Barroca et al v. Hayward Area Recreation And Parks District et al

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
ROBERT BARROCA, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
HAYWARD AREA RECREATION AND
PARKS DISTRICT, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-cv-00440-EMC
ORDER GRANTING IN PART
MOTION TO DISMISS
Docket No. 95
Plaintiff Robert Barroca, proceeding pro se, has sued the Hayward Area Recreation and
Parks District (HARD) as well as HARD rangers Ed Untalan, Dachineewan Oliver, Hillary
Fitzpatrick, and retired HARD employee Marco Hernandez, alleging failure to perform mandatory
duties under California law and numerous violations of the federal constitution, including the
Fourteenth, Fourth, and First Amendment. Defendant HARD, on behalf of itself and its
employees, moves to dismiss all counts based on the California Tort Claims Act, qualified
immunity, and failure to state a claim.
For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s claim under the Fourteenth Amendment for
Selective Enforcement against Defendant Fitzpatrick may proceed; HARD’s motion to dismiss is
DENIED as to this count against this defendant. Otherwise, HARD’s motion to dismiss is
GRANTED on all counts and as to all defendants.
The Court also DISMISSES Plaintiff Gomes under Rule 41 and STRIKES Plaintiff
Barroca’s claim against Officer Ghishan, which was improperly realleged after dismissal with
prejudice.
Case 3:25-cv-00440-EMC Document 124 Filed 02/23/26 Page 1 of 25

2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Meek Park is a public park in Hayward, California, operated by HARD. Dkt. No. 93,
(SAC) ¶¶ 1-3. In 2021, Plaintiff Robert Barroca’s girlfriend Raelynn Gomes moved into a
residence in Hayward, California that abuts Meek Park. SAC ¶ 1.
In the summer of 2022, Plaintiff Barroca took over feeding a group of approximately
twenty cats in the park. Id. ¶ 21. These cats were “not all feral but were actually neighborhood
cats that Barroca had seen on doorsteps and in the front yards of neighboring houses.” Id. He fed
these cats every day twice a day. Id. Plaintiff was motivated to care for the cats by his catholic
faith and the teachings of St. Francis of Assisi. Id. ¶¶ 41-42 (Plaintiff “takes care of, feeds,
shelters, provides medical needs, spay and neuters, play, love, and protected these cats” out of
“love and faith from his own religious beliefs.”)
Around the time that Plaintiff began to take care of the cats, Plaintiff became aware that
many patrons of Meek Park walked their dogs off-leash. Id. ¶ 23. This concerned Plaintiff
because off-leash dogs were prone to chasing cats and otherwise acting aggressively. Id. ¶ 24, 25.
Plaintiff was himself bitten four times. Id. ¶ 26, 37. On many occasions, Plaintiff asked dog
owners to put their dogs on leash but they frequently responded confrontationally. Id. ¶ 26. For
example, one dog owner pulled a gun on Plaintiff after being asked to put his dog on a leash. Id. ¶
37. Plaintiff started “video taping every single encounter.” Id. ¶ 26. To date, Plaintiff has “over
2,700 videos and pictures, most of them of off-leash dogs.” Id.
HARD Ordinance 19(a) provides that “All pets shall be restrained at all times on a leash or
device no more than 6 feet in length and under the complete control of the pets’ owner or person
in possession of the pet, except when in District designated off-leash areas.” Id. at Ex. B (HARD
Ordinance No. 001-02 as amended 10/21/2019). Plaintiff began to make frequent calls to the
HARD park rangers to report these incidents of off-leash dogs. Id. ¶ 27. Between the summer of
2022 and 2023, Plaintiff called the rangers “hundreds of times.” Id. ¶ 38. The rangers were
“bothered by the amount of phone calls.” Id. ¶ 33.
When Plaintiff called in a complaint, the park rangers would typically either not show up
Case 3:25-cv-00440-EMC Document 124 Filed 02/23/26 Page 2 of 25

3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
or show up a couple of hours after he called, by which time the off-leash owners had already left
the park. Id. ¶ 28, 38. When Plaintiff asked the rangers why it was taking them so long to
respond, he was told that there were only five rangers for over 128 parks and that there was simply
not enough manpower to respond more quickly. Id. ¶ 28. However, Plaintiff often observed
HARD rangers in the park ignoring off-leash dogs. Id. ¶ 29.
Sometime in January, 2023, while feeding cats at the park, Plaintiff observed a group of
parkgoers drinking and playing loud music in the park. Id. ¶ 30. Plaintiff believed them to be in
violation of HARD Ordinances 16(a), 20(a), and 23(a), which prohibit consuming alcohol and
being unusually loud. Id.; Ex. B. Plaintiff got into an argument with one of these parkgoers, who
pulled a knife on him. Id. After this, Plaintiff left the park. Id.
The next day, Defendant HARD Ranger Ed Untalen approached Plaintiff while he was
feeding the cats and told him that he had been dispatched due to a complaint about Plaintiff
feeding cats in the park. Id. ¶ 31. Ranger Untalan told Plaintiff not to feed the cats on district
property. Id. Plaintiff expressed his frustration to Ranger Untalan that “all of the hundreds of
times Barroca had called Rangers none ever came” to address his complaints of violations for
drinking alcohol, doing drugs, lighting fires, sleeping in the park, blasting music, and off-leash
dogs, but when there is a complaint about Plaintiff feeding the cats, a ranger “miraculously
appears.” Id. ¶ 31.
On April 9, 2023, Plaintiff observed Defendant Marco Hernandez having a family
barbecue in the park. Id. ¶ 34. Mr. Hernandez is a retired HARD employee who occupies the
caretaker’s house in the park. Id. ¶ 18. Mr. Hernandez and Plaintiff had prior history: Mr.
Hernandez had previously confronted Plaintiff about his feeding of the cats, telling Plaintiff “You
feed those f-ken cats . . . fuck those cats, those cats shit in my yard.” Id. ¶ 22. Plaintiff had
responded to this “angrily.” Id.
Mr. Hernandez’ barbecue was located next to the caretaker’s house in a public area of the
park. Id. ¶ 34. Plaintiff observed a fire and that alcohol was being served, which Plaintiff
believed to violate HARD Ordinances 18(a) and 16(a), which ban serving alcohol and open fires.
Id. ¶ 34; Ex. B. Plaintiff walked over and began to film the barbecue from 150 yards away. Id. ¶
Case 3:25-cv-00440-EMC Document 124 Filed 02/23/26 Page 3 of 25

