Mota v. Bizor et al

1
3:23-cv-02198-RBM-JLB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
RICHARD MOTA,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHRISTOPHER BIZOR, UNITED
STATES ARMY, UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA,
Defendants.
Case No.: 3:23-cv-2198-RBM-JLB
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS
[Doc. 5]
Defendant United States (“Defendant”) has filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5)
Plaintiff Richard Mota’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint (Doc. 1). Defendant: (1) moves to dismiss
an individual Defendant and the United States Army as improper defendants; (2) moves to
dismiss the Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction based on failure to exhaust; and (3) moves under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 5 to dismiss for failure to properly serve the United States under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 4(i). (Doc. 5.) Plaintiff has filed an Opposition agreeing to dismissal
without prejudice of the improperly named defendants but arguing he should be given an
extension of time to complete service and that he properly exhausted by filing an
administrative claim with the Army. (Doc. 6.) Defendant has filed a Reply. (Doc. 7.)
Case 3:23-cv-02198-RBM-JLB Document 8 Filed 03/12/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
1 of 12

2
3:23-cv-02198-RBM-JLB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
The Court finds the matter suitable for determination on the papers and without oral
argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). 	For the reasons set forth below, the
Motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Complaint
Plaintiff alleges that his vehicle was struck by Christopher Bizor’s vehicle on
“Interstate Five (5) Highway, at or near Poinsettia Lane, in the City of Carlsbad” within
San Diego County. (Compl. ¶ 5.1) Plaintiff alleges Mr. Bizor was acting in the course and
scope of his employment with the United States Army and was driving at a greater speed
than he should have and in a “careless[], negligent[], and extrem[ly] reckless” manner that
caused the collision. (Id. ¶¶ 6–7; see also id. ¶¶ 11–15 (describing careless, negligent, and
reckless manner of Bizor’s driving that caused collision and injury, including mental
anguish).) 	He alleges the collision resulted in vehicle damage and that his injuries will
continue to result in lost earnings and medical expenses. (Id. ¶¶ 16–19.)
The Complaint alleges the following as to compliance with the Federal Tort Claims
Act’s (“FTCA”) administrative exhaustion requirement: “[o]n or about April 7, 2022,
Plaintiff 	submitted 	a 	claim to 	the United 	States 	Army; 	“the United 	States 	Army
acknowledged receipt of the claim and expressly stated that the claim would be preserved
under the [FTCA] or Military Cl[ai]ms Act;” and “[t]he United States [Army]2 did not
expressly deny the claim and six months have passed.” (Id. ¶ 8.)
B. 	Procedural History
The Complaint was filed on December 1, 2023. 	(Doc. 1.) 	On March 4, 2024,
Plaintiff filed a proof of service that indicates the United States Army was served with the
1 The Court cites the paragraph numbers of the Complaint and the CM/ECF electronic
pagination for all other cites to the record unless otherwise noted.
2 This is the first of two instances in the Complaint that refer to the “Postal Service” instead
of the Army. (Compl. ¶¶ 8, 12.)
Case 3:23-cv-02198-RBM-JLB Document 8 Filed 03/12/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
2 of 12

3
3:23-cv-02198-RBM-JLB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
summons on February 28, 2024. (Doc. 3.) Plaintiff filed another proof of service on June
19, 2025 indicating service at “880 Front Street, Room 6253 San Diego, CA 92101” on
June 12, 2025.3 (Doc. 4.) This Motion followed on August 14, 2025. (Doc. 5.)
II. 	DISCUSSION
Defendant raises three issues in its Motion: (1) dismissal of improperly named
defendants (Doc. 5 at 5–6); (2) dismissal for failing to exhaust administrative remedies
under the FTCA prior to filing suit (id. at 4–5); and (3) dismissal of the Complaint for lack
of complete and proper service (id. at 7). As set forth below, the Court grants the Motion
as to dismissal of the improperly named defendants, grants dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction with leave to amend, and denies dismissal based on incomplete service
and extends Plaintiff’s time to complete service.
A. 	Dismissal of Improperly Named Defendants
The Complaint names the United States of America, the United States Army, and
Mr. Bizor. 	(Compl. ¶ 4.) 	Defendant moves to dismiss the United States Army and Mr.
Bizor because FTCA claims may not be brought against individual employees or federal
agencies. (Doc. 5 at 5–6.) In Opposition, Defendant agrees. (Doc. 6 at 6.) He concedes
“[t]he United States correctly notes that FTCA claims are actionable only against the
United States itself, not the agencies or individual employees” and “does not oppose
dismissal of the United States Army and Mr. Bizor in their official capacity under the
FTCA.” (Id.) Plaintiff argues, however, the “dismissal should be without prejudice, and
Plaintiff should retain the right to maintain claims as appropriate under state law or other
statutory remedies if applicable.” (Id.)
///
///
3 This appears to be Plaintiff’s service of the United States Attorney’s Office for the
Southern District of California. One of the requirements for service on the United States.
(See infra II.C.)
Case 3:23-cv-02198-RBM-JLB Document 8 Filed 03/12/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
3 of 12

