Ruffins v. Din

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
TYREE RAYBON RUFFINS,
CDCR #BJ-6459,
Plaintiff,
v.
R. DIN, Lieutenant,
Defendant.
Case No.: 25-cv-00267-AJB-SBC
ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED
COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO
STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT
TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
AND 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)
(Doc. No. 7)
Before the Court is an amended civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42
U.S.C.§ 1983 by Plaintiff Tyree Raybon Ruffins, a prisoner at Mule Creek State Prison,
who is proceeding in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and without counsel. (See Doc. No. 7.)
Plaintiff’s original complaint alleged R. Din, a correctional lieutenant at Centinela State
Prison (“CEN”), violated his constitutional rights in November 2021 by failing to follow
proper known-enemy protocol after Plaintiff and another inmate engaged in a fight. (See
Doc. No. 1 at 3.) Because Plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim
for 	relief, 	the 	Court 	dismissed 	his 	complaint 	sua 	sponte 	pursuant 	to 	28 	U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1), but provided him notice of his pleading deficiencies
and granted him leave to fix them. (See Doc. No. 6.)
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Plaintiff has since filed a letter addressed to the Court captioned as his amended
complaint, but this pleading too fails to state any claim upon which § 1983 relief may be
granted. 	(See Doc. No. 7.) Thus, for reasons explained, the Court now DISMISSES his
amended complaint and denies further leave to amend as futile.
I. 	PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff original complaint was sparse and conclusory, but the Court construed it
liberally, when read together with his attached exhibits, to allege that Lt. Din’s mishandled
a CDCR 128-B “marriage chrono” sometime after Plaintiff and another inmate named
Wilson had a fight at CEN. (See Doc. No. 6 at 5–6, citing Doc. No. 1 at 2–3.) Plaintiff
appeared to claim Din falsified this document to suggest Plaintiff and Wilson were not in
fact enemies, but had instead agreed to “get along.” (Id. at 7.) Approximately two years
later, after both Plaintiff and Wilson transferred to California State Prison in Lancaster
(“LAC”), Plaintiff alleged he was “plac[ed] in danger” due to the “non-enemy concern
chrono” Din is alleged to have placed in his file. (Id. at 6–7, n. 4.)
The Court found Plaintiff’s complaint failed to state any plausible claim for relief
against Din because his allegations were primarily focused on Din’s alleged failure to
follow CDCR rules and regulations. (Id. at 6.) The Court further found that to the extent
Plaintiff sought to hold Din liable for failing to protect him from harm in violation of the
Eighth Amendment, he failed to include any facts to plausibly show Din acted with
deliberate indifference to any known and substantial risk to his safety. (Id. at 6–7 (citing
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833, 834, 837 (1994)).) Specifically, the Court
concluded Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims fell short because he failed to allege:
“(1) he was injured as a result of the allegedly false marriage chrono; (2) that Lt. Din knew
he would later be transferred to LAC; (3) that Din knew Wilson would be also be
transferred there; or (4) that Lt. Din actually drew the inference that Wilson would later be
identified as Plaintiff’s known enemy and therefore pose a substantial risk of harm to him.”
(Id. at 8, citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.) The Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend, and
cautioned that his amended complaint “must be complete by itself without reference to his
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original pleading.” (Id. at 9 (citing S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v.
Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading
supersedes the original.”)).)
In response, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, but it includes even less, not more,
factual detail with respect to his claims against Lt. Din. (Doc. No. 7.) In fact, as discussed
below, Plaintiff’s current 2-page letter pleading fails to function as an amended complaint
at all, and instead is comprised of argument as to why his original pleading was “valid.”
(Id.)
II. 	SCREENING
A. 	Standard of Review
Because Plaintiff remains a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his purported amended
complaint, like his original, requires a preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a
prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion found frivolous, malicious, failing to state a claim,
or seeking damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,
1126‒27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v.
Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The
purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not
bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014)
(citation omitted).
“The standard for dismissal for prisoner claims at screening is the ‘same as the
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.’” Long v.
Sugai, 91 F.4th 1331, 1336 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108,
1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted)); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121
(9th Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar
standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6)”). Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 12(b)(6) together require
a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
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that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. A complaint fails to state a claim if it lacks a
“cognizable legal theory” or “sufficient facts . . . to support a cognizable legal theory.”
Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)). Detailed factual allegations
are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Finally, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se,
particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford [him] the
benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342, n.7 (9th Cir. 2010), it “may not
supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled,” Chapman v. Pier 1
Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 954 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
B. 	Discussion
The Court finds Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to comply with Rule 8 and still
fails to state a plausible claim for relief against Lt. Din. Therefore, it too must be dismissed
sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). See Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 677‒78.
Every complaint must contain: “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for
the court’s jurisdiction, . . . (2) a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)-(3); Gibson
v. City of Portland, --- F.5th ----, No. 24-1663, 2026 WL 235118, at *16 (9th Cir. Jan. 29,
2026). Unlike his original complaint, which was filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, named
Lt. Din as a defendant, and arguably invoked Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to remain
free from a substantial risk of harm at the hand of another prisoner, (see Doc. No. 1 at 1–
3), his current pleading, while captioned as his “Amended Complaint,” (see Doc. No. 7 at
1), is not a complaint at all. It fails to clearly identify any defendant, see Fed. R. Civ. P.
