Hardin v. City of Richmond, et al

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United States District Court
Northern District of California
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
TRAYVON HARDIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF RICHMOND, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 24-cv-09411-EMC
CORRECTED ORDER GRANTING IN
PART AND DENYING IN PART
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Docket No. 66
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Trayvon Hardin brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
City of Richmond and four of its police officers arising out of a traffic stop on the afternoon of
February 25, 2024. Then eighteen years old, Mr. Hardin was the front-seat passenger in a vehicle
stopped for a supposed window tint violation. What began as an equipment stop escalated into a
physical encounter.
For organizational purposes, the Court divides the physical encounter into two phases.
According to Mr. Hardin, he was a passenger in a car stopped because of an infraction for tinted
windows. The officer who initiated the stop responded to the driver’s repeated demands for the
officer to explain the reason for the stop, unsuccessfully asked Mr. Hardin for his identification,
and took Mr. Hardin’s cell phone from his hands. After Mr. Hardin refused to exit the vehicle
upon command, two officers forcefully pulled Mr. Hardin out of the vehicle by his arms, took him
to the ground, subdued him on the ground by applying a knee to his back, and handcuffed him.
(Phase One). The two officers then located a semi-automatic firearm on Mr. Hardin’s person.
After Mr. Hardin was handcuffed and the firearm was removed, and as one officer walked him to
the police vehicle, the officer executed a second takedown of Mr. Hardin to the ground (Phase
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Two).
Mr. Hardin asserts claims for excessive force, unlawful arrest and detention, municipal
liability under Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and, as to other officers
present at the scene, failure to intervene.
Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims. For the reasons set forth below,
the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
On the record before the Court, including body-worn camera (“BWC”) footage, and with
the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn in Plaintiff’s favor, a reasonable jury could find that
the two phases of force asserted against Mr. Hardin were objectively unreasonable. Defendant
Salala’s and Defendant Charles’ motion for summary judgment on the excessive force claim is
therefore DENIED as to all uses of force.
Summary judgment as to qualified immunity is also DENIED as to Officers Salala and
Charles as to both phases of force.
On the unlawful arrest and detention claim, the motion for summary judgment is DENIED
as to Officer Salala’s seizure of Mr. Hardin’s phone, but otherwise GRANTED as to the alleged
unlawful detention. Qualified immunity is DENIED as to Officer Salala’s seizure of Mr. Hardin’s
phone.
Summary judgment as to unlawful arrest and detention is otherwise GRANTED in part as
to Officer Salala, and GRANTED in full as to Officers Charles and Castillo.
On the failure to intervene claim, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to
Officers Castillo and Remick; and
On the Monell claim, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of the City
of Richmond.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Traffic Stop
In the afternoon of February 25, 2024, Officer Jose Salala of the Richmond Police
Department (“RPD”) was on patrol in the area of the city known as the “Iron Triangle.” Salala
Dep. (Fine Decl., Ex. 5) at 60:1–7. Officer Salala observed a gray Audi with tinted front
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windows, which he believed violated California Vehicle Code § 26708(a), and he activated his
emergency lights to initiate a traffic stop. Id. at 24:14–29:25. Mr. Hardin’s then-girlfriend, Taliah
Addi, drove the vehicle, while then-eighteen-year-old Trayvon Hardin sat in the front seat as the
sole passenger. FAC ¶¶ 25, 27; Hardin Dep. (Fine Decl., Ex. 7) at 5:5–23. Mr. Hardin does not
dispute, for the purposes of this motion, that the stop was initiated based on the window tint
(though Mr. Hardin points out that “[n]o tint citation was ever issued to any occupant.”). Opp.
(Dkt. 69) at 12.
According to Officer Salala, the vehicle did not immediately yield; it slowed and stopped
in the roadway, during which time Mr. Hardin briefly opened and then closed the front passenger
door.1 Salala Dep. at 30:17–32:18. Officer Salala classified this as one of multiple “furtive
movements” by Mr. Hardin “throughout the entirety of the traffic stop.” Id. at 49:17-50:16.
Officer Salala stated that he believed that Mr. Hardin’s opening and closing of the car door
indicated that Mr. Hardin sought to flee, reach for a weapon, or attempt to discard contraband. Id.
at 31:8–32:18. Officer Salala also described that “through the back window” he observed Mr.
Hardin making “furtive movements” inside the vehicle, which he considered indicative of an
attempt to hide contraband, access or hide a weapon, or prepare to attack. Id. at 49:15–50:2.
Officer Salala did not specify whether his observations through the back window occurred before
or after the vehicle stopped moving. See id. Last, Officer Salala claims he saw Mr. Hardin “move
around his hands” – conduct Officer Salala also considered a “furtive movement.” Id. at 50:10-16.
Mr. Hardin offers a more innocuous explanation for his conduct preceding and during the
stop: he states that he briefly opened and closed the passenger door only to stop it from chiming
because it was ajar. Hardin Dep. at 5:24–8:8; Opp. at 10. The BWC footage of the encounter
after the vehicle was stopped does not show that Mr. Hardin made any “furtive movements”;
instead it shows that he sat calmly in place with his hands clearly visible. See Salala BWC (Fine
1 The RPD did not equip patrol vehicles with dashboard cameras at the time, so the pre-stop
movements are not independently recorded. MSJ (Dkt. 66) at 4 n.1.
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Decl., Ex. 2); Charles BWC (Fine Decl., Ex. 3). Mr. Hardin testified that he was not moving in
the vehicle while they were being pulled over. Hardin Dep. at 31:21–23. He also testified that
after the officers pulled the vehicle over, he used his cell phone to call his sister. Id. at 35:17-24.
Officer Salala approached the passenger side of the vehicle to conduct the stop. Officer
Salala conceded that Mr. Hardin made no threats, verbal or otherwise. Salala Dep. at 49:5–7. He
also admitted that during the stop, Mr. Hardin’s hands were visible and that Officer Salala is “not
too concerned” when a person’s hands are visible. Id. at 46:7–22. Officer Salala stated that when
he stood by the passenger window after initiating the stop, Mr. Hardin “was not doing much.” Id.
at 53:13–54:9.
The BWC footage indicates that Mr. Hardin was not wearing a seatbelt. See Salala BWC
at 3:24-35. Officer Salala, however, did not testify he attempted to cite Mr. Hardin for any
seatbelt violation.
At the outset of the stop, Officer Salala initiated verbal contact with Taliah Addi and Mr.
Hardin at 3:44:44 p.m. The BWC shows that Officer Salala initially engaged with the driver,
Addi. Salala BWC at 0:54–1:02. From the moment Addi rolled down the car windows (first the
back window, then the passenger side window), she questioned why Officer Salala had stopped
the vehicle. Salala BWC at 0:54–1:02. Addi protested that it was daytime, went back and forth
with Officer Salala regarding her driver’s permit, and asked to speak to Salala’s supervisor,
maintaining that he had no reason to pull her over because her tint was not illegal. Salala BWC at
0:54–2:18. Initially, when Officer Salala asked Addi for her driver’s license (which she ultimately
did not provide despite stating that she was looking for it), Officer Salala also demanded Mr.