4
3:23-cv-02198-RBM-JLB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Here, Defendant did not specifically move to dismiss the United States Army or Mr.
Bizor with prejudice. (Doc. 5 at 5–6.) Defendant sought dismissal of Mr. Bizor and the
United States Army for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and Defendant agrees they
should be dismissed because “they are not subject to suit under the FTCA.” (Doc. 5 at 6;
Doc. 6 at 7.) The Court agrees. “The FTCA is the exclusive remedy for tortious conduct
by the United States, and it only allows claims against the United States.” FDIC v. Craft,
157 F.3d 697, 706 (9th Cir. 1998) (“dismiss[ing] all claims against the FDIC for lack of
jurisdiction.”). 	Plaintiff speculates about the need to avoid “penaliz[ing] plaintiffs for
technical or procedural defects beyond their control” in arguing for a dismissal without
prejudice but there is no explanation how Plaintiff could possibly bring tort claims against
either Defendant. (Doc. 6 at 7.) However, in general a “dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction is without prejudice” because “the merits have not been considered before
dismissal.” Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 847 F. 3d 646, 656 (9th Cir. 2017) (citations
omitted).
Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Mr. Bizor and the United States Army for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. 	As noted below, the Court is granting Plaintiff leave to
amend the Complaint for purposes of attempting to demonstrate compliance with the
FTCA’s exhaustion requirement. 	(See infra II.B.) 	However, the dismissal of Mr. Bizor
and the United States Army is WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND because any amendment
would be futile. Carrico v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 656 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir.
2011) (Leave to amend “is properly denied … if amendment would be futile.”)
B. 	Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 	Defendant argues the Court
lacks jurisdiction because Plaintiff has failed to comply with the exhaustion requirement
of the FTCA. (Doc. 5 at 4–5 (Defendant asserts “the Army Claims Office closed the claim
and received no further contact from [Plaintiff] or counsel on his behalf until this lawsuit
was filed on December 1, 2023—the day before the statute of limitations would expire.”)
Case 3:23-cv-02198-RBM-JLB Document 8 Filed 03/12/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
4 of 12

5
3:23-cv-02198-RBM-JLB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Plaintiff argues his claim “had been pending” and was “neither denied nor acted upon
within six months, as required by statute” (Doc. 6 at 5) and that “[p]rior counsel’s
withdrawal, over which Plaintiff had no control, temporarily paused the process” (Doc. 6
at 4).
1. 	FTCA
The FTCA “waives the sovereign immunity of the United States for certain torts
committed by federal employees ‘under circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred.’” Vacek v. U.S. Postal Serv., 447 F.3d 1248, 1250 (quoting Smith
v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 201 (1993)). 	It “provides that an ‘action shall not be
instituted upon a claim against the United States for money damages’ unless the claimant
has first exhausted administrative remedies.” 	Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)). 	Under
§ 2675(a)’s exhaustion or claims presentment requirement, a plaintiff may not bring an
action against the United States “unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to
the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency
in writing and sent by certified or registered mail.” § 2675(a). “The purpose of requiring
the plaintiff to file an administrative claim before bringing an action is to allow the agency
to investigate the claim to determine whether it should be voluntarily paid or a settlement
sought.” Poindexter v. United States, 647 F.2d 34, 36 (1981). “[A] claimant has two years
after the cause of action accrues to file an administrative claim with the government agency
responsible for the alleged injury.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)).
Here, there is no dispute that Plaintiff submitted an administrative claim to the Army.
(Compl. ¶ 8; Decl. of Arthur M. Petrousian (“Petrousian Decl.”) ¶ 2, Ex. A (“April 7, 2022
Letter”) (Letter from the Army acknowledging receipt of the claim); see also Doc. 5 at 5
(Defendant acknowledges “Plaintiff presented his administrative claim to the Army on
April 7, 2022”) (citing Compl. ¶ 8))); see also Burns v. United States, 764 F.2d 722, 724
(9th Cir. 1985) (Jurisdictional requirement of § 2675 “satisfied by (1) a written statement
sufficiently describing the injury to enable the agency to begin its own investigation, and
Case 3:23-cv-02198-RBM-JLB Document 8 Filed 03/12/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
5 of 12