4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
34. Ten minutes later, Defendant Ranger Dachineewan Oliver entered the park and spoke with
Mr. Hernandez. Id. She then approached Plaintiff and questioned him on why he was video
recording Mr. Hernandez. Id. Ranger Oliver ordered Plaintiff to stop filming. Id. ¶ 35. After
Plaintiff refused, Ranger Oliver called the Alameda County Sheriffs. Id. ¶ 36. When four sheriffs
deputies arrived, Ranger Oliver told them there had been an altercation. Id. Plaintiff does not
allege that he was arrested or that the deputies took any further action. Id.
In the summer of 2023, HARD put up new signs in the park that read, “All Pets Must Be
On A Leash, No Longer Than 6 Feet in Length” and “Feeding of Wild or Feral Animals
Prohibited.” Id. ¶ 39-40. Plaintiff believed that these new signs were posted because of Plaintiff’s
numerous complaints and his feeding of the neighborhood cats. Id. ¶ 41. Plaintiff maintains that
the rule on feeding feral animals does not apply to his activities, because the cats he feeds are not
feral, but are neighborhood cats. Id.
On August 31, 2023, Plaintiff was again feeding cats in the park. Id. ¶ 43. Defendant
Thomas Vigil, a HARD maintenance employee, yelled at Plaintiff in “an aggressive and
intimidating manner” to stop feeding the cats. Id. ¶ 44. Plaintiff began to videotape him. Id. A
half hour later, Defendant HARD Ranger Hillary Fitzpatrick showed up. Id. ¶ 45.
Ranger Fitzpatrick cited Plaintiff for having his cats off leash in violation of Ordinance
19(a) and for feeding these cats in the park. Id. She said that Plaintiff had threatened her staff
and instructed Plaintiff not to videotape anyone in the park without their consent. Id. Ranger
Fitzpatrick then called the Alameda County Sheriff for back-up, stating that Plaintiff was not
complying with her citation and was known to carry weapons. Id. Plaintiff was not carrying any
weapons at this time. Id.
Plaintiff complied with the citation and informed Ranger Fitzpatrick that the house
adjoining the park was his girlfriend’s house, not his. Id. ¶ 46. When the Alameda County sheriff
deputy arrived, Ranger Fitzpatrick told him that Plaintiff had threatened her staff. Id. Plaintiff
disputed her characterization and showed the deputy his recording of his encounter with Mr. Vigil.
Id. After viewing the recording, the deputy told Ranger Fitzpatrick that Plaintiff was not a threat.
Id. When Plaintiff told the deputy that Ranger Fitzpatrick had instructed him that he could not
Case 3:25-cv-00440-EMC Document 124 Filed 02/23/26 Page 4 of 25

5
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
videotape people in the park without their consent, the deputy replied, “Yes, he can.” Id. ¶ 47. A
half hour after this incident, Plaintiff reported a large dog running off leash in the park, but no
rangers showed up. Id. ¶ 49.
On September 11, 2023, Ranger Fitzpatrick again approached Plaintiff while he was in the
park petting two cats. Id. ¶ 50. She told Plaintiff that he was the” only one in the park that wasn’t
compliant” with the leash ordinance and told him to feed the cats on his girlfriend’s property. Id.
¶ 51. Plaintiff argued that the “all pets” language of the leash rule does not refer to cats, pointing
out that the park sign pictures a dog and that some pets, like hamsters, cannot be put on a leash.
Id. He also argued that his feeding the cats is no different than dog owners feeding their dogs. Id.
¶ 53. Plaintiff accused Ranger Fitzpatrick of harassing him because she favored Mr. Hernandez
and of selectively enforcing the rules against him. Id. ¶ 52.
At this point, a dog owner in the park joined the conversation and began to argue with
Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 53, 54. His dog was on a leash over 20 feet long. Id. ¶ 53. The dog owner and
Plaintiff called each other names, after which the dog owner threatened to punch Plaintiff and
break the phone he was using to record the incident. Id. ¶ 54. Ranger Fitzpatrick witnessed this
but did not cite the dog owner either for having a leash more than 6 feet long or for threatening
behavior in violation of HARD ordinance 20(a). Id. ¶ 55. When Plaintiff reported the dog owner
afterward for the leash violation, Ranger Fitzpatrick stated that the leash was not longer than 6
feet. Id. ¶ 56. In the days following this incident, Plaintiff recorded video of multiple dogs
running off-leash in the park, as well as rangers showing up at the park, witnessing the off-leash
dogs, and doing nothing about them. Id. ¶ 60, 61.
On January 30, 2024, Plaintiff stabbed a man in Meek Park, for which he was arrested and
prosecuted. See Dkt. No. 63 at 5; see generally 3:94-cr-00470-EMC-1 (Criminal Matter).
Plaintiff claims that “HARD Rangers are supposed to search these areas specifically for homeless,
criminals, people sleeping in the park, when they close the gates,” and that “if defendant Ranger
Oliver would have done her job and the mentally ill homeless man masturbating in the park
wouldn’t have been there, the incident would not have occurred.” Id. ¶ 65.
After the stabbing incident, Plaintiff alleges that Ranger Oliver provided “false
Case 3:25-cv-00440-EMC Document 124 Filed 02/23/26 Page 5 of 25

6
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
information” to Plaintiff’s probation officer that Plaintiff “lived at his girlfriend’s house that
bordered the park” despite knowing that Plaintiff actually lived at his sister’s house. Id. ¶ 66, 75.
Plaintiff alleges that the rangers knew his correct address because they had seen his driver’s
license and issued citations to Plaintiff using that address. Id. ¶ 66, 75; p.37, Claim 6. Plaintiff
alleges this information led to the search of Ms. Gomes’ house, which occurred on May 30, 2024.
Id. ¶ 66, 79. Although Plaintiff characterizes this search as illegal and describes the circumstances
behind it at length, the Court has previously dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment claim regarding the search as barred by qualified immunity. See Dkt. No. 63.
On July 17, 2025, Plaintiff Gomes received a phone call from her property manager, Ron
Smith. Id. ¶ 80. Mr. Smith informed her that he had received a call from an individual from
HARD. Id. This unknown individual told Mr. Smith that Plaintiff “had created and was involved
in multiple incidents in the Park that this person represented and was considered a nuisance.” Id.
at p.41, Claim 8. Mr. Smith then told Ms. Gomes that if the information was true and the behavior
persisted, it “could affect her tenancy negatively, meaning that she could be evicted.” Id. Mr.
Smith “made clear that he was not filing an eviction at this time” but that it could be “a possibility
in the future” and stated that “it would be a good idea if she [Ms. Gomez] restricted Mr. Barroca
from visiting her.” Id.
Plaintiff categorizes his claims by factual incident, rather than legal theory. The Court
understands Plaintiff to assert the following claims: Breach of Mandatory Duties under California
Code Section 815.6; Selective Enforcement in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; First
Amendment Retaliation; Free Exercise; Provision of False Information in violation of the Fourth
Amendment; Fourth Amendment Search Violation.1
1 Plaintiff also alleged a defamation claim that was stricken at Dkt. No. 121, as Plaintiff
improperly realleged it after dismissal with prejudice. In addition, Plaintiff refers to the Fifth
Amendment at times but states no facts upon which a Fifth Amendment claim could be based or
any theory for such a claim. To the extent Plaintiff purports to assert a Fifth Amendment claim, it
is dismissed with prejudice.
Case 3:25-cv-00440-EMC Document 124 Filed 02/23/26 Page 6 of 25

