Attia v. Oura Ring, Inc. et al

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United States District Court
Northern District of California
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
PETER ATTIA,
Plaintiff,
v.
OURARING INC., et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 23-cv-03433-HSG
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
MODIFY THE SCHEDULING ORDER
Re: Dkt. No. 308
Pending before the Court is the motion to modify the scheduling order submitted by
Defendants Oura Ring, Inc. and Oura Health Ltd. (“Defendant”1). Dkt. No. 308. The Court finds
this matter appropriate for disposition without oral argument and the matter is deemed
submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). The Court DENIES the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
The parties are familiar with the factual background underlying this dispute, which the
Court has detailed in a prior order. Dkt. No. 31. Relevant here, the Court issued an amended
scheduling order on December 3, 2025 setting trial and pretrial deadlines. Dkt. No. 158. In that
order, the Court set the dispositive motion hearing deadline for May 7, 2026, and set trial to begin
on August 31, 2026. Id. at 1. Although it filed three Daubert motions in early March, Defendant
did not file a motion for summary judgment at that time, and it did not file one by the April 2
filing deadline set by the Local Rules. L.R. 7-2(a). On April 25, 2026, Defendant moved to
modify the case scheduling order.
1 In its papers, Defendant refers to itself as a singular party (“Oura”). For the sake of consistency,
the Court does so too.
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II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b) provides that the district court must issue a
scheduling order that limits the time to join other parties, amend the pleadings, complete
discovery, and file motions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Once in place, “[a] schedule may be
modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Id. The “good cause” requirement
of Rule 16 “primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” See Johnson
v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992); see also 6A Wright & Miller, et
al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 1522.2 (3d ed. 2018) (“What constitutes good cause sufficient to justify
the modification of a scheduling order necessarily varies with the circumstances of each case.”).
“The district court may modify the pretrial schedule if it cannot reasonably be met despite the
diligence of the party seeking the extension.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609 (quotation omitted).
“Although the existence or degree of prejudice to the party opposing the modification might
supply additional reasons to deny a motion . . . [i]f [the] party was not diligent, the inquiry should
end.” Id.
III. DISCUSSION
The Court finds that Defendant did not act diligently with regard to its motion for summary
judgment, requiring denial of the motion to modify the case scheduling order. Since December 3,
2025, the parties have been on notice of the pretrial and trial deadlines in this case. Dkt. No. 158.
Under the Local Rules, the parties were permitted to file their dispositive motions and Daubert
motions 35 days before the May 7, 2026 hearing date, meaning that they could file as late as April
2, 2026. L.R. 7-2(a).
The case scheduling order set an unequivocal deadline of May 7, 2026 for the hearing on
dispositive motions. Dkt. No. 158. Defendant appears to have understood the importance of that
deadline. Defendant indicates, for example, that it was actively monitoring the May 7 hearing
date, and that it observed the clerk reject certain motions noticed for hearing on that date. Dkt.
No. 308 at 12; see also Dkt. No. 268 at 2. Defendant explains that it missed the filing deadline as
a “result of [a] good-faith error”—it believed the Court’s hearing date was no longer available
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based on the Court’s scheduling notes. Dkt. No. 308 at 7.2 Defendant essentially asserts that there
was some conflict between the case scheduling order and the Court’s Standing Order, and that the
former overrode the latter. Diligent counsel would have, at a minimum, sought clarification.
Instead, Defendant watched the deadline pass, only seeking leave to amend the case scheduling
order after the relevant deadline had passed.
Defendant indicates that it “mistakenly believed that the filing deadline by when it could
have filed its Proposed Motion had passed, and that it would need to seek a scheduling
modification.” Id. at 12. But the Court finds this assertion unconvincing. Defendant represents
that it believed the hearing date was unavailable shortly after March 7. Id. If Defendant knew that
it would need to seek a scheduling modification since early- to mid-March, then it was not
reasonable (or diligent) to wait nearly seven weeks, until April 25, 2026, to file this motion. A
diligent party would have moved to amend the case schedule immediately upon concluding that
the hearing date was unavailable. Alternatively, after Plaintiff timely filed his motion for
summary judgment on April 2, a diligent party would have immediately moved to amend the case
schedule. Defendant did not do so. Defendant is represented by sophisticated counsel who easily
could have—and should have—taken any number of steps to diligently work towards meeting this
critical deadline before it passed. The Court finds that Defendant’s “carelessness is not
compatible with a finding of diligence.” Johnson, 975 F.2d 604 at 609. And because the Court
finds that Defendant was not diligent, its good cause inquiry ends. Id.; Zivkovic v. Southern
California Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1097 (9th Cir. 2002).3
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2 Unless otherwise noted, all references to page numbers herein are to the ECF header at the top of
the page.
3 Defendant’s primary argument in its contemplated motion for summary judgment concerns
choice of law issues. See Dkt. No. 308-2 at 20–28 (advancing arguments that Finnish law governs
this dispute under contractual choice-of-law rules, the internal affairs doctrine, or the
governmental interests test). Defendant has already briefed those arguments in response to
Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. Dkt. No. 282 at 14–16.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:
______________________________________
HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.
United States District Judge
June 23, 2026
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