6
3:23-cv-02198-RBM-JLB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
(2) a sum certain damages claim.”). Plaintiff’s claim appears to have been timely because
it was filed less than five months after the December 2, 2021 collision. (Compl. ¶¶ 5, 10
(collision); Doc. 6 at 15–16 (April 7, 2022 letter from the Army confirming receipt of the
claim); Compl. ¶ 8 (claim submitted April 7, 2022).)
“If the administrative claim is denied, the claimant has six months to file an action
in district court.” 	Id. (citing § 2401(b)). 	“The failure of an agency to make a final
disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed shall, at the option of the claimant
any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of this section.” Id.;
see also Sparrow v. U.S. Postal Serv., 825 F. Supp. 252, 253 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (“As a
jurisdictional prerequisite, an FTCA action can only be instituted once an administrative
claim is denied, either actually, or constructively by the agency’s failure to act upon the
claim within six months.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)). The absence of any denial by the
Army also appears not to be in dispute. Plaintiff alleges it was never denied (Compl. ¶ 8;
see also Petrosian Decl. ¶ 4) and Defendant has not submitted any documentation of denial
of the claim by the Army. The only disputed issue is whether the April 7, 2022 claim was
withdrawn.
2. 	Rule 12(b)(1)
Before addressing Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff did not comply with the
FTCA exhaustion requirement because the claim was withdrawn, the Court addresses the
type of Rule 12(b)(1) challenge before the Court. 	“A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack
may be facial or factual.” 	Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.
2004) (citation omitted). 	“In a facial attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations
contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” 	Id.
This does not appear to be a facial attack because Defendant does not argue the allegations
of the Complaint are insufficient, however, it is also not clearly a factual attack because
Defendant has presented no evidence to dispute the allegations of the Complaint.
///
///
Case 3:23-cv-02198-RBM-JLB Document 8 Filed 03/12/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
6 of 12

7
3:23-cv-02198-RBM-JLB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
“[I]n a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by
themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” 	Id. Defendant argues Plaintiff
“failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before commencing this action” because he
“withdrew his administrative claim and did not reopen it prior to filing suit.” (Doc. 5 at 5;
see also Doc. 5 at 2.) 	While Defendant’s Motion goes beyond the allegations of the
Complaint, as permissible for a Rule 12(b)(1) factual attack on jurisdiction, no evidence
has been submitted in support. 	See Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039 (“Once the
moving party has converted the motion to dismiss into a factual motion by presenting
affidavits or other evidence properly brought before the court, the party opposing the
motion must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of
establishing subject matter jurisdiction.”) (emphasis added). 	Defendant asserts in the
Motion that the same day Plaintiff presented his claim, April 7, 2022, the Army sent a letter
to his then counsel, Levin, requesting documentation. 	(Doc. 5 at 5.4) 	Defendant then
aruges that Levin “did not respond and on June 22, 2022 … withdrew the claim and
provided a letter to the Army (which was directed to [Plaintiff]) conveying that she no
longer represented him and warned him of ‘strict time limitations’ which could ‘forever
bar’ his claim.” (Doc. 5 at 5 (citing “See Ex. 1, Ltr. [f]rom Levin to Mota dated May 12,
2022”).) This letter was not filed in support of Defendant’s Motion or Reply.
Despite the absence of evidence from Defendant, the Court proceeds to consider
Defendant’s argument for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. As explained
further below, the declaration from Plaintiff’s current counsel, submitted in support of
Plaintiff’s Opposition, does not clearly indicate whether Plaintiff’s April 7, 2022 claim was
withdrawn, and Plaintiff still “bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.”
4 The Court presumes this is the section of the April 7, 2022 letter from the Army that
includes at the bottom of the first page a list of “information/documents which are required
to properly investigate and adjudicate your claim.” 	(Decl. of Arthur M. Petrousian
(“Petrousian Decl.”), Ex. A (“April 7, 2022 Letter”) [Doc. 6 at 15].) 	This letter was
submitted only by Plaintiff in support of his Opposition. (Id.)
Case 3:23-cv-02198-RBM-JLB Document 8 Filed 03/12/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
7 of 12