7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed his complaint on January 13, 2025 proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis.
Dkt. No. 1. On February, 2019, he amended his complaint. Dkt. No. 12. The Alameda County
Defendants moved to dismiss the claims on March 12, 2025. Dkt. No. 24. Defendant Ghishan,
Plaintiff’s former probation officer, moved to dismiss on April 28, 2025. Dkt. No. 35. On August
1, 2025, the Court granted both motions to dismiss with prejudice. Dkt. No. 63.
On September 2, 2025, Defendant HARD moved to dismiss. Dkt. No. 77. That same
month, Plaintiff filed a motion for a TRO. Dkt. No. 78. The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for
TRO and preliminary injunction. Dkt. No. 85. Plaintiff also sought leave to amend, which the
Court granted. Dkt. No. 78, 81. The Court subsequently granted Plaintiff’s request for an
extension of time to file his second amended complaint. Dkt. No. 92, 93. On October 30, 2025,
HARD brought the instant motion to dismiss the SAC. Dkt. No. 95. After requesting and
receiving an extension of time from the Court, Plaintiff opposed. Dkt. No. 105, 108.
On November 4, 2025, the Alameda County Defendants filed a motion to strike/dismiss
the defamation claim that the Court had previously dismissed with prejudice. Dkt. No. 97. The
Court granted this motion on January, 22. Dkt. No. 121.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a defendant to move to dismiss on the
ground that there is a “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” A motion to
dismiss should be granted if the plaintiff fails to proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (abrogating
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957)). The Court “must accept as
true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007). The Court need not accept as true allegations that are legal conclusions, unwarranted
deductions of fact or unreasonable inferences. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d
979, 988, amended, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001). “A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally
construed,’ and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
Case 3:25-cv-00440-EMC Document 124 Filed 02/23/26 Page 7 of 25

8
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers’” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 8(a)
As a threshold matter, HARD seeks dismissal on Rule 8(a) grounds. Rule 8 requires a
plaintiff to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” The Ninth Circuit has upheld dismissal on Rule 8(a) grounds where a complaint consists
of “narrative ramblings” and does “not provide defendants notice of what legal claims are asserted
against which defendants.” McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1175-1176 (9th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff’s complaint here, while given to narrative asides, does provide concrete factual
allegations tied to recognizable legal theories. The complaint also specifies which individually
named defendants were involved in which specific incidents. The Court finds the complaint
sufficient under Rule 8(a) to put the defendants on notice to the facts and claims asserted. While
the Court appreciates Defendants’ concerns over whether the SAC is fit to “serve as the document
that will define the issues and control the litigation and discovery in this matter,” the Court does
not find that these prudential concerns merit dismissal. Dkt. No. 95 at p.8. This order
substantially narrows the live issues in the case and Defendants’ discovery obligations will be so
tailored.
B. State Law Claims
Plaintiff seeks to hold HARD liable under Cal. Gov. Code § 815.6 (“Liability for failure to
discharge statutory duty”) for injuries he has suffered due to HARD’s alleged failure to enforce
various park ordinances. SAC at p.32.
1. Plaintiffs’ State Law Claims Are Barred by the California Tort Claims Act
The California Tort Claims Act (“CTCA”), codified as California Government Code §
911.2, requires that “[a] claim relating to a cause of action [against public entities] . . . shall be
presented . . . not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action.” Cal. Gov. Code §
Case 3:25-cv-00440-EMC Document 124 Filed 02/23/26 Page 8 of 25

9
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
911.2. This prerequisite is a mandatory condition precedent to filing suit and applies to state law
claims for damages asserted against public entities. See Mangold v. California Public Utilities
Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995). The claim filing requirement has been held
applicable to claims including breach of statutory duties. Lozada v. City & Cty. of S.F., 145 Cal.
App. 4th 1139, 1152 (Cal. App. 2006).
Plaintiff Barroca did not file any written claim within the prescribed period, so he may not
pursue any of his state law claims against HARD as damages actions. Plaintiff argues it was
“unnecessary to comply” with the CTCA because his claims are constitutional in nature. Dkt. No.
108 at 5. Plaintiff does not allege any claims under the California constitution; he does appear to
allege state law claims for breach of statutory duties under California Gov. Code Section 815.6.
Such state claims are subject to the CTCA and must be dismissed for failure to comply with the
CTCA.
2. Plaintiff’s State Law Claims under California Government Code Section 815.6 Also Fail
Because Plaintiff Does Not Show a Mandatory Duty
Even if Plaintiff’s state law claims were not barred by the CTCA, his state law claims
could not proceed for failure to show that HARD violated a mandatory duty.
California public entities are typically immune to tort liability. Lawson v. Superior Court,
180 Cal. App. 4th 1372, 1382 (Cal. 2010) (citing Cal. Gov. Code 815). However, Section 815.6
provides a private right of action against a public entity that fails to discharge a mandatory duty.
Cal. Gov. Code Section 815.6 (“Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an
enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity
is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the
public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.”). For
liability to attach, the “enactment at issue be obligatory, rather than merely discretionary or
permissive, in its directions to the public entity; it must require, rather than merely authorize or
permit, that a particular action be taken or not taken.” San Mateo Union High Sch. Dist. v. Cty. of
San Mateo, 213 Cal. App. 4th 418, 428 (Cal. App. 2013). “It is not enough, moreover, that the
Case 3:25-cv-00440-EMC Document 124 Filed 02/23/26 Page 9 of 25

