USA v. Rivas Contreras

3:25-cr-04185Casd13.02.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
ALAIN ISAI RIVAS CONTRERAS,
Defendant.
Case No.: 25-CR-4185-TWR
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S
REQUEST FOR A MINIMAL ROLE
ADJUSTMENT UNDER GUIDELINE
§ 2D1.1(e)(2)(B)(i)
Pending before the Court is Defendant Alain Isai Rivas Contreras’s request that the
Court apply § 2D1.1(e)(2)(B)(i) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual and
grant him a minimal-role adjustment under Guideline § 3B1.2(a). For the reasons set forth
below, the Court DENIES Defendant Rivas Contreras’s request.
I. 	Factual and Procedural Background1
On July 19, 2025, at approximately 9:30 a.m., Defendant Rivas Contreras applied
for entry into the United States from Mexico via the San Ysidro Port of Entry in San Diego,
California. Defendant Rivas Contreras was the driver, sole occupant, and registered owner
1 	The following facts are taken from the Presentence Report filed by United States
Probation Officer Juan Valencia on January 9, 2026. (See ECF No. 39.) Neither Party has
filed objections to the PSR. (See generally Docket.)
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of a 2018 Kia Forte bearing Mexican license plates. 	A narcotics detection canine
conducting pre-primary operations alerted to the vehicle.
Defendant Rivas Contreras gave two negative customs declarations to a United
States Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) officer and stated that he was crossing the
border to shop in San Ysidro. A second CBP officer noticed a non-factory compartment
in the floor area of the vehicle and referred the 2018 Kia Forte for further inspection in the
secondary 	inspection 	area. 	An 	X-ray 	scan 	revealed 	anomalies 	in 	the 	floor 	and
undercarriage area of the vehicle. A subsequent search of the vehicle resulted in the seizure
of 48.62 kilograms of cocaine. Defendant Rivas Contreras was then placed under arrest.
Defendant Rivas Contreras’s jury trial commenced on November 17, 2025. 	On
November 19, 2025, the jury found Defendant Rivas Contreras guilty of participating in a
conspiracy to import more than 5 kilograms of cocaine in violation of Title 21, United
States Code, Sections 952, 960, and 963, and importation of more than 5 kilograms of
cocaine in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 952 and 960.
On February 9, 2026, Defendant Rivas Contreras filed a Sentencing Memorandum,
(see ECF No. 44), in which he requests, among other Guideline calculations, that he be
given 	a 	four-level 	downward 	adjustment 	for 	minimal 	role 	pursuant 	to 	Guideline
§§ 2D1.1(e)(2)(B)(i) and 3B1.2(a). 	See ECF No. 44 at 5. 	The Government has filed a
Sentencing Memorandum opposing that request. See ECF No. 43 at 9–11.
II. 	Discussion
A. 	Role Adjustments Under the Recent Guideline Amendments
Recently added Guideline § 2D1.1(e)(2)(B) addresses the application § 3B1.2, the
mitigating role Guideline provision, to drug importation cases such as this one. 	More
specifically, § 2D1.1(e)(2)(B) does so through an evaluation of whether an offender’s
primary function in the offense was performing “a low-level trafficking function.”
Subsection (i) provides that a four-level minimal role adjustment under § 3B1.2(a) is
“generally warranted if the defendant’s primary function in the offense was plainly among
the lowest level of drug trafficking functions, such as serving as a courier, running errands,
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sending or receiving phone calls or messages, or acting as a lookout.” 	U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(e)(2)(B)(i).
B. 	Application of Section 2D1.1(e)(2)(B)(i) to This Case
Here, Defendant Rivas Contreras was responsible for transporting 48.62 kilograms
of cocaine from Mexico to the United States via the San Ysdiro Port of Entry. He therefore
clearly meets the dictionary definition of a drug “courier,” that is, someone who transported
drugs from point A (Mexico) to point B (the United States). According to Defendant Rivas
Contreras, that is the end of the Court’s inquiry under § 2D1.1(e)(2)(B)(i). 	See ECF No.