8
3:23-cv-02198-RBM-JLB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 546 F.3d 981, 984 (9th
Cir. 2008) (“The party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing subject matter
jurisdiction on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”); see also
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 671 (2009) (“Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be
forfeited or waived and should be considered when fairly in doubt.”) (citations omitted).
a) 	Withdrawal of the Claim
The only dispute appears to be whether Plaintiff withdrew his April 7, 2022
administrative claim, as argued by Defendant, or if it remained pending without any action
by the Army, as seemingly asserted by Plaintiff. As noted above, the letter from Levin to
Plaintiff has not been submitted, however, even as described, there are issues with
Defendant’s reliance on this letter alone to establish Plaintiff’s claim was withdrawn. First,
it is unclear how an attorney that withdrew from representing Plaintiff on May 12, 2022
had the authority to withdraw his administrative claim from the Army on June 22, 2022.
Second, assuming Levin still had the authority to withdraw Plaintiff’s claim on June 22,
2022, it is concerning that no other documentation of that withdrawal has been provided
by Defendant. Unlike the unsubmitted May 12, 2022 letter, there are no references in the
Motion to any other evidence showing Levin withdrew the claim, particularly while still
representing Plaintiff.5 Defendant has not submitted any records or documents from the
Army indicating they were treating the claim as withdrawn or closed or otherwise notified
Plaintiff of the Army’s withdrawal or closing of his claim. 	Without any evidence or
documentation, or even a declaration attesting to what the Army did with the claim, it is
unclear if it was properly withdrawn or if the claim submitted on April 7, 2022 was simply
never acted on by the Army, leaving Plaintiff the option to treat the claim as constructively
denied and file a FTCA claim in this Court. 	See § 2675(a) (“The failure of an agency to
5 It is not even clear from Defendant’s argument how the claim was withdrawn, i.e. by
phone, email, or other correspondence, because no documentation from the Army as to
their actions has been submitted.
Case 3:23-cv-02198-RBM-JLB Document 8 Filed 03/12/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
8 of 12

9
3:23-cv-02198-RBM-JLB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
make a final disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed shall, at the option of
the claimant any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of this
section.”) (emphasis added).
However, Plaintiff’s arguments and Plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration raise more
questions than they answer. Some of Plaintiff’s arguments suggest that the administrative
claim was not withdrawn and others suggest it was, and Plaintiff’s failure to address the
issue directly leaves subject matter jurisdiction in question. First, it appears the claim was
likely considered closed in some respect, at least by the Army. Plaintiff explains that after
the claim was submitted, “Plaintiff’s prior counsel … withdrew representation, which
delayed the administrative process,” suggesting the claim remained pending before the
Army for decision, but then Plaintiff’s counsel references Levin notifying Plaintiff of the
consequences “of failing to reopen the administrative claim,” suggesting it was at least
closed if not withdrawn. (Petrousian Decl. ¶ 3 (emphasis added).) Plaintiff also asserts the
claim “was neither denied nor acted upon within six months” and “the delay in agency
action 	cannot 	be 	imputed 	to 	Plaintiff, 	particularly 	where 	prior 	counsel 	withdrew
representation.” 	(Id. 	at 	5.) 	Plaintiff’s 	current 	counsel 	attests 	that 	he 	“reopened
communications and filed this action on December 1, 2023, well within the statute of
limitations as filing an administrative claim tolls the statute of limitations indefinitely or
until the Army takes final administrative action in writing on the claim.” (Id. at 3.) What
constituted “reopening communications” is unclear. 	Additionally, Plaintiff characterizes
his counsel’s “withdrawal, over which Plaintiff had no control” as “temporarily paus[ing]
the process,” although it is unclear if the withdrawal Plaintiff references is of the claim or
prior counsel’s withdrawal from representation of Plaintiff. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff also argues
“dismissal is not warranted when the agency has received a claim and failed to act for over
six months” suggesting the claim remained pending before the Army for action. (Id. at 4–
5.)
Although Defendant failed to present evidence on this issue, even Plaintiff’s
counsel’s declaration and argument suggest the April 7, 2022 claim may have been
Case 3:23-cv-02198-RBM-JLB Document 8 Filed 03/12/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
9 of 12