10
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
public entity or officer have been under an obligation to perform a function if the function itself
involves the exercise of discretion.” Hacala v. Bird Rides, Inc. 90 Cal. App. 5th 292, 305–306
(Cal. App. 2003).
Plaintiff argues that Cal. Pub. Resources Code § 5786.17(c) and HARD Ordinance 001-
003 Section 5 enact a mandatory duty for HARD rangers to enforce violations of park ordinances.
These enactments together provide:
Cal. Pub. Resources Code § 5786.17(c):
“To protect property and to preserve the peace at recreation facilities
and other property owned or managed by a district, the board of
directors may confer on designated uniformed district employees the
power to issue citations for misdemeanor and infraction violations of
state law, city or county ordinances, or district rules, regulations, or
ordinances when the violation is committed within a recreation
facility and in the presence of the employee issuing the citation.
District employees shall issue citations pursuant to Chapter 5C
(commencing with Section 853.5) of Title 3 of Part 2 of the Penal
Code.” (emphasis added).
HARD Ordinance 001-003 Section 5:
“In accordance with Public Resource Code section 5786.17, and to
protect property and preserve the peace at recreation facilities and
other property owned and managed by the District, the board of
directors confers on District Park Rangers, the power to issue citations
for misdemeanor and infraction violations of state law, city or county
ordinances, or district rules, regulations, or ordinances when the
violation is committed within a recreation facility and in the presence
of the employee issuing the citation.”
Plaintiff locates a mandatory duty in the language that district employees with the power to
issue citations, which include HARD rangers, “shall issue citations pursuant to Chapter 5C
(commencing with Section 853.5) of Title 3 of Part 2 of the Penal Code.” (emphasis added).
However, on a plain reading this sentence requires that when district employees issue citations, it
must be according to Chapter 5C of the penal code; it does not impose a mandatory duty to issue a
citation every time a violation is committed in the officer’s presence. Plaintiff also cites to a
HARD Ordinance which provides that HARD rangers have “the primary responsibility to enforce
these Regulations and other District rules as assisted by local law enforcement officers.” Dkt. No.
108 at 8. But the fact that the rangers have the ability and responsibility to enforce their
regulations does not imply a mandatory duty to enforce in every instance.
Case 3:25-cv-00440-EMC Document 124 Filed 02/23/26 Page 10 of 25

11
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
Because Plaintiff has failed to show that HARD had a mandatory duty to enforce any
particular park ordinances, HARD cannot be held liable under Section 815.6 and is immune from
suit for state law claims. Plaintiffs’ state law claims against HARD are dismissed.
C. Federal Claims under Section 1983
1. Qualified Immunity
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231
(2009). “Qualified immunity shields an officer from suit when she makes a decision that, even if
constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the circumstances she
confronted.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004). To determine whether a
government official is entitled to qualified immunity, a court should decide whether the facts that a
plaintiff has alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right, and if so, determine whether the
right at issue was “clearly established” at the time of the allegedly unconstitutional conduct.
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. “Qualified immunity is applicable unless the official’s conduct violated
a clearly established constitutional right.” Id. A right is not clearly established “unless the right's
contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would
have understood that he was violating it.” Manriquez v. Ensley, 46 F.4th 1124, 1130-31 (9th Cir.
2022) (quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014)). “[T]he assertion of an affirmative
defense [such as qualified immunity] may be considered properly on a motion to dismiss where
the ‘allegations in the complaint suffice to establish’ the defense.’” Sams v. Yahoo! Inc., 713 F.3d
1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007)).
Plaintiff asserts various constitutional claims against HARD’s rangers under Section 1983.
To succeed on any claim, he must not only plausibly allege that an officer violated a constitutional
right but also show that the right was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation.
Case 3:25-cv-00440-EMC Document 124 Filed 02/23/26 Page 11 of 25

12
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
2. Fourteenth Amendment Selective Enforcement
The Supreme Court has recognized Fourteenth Amendment “equal protection claims
brought by a ‘class of one,’ where the plaintiff alleges that []he has been intentionally treated
differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in
treatment.” Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam). To state such a
claim “a class-of-one plaintiff must be similarly situated to the proposed comparator in all material
respects.” SmileDirectClub, Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Tippins, 31 F.4th 1110, 1123 (9th Cir. 2022). There
must be “an extremely high degree of similarity between themselves and the persons to whom
they compare themselves.” Id. “Many courts have determined that this requirement should be
enforced ‘with particular strictness when the plaintiff invokes the class-of-one theory rather than
the more settled cognizable-group theory.’” Grant v. Corral, No. 2:19-cv-01495-MCE-CKD
(PS), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41079, at *19 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2021) (citing Warkentine v. Soria,
152 F. Supp. 3d 1269, 1294 (E.D. Cal. 2016).
Plaintiff alleges that HARD rangers have enforced park ordinances against him while
declining to do so against others. To state an equal protection claim, though, Plaintiff must satisfy
the similarly situated requirement. At minimum, this means alleging that the same ordinance was
enforced against him but not others for the same conduct. Most of Plaintiff’s alleged selective
enforcement does not meet this standard. Plaintiff alleges that the rangers enforced an ordinance
prohibiting feeding wild or feral animals against him for feeding the neighborhood cats but does
not allege that HARD declined to enforce this ordinance against a different parkgoer who was
feeding the cats (or some other animal that the HARD rangers consider wild or feral).2 See SAC
p. 33, 35 Claim 2 & 4. Plaintiff also alleges that HARD rangers failed to enforce park ordinances
relating to open fires and alcohol against other parkgoers but does not allege that the rangers
enforced these ordinances against him. See p. 33, Claim 3. That HARD rangers enforced certain
2 Plaintiff argues that HARD improperly applied the feral animal ordinance because the cats he fed
were not “feral or wild animals.” Whether or not Plaintiff is correct is irrelevant to his selective
enforcement claims, which turns on whether he has been treated differently than others in a similar
situation.
Case 3:25-cv-00440-EMC Document 124 Filed 02/23/26 Page 12 of 25