10(a) (“[T]he title of the complaint must name all the parties”), fails to allege federal
subject matter jurisdiction under § 1983, see Watson v. Chessman, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1190,
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1194 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (“The court will not . . . infer allegations supporting federal
jurisdiction; federal subject matter [jurisdiction] must always be affirmatively alleged.”),
fails to contain “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
[any] defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged” in it, and fails to contain any claim
for relief whatsoever. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Rule 8 “prescribes the information a plaintiff must provide about the merits of his
claim at the outset of litigation.” 	Berk v. Choy, 607 U.S. ----, --- S. Ct. ----, No. 24-440,
2026 WL 135974, at *4 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2026). While detailed factual allegations are not
required, at a minimum, a complaint must contain some factual content sufficient to
provide “fair notice” of both the claim being asserted and the legal “grounds upon which
[the claim] rests.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 & n.3 (2007) (citation and
quotation marks omitted). “Something labeled a complaint but written more as a press
release, prolix in evidentiary detail, yet without simplicity, conciseness and clarity as to
whom plaintiffs are suing for what wrongs, fails to perform the essential functions of a
complaint.” McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 1996).
Here, Plaintiff’s amended complaint simply asserts he “has stated & or alleged []
valid facts,” refers again to a “128-B marriage chrono” that he only “supposedly signed,”
and accuses Lt. Din of “disregard[ing] the necessities.” (See Doc. No. 7 at 2 (emphasis
added).) However, Plaintiff makes “no attempt . . . to match up the specific factual
allegations [with any] specific legal claim[].” McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1177. Moreover, he
cannot amend by merely incorporating previously-named defendants or prior factual
allegations into his amended pleading by reference. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1.a (“Every
pleading to which an amendment is permitted as a matter of right or has been allowed by
court order, must be complete in itself without reference to the superseded pleading.”); Hal
Roach, 896 F.2d at 1546 (holding that “[t]he fact that a party was named in the original
complaint is irrelevant; an amended pleading supersedes the original.”). This approach
leaves the “defendant[] and th[e] court . . . literally guessing as to what facts support the
legal claims being asserted[.]” McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1177. Instead, Plaintiff must re-name
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the parties he intends to sue, and contain within his amended pleading “sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a [§ 1983] claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
He has not. Instead, Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to address any of the
pleading deficiencies clearly and specifically identified in the Court’s prior Order. He still
fails to allege what injury Din’s allegedly false marriage chrono caused, how or whether
Lt. Din knew he would later be transferred to LAC, or include any factual content which
plausibly suggests Lt. Din actually drew the inference Wilson would later be identified as
Plaintiff’s known enemy and therefore pose a substantial risk of harm to him at another
prison two years in the future. (See Doc. No. 6 at 8, citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.) In
fact, while his amended pleading refers to Lt. Din, it fails to set forth, clearly and concisely,
any factual allegations or context sufficient to provide notice of just “who is being sued,
for what relief, and on what theory, with enough detail to guide discovery.” McHenry, 84
F.3d at 1177–78; see also Exmundo v. Kane, 553 F. App’x 742, 743 (9th Cir. 2014)
(affirming district court dismissal of § 1983 claims where plaintiff’s allegations “were
unclear as to the timing and nature of [the defendant’s] actions”). “[I]t is not the district
court’s job to stitch together cognizable claims for relief from [a] wholly deficient
pleading.” Hearns v. San Bernardino Police Dept., 530 F.3d 1124, 1132 (9th Cir. 2008)
(citation omitted); see also Morrison v. United States, 270 F. App’x 514, 515 (9th Cir.
2008) (affirming Rule 8 dismissal of pro se complaint “contain[ing] a confusing array of
vague and undeveloped allegations,” and which “did not allege sufficient facts or
jurisdictional basis for any federal claim for relief.”). Nor is it “the job of the district courts
to make sense of the pleading, to supply facts to support the claim, or to imagine the claims
that might fit the facts.” Gibson, 2026 WL 235118, at *18.
C. 	Leave to Amend
Accordingly, because Plaintiff’s amended complaint lacks both a “cognizable legal
theory” or “sufficient facts . . . to support a cognizable legal theory,” Shroyer, 622 F.3d at
1041, contains only “the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s],” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
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at 678, and he has already been provided a short and plain explanation of his pleading
deficiencies, yet has failed to take advantage of his opportunity to amend them, the Court
finds further amendment would be futile. See Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552
F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]here the plaintiff has previously been granted leave
to amend and has subsequently failed to add the requisite particularity to its claims, [t]he
district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad.” (internal quotation
marks omitted) (second alteration in original)).
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s amended complaint
(ECF No. 7) for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1), CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal would
not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), and DIRECTS the Clerk of
Court to enter a final judgment of dismissal and close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 30, 2026
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