffice to establish the jurisdictional amount unless it appears legally certain
that the amount in dispute is $75,000 or less.” Id. at 1107. Here, “[a]lthough Plaintiffs’
claims are based on the similar facts . . . they do not involve a single title or right in which
all of the Plaintiffs share a common interest.” Travelers Indem. Co. of Connecticut v. Pulte
Grp., Inc., No. LACV1808994, 2019 WL 1915760, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2019). Thus,
Defendant correctly argues that Plaintiffs cannot aggregate their claims and “each
[Plaintiff] must meet the jurisdictional threshold.” (MTD 4–5 (citations omitted)). That
is, the allegations must show that each Plaintiff has a claim for over $75,000.
Plaintiffs seek general and punitive damages and reasonable costs and expenses.
(Compl., Prayer for Relief, ¶¶ I, ii). Plaintiffs argue in their Opposition that damages “far
exceed[] $75,000 each.” (Opp’n 25). However, Plaintiffs fail to allege any facts in their
Complaint supporting that conclusion. While Plaintiffs allege that both Plaintiffs have
been “deprived of work, prospective contracts and repaired business relationships” because
of Defendant’s statements, (Compl. ¶ 61), Plaintiffs do not detail the monetary value of
these lost business opportunities. Plaintiffs do not provide any monetary amounts or
calculation of harm suffered outside a single allegation that the “amount in controversy
exceeds seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000.00), exclusive of interests and costs.” (Id.
¶ 20). Such an allegation does not demonstrate that each Plaintiff can support a claim for
over $75,000. Thus, facially, there are insufficient allegations to show subject matter
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jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs’
Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend.1
III. DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
A court may consider “matters of judicial notice” in ruling on a motion to dismiss.
United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). Defendant seeks judicial notice
of “the existence, legal effect and status” of twelve cases in which Plaintiffs were parties
to. (Req. 1). However, because the Court did not rely on these cases when deciding the
Motion to Dismiss, the Court DENIES Defendant’s request for judicial notice. Mikulsky
v. Noom, Inc., 23-cv-00285, 2024 WL 251171, at *2 n.2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2024) (denying
the defendant’s request for judicial notice of a privacy policy because the Court’s analysis
under Rule 12(b)(1) did not rely on that policy).
IV. PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO STRIKE
Plaintiffs argue Defendant’s Reply “invents new factual and legal theories—
claiming Plaintiffs are ‘vexatious,’ ‘public figures,’ and ‘on government assistance,’ and
asserting that ‘no jury on the planet would award these Plaintiffs anything.’” (Mot. to
Strike 9 (citing Reply 10, 11, 17-18)). Plaintiffs also take issue with Defendant’s
arguments regarding Plaintiffs’ other legal matters and Defendant’s request for judicial
notice. (See Mot. to Strike 11–12). Plaintiffs ultimately argue that, under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(f), “the Court should either strike or disregard those portions of
Defendant’s filings and the New [request for judicial notice] Exhibits.” (See Mot. to Strike
22). In the alternative, Plaintiffs move to submit a sur-reply. (Mot. to Strike 13–14).
Under Rule 12(f), a court may strike from any pleading “any redundant, immaterial,
impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “Motions to strike under Rule
12(f) are directed to pleadings only.” Goodwin v. AT&T, No. 2:23-CV-01950, 2024 WL
2866895, at *2 (D. Nev. June 6, 2024). “Thus, a motion to strike is not available to strike
1 In light of this determination, the Court declines to consider Defendant’s factual challenge to subject
matter jurisdiction. (See MTD 6–9).
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material contained in motions and other briefs.” Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, Rule
12(f) is the not the appropriate legal basis for Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike. However,
“district courts have inherent power to control their docket,” including striking documents
and improper filings. Ready Transp., Inc. v. AAR Mfg., Inc., 627 F.3d 402, 404 (9th Cir.
2010) (internal citation omitted). In deciding whether to exercise that power, courts
consider, in part, “whether striking the filing would ‘further the overall resolution of the
action.’” Goodwin, 2024 WL 2866895, at *2. The Court did not consider the specific
arguments Plaintiffs challenge when ruling on the Motion to Dismiss. Thus, the Court
finds it unnecessary to strike these portions of Defendant’s Reply. Further, the Court
denied Defendant’s request for judicial notice, negating the need to strike it and the
exhibits. Thus, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike, including their request to
file a sur-reply.
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
with leave to amend. Any amended complaint must be filed within fourteen (14) days
of the entry of this Order. In addition, Defendant’s request for judicial notice is DENIED,
and Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 31, 2025
_________________________________
Hon. Dana M. Sabraw
United States District Judge
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