13
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
ordinances against Plaintiff while failing to enforce different ordinances against other parkgoers
does not satisfy the similarly situated requirement.
However, Plaintiff does allege that he was cited for violating HARD Ordinance 19(a),
which prohibits off-leash pets and leashes over six feet, but that the HARD rangers decline to
enforce this ordinance against others.3 Plaintiff provides extensive allegations that HARD rangers
do not generally enforce the leash ordinance against parkgoers, despite Plaintiff’s frequent calls
and complaints. See e.g., SAC ¶ 26 (over 2,700 videos and pictures “most of them of off-leash
dogs); id. ¶ 29 (alleging that HARD rangers frequently witness dogs running off-leash but take no
action); id. ¶¶ 60-61 (alleging Plaintiff recorded HARD rangers showing up, witnessing off-leash
dogs, and taking no action). Plaintiff also alleges that Ordinance 19(a) has been enforced against
him. On August 31, 2023, Plaintiff alleges that HARD Ranger Fitzpatrick cited him for having
cats off-leash. SAC ¶¶ 45-46. On September 11, 2023, Ranger Fitzpatrick again approached
Plaintiff while he was petting cats in the park to cite him for violating the leash ordinance. Id. ¶
50. She told him Plaintiff that he was “the only one in the park that wasn’t compliant” with the
leash ordinance. Id. While Plaintiff was arguing with Ranger Fitzpatrick over whether Ordinance
19(a) only applies to dogs, a dog-owner joined the conversation. Id. ¶¶ 51-54. He had his dog on
a leash longer than 20 feet, in facial violation of Ordinance 19(a). Id. ¶ 53. Ranger Fitzpatrick
ignored this alleged violation, even after Plaintiff called it to her attention. Id. ¶¶ 54-56. Plaintiff
alleges that Ranger Fitzpatrick chose to enforce the leash ordinance against him, but not others,
because she held animus against him due to his repeated confrontations with her former co-worker
Mr. Hernandez. Id. ¶ 52. Drawing all inferences in favor of Plaintiff, Plaintiff has thus alleged
that despite the rangers’ general policy of not enforcing Ordinance 19(a) against parkgoers, on two
occasions Ranger Fitzpatrick enforced this ordinance against Plaintiff – in one interaction,
declining to enforce the same ordinance against another parkgoer committing the same violation at
the same time – and that the reason for this difference in treatment was personal animus toward
3 Ordinance 19(a) provides that “All pets shall be restrained at all times on a leash or device no
more than 6 feet in length and under the complete control of the pets’ owner or person in
possession of the pet, except when in District designated off-leash areas.” SAC, Ex. B.
Case 3:25-cv-00440-EMC Document 124 Filed 02/23/26 Page 13 of 25

14
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
Plaintiff.
Of course, Ranger Fitzpatrick’s enforcement of the leash ordinance against Plaintiff in both
instances concerned cats, and the non-enforcement that Plaintiff identifies concerns dogs. But
HARD has not argued that the difference between a cat and a dog is “material” to the enforcement
of the “all pets” leash law. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged for the pleading stage that there is “an
extremely high degree of similarity between [himself] and the persons to whom [he] compare
[himself].” SmileDirectClub, Ltd. Liab. Co., 31 F.4th at 1123.
HARD has not pointed, in its briefing or in argument, to any rational basis for the alleged
difference in treatment. Rather, Defendant reiterates that “HARD park rangers are not employed
by Plaintiff Barroca to only respond to Plaintiff’s requests immediately and ignore that numerous
other parks serviced and patrolled by HARD park rangers.” Dkt. No. 111 at 3. HARD’s argument
would be well taken if Plaintiff’s allegations of non-enforcement of the leash laws concerned only
a lack of ranger presence or failure to respond promptly (or at all) to his calls, and if the rangers
applied this non-enforcement of the leash law to Plaintiff as well. But Plaintiff alleges that even
HARD rangers already present in the park and witnessing off-leash dogs did not enforce the leash
ordinance. And Plaintiff specifically alleges that Officer Fitzpatrick enforced the leash ordinance
against him but not a dog-owner also violating the same rule in the same encounter.
Plaintiff’s allegations of selective enforcement of Ordinance 19(a) are sufficient to state a
claim against Ranger Fitzpatrick. Plaintiff, however, does not state a claim as to any other HARD
rangers on this count.
The Court must consider whether qualified immunity provides a defense for Ranger
Fitzpatrick. It does not. The defense of qualified immunity is not typically available when a
plaintiff’s claim is based on intentional discrimination. See Gutierrez v. Mun. Court of Se.
Judicial Dist., 838 F.2d 1031, 1050-51 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[A] government official is not entitled to
qualified immunity from a Section 1981 or 1983 action that is based on a claim of intentional
discrimination.”) vacated on mootness grounds, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989); Barich v. City of Cotati,
No. 21-cv-00034-EMC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61141, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2021)
(“[Q]ualified immunity is not ordinarily available when the plaintiffs allege a claim which requires
Case 3:25-cv-00440-EMC Document 124 Filed 02/23/26 Page 14 of 25

15
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
intentional discrimination which, if proven, would clearly constitute a constitutional violation.”).
The gist of the equal protection claim here is that Ranger Fitzpatrick purposefully singled out
Plaintiff for adverse treatment compared to others who were similarly situated – i.e. intentional
discrimination.
Moreover, the law of class-of-one discrimination was clearly established in Village of
Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000), which held that a government official cannot
purposefully single out individuals and treat similarly situated individuals differently without a
rational basis, even if the plaintiff does not belong to a particular protected group. The Ninth
Circuit “consistently read[s] Olech broadly as clearly establishing the right to be free from
differential treatment by the state without a rational basis.” Ohana Control Sys. v. City & Cty. of
Honolulu, No. 22-15956, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 15994, at *3 (9th Cir. June 26, 2023) (mem.)
(affirming denial of motion to dismiss class-of-one claim and rejecting qualified immunity
defense).
Ranger Fitzpatrick is not entitled to qualified immunity on the equal protection claim.
HARD’s motion to dismiss the Fourteenth Amendment claim is DENIED as to Defendant
Fitzpatrick but GRANTED as to all other Defendants.
3. First Amendment Claims
a. Free Exercise
“[L]aws incidentally burdening religion are ordinarily not subject to strict scrutiny under
the Free Exercise Clause so long as they are neutral and generally applicable.” Fulton v. City of
Phila., 593 U.S. 522, 533 (2021) (declining to overturn Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882
(1990)).4 The Supreme Court has rejected the argument that “when otherwise prohibitable
conduct is accompanied by religious convictions, not only the convictions but the conduct itself
must be free from governmental regulation.” Smith, 494 U.S. at 882. A neutral and generally
4 In Fulton, the Court held that a law is not neutral and generally applicable when the state
provides a “mechanism for individualized exemptions,” and “refuse[s] to extend that system to
cases of ‘religious hardship’.” Fulton, 593 U.S. at 535 (citing Smith, 494 U. S., at 884).
Case 3:25-cv-00440-EMC Document 124 Filed 02/23/26 Page 15 of 25