Hardin’s identification, even though Mr. Hardin was not the driver and there was no indication
that he was responsible for the car and the tinted windows. Salala BWC at 1:07–25. Hardin
declined to provide a form of identification. Salala BWC at 1:10–25.
During this initial encounter, Mr. Hardin for the most part sat silently and did not engage
in conversation with Officer Salala, other than to decline to provide his identification. Salala
BWC at 0:54–2:18; see Salala BWC at 1:58–2:00 (as Addi challenges Officer Salala’s basis for
the stop, Mr. Hardin quietly makes an unintelligible remark that seems to reference being “pulled
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over,” but the conversation is primarily between Addi and Officer Salala). Most of the exchange
was between Addi and Officer Salala.
Two minutes into the exchange, after turning the conversation to Mr. Hardin, Officer
Salala told Mr. Hardin to “stop calling people or I’m going to take your phone.” Salala BWC at
2:05–07. Ten seconds later, Officer Salala reached into the vehicle through the passenger
window and took Mr. Hardin’s cell phone from his hand. Id. at 2:16-19.
The parties characterize this act in different terms. Officer Salala testified that he
suspected Mr. Hardin was using his phone to summon others to the scene and that removing the
phone was a reasonable safety measure. Salala Dep. at 35:7–19. Mr. Hardin testified that he was
simply speaking with his sister on the phone and asserts that Officer Salala’s seizure of the phone
from his hand was unjustified. Opp. at 13.; Hardin Dep. at 35:2–36:18. Officer Jarred Charles
arrived at the scene as backup during this time, followed by Officers Enrique Castillo and
Nicholas Remick shortly thereafter.
At 3:47:22 p.m., two minutes and thirty-eight seconds into the stop, Officer Salala ordered
Mr. Hardin to exit the vehicle. Salala BWC at 3:29–30. Mr. Hardin did not expressly refuse, but
also did not make any movements indicating he would exit the vehicle. Id. at 3:29-30. Two
seconds after the request, Officer Salala opened the car door. Id. at 3:31. Mr. Hardin did not
comply with the request to exit, asking instead why he was being ordered out of a car in which he
was a passenger. Hardin Dep. at 34:6–35:16. Officer Salala again asked Hardin to step out of the
car. Salala BWC at 3:37. Mr. Hardin verbally refused to exit the vehicle, while Addi stated
multiple times to Officer Salala that the officers’ search was illegal. Salala BWC at 3:29–4:38.
Exactly one minute after his second request for Mr. Hardin to exit the vehicle, Officer Salala took
hold of Mr. Hardin’s arm to remove him forcefully from the vehicle, and together, Officers Salala
and Charles forced Mr. Hardin to the ground, placed him in a prone position, and handcuffed him.
Salala BWC at 4:38–56; Charles BWC at 1:09–30. Mr. Hardin alleges that an officer then placed
his knee and weight on his back while he was prone.
The parties’ account of this sequence diverges sharply, and each side maintains that the
footage supports its version. Although Defendants contend that Mr. Hardin actively and
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physically resisted by pulling his arm away as Officer Salala attempted to remove him from the
vehicle, there is evidence from which a reasonably jury could find that Mr. Hardin was largely
passive. The BWC footage shows Officer Salala reaching into the cabin and taking ahold of Mr.
Hardin’s wrist, after which Mr. Hardin uses his left hand to help remove his right wrist from
Officer Salala’s grasp while asking, “what are you doing?” Salala BWC at 4:17–39. The video
does not depict active or forceful resistance by Mr. Hardin such as using force against the officer
or striking the officer. Id.
After Mr. Hardin was brought to the ground, the officers applied handcuffs. Salala BWC
at 4:47–59; Charles BWC at 1:16–30. The body worn camera footage shows Mr. Hardin on the
ground from 3:48:34 p.m. to 3:49:06 p.m., for approximately thirty seconds. Charles BWC at
1:14–48; Salala BWC at 4:43–5:16. An officer applied handcuffs at around 3:48:50 p.m., about
fifteen seconds after Mr. Hardin was taken down to the ground by officers. See Salala BWC at
4:58. At 3:48:34 p.m., the footage briefly depicts Officer Salala kneeling on Mr. Hardin’s
backside, shifting his knees to Mr. Hardin’s lower back, and holding Mr. Hardin’s left arm behind
his back. Charles BWC at 1:14–21; Salala BWC at 4:42–46. The footage suggests that pressure
may have been applied but was not applied for the entire time Mr. Hardin was on the ground.
Charles BWC at 1:35 (depicting neither officer placing pressure on Mr. Hardin at 3:48:54 p.m. as
Officer Salala searches Mr. Hardin’s backpack from a standing position). However, it is unclear
from the officers’ video footage angles how long exactly pressure was applied to Mr. Hardin’s
back, and how much pressure was applied at any given point.
Mr. Hardin has presented evidence that he remained face-down and handcuffed on the
pavement for roughly 37 seconds and that an officer’s body weight remained on his back after the
cuffs were applied. Hardin Dep. at 50:3–51:10. Mr. Hardin does not specify precisely how the
pressure was applied but testified that officers were “leaning” on his back. Id. at 50:8–19.
While Mr. Hardin was handcuffed and on the ground, the officers discovered a firearm
concealed in Mr. Hardin’s waistband: a loaded Glock handgun fitted with an extended magazine,
convertible to automatic fire. Notably, the firearm was discovered after the officers had taken Mr.
Hardin to the ground and handcuffed him; there is no contention that any officer saw a weapon or
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a suspicious shape while Mr. Hardin was seated in the vehicle. Reply at 5.
After discovering the firearm, the officers lifted Mr. Hardin to his feet and began walking
him toward a patrol vehicle. Salala Dep. at 72:14–77:2. As Officer Salala walked Mr. Hardin
toward the patrol vehicle, Salala applied a second use of force. Defendants contend that Mr.
Hardin “leaned forward, spun in a circle,” and successfully broke free of Officer Salala’s grasp,
prompting Officer Salala to reasonably perceive that Mr. Hardin was attempting to flee and to
push him to the ground in response. Reply at 9–10. Mr. Hardin, however, contends that he moved
his arm only because his handcuffs were too tight, not because he was attempting to flee, and that
as a cuffed, searched, and disarmed teenager surrounded by officers in the middle of a street, he
posed no flight or safety risk justifying a second takedown. Opp. at 15–16; Hardin Dep. at 52:1–
25. The BWC footage does not resolve this disputed fact. See Salala BWC at 5:17–22; Charles
BWC at 1:49–53.
Mr. Hardin was arrested. MSJ at 16; FAC ¶ 50. He was transported to Kaiser Permanente
Richmond Medical Center, where he was medically cleared before being taken to jail. Hardin
Dep. at 54:24–55:10; FAC ¶¶ 45, 51. He was later charged in the Superior Court of Contra Costa
County for violation of (1) California Penal Code (PC) § 32625 (a), possession of a machine gun,
(2) PC § 25850(a), carrying an unregistered handgun, and (3) PC § 148(a)(1), resisting arrest.
MSJ at 16, 76; FAC ¶ 50.