44 at 5 (arguing that all Defendant Rivas Contreras did was “move drugs from one location
to another” and that he therefore meets the “plain meaning” of the word “courier” as used
in § 2D1.1(e)(2)(B)(i)).
Defendant Rivas Contreras’s interpretation of § 2D1.1(e)(2)(B)(i) is similar to that
adopted in United States v. Maciel, 789 F. Supp. 3d 934 (S.D. Cal. 2025), in which the
court concluded that “a person whose primary function is to transport drugs—regardless of
the amount of drugs they are transporting and regardless of whether they are transporting
drugs 	across 	an 	international 	border—is 	a ‘courier’ in 	the context of amended §
2D1.1(e)(2)(B)(i).” Maciel, 789 F. Supp. 3d at 937. In concluding that cross-border drug
smugglers are “generally” entitled to a minimal role reduction under § 2D1.1(e)(2)(B)(i),
the court in Maciel considered (1) the testimony from several practicing attorneys who
used the term “courier” to refer to cross-border drug smugglers during a hearing regarding
the proposed Guideline amendments before the Sentencing Commission, (2) the Ninth
Circuit’s use of the term “courier” in addressing cross-border drug smuggling in two
decisions issued in 2014 and 2018, and (3) the Sentencing Commission’s Office of General
Counsel’s use of the term “courier” (albeit in tandem with the term “mule”) in a 2024
primer on proposed Guideline amendments. 	See Maciel, 789 F. Supp. 3d at 938–39.
However, as there is no reasonably discernable nexus between these three bases and the
Sentencing 	Commission’s 	ultimate 	decision 	to 	use 	the 	word 	“courier” 	in 	§
2D1.1(e)(2)(B)(i), this Court finds Maciel’s reasoning unhelpful in properly interpreting
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the term “courier” as used in § 2D1.1(e)(2)(B)(i). See United States v. Joey, 845 F.3d 1291,
1297 n.8 (9th Cir. 2017) (“As with the interpretation of legal texts generally, our search for
the Sentencing Commission’s intent will most often begin and end with the text and
structure of the Guidelines.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, Maciel does not address the Sentencing Commission’s use of the term
“courier” 	in 	relation 	to 	the 	other 	examples 	given 	in 	§ 	2D1.1(e)(2)(B)(i) 	or 	read
§ 2D1.1(e)(2)(B)(i) in harmony with § 2D1.1(e)(2)(B)(ii). 	See United States v. Martinez,
870 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2017) (“In interpreting the text [of a guideline provision], we
look at the structure of the guidelines as a whole to understand the provision in context.”);
United States v. Petrushkin, 142 F.4 th 1241, 1246 (9 th Cir. 2025) (“We interpret the
Sentencing Guidelines using the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation. 	Interpretation
of a word or phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory text, considering the purpose
and context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or authorities that inform the
analysis.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 	As such, this Court does not find
Defendant Rivas Contreras’s reliance on Maciel persuasive.
Employing—as the Court must—the canons of statutory construction, this Court
finds that the term “courier” as used in § 2D1.1(e)(2)(B)(i) is a term of art that must be read
in the context of, and harmoniously with, the accompanying examples of roles which the
Sentencing Commission co-designates as “plainly among the lowest level of drug
trafficking functions.” 	See United States v. Soberanes, 318 F.3d 959, 963 n.4 (9th Cir.
2003) (“We use traditional canons of statutory construction to interpret the sentencing
guidelines.”); see also Fischer v. United States, 603 U.S. 480, 487 (2024) (“[T]he canon
of noscitur a sociis teaches that a word is ‘given more precise content by the neighboring
words with which it is associated[]’ [and] . . . ‘avoid[s] ascribing to one word a meaning
so broad that it is inconsistent with’ ‘the company it keeps.’”) (fifth alteration in original)
(first quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 294 (2008); then quoting Gustafson
v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995))). 	Thus, for § 2D1.1(e)(2)(B)(i) to apply, the
“courier” role performed by Defendant Rivas Contreras must be functionally equivalent to
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the other tasks listed—“running errands, sending or receiving phone calls or messages, or
acting as a lookout[.]”