16
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
applicable law is evaluated under the rational basis standard. Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d
1064, 1076 (9th Cir. 2015); accord Bacon v. Woodward, No. 22-35611, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS
14759, at *4 (9th Cir. June 18, 2024) (mem.). Under rational basis, a law must be upheld if it is
“rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.” Stormans, 794 F.3d at 1084. Plaintiff
has “the burden to negative every conceivable basis which might support [the rule],” FCC v.
Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff alleges that under his Catholic faith and the teachings of St. Francis of Assisi, he
believes he has “a duty to God to take care of and love all of God’s animals.” SAC ¶ 41. Due to
these religious beliefs, Plaintiff “takes care of, feeds, shelters, provides medical needs, spay and
neuters, play, love, and protect these cats and all of God’s animals.” Id. ¶ 42.5 HARD’s
Ordinance 19(b) provides that “Feeding feral or wild animals or depositing feed for feral or wild
animals is prohibited.” SAC, Ex. B. Plaintiff has alleged that this park ordinance interferes with
his ability to feed cats within Meek Park, thus burdening his religious duty to take care of animals,
specifically, the cats that frequent Meek Park.
HARD Ordinance 19(b) is neutral and generally applicable. Any burden it places on
Plaintiff’s ability to exercise his religious beliefs in caring for animals is incidental. Since the law
is neutral and generally applicable, Plaintiff must show that it is not rationally related to any
conceivable legitimate government purpose. But there are many potential legitimate bases for the
rule: for example, feeding wild or feral animals attracts them to the park, increasing the risk of
conflict with parkgoers and their pets, and the spread of disease. Since the rule has a conceivable
legitimate basis, Plaintiff’s free exercise claim fails. 6
b. Retaliation
Under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, a citizen has the right to be
5 HARD does not challenge the sincerity or validity of Plaintiff’s religious beliefs in its briefing.
Since it is outside “the judicial function and judicial competence” to act as “arbiters of scriptural
interpretation,” the Court accepts Plaintiff’s religious beliefs as sincerely held for the purpose of
this claim. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982).
6 Plaintiff does not plausibly allege that Defendants were aware of his personal religious beliefs
and took action purposefully to suppress those beliefs.
Case 3:25-cv-00440-EMC Document 124 Filed 02/23/26 Page 16 of 25

17
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
free from governmental action taken to retaliate against the citizen’s exercise of First Amendment
rights or to deter the citizen from exercising those rights in the future. Sloman v. Tadlock, 21 F.3d
1462, 1469-70 (9th Cir. 1994). “A plaintiff may bring a [§] 1983 claim alleging that public
officials, acting in their official capacity, took action with the intent to retaliate against, obstruct,
or chill the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.” Ariz. Students’ Ass’n v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 824
F.3d 858, 867 (9th Cir. 2016). “To bring a First Amendment retaliation claim, the plaintiff must
allege that (1) [he] engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) the defendant’s actions
would ‘chill a person of ordinary firmness’ from continuing to engage in the protected activity;
and (3) the protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s conduct—
i.e., that there was a nexus between the defendant’s actions and an intent to chill speech.” Id.
Conduct that chills speech may take the form of threatening or causing pecuniary harm,
withholding a license, right, or benefit, prohibiting the solicitation of charitable donations,
detaining or intercepting mail, or conducting covert surveillance of church service. Id. at 868.
“[A] plaintiff need only show that the defendant ‘intended to interfere’ with the plaintiff's First
Amendment rights and that it suffered some injury as a result; the plaintiff is not required to
demonstrate that its speech was actually suppressed or inhibited.” Id. at 867. The Ninth Circuit
has recognized circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent or motive may be established by “(1)
proximity in time between protected speech and the alleged retaliation; (2) the defendant
expressed opposition to the speech; or (3) other evidence that the reasons proffered by the
defendant for the adverse action were false and pretextual.” McCollum v. California Dep't of
Corr. & Rehab., 647 F.3d 870, 882 (9th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up); Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d
1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Because direct evidence of retaliatory intent rarely can be pleaded in
a complaint, allegation of a chronology of events from which retaliation can be inferred is
sufficient to survive dismissal.”). By the same logic, a significant gap between the protected
activity and the alleged retaliation can merit a finding of no retaliation. Keyser v. Sacramento City
Unified Sch. Dist., 265 F.3d 741, 752 (9th Cir. 2001).
Case 3:25-cv-00440-EMC Document 124 Filed 02/23/26 Page 17 of 25

18
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
i. Conversation with Property Manager
In one retaliation claim, Plaintiff alleges that an unknown individual from HARD phoned
the property manager of Plaintiff’s girlfriend, Ms. Gomes, and informed him that Plaintiff “had
created and was involved in multiple incidents in the Park that this person represented and was
considered a nuisance.” SAC at p. 41. The property manager told Ms. Gomes that if the
information was true and the behavior persisted, it “could affect her tenancy negatively, meaning
that she could be evicted.” Id. The property manager “made clear that he was not filing an
eviction at this time” but that it could be “a possibility in the future” and stated that “it would be a
good idea if she [Ms. Gomez] restricted Mr. Barroca from visiting her.” Id.
Plaintiff argues that this conduct was in retaliation for Plaintiff’s civil lawsuit against
HARD. But Plaintiff fails to show a sufficient nexus between HARD’s action and an intent to
chill Plaintiff’s protected speech. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in January of 2025 but alleges that
HARD did not contact his girlfriend’s property manager until July of 2025. Dkt. No. 1; SAC at
p.41. This five-month gap is insufficient to support an inference of retaliation, and Plaintiff pleads
no other facts that indicate the call was motivated by Plaintiff’s lawsuit, as opposed to his ongoing
interactions with the HARD rangers. See Keyser, 265 F.3d at 752 (9th Cir. 2001) (observing that a
three-month gap was an insufficient temporal nexus to support retaliation). Plaintiff thus cannot
state a claim for retaliation based on this incident.
Moreover, the alleged retaliatory conduct was not sufficient to chill protected conduct.
Negative comments to a property manager are not something that likely would adversely affect
Plaintiff. It is several steps removed. The only conduct Plaintiff has alleged is badmouthing by
HARD. While Plaintiff alleges that HARD’s speech led his girlfriend’s property manager to raise
the possibility of eviction, this injury – which has not materialized – is not to Plaintiff and Plaintiff
does not show how it would chill his ability to conduct his lawsuit. Nunez v. City of L.A., though
arising in the employment retaliation context, is instructive. In Nunez, the Plaintiff had shown
only that that “he was bad-mouthed and verbally threatened” by his government employer but
otherwise suffered no injury or adverse action. 147 F.3d 867, 875 (9th Cir. 1998). The Ninth
Circuit held that this conduct was insufficient to state a claim, observing that “[i]t would be the
Case 3:25-cv-00440-EMC Document 124 Filed 02/23/26 Page 18 of 25