Mr. Hardin alleges that the traffic stop and ensuing encounter caused bruising and
abrasions to his shoulder and an injury to his left bicep for which he underwent shoulder x-rays,
was prescribed pain medication, and received a sling. FAC ¶¶ 45, 47. He also alleges ongoing
emotional distress. Id. ¶ 48–49. Mr. Hardin alleges that the Contra Costa County District
Attorney ultimately dismissed all charges against him, FAC ¶ 52, a fact that appears to be
undisputed.
B. Evidence Bearing on Monell Claim
Mr. Hardin’s municipal liability claim rests on three theories: ratification, custom, and
failure to train. FAC ¶¶ 112–57.
The City investigated the February 25, 2024 incident and did not issue a finding of
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misconduct against either Officer Salala or Officer Charles. Opp. at 24. Separately, the City
placed Officer Salala on administrative leave in March 2024 in connection with an unrelated
matter and, months later, terminated him upon sustained findings of excessive force in another
matter. Salala Dep. Vol. 2 (Jagannath Decl., Ex. 2) at 4:6–5:1, 6:19–7:2, 8:1–9:2. The parties
draw opposite inferences from this history. Mr. Hardin contends that a city that exonerated the
conduct at issue here, while terminating the same officer for excessive force elsewhere, ratified the
conduct in this case. Opp. at 24–25. Defendants contend that the termination demonstrates that
the RPD disciplines misconduct when it is substantiated. Reply at 16.
Mr. Hardin identifies a set of prior RPD incidents and pre-suit civil actions that he offers as
evidence of a systemic custom of tolerating excessive force during stops. These include internal
affairs files reflecting exonerated uses of force during stops, as well as numerous civil actions filed
against the City before February 25, 2024, alleging unlawful use of force during stops, detentions,
and arrests. Jagannath Decl., Exs. 28–30. Defendants respond that these are unproven allegations
offered without any contextual comparison, that the incidents are factually distinct, and that none
are tied to the conduct of Officers Salala or Charles. Reply at 16–18.
C. Procedural Background
The Court previously dismissed two categories of claims with prejudice in this case. First,
it dismissed the claims against Chief Bisa French in her official capacity as duplicative of the
claims against the City. Second, it dismissed Mr. Hardin’s state law claims because Mr. Hardin
failed to timely present them, noting that he could seek to reinstate them only if he obtained a
finding of excusable neglect from the Superior Court. Mr. Hardin never did so, and no state law
claim was repleaded in the FAC. As a result, only federal claims remain in this action. Minute
Entry (Dkt. 33).
Mr. Hardin filed the FAC naming the City and Officers Salala, Charles, Castillo, and
Remick in their individual capacities.2 It does not name Chief French, and it pleads no state law
claims. See FAC. It asserts four claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) excessive force against
2 At this stage, “Plaintiff withdraws the individual-capacity claims against Officer Remick.” Opp.
at 17.
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Officers Salala and Charles; (2) unlawful arrest and detention against Officers Salala, Charles,
Castillo, and Remick; (3) Monell liability against the City of Richmond; and (4) failure to
intervene against Officers Castillo and Remick. FAC ¶¶ 78–176. The excessive force count
encompasses all applications of force described above: (a) the grabbing and removal of Mr.
Hardin from the vehicle, (b) the takedown that forced him into a prone position on the ground; and
(c) the second push after he was handcuffed.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a “court shall grant summary judgment
[to a moving party] if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue of fact is
genuine only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party.
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–49 (1986). “The mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence … will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could
reasonably find for the [nonmoving party].” Id. at 252. At the summary judgment stage, evidence
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and all justifiable inferences
are to be drawn in the nonmovant's favor. See id. at 255.
Where a defendant moves for summary judgment based on a claim for which the plaintiff
bears the burden of proof, the defendant need only point to the plaintiff's failure “to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [the plaintiff's] case.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
A party’s assertion of a fact as undisputed must be supported by materials in the record,
including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations,
stipulations, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials. Fed. R. Civ. Pr. 56(c)(1)(A).
Evidence may be presented in a form that is not admissible at trial so long as it could ultimately be
capable of being put in admissible form. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2) (“A party may object that
the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be
admissible in evidence”); Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Ariz., Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 846 (9th Cir.
2004) (“Even the declarations that do contain hearsay are admissible for summary judgment
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purposes because they ‘could be presented in an admissible form at trial’”).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Excessive Force (Officers Salala and Charles)
Mr. Hardin’s excessive force claim arises from two applications of force. The first
application of force includes Officer Salala’s removal of Mr. Hardin from the vehicle, takedown
by Officers Salala and Charles, and alleged kneeling on Plaintiff’s back while he was being
searched and handcuffed by both officers. The second application of force consists of Officer
Salala’s second takedown of Plaintiff while escorting him to the patrol vehicle. The Court
evaluates each alleged use of force separately. See, e.g., Robinson v. City of San Jose, 2021 WL
4222133, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 16, 2021) (“The Court will evaluate each alleged use of force
separately.”); Manzo v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 2020 WL 6940935, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2020)
(same); Escalera v. City of San Pablo, 2026 WL 220998, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2026) (“Each
application of force must be justified at the time it is used.”).
A claim that officers used excessive force in the course of an arrest or investigatory stop is
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard. Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388, 395 (1989). The inquiry asks “whether the officers’ actions are
‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them,” judged “from
the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of
hindsight.” Id. at 396–97. The analysis requires “a careful balancing of the nature and quality of
the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing
governmental interests at stake.” Id. at 396 (internal quotation marks omitted).
To gauge the governmental interests, courts weigh the factors identified in Graham: (1) the
severity of the offense at issue, (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of
the officers or others, and (3) whether the suspect was actively resisting or attempting to evade
arrest by flight. Id. “The most important Graham factor is whether the suspect posed an
immediate threat to anyone’s safety.” Williams v. City of Sparks, 112 F.4th 635, 643 (9th Cir.
2024) (quoting Nehad v. Browder, 929 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2019)); Rice v. Morehouse, 989
F.3d 1112, 1121 (9th Cir. 2021).
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Reasonableness of the force used turns on “the facts and circumstances of each particular
case” as they were known to the officer at the time. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97. Facts that an
officer learns only after the fact can neither create nor cure the reasonableness of force already
used. Id.
Furthermore, the quantum of force used must be proportional to the need for it. Officers
are not required to use the least intrusive means available, but a takedown, like any other use of
force, “must be justified by the need for the specific level of force employed,” and the availability
of less intrusive alternatives is a relevant consideration. Rice, 989 F.3d at 1121. Because the
reasonableness of force scales in relation to the governmental interest, “when the governmental
interest is insubstantial, the application of even minimal force may be unreasonable.” Nelson v.
City of Davis, 685 F.3d 867, 878 (9th Cir. 2012). Both “the nature and degree of physical contact”
and “the risk of harm and the actual harm experienced” inform the Court’s analysis. Seidner v. de
Vries, 39 F.4th 591, 597 (9th Cir. 2022).