The Court further finds that transporting a large quantity of drugs across the
international border between the United States and Mexico is not “plainly among the lowest
level of drug trafficking functions.” 	Indeed, successfully crossing narcotics across the
international border is one of the most critical and risky drug trafficking functions. 	The
risk of the drugs being detected and seized at the border is heightened by the presence of
law enforcement officers, drug detecting dogs, X-ray inspection devices, and random
searches. 	Further, it is a basic principle of the drug trafficking world that the value of
narcotics increases significantly following a successful border crossing, (see, e.g., ECF No.
41 at 20:2–21:1 (Defendant Rivas Contreras’s drug trafficking expert testifying that “[t]he
drugs sitting in [Mexico] . . . are pretty must zero value. [The drug trafficking organization]
need[s] to get them across [the border] to make money.”)), thus confirming the critical
nature of a cross-border smuggling event. 	See, e.g., id. at 28:18–29:3 (Defendant Rivas
Contreras’s expert testifying that “it’s the driver that gets the[ drugs] from Mexico to the
United States” and therefore “is important for that particular mission”). 	Simply put, a
defendant who is entrusted with transporting a large quantity of drugs across the
international border does not perform a low-level drug trafficking function. Rather, such
a defendant performs a significant drug trafficking function that is integral to the overall
success of the drug trafficking organization and is in no way akin to running an errand,
sending or receiving a phone call or message, or acting as a lookout. To conclude otherwise
would lay bare a profound misunderstanding of how drug trafficking organizations
function.
C. 	Section 	2D1.1(e)(2)(B)(i) 	Must 	Be 	Read 	in 	Harmony 	with 	Section
2D1.1(e)(2)(B)(ii)
The above-stated conclusion regarding the applicability of § 2D1.1(e)(2)(B)(i) is
consistent with the scope, language, and requirements of its accompanying Guideline
provision—§ 	2D1.1(e)(2)(B)(ii)—which 	addresses 	when 	a 	two-level 	minor 	role
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adjustment is appropriate under § 3B1.2(b). 	To be clear, a defendant who is entitled to
receive a four-level minimal role adjustment (i.e., the adjustment requested by Defendant
Rivas Contreras) must perform a relatively lower-level drug trafficking function and
therefore be even less involved in the offense than a defendant entitled to a two-level minor
role adjustment. In other words, a “courier,” as that term is used in subsection (i), must be
even less involved than someone performing what subsection (ii) labels “another low-level
trafficking function.”
The example given in subsection (ii) is an individual who is “distributing controlled
substances in user-level quantities for little or no monetary compensation or with a primary
motivation other than profit.” 	Examples of conduct that would fall within the ambit of
subsection (ii) include a drug addict sharing his or her drugs with a co-addict or a
recreational drug user sharing a portion of his or her “stash” with friends. See Ninth Circuit
Committee on Model Jury Instructions, Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions for
the District Courts of the Ninth Circuit § 12.4 (rev. Dec. 2025) (“‘Distributing’ means
delivering or transferring possession of [specified controlled substance] to another person,
with or without any financial interest in that transaction.”). This Court finds that it cannot
credibly be argued that transporting a large quantity of narcotics2 from Mexico to the
United States is a drug trafficking function that is a lower-level function than distributing
user-level quantities of drugs for little or no monetary compensation. Again, to conclude
otherwise would lay bare a profound misunderstanding of the drug trafficking world.
/ / /
/ / /
/ / /
2 	At trial, the Government introduced expert witness testimony that the 48.62
kilograms of cocaine being smuggling into the United States by Defendant Rivas Contreras
had a wholesale value of between $376,500 and $715,350 and a retail value between
$1,882,500 and $3,765,000. (See, e.g., ECF No. 41 at 26:12–14.)
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III. 	Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES Defendant’s request for a
minimal role adjustment pursuant to Guideline §§ 2D1.1(e)(2)(B)(i) and 3B1.2(a).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: 	___________________________
HON. TODD W. ROBINSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
2/13/2026
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