19
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
height of irony, indeed, if mere speech, in response to speech, could constitute a First Amendment
violation. Id. In Coszalter v. City of Salem, the Ninth Circuit reiterated that “minor acts” such as
“badmouthing,” even if occurring in response to protected speech, do not violate the First
Amendment. 320 F.3d 968, 976 (9th Cir. 2003).
Plaintiff cannot show that the retaliatory conduct he alleges was sufficient to chill speech.
Certainly, any such claim was not clearly established and thus qualified immunity would apply.
ii. Filming Incident
Plaintiff also asserts a First Amendment claim based on an incident in which a park ranger
told him to stop filming a family barbecue held by Marco Hernandez, a retired HARD employee.
SAC ¶¶ 18, 34.
The Ninth Circuit has “recognized that there is a First Amendment right to film matters of
public interest.” Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184, 1203 (9th Cir. 2018). A
well-established application of this right is recording the official conduct of police and other
public officials in public spaces. See e.g., Askins v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 899 F.3d 1035,
1044 (9th Cir. 2018) (stating that “[t]he First Amendment protects the right to photograph and
record matters of public interest,” which “includes the right to record law enforcement officers
engaged in the exercise of their official duties in public places”); see also Fields v. City of
Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 355-356 (3d Cir. 2017) (stating that “the First Amendment protects
the act of photographing, filming, or otherwise recording police officers conducting their official
duties in public”); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (“The First
Amendment protects the right to gather information about what public officials do on public
property, and specifically, a right to record matters of public interest”); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d
78, 83 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that “the First Amendment protects the filming of government
officials in public spaces”).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that he noticed Mr. Hernandez, a retired HARD employee who lives
in the caretaker’s house in the park, hosting a family and friends barbecue in a public area next to
the caretaker’s house. SAC ¶ 34, 18. Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Hernandez and his guests were
Case 3:25-cv-00440-EMC Document 124 Filed 02/23/26 Page 19 of 25

20
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
violating numerous park ordinances, including having a fire, drinking and serving alcohol, and
using a fenced-off yard for his guests. Id. ¶ 34. Plaintiff started filming from 150 yards away. Id.
Ten minutes later, Ranger Oliver arrived and ordered Plaintiff to stop filming. Id. ¶ 35. When
Plaintiff refused to stop videotaping, Ranger Oliver called the Alameda County Sheriffs and told
them there had been an altercation. Id. ¶ 36. Plaintiff does not allege that he was arrested.
Plaintiff fails to satisfy the first prong of First Amendment retaliation – that he was
engaged in protected First Amendment conduct. While the First Amendment protects filming
public officials in the exercise of their duties, Mr. Hernandez was not a public official and was not
engaged in any public duty. As to the more general rule that the First Amendment protects
filming matters of public interest, Plaintiff provides no authority that a family barbecue in a public
park is a matter of public interest, whether or not Plaintiff suspects that barbecue violates park
ordinances. The Court does not find that the barbecue, as alleged by Plaintiff, constitutes a matter
of public interest. Plaintiff has not stated a claim on this count.
Further, any such claim would be barred by qualified immunity since the right alleged is
not “clearly established.” Saved Magazine v. Spokane Police Dep’t, 19 F.4th 1193, 1198 (9th Cir.
2021); Powelson v. Sausalito Police Dep’t, No. 23-cv-01360-EMC, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
174051, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 7, 2025) (dismissing First Amendment retaliation claim on
qualified immunity grounds because pro se Plaintiff had “not cited any authority to support his
position that his filming of documents inside a law enforcement vehicle is constitutionally
protected activity, a predicate to a claim of retaliation”).
Furthermore, Ranger Oliver’s conduct was not sufficient to chill speech. In the police
filming context, the Ninth Circuit has recognized arrest without probable cause is an adequate chill
to satisfy the second prong of First Amendment retaliation. See Adkins v. Limtiaco, 537 F. App'x
721, 722 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 853, 870-71 (9th Cir. 2008); see
also White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1228 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that informal measures such as an
investigation can chill First Amendment activities). In Green v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., a district court considered a First Amendment claim where the officer “simply [] order[ed] a
citizen to stop filming, with no further threat of arrest or harm.” 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 252311,
Case 3:25-cv-00440-EMC Document 124 Filed 02/23/26 Page 20 of 25

21
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
at *10 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2021). Finding no controlling case law supporting a claim on that basis,
the court held that a person of “ordinary firmness” “would not be deterred from videotaping
merely because officers ordered him to stop, particularly since Plaintiff continued filming after”
being told to stop. Id.
Here, Ranger Oliver did not arrest Plaintiff for his filming. She arguably tried to get him
arrested, but since park rangers lack the power to do more than give citations, this meant calling
the police as any private citizen might have done in response to unwelcome recording. Ranger
Oliver did not control whether the police arrested Plaintiff for his filming and, indeed, the police
did not decide to do so. In fact, in a different encounter Plaintiff alleges that the Alameda deputies
told the park rangers and Plaintiff that he had a right to film in the park. Moreover, it is not clearly
established that a park ranger who lacks the power to make arrests calling the police, who
ultimately make no arrest, satisfies the chilling prong of First Amendment retaliation. Both
substantively and as a matter of qualified immunity, Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim fails.
HARD’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims is GRANTED as to all
Defendants.
4. Fourth Amendment – Provision of False Information
An officer may be liable under § 1983 for false statements submitted in support of a search
warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1024–26 (9th Cir.
2002). To state a claim, a plaintiff must show that the investigator ‘made deliberately false
statements or recklessly disregarded the truth in the affidavit’ and that the falsifications were
‘material’ to the finding of probable cause.” Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119,
1126 (9th Cir. 2002).
Plaintiff asserts that that Ranger Oliver provided false information to law enforcement that
resulted in a search of Plaintiff and Ms. Gomes’ house. SAC at p.36-37. On January 30, 2024, the
police were called after Plaintiff stabbed a man in Meek Park. Dkt. No. 63 at 5; SAC at p.36.
Plaintiff alleges that at this time Ranger Oliver told the police that Plaintiff “resided as a house
that Barroca frequented, his girlfriend Raelynn Gomes house.” SAC at p.37. Plaintiff alleges that
Case 3:25-cv-00440-EMC Document 124 Filed 02/23/26 Page 21 of 25