With respect to resistance, courts recognize that resistance “runs the gamut from the purely
passive protestor who simply refuses to stand, to the individual who is physically assaulting the
officer,” and courts must “evaluate the nature of any resistance in light of the actual facts of the
case” rather than affix a conclusory label. Bryan v. McPherson, 630 F.3d 806, 830 (2010). Along
that spectrum, the Ninth Circuit distinguishes between passive and active resistance: “a failure to
fully or immediately comply with an officer’s orders neither rises to the level of active resistance
nor justifies the application of a non-trivial amount of force.” Nelson, 685 F.3d at 881. A refusal
to exit or re-enter a vehicle at an officer’s command, in particular, has been held not to constitute
active resistance. Young v. Cnty. of L.A., 655 F.3d 1156, 1165–66 (9th Cir. 2011) (pepper spray
and baton blows inflicted on a plaintiff stopped for a seatbelt violation was considered
unreasonable and thus excessive when plaintiff only engaged in “passive noncompliance” with
orders to re-enter his vehicle). Although passive resistance may in some instances justify some
measured force to gain compliance, the level of force permitted depends on the surrounding
circumstances. See Nelson, 685 F.3d at 881.
The Ninth Circuit has cautioned:
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“Resistance,” should not be understood as a binary state, with
resistance being either completely passive or active. Rather, it runs
the gamut from the purely passive protestor who simply refuses to
stand, to the individual who is physically assaulting the officer. We
must eschew ultimately unhelpful blanket labels and evaluate the
nature of any resistance in light of the actual facts of the case. For
example, in Smith v. City of Hemet, we confronted an individual
who “continually ignored” officer commands to remove his hands
from his pockets and to not re-enter his home. In addition, he
“physically resisted ... for only a brief time.” 394 F.3d at 703.
Although Smith was not perfectly passive in the encounter, we
stated that it did not appear “that Smith's resistance was particularly
bellicose” and thus found that this factor provided little support for a
use of significant force. Id. Even purely passive resistance can
support the use of some force, but the level of force an individual's
resistance will support is dependent on the factual circumstances
underlying that resistance.
Bryan, 630 F.3d at 830.
Because inquiries into excessive force “nearly always require[] a jury to sift through
disputed factual contentions, and to draw inferences therefrom,” “summary judgment or judgment
as a matter of law in excessive force cases should be granted sparingly.” Santos v. Gates, 287
F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223
(2009). Where the parties have submitted video of the encounter, the court views the facts “in the
light depicted by the videotape,” but only to the extent the footage “blatantly contradict[s]” the
non-moving party’s account. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007). Where the recording
is open to more than one reasonable interpretation, the ordinary rule governs and the evidence,
including the video, is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See id. But where there
is passive resistance involving no threats or resistance to the officer, the use of “non-trivial force
of any kind” is generally unreasonable. Rice, 989 F.3d at 1125–26 (quoting Gravelet-Blondin v.
Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1093 (9th Cir. 2013)).
1. Phase One: Removal from Vehicle, Takedown, and Handcuffing on Ground
The force at issue in Phase One consists of the officers’ grasping Mr. Hardin, forcibly
removing him from the passenger seat of the vehicle, taking him to the ground face-down on the
pavement, and applying body weight to restraint him while placing him in handcuffs.
Officers Salala and Charles both participated in the Phase One force, and the claim is
asserted against both. For the reasons that follow, under the facts viewed in Mr. Hardin’s favor,
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the officers applied excess force and are not entitled to qualified immunity. The Court DENIES
summary judgment as to this first use of force.
Defendants correctly observe that, during a lawful traffic stop, an officer may order a
passenger out of the vehicle as a matter of course without an independent justification. Penn. v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410–15 (1997). That
authority forecloses any claim that the order to exit was itself unlawful per se. But it does not
resolve whether the degree and manner of force used to enforce that command were reasonable.
The lawfulness of an order and the reasonableness of the force used to carry it out are analytically
distinct inquiries, and the latter is governed by Graham.
The Court now turns to the circumstances relevant under Graham.
a. Severity of the Offense.
First, the Court examines the severity of the offense at issue during the traffic stop of
Taliah Addi’s vehicle. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. The only offense under investigation was a
window-tint infraction by the driver – not Mr. Hardin. Mr. Hardin was a passenger who, at most,
after the stop, presented a seatbelt violation. The stop itself was not based on reports of violent or
dangerous offenses such as a robbery, assault, reckless driving, or driving under the influence.
The stop was based only on an allegedly unlawful windshield tint – a minor equipment violation
that sits at the lowest end of the governmental interest scale. This factor weighs significantly
against the application of non-trivial force. See Young, 655 F.3d at 1170 (minor misdemeanors
weigh against the use of significant force); Rice, 989 F.3d at 1122–23.
b. Threat to Officer Safety
With respect to the second Graham factor – whether Mr. Hardin posed an immediate threat
to the safety of others – a reasonable jury could find no reasonable basis for believing he posed
such a threat. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. Again, the stop was based on an allegedly unlawful
window tint, a possible infraction attributable only to the driver. The officers were not responding
to a reported crime, much less a crime involving a suspected firearm. Cf. Handy v. Jones, No. 25-
5105, 2026 WL 2716416, at *6 (9th Cir. Sep. 15, 2026) (officers reasonably identified plaintiff as
an immediate threat because plaintiff had reportedly assaulted his girlfriend while in possession of
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a shotgun, and was reportedly awaiting officers while still armed).
Moreover, Officer Salala testified that Mr. Hardin made no threats of any kind, Salala Dep.
at 49:5-7, that Mr. Hardin’s hands remained visible during the encounter and Officer Salala is “not
too concerned” when a person’s hands are visible, id. at 46:7–22, and that Mr. Hardin “was not
doing much,” id. at 53:24–54:9. Indeed, the BWC footage shows Officer Salala initially engaging
with the driver, Taliah Addi. Salala BWC at 0:54–2:18. While Salala and Addi engaged in a
heated verbal exchange lasting more than two minutes, Mr. Hardin remained generally quiet
throughout most of that exchange. Id. The footage shows no furtive movements or any physical
or verbal conduct by Mr. Hardin that could reasonably be perceived as a threat to Officer Salala.
Defendants rely on Mr. Hardin’s opening and closing of the passenger door while the
vehicle was moving and his allegedly “furtive movements” at the beginning of the traffic stop to
suggest that the officers reasonably feared he was armed. MSJ at 11. Plaintiff concedes that he
opened and closed the door while the vehicle was moving, but claims he did so only because the
car had been beeping to alert him that the door was open. Hardin Dep. at 6:14–24.
Given the basis for the traffic stop (a mechanical infraction) and the lack of any other basis
to suspect involvement or possession of a firearm (no call of a sighting or use of a firearm or of
any crime that might involve a firearm), the mere momentary opening and shutting of the door
while in plain sight of the pursing officer in broad daylight does not give rise to a reasonable
suspicion that Mr. Hardin possessed a firearm. Defendants do not identify any case law
supporting the contention that merely opening and closing a car door itself establishes reasonable
suspicion that a suspect is armed. Nor did Mr. Hardin’s behavior during the stop suggest as
much: he was quiet and his hands were visible throughout the stop. Salala BWC at 1:40–4:37.
And, viewing the evidence in Mr. Hardin’s favor, Mr. Hardin made no furtive gesture indicating
he possessed a weapon.
Indeed, the lack of reasonable suspicion that Mr. Hardin was armed is consistent with
Officer Sala’s conduct. Officer Salala did not approach the car with caution as if he suspected the
driver or passenger possessed a firearm, nor did he pull out his firearm and order Mr. Hardin out
of the car with his hands up, as officers normally would when they suspect an individual is armed
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and dangerous. Instead, Officer Salala approached the passenger side where Mr. Hardin was
sitting, questioned Mr. Hardin and Ms. Addi for nearly three minutes, and used both his hands to
hold a notebook and pen while asking questions and writing down information. See Salala BWC
0:48-3:36. He also took the cell phone from Mr. Hardin’s hands and ordered him out of the
vehicle without instructing him to raise or show his hands before grabbing him. Salala BWC
0:48–3:36; see Rice, 989 F.3d at 1123 (a reasonable jury could find the suspect did not present an
immediate safety threat in part because the defendant officer turning her back on the plaintiff’s car
during the stop “undermin[ed] any suggestion that she believed [plaintiff] might have a firearm”).
Although the reasonableness of the use of force under Graham is an objective test and is
based on a reasonable officer standard, Officer’s Salala’s perception is relevant evidence of what
an objectively reasonable officer would believe and understand, particularly since Defendants are
not likely to take the position in this case that Officer Salala did not represent the actions of
anything but a reasonable officer.3 Cf. Rice, 989 F.3d at 1123.
Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Hardin, a reasonable jury could find
that it was not objectively reasonable for officers to believe Mr. Hardin posed an immediate threat
to officer safety when the officers pulled him out of the car and brought him to the
ground. Further, as noted above, the degree of threat to officer safety – or the lack thereof – is the
most important factor under the Graham test. Williams, 112 F.4th at 643.
c. Degree of Resistance
The third Graham factor is the degree of resistance offered by the subject of the force. 490
U.S. at 396. A refusal to exit a vehicle and a failure to comply promptly with an officer’s
command, is not active resistance; it is passive. Young, 655 F.3d at 1165–66; Nelson, 685 F.3d at
881 (group of party-going individuals at an apartment complex who failed to immediately disperse
“at most” engaged in passive resistance). Although Defendants contend that Mr. Hardin resisted
Officer Salala’s attempt to extract him from the vehicle by pulling his arm away, the nature of any
3 A firearm was later found on Mr. Hardin’s person, but it was discovered only after he was on the
ground and handcuffed. The reasonableness of force is measured by what the officers knew at the
time they acted, not on later acquired evidence. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97.
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such resistance is disputed. Salala Dep. at 66:7–22.
Mr. Hardin does not contest in his deposition or in his briefing that he tried to pull his right
arm away from Officer Salala’s grasp. See id. The body camera footage shows Mr. Hardin
attempting to remove his right wrist from Officer Salala’s grasp by using Mr. Hardin’s left hand to
help pull his right wrist away. Salala BWC at 4:37–45; Charles BWC at 1:08–16. Viewing the
video footage in Mr. Hardin’s favor, a reasonable jury could find that Mr. Hardin did not
forcefully attempt to resist, and that he only momentarily attempted to use his left hand to
withdraw his right hand from the officer’s grasp. A jury could reasonably find that Mr. Hardin’s
action was a reflexive response to Office Salala’s sudden grasp of Mr. Hardin’s hand and did not
involve any real force. Mr. Hardin’s minor resistance was totally ineffectual; within seconds,
Officer Salala was able to grab both of Mr. Hardin’s hands and quickly extract him from the
vehicle. The video does not show Mr. Hardin striking Officer Salala or applying injurious force to
Officer Salala’s hand. Salala BWC at 4:37–45.
Thus, a reasonable jury could find that Mr. Hardin’s verbal refusal to comply with a
command and his reflexive reaction involving minimal, if any, force would constitute only passive
or very minimally active resistance. See, e.g., Thomas v. Dillard, 818 F.3d 864, 890 (9th Cir.
2016) (stepping backwards away from the officer when the officer “tried to grab his arm,” was “a
brief reaction to [the officer’s] own sudden movement” that constituted passive resistance); Young,
655 F.3d at 1165–66 (absent a warning he could be arrested for disobeying an officer, defendant
who merely failed to comply with an officer’s order did not actively resist arrest); Close v. City of
Vacaville, 846 F. App’x 513, 516 (9th Cir. 2021) (tensing muscles and pulling hand awas was “at
most minimal resistance” which did not justify application of non-trivial force).
Regarding the last Graham inquiry, the proportionality of the force employed: the force
used against Mr. Hardin was “substantial” and “non-trivial.” Forcibly extracting him from the
vehicle, immediately taking him down face-first onto the pavement, and applying body weight on
his back while handcuffing him is a “substantial” “non-trivial” use of force that cannot be justified
by Mr. Hardin’s passive or minimally resistive reaction. The Ninth Circuit has held that “non-
trivial force was not justified in the face of passive or even minimal resistance.” Rice, 989 F.3d at
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1126 (citing Nelson, 685 F.3d at 881–82) (emphasis added); Close, 846 F. App’x at 516.
Defendants’ authorities, particularly Tatum v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 441 F.3d 1090 (9th
Cir. 2006), and Acosta v. City of Costa Mesa, 718 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 2013), are not persuasive.
While those decisions held that an officer may use a control-hold takedown to overcome a suspect
who actively resists being secured, the cases presuppose the very fact in dispute: active resistance.
In Tatum, the suspect, who was believed to be intoxicated by a controlled substance after
repeatedly kicking the side door of the Tenderloin police station, spun out of the officer’s grasp
and continued actively resisting. Tatum, 441 F.3d at 1095–96. In Acosta, the plaintiff was
removed from a city council meeting for disrupting the meeting and refusing to leave the podium,
and later resisted officers outside the city hall in an escalating situation with other protesters in
attendance. 718 F.3d at 825. The plaintiff was found to have “actively resist[ed]” by “kicking
and flailing his body[,]” causing another officer to fall to the ground. Id. at 809, 826. The force
used by the officers in those decisions was reasonable in response to the active resistance they
encountered, a fact disputably challenged here.
d. Summary
In sum, as to the first Graham factor, the severity of the offense was minimal – at most a
seatbelt violation discovered upon a stop based on the driver’s window tint violation. With
respect to the second factor, a jury could find there was no reasonable basis to believe Mr. Hardin
posed a threat to the safety of the officers. As to the third factor, as discussed above, a reasonable
jury could find that Mr. Hardin presented only passive or minimal resistance when Officer Salala
grabbed Mr. Hardin’s wrist. The amount of force used to grab Mr. Hardin, take him to the ground,
and hold him there while he was handcuffed was substantial and outweighed the justification for
such force under the Graham factors. Summary judgment on the Phase One excessive force claim
is therefore DENIED.
e. Qualified Immunity — Phase One
Defendants Salala and Charles alternatively assert qualified immunity as a defense to Mr.
Hardin’s excessive force claim.
Qualified immunity “gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but
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mistaken judgments, and protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate
the law.” Thomas, 818 F.3d at 887 (quoting Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 6 (2013)). An officer is
entitled to qualified immunity unless (1) the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
establish a constitutional violation, and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the
conduct. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232.
“[E]ven with a constitutional violation, officers may still receive qualified immunity if the
unlawfulness of their conduct was not ‘clearly established’ at the time of arrest.” Vanegas v. City
of Pasadena, 46 F.4th 1159, 1164 (9th Cir. 2022). A right is clearly established when existing
precedent has placed the constitutional question “beyond debate,” such that “every reasonable
official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563
U.S. 731, 741 (2011); see also Reese v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir. 2018).
An officer “cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right’s contours
were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have
understood that he was violating it.” Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 105 (2018). This inquiry
turns on the “objective legal reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that
were clearly established at the time it was taken.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244.
The inquiry is undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, Kisela, 584 U.S. at
104–05, though a case “directly on point” is not required, White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017).
“Where constitutional guidelines seem inapplicable or too remote, it does not suffice for a court
simply to state that an officer may not use unreasonable and excessive force, deny qualified
immunity, and then remit the case for a trial on the question of reasonableness.” Kisela, 584 U.S.
at 105.
The plaintiff bears the burden of identifying a clearly established law. See Shafer v. Cnty.
of Santa Barbara, 868 F.3d 1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 2017). However, at summary judgment, the
court resolves genuinely disputed facts in the plaintiff’s favor at both steps of the inquiry, and then
asks whether, on that version of the events, the law was clearly established. Tolan v. Cotton, 572
U.S. 650, 657, 660 (2014). Where the reasonableness of the force turns on disputed facts,
qualified immunity cannot be granted at summary judgment. Torres v. City of Madera, 648 F.3d
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1119, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2011).
As noted above, viewing the evidence in Mr. Hardin’s favor, Mr. Hardin was a passenger
in a vehicle where the driver was suspected only of a minor equipment infraction. Mr. Hardin
himself was, at most, in violation of the seatbelt law. He offered no real resistance other than
refusing the command to get out of the car and reflexively trying to pull his hand away from the
officer’s grasp with minimal force. Nevertheless, the officers subjected Mr. Hardin to substantial,
non-trivial force. Long before this incident, in 2013, the Ninth Circuit clearly established one’s
“right to be free from the application of non-trivial force for engaging in mere passive resistance.”
Gravelet-Blondin, 728 F.3d at 1093. And the Ninth Circuit held in 2012 (Nelson) and 2021 (Rice)
that the application of non-trivial force is not justified in the face of passive or minimal resistance.
See Nelson, 685 F.3d at 881; Rice, 989 F.3d at 1126.
In Rice, the officers stopped a vehicle for a minor signaling violation (failing to signal for
a full five seconds). 989 F.3d at 1117. The driver showed the officer his license through the
window but refused to provide his registration and proof of insurance, and refused to exit the
vehicle. Id. The officer who initiated the stop called for “urgent” backup, stating she needed
assistance getting the plaintiff out of the car. Id. The plaintiff rolled down the car window and
unlocked the car, but continued to decline to exit the vehicle. Id. When the backup officer
arrived, he and the officer who initiated the traffic stop pulled the plaintiff from the car, put him in
a “police lead” position, and “forcibly threw him to the ground using a ‘take-down’ maneuver.” Id
The Ninth Circuit held that a reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff engaged in passive
resistance, that the takedown was excessive, and that this would have violated clearly established
law. Id. at 1125. The court held that the plaintiff’s “refusals to exit his car [were] far closer to
‘the purely passive protestor who simply refuses to stand’ than to the ‘minor’ or even ‘truly active’
forms of resistance” the Ninth Circuit had considered in other cases. Id. at 1123 (citing Bryan,
630 F.3d at 830) (plaintiff’s refusal to remain in his car after a traffic stop, even while “yelling
gibberish and hitting his thighs,” was not active resistance). The court reversed a grant of
qualified immunity, holding that the right was clearly established years earlier. Id. at 1125–27.
Though not binding precedent, the Ninth Circuit’s memorandum disposition in Close v.
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City of Vacaville is instructive. In Close, the plaintiff refused to leave a medical center exam room
after repeated requests by a security guard. 846 F. App’x at 515. A police officer arrived and
arrested the plaintiff for criminal trespass – a nonviolent misdemeanor. Id. at 516. The Ninth
Circuit concluded that, under the Graham factors, a reasonable jury could find that the force used
by the responding officer who fractured the plaintiff’s arm was significant, while the justification
for using such force was low because the plaintiff was being arrested for a nonviolent
misdemeanor and posed only a minimal threat to the officer’s safety. Id. at 515–16. The court
also concluded that there were “genuine issues of disputed fact as to the amount and type of
resistance [the plaintiff] employed.” Id. at 516. Thus, there remained genuine issues of disputed
fact as to whether the force used was unconstitutionally excessive. Id. at 515–16.
As for qualified immunity, the Ninth Circuit in Close observed that, prior to the plaintiff’s
2016 arrest, it was clearly established that the use of “non-trivial force was unconstitutionally
excessive when used against an individual who was passively resisting arrest.” Id. at 516 (citing
Gravelet-Blondin, 728 F.3d at 1092; Nelson, 685 F.3d at 881. “A reasonable jury could find that
exerting enough force on [plaintiff’s] arm to fracture it, partially dislocate her elbow, and tear the
soft tissue, rose to the level of non-trivial force.” Id. “[N]on-trivial force [is] not justified in the
face of passive or even minimal resistance,” the Ninth Circuit emphasized. Id. (quoting Rice, 989
F.3d at 1126). The officer alleged that the plaintiff resisted by “tensing her muscles” and “pulling
her hand away.” Id. But even if they were disputed, the Ninth Circuit concluded, the actions were
“at most minimal resistance.” Id. Thus, the court held, “[b]ecause clearly established law held
that the alleged degree of force was excessive whether [the plaintiff] was passively or minimally
resisting, and because there are genuine disputed issues of material fact on this case, the district
court erred in granting summary judgment for [the police officer] on [plaintiff’s] excessive force
claim.” Id. (emphasis added).
Based on the facts discussed above, viewed in Mr. Hardin’s favor, the application of non-
trivial force where all of the Graham factors favor the Plaintiff, violates clearly established law
that “every reasonable official would have understood” prohibits the use of such force. See
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232; Kisela, 584 U.S. at 105; Rice, 989 F.3d at 1123; Bryan, 630 F.3d at 830;
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Young, 655 F.3d at 1165–66.4
Accordingly, qualified immunity on the Phase One excessive force claim is therefore
DENIED as to both Officers Salala and Charles.
2. Phase Two: The Second Takedown
The second application of force occurred after Mr. Hardin had been handcuffed, searched,
and disarmed, as Officer Salala walked him toward the patrol vehicle. Less than ten seconds after
Mr. Hardin is picked up and walked towards the patrol vehicle by Officer Salala, Officer Salala
pushed Mr. Hardin to the ground. MSJ Opp 21; Salala Dep. at 90:21–91:4. The BWC footage
does not clearly depict the events leading to Mr. Hardin falling to the ground, and the parties
dispute the reason for the takedown. See Salala BWC at 5:17-26; Charles BWC at 1:53-56
(capturing the fall when Mr. Hardin was already in motion towards the ground).
The parties give differing accounts. Officer Salala claims that Mr. Hardin “attempted to
pull away,” so Officer Salala “redirected him to the ground.” MSJ Opp 21. Officer Salala
testified that he did not have “good control” of Mr. Hardin’s forearm, “Mr. Hardin leaned forward
and spun in a circle to attempt to break free from [his] grasp,” and that he “pushed him down using
the same momentum to prevent him from running away, at which point he then hit the ground.”
Salala Dep. at 90:21–91:4. Mr. Hardin testified that he moved his arm “one time because the
cuffs [were] too tight,” and that Officer Salala then “slammed” him on the shoulder and took him
down to the ground. Hardin Dep. at 52:04–13. Because Officer Salala was walking side by side
with Mr. Hardin (and because Officer Charles was turned away from Officer Salala and Mr.
Hardin before the second takedown occurred), the BWC footage does not capture Mr. Hardin’s
arm movements and whether he spun in a circle or attempted to move away. Salala BWC at 5:17–
26; Charles BWC at 1:50–56. Nor were any words exchanged between Mr. Hardin and Officer
4 Mr. Hardin further argues that placing bodyweight on a “compliant detainee” violates clearly
established law. See MJ Opp at 15; Drummond ex rel. Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d
1052, 1062 (9th Cir. 2003) (it was clearly established that pressing weight on plaintiff’s neck and
torso when plaintiff’s hands were cuffed behind his back, he offered no resistance, and cried for
air). The Court need not reach the question whether any use of officer bodyweight in the fashion
alleged violates clearly established law per se.
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Salala. Salala BWC at 5:17-26.
By this point, the governmental interest had diminished even further relative to Phase One:
Mr. Hardin was handcuffed and searched, and the firearm had already been recovered. Mr.
Hardin’s capacity to harm the officers or others was controlled. The gun, now part of the totality
of the circumstances known to the officers by the time Phase Two began, was not a source of
immediate threat, as Mr. Hardin had been disarmed and restrained.
The only justification for the second takedown was Officer Salala’s assertion that Mr.
Hardin was attempting to flee. Mr. Hardin responds that he shifted his arm because his handcuffs
were too tight, not because he was attempting to flee, and that as a cuffed and disarmed teenager
surrounded by officers in the middle of a street, he posed no flight or safety risk. Opp. at 15–16.
As set out above, the BWC footage does not resolve whether Mr. Hardin intended to flee in the
moments before the second takedown. See Salala BWC at 5:17–22; Charles BWC at 1:49–53.
Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Hardin – a handcuffed, disarmed
suspect who shifted his position but made no obvious attempt to flee – a reasonable jury could find
that there was no legitimate need for the second takedown and that the force used was therefore
unreasonable. “Gratuitous and completely unnecessary acts of violence by the police during a
seizure violate the Fourth Amendment,” Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 880 (9th Cir. 2001),
and “since there [i]s no need for force,” such force is “objectively unreasonable,” P.B. v. Koch, 96
F.3d 1298, 1303–04 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1996). Moreover, all the Graham factors at this juncture favor
Mr. Hardin. Viewed in his favor, the facts establish that Mr. Hardin was not actively committing a
crime, there was no immediate threat to officer safety, and there was no resistance. The fact that
Mr. Hardin’s legs were unrestrained and that he theoretically could have run does not establish an
undisputed risk of or attempt at flight – especially because Mr. Hardin’s arms were cuffed and he
was surrounded by police officers who had arrived at the scene. A reasonable jury could find the
second takedown – the use of non-trivial, potentially injurious force – was an unreasonable use of
force under Graham.
Summary judgment on the Phase Two excessive force claim is therefore DENIED as to
Officer Salala.
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a. Qualified Immunity – Phase Two
Applying the framework set out above, qualified immunity does not shield Officer Salala
on this record.
Taking the facts in Mr. Hardin’s favor, it was clearly established well before February
2024 that an officer may not use non-trivial force against a handcuffed, disarmed suspect who is
not resisting or attempting to flee. Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 480–81 (9th Cir.
2007) (because “force is only justified when there is a need for force,” a reasonable officer would
be on notice that “punching [plaintiff] to free his arms when, in fact, he was not manipulating his
arms in an attempt to avoid being handcuffed, was also a Fourth Amendment violation”); LaLonde
v. Cnty. of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 961 (9th Cir. 2000) (a reasonable officer would have known
that pepper spraying a plaintiff who has surrendered and is “rendered helpless” by handcuffs
constituted excessive force).
On Mr. Hardin’s version of events, Officer Salala pushed a cuffed, disarmed, non-fleeing
suspect to the ground, risking injury, in violation of the clearly established law barring the use of
non-trivial force absent any reasonable justification under Graham. Qualified immunity is
therefore DENIED as to Officer Salala on the Phase Two excessive force claim.
B. Unlawful Arrest and Detention (Officers Salala, Charles, and Castillo)
Mr. Hardin’s second claim alleges that the officers detained and arrested him in violation
of the Fourth Amendment. Mr. Hardin has narrowed this claim considerably in his opposition
brief. He does not appear to dispute, for purposes of the motion, that the traffic stop was lawfully
initiated based on the window tint. Opp. at 12. Mr. Hardin concedes that once the officers
discovered the firearm, they had probable cause to arrest him. Id. at 16. He has also withdrawn
all individual-capacity claims against Officer Remick. Id. at 17.
What remains is a much narrower contention: that Officer Salala unlawfully prolonged the
stop by investigating Mr. Hardin, demanding his identification, and seizing his phone, without
independent reasonable suspicion and before the firearm was found. Opp. at 12. For the reasons
set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part summary judgment on this
claim.
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A traffic stop is a seizure that must be justified at its inception and limited in scope to its
“mission” – addressing the violation that warranted the stop and attending to related safety
concerns. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354–55 (2015) (dog sniff conducted around
the plaintiff’s vehicle stopped for driving in a shoulder lane exceeded the “mission” of issuing a
ticket for the violation). An officer may pursue unrelated inquiries during a stop, but may not do
so in a manner that prolongs the stop beyond the time reasonably required to complete that
mission, absent independent reasonable suspicion. Id. at 355, 357. Relatedly, an officer may
order a driver or passenger out of a lawfully stopped vehicle. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111 (when
weighed against concerns for officer safety, the additional intrusion on a driver’s personal liberty
is de minimis); Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414–15 (applying the Mimms rule to passengers).
The rationale for extending the order to the passenger is to protect officer safety, and thus
no particularized justification is required. However, demanding a passenger’s identification is
permissible only if it is part of the mission of a traffic stop, or (2) there is reasonable suspicion that
the passenger has committed a criminal offense. United States v. Landeros, 913 F.3d 862, 867–68
(9th Cir. 2019).
Landeros governs the inquiry as to whether an officer may not only request a passenger to
exit the vehicle, but also request the passenger’s identification. Landeros involved an early
morning vehicle stop where the driver, Mr. Landeros, was pulled over for driving 11 miles over
the speed limit near a Pascua Yaqui Indian reservation. 913 F.3d 864. The officer saw two
individuals who appeared to be minors sitting in the backseat and noticed the smell of alcohol in
the car. Id. He asked the passengers for identification because they looked under the age of
eighteen and it was past the 10:00 p.m. tribal code curfew for minors. Id. The passengers – aged
19 and 21 – provided their identification. Id.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the officer was permitted to “prolong the initially lawful
stop to ask the two women for identification, because he had reasonable suspicion they were
underage.” Id. This reasonable suspicion was independent of the reasonable suspicion that
supported the traffic stop for speeding. See id. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that ordinarily, the
identity of a passenger has “no relation to a driver’s safe operation of a vehicle.” Landeros, 913
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F.3d at 868. The mission of the traffic stop involves “ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic
stop” such as “checking the driver's license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants
against the driver, and inspecting the automobile's registration and proof of insurance.” Id.
(quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. 348 at 355). Those inquiries each share “the same objective as
enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and
responsibly.” Id. (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. 348 at 355).
Thus, per Landeros, while an officer may order a passenger out of the car during a traffic
stop, the officer may not prolong the stop by demanding the passenger’s identification absent
reasonable suspicion of the passenger’s criminal conduct. Id.
For the reasons stated below, each component of this stop was lawful and not unreasonably
prolonged. However, the seizure of the phone was unlawful.
1. Order to Exit the Vehicle
First, the Court addresses Officer Salala’s order that Mr. Hardin exit the vehicle. This
command was lawful. Under Mimms and Wilson, Officer Salala could order Mr. Hardin, a
passenger in a lawfully stopped car, to step out. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111; Wilson, 519 U.S. at
414–15. No particular suspicion of danger is required. Applicable case law disposes of any claim
premised on the order to exit itself. Since ordering the passenger to exit is generally permissible,
the time it takes to effectuate that order cannot be deemed an unlawful prolonging of the stop.
2. Demand for Identification
Second, the Court addresses the demand for identification. This request did not exceed the
permissible scope of the stop, because Officer Salala had an independent justification to
investigate Mr. Hardin. Officer Salala testified (and the BWC footage establishes) that Mr. Hardin
was not wearing a seatbelt – a violation of state law. Salala Dep. at 10:24–12:6; MSJ Reply at 5
(arguing that Mr. Hardin’s failure to wear a seatbelt “provided Officer Salala with reasonable
suspicion to investigate Plaintiff for a criminal violation/infraction and to demand his
identification”). Having personally observed Mr. Hardin committing that violation, Officer Salala
was entitled to ascertain Mr. Hardin’s identity to issue a citation. See Landeros, 913 F.3d at 868.
The seatbelt infraction thus supplied the independent reasonable suspicion basis to request
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identification from Mr. Hardin as a passenger. And again, the time spent trying to obtain Mr.
Hardin’s identification did not unlawfully prolong the stop under these circumstances.
3. Seizure of the Phone
Third, the Court addresses the seizure of Mr. Hardin’s cell phone. Officer Salala testified
that he feared that Mr. Hardin used his phone to summon others to the scene located in a “high-
crime area,” and that Officer Salala took the phone as a safety precaution. Salala Dep. at 47:2–
49:4. Mr. Hardin, however, testified that he simply called his sister who lived down the street so
that he would have a witness present if anything were to happen to him. Hardin Dep. at 35:17-
36:18.
During a traffic stop seizure, officers may take reasonable measures to address safety
concerns attendant to the traffic stop. See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356 (an “officer may need to
take certain negligibly burdensome precautions in order to complete [their] mission safely”);
United States v. Hylton, 30 F.4th 842, 847 (9th Cir. 2022) (a criminal history check is a negligibly
burdensome precaution necessary to complete a stop safely). Defendants, however, do not
identify any case law establishing that there was a reasonable basis to conclude that an individual
contacting other individuals during a traffic stop – here, a family member – interfered with
Defendants’ ability to conduct the traffic stop or threatened officer safety. Cf. Yun v. City of Los
Angeles, No. CV 16-05468-SVW-KS, 2016 WL 11969686, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2016)
(rejecting general assertions that “officer safety grant[s] an officer carte blanche to physically strip
a subject’s cell phone through any means necessary” when officers admit that “Plaintiff’s cell
phone use did not interfere in their ability to complete the stop.”). At the very least, viewing the
facts and reasonable inferences in Mr. Hardin’s favor, a reasonable jury could find there was no
sufficient basis for believing Mr. Hardin’s call was intended to summon others to come and
interfere with the officers’ activity in conducting the stop. There is no evidence, for instance, that
the police knew or suspected that Mr. Hardin was involved in gang activity and that he was likely
summoning other gang members to come to the scene and intervene. Thus, absent a reasonable
safety justification, Officer Salala’s seizure of Mr. Hardin’s phone violated his Fourth Amendment
rights. This is so regardless of whether that seizure actually prolonged the stop.
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4. The Arrest
Fourth, the Court addresses the arrest itself. Mr. Hardin concedes that the arrest following
discovery of the firearm was supported by probable cause. Opp. at 16 (“Once the weapon was
found, probable cause existed on the firearms offenses regardless of the lawfulness of what
preceded it.”). Once the officers found a loaded gun concealed in Mr. Hardin’s waistband, they
had probable cause to arrest him for its possession. This concession defeats any false-arrest
theory, because probable cause to believe a person has committed an offense forecloses such a
claim. Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Because police had probable cause to
arrest him, Hart’s false arrest claim necessarily fails.”) (citing Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park,
159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam)).
Because the stop, order to exit, demand for identification, and the arrest were all lawful,
Mr. Hardin’s unlawful arrest and detention claim fails as a matter of law as to those aspects of the
stop. This is a matter independent of the use of force in enforcing the officer’s lawful command to
Mr. Hardin to exit the car. However, viewing the facts in Mr. Hardin’s favor, a jury could find
that Officer Salala’s seizure of Mr. Hardin’s cell phone, absent any officer-safety justification,
violates the Fourth Amendment.
Summary judgment on the unlawful arrest and detention claim as to Officers Salala and
Charles is therefore GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, solely as to the cell phone
seizure.
a. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity as to the cell phone seizure is DENIED as to Officer Salala.
Mr. Hardin bears the burden of identifying a clearly established law. Shafer, 868 F.3d
1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 2017). As stated above, a traffic stop seizure may extend beyond the
“mission of the stop itself” if the precautions are required to complete the mission safely.
Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356. For example, criminal record and warrant checks during a traffic stop
are justified as a matter of officer safety. Id. (citing United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1223
(10th Cir. 2001)). That an officer may take reasonable measures to protect officer safety during
the traffic stop is established. See id.
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Here, the contours were sufficiently definite that an officer would have known they were
violating these standards. Kisela, 584 U.S. at 105. Rodriguez and Taylor establish that the
“mission of the stop itself” may only be expanded if the precautions are required to complete the
mission safely. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356; United States v. Taylor, 60 F.4th 1233, 1239 (9th Cir.
2023) (asking the suspect whether he had been arrested before or had drugs or weapons in his car
were “basic questions” reasonably asked in the name of officer safety). Here, a jury could find
that no objectively reasonable safety concern justified the seizure of Mr. Hardin’s phone. Absent
any safety justification, no reasonable officer could find that seizing a cell phone was required to
complete the mission safely.
Officer Salala claims that he doesn’t recall whether he “actually observe[d] the texts that
Mr. Hardin was sending,” and claimed it was “a common tactic that people use to overwhelm law
enforcement when they don’t want to be pulled over.” Salala Dep. at 35:25, 26:1–10. Calling
“people” generally, without any indication that those people were being summoned to the scene or
would pose a threat to officers, does not objectively indicate a safety threat. As discussed above,
absent any other indication based on the alleged offense (a seatbelt violation