10
3:23-cv-02198-RBM-JLB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
withdrawn. 	On this record, the Court is not convinced it has subject matter jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is GRANTED.
However, because it is possible Plaintiff could cure this deficiency by more clearly
articulating all the facts regarding submission of and any withdrawal of the April 7, 2022
claim, the Court will GRANT Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint that explicitly
and in detail addresses Plaintiff’s compliance with § 2675(a).
C. 	Service
Defendant moves under Rule 12(b)(5) to dismiss the Complaint for insufficient
service of process. 	Defendant argues Plaintiff has not completed service as required by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i) because Plaintiff has not served the Attorney General.
The requirements for service of the United States are detailed in Rule 4(i). 	Rule 4(i)(1)
provides:
To serve the United States, a party must:
(A)(i) deliver a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the United
States attorney for the district where the action is brought--or to an assistant
United States attorney or clerical employee whom the United States attorney
designates in a writing filed with the court clerk--or
(ii) send a copy of each by registered or certified mail to the civil-
process clerk at the United States attorney’s office;
(B) send a copy of each by registered or certified mail to the Attorney
General of the United States at Washington, D.C.; and
(C) if the action challenges an order of a nonparty agency or officer of
the United States, send a copy of each by registered or certified mail to the
agency or officer.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1)(emphasis added).
Based on a review of: (1) the two proofs of service Plaintiff filed that appear to serve
the Army and the United States Attorney’s Office for this District (Docs. 3–4); (2)
Defendant’s unchallenged assertion that the Attorney General has not been served (Doc. 5
at 7); and (3) the absence of a proof of service on the Attorney General, the Court concludes
that Plaintiff did not complete service on the United States under Rule 4(i). Plaintiff does
not dispute that he has not served the Attorney General but argues he “made reasonable
Case 3:23-cv-02198-RBM-JLB Document 8 Filed 03/12/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
10 of 12

11
3:23-cv-02198-RBM-JLB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
efforts to effect service in accordance with Rule 4(i) and requests an extension of time
under Rule 4(m) to complete service.”
Rule 4(m) “requires a district court to grant an extension of time if good cause is
shown and permits the district court to grant such an extension even absent good cause.”
Mann v. Am. Airlines, 324 F.3d 1088, 1090 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Henderson v. United
States, 517 U.S. 654, 662 (1996)). 	“District courts have broad discretion to extend time
for service under Rule 4(m),” but it is not “limitless.” 	Efaw v. Williams, 473 F.3d 1038,
1041 (9th Cir. 2007) (reversing district court’s grant of extension of the time to serve after
seven-year delay with no explanation from the district court why extension was granted).
“In making extension decisions under Rule 4(m) a district court may consider factors “like
a statute of limitations bar, prejudice to the defendant, actual notice of a lawsuit, and
eventual service.” Id. (quoting Troxell v. Fedders of N. Am., Inc., 160 F.3d 381, 383 (7th
Cir.1998)).
Here, Plaintiff’s showing of good cause is not particularly persuasive. (Doc. 6 at 7–
9.) 	Plaintiff primarily characterizes service deficiencies as “technical” and “minor” and
asserts that he has been diligent without explaining what he has done to complete service
or why he did not serve the Attorney General. 	(Id. at 7–8.) 	However, given the record
reflects that Plaintiff did attempt to complete service by serving the Army and the United
States Attorney’s Office (Doc. 3–4) and this partial service provided the United States
notice of the case, the Court denies dismissal based on insufficient service under Rule 5.
Plaintiff’s time to complete service is extended to no later than April 10, 2026.
III. 	CONCLUSION
The Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The
United States Army and Mr. Bizor are DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
The Complaint is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 	If Plaintiff chooses to
amend, the amended complaint must comply with this Order and address in detail any
withdrawal of or closing of Plaintiff’s April 7, 2022 claim. The amended complaint must
be filed by March 27, 2026. Plaintiff must complete service under Rule 4(i) on or before
Case 3:23-cv-02198-RBM-JLB Document 8 Filed 03/12/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
11 of 12

12
3:23-cv-02198-RBM-JLB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
April 10, 2026. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, Defendant shall respond to it by
April 17, 2026.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 12, 2026
Case 3:23-cv-02198-RBM-JLB Document 8 Filed 03/12/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
12 of 12