22
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
Ranger Oliver knew this information was false because she was “familiar with Barroca” and
“knew Barroca’s actual address as reflected on his driver’s license.” Id. Plaintiff further alleges
that this “false information” caused Plaintiff’s probation officers to search Ms. Gomes’ house on
May 30, 2024. Id.
The Court previously considered the search of Ms. Gomes’ house in adjudicating
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment Bivens claim against his probation officer Ghishan. On May 17,
Officer Ghishan filed a Petition for Warrant for Person Under Supervision that alleged that
“Barroca changed his address to the Hayward residence without informing Probation . . . [based
on] the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office Incident Report #24-001486, which revealed Mr.
Barocca is known by . . . (HARD) Rangers [along with] prior law enforcement contacts with Mr.
Barroca [to reside in] 16922 Harvard Avenue in Hayward, CA.” Criminal Matter Dkt. No. 983 at
3-4. This Court thereafter “[found] there [was] probable cause to believe there has been a
violation of the conditions of supervision” and ordered issuance of a no-bail arrest warrant. Dkt.
No. 63 at 5. Plaintiff argued in his claim against Officer Ghishan that “Ghishan had no legitimate
reason to be at Gomes’s residence other than based on the misinformation provided by Ranger
Oliver and therefore no probable cause to search the Hayward residence.” Id.
However, this Court found that “[e]ven when viewing the facts in the light most favorable
to Plaintiffs, the record reflects ample evidence to support Officer Ghishan’s search of what she
believed was Plaintiff Barroca’s residence.” Id. at 8 (citing Amend. Compl. at 25–26, Dkt. No. 12
[Plaintiff Barroca was repeatedly absent from his registered address in Belmont], id. [Plaintiff
conceding that his conduct may have created a “false impression” that he lived at a different
location to Officer Ghishan]), Mot. to Dismiss Amend. Compl. at 9, Dkt. No. 35 [Officer Ghishan
explaining that while surveilling Meek Estate Park on May 30, 2024, they observed Plaintiff in the
park in the morning but had not observed him driving to Ms. Gomes house that morning];
Criminal Matter at Dkt. No. 1020 ¶¶ 11-12 [when Mr. Barroca was arrested he had possession of a
door key to the house]).
On this record, Plaintiff cannot show that Ranger Oliver’s comment that Plaintiff resided at
Ms. Gomes house was deliberately false or made with reckless disregard for the truth. Plaintiff’s
Case 3:25-cv-00440-EMC Document 124 Filed 02/23/26 Page 22 of 25

23
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
only basis for this assertion is that Ranger Oliver knew the address listed on Plaintiff’s driver’s
license and on prior citations to Plaintiff. SAC ¶ 75; p.37. But Plaintiff’s own allegations
demonstrate that he was very visible in Meek Park: he visited the park twice a day every day, and
he repeatedly called and encountered HARD rangers there, including Ranger Oliver. Since
Ranger Oliver had ample reasons to believe that Plaintiff was actually living by the park, despite
what it said on his papers, her comment to the police was not “deliberately false: or made with
“reckless disregard for the truth.” Indeed, Plaintiff himself refers to the Hayward residence in his
complaint as “Plaintiff and Co-Plaintiff’s Raelynn Gomes house.” SAC at p.36 (sic). Plaintiff’s
claim for false support of an arrest warrant under the Fourth Amendment is DISMISSED.
D. Raelyn Gomes Is Dismissed as a Plaintiff
HARD argues that Plaintiff Raelyn Gomes lacks standing to sue HARD. Dkt. No. 95 at 8;
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). For a party to have standing,
“[T]here must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of -- the
injury has to be ‘fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . the
result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.’” Id. The only claim
that hints at injury to Ms. Gomes by HARD is the incident in which HARD rangers apparently
called her property manager, who then told her that eviction could be a “possibility” if “these
types of complaints are true and persist.” SAC at p. 41. Given that Ms. Gomes has not been
evicted, this injury is speculative. Any injury would also be based on the independent action of
her property manager, posing difficulty for causation. Further, no relief Plaintiff seeks could
redress the hypothetical possibility of Ms. Gomes’ property manager deciding to evict her based
on the information HARD provided. The court has no basis to enjoin Ms. Gomes’ property
manager from evicting her if he is unhappy with Mr. Barroca’s presence at the Hayward residence.
See Iran Thalassemia Soc'y v. Office of Foreign Assets Control, No. 3:22-cv-01195-HZ, 2023 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 77022, at *24 (D. Or. May 1, 2023) (“[W]here a court order directed at a defendant
will not grant the plaintiffs relief absent decisions by third parties not bound by that order, courts
regularly find that the plaintiff has failed to establish redressability.”).
Case 3:25-cv-00440-EMC Document 124 Filed 02/23/26 Page 23 of 25

24
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
In addition to lack of standing, Ms. Gomes has failed to participate in this lawsuit. While
Plaintiff Barroca has submitted many filings and responses on his and Ms. Gomes’ behalf,
Plaintiff Barroca is not a lawyer and may not file on Ms. Gomes’ behalf or otherwise represent her
in court. See 28 U.S. Code § 1654. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 41, the Court may dismiss a
plaintiff for failure to prosecute. This action was filed over a year ago and contains over one
hundred filings; in that time, Ms. Gomes has not submitted any filings independently of Plaintiff
Barroca. She also did not appear at the January 26, 2026 hearing held on this motion, despite
HARD moving to dismiss her claims.
The Court therefore DISMISSES Ms. Gomes from this action and DISMISSES all claims
she purports to assert. The Court notes that Plaintiff has realleged a claim for violation of the
Fourth Amendment arising from Probation Officer Ghishan’s May 30, 2024 search of the
Hayward residence. SAC at p.41, Claim 7. The Court previously dismissed this claim with
prejudice. Dkt. No. 63 at 10. This claim is accordingly STRICKEN.
Case 3:25-cv-00440-EMC Document 124 Filed 02/23/26 Page 24 of 25

25
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
IV. CONCLUSION
HARD’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim for
selective enforcement against Ranger Fitzpatrick; HARD’s Motion to Dismiss is otherwise
GRANTED on all counts and as to all defendants. The claims are dismissed with prejudice.
The Court also DISMISSES Raelyn Gomes as a Plaintiff, along with any claims she
purports to assert in this action.
Plaintiff’s improperly realleged Fourth Amendment claim against Probation Officer
Ghishan is STRICKEN.
For the clarity of the parties, the only live claim that now remains in this action is a single
count under Section 1983 for Fourteenth Amendment Selective Prosecution against Ranger
Fitzpatrick. At the 1/29/2026 hearing, the Court deferred the initial case management conference
pending the outcome of HARD’s motion to dismiss. The Court now sets an initial case
management conference for March 17, 2026 at 1:30 by Zoom.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: 2/23/2026
______________________________________
EDWARD M. CHEN
United States District Judge
Case 3:25-cv-00440-EMC Document 124 Filed 02/23/26 Page 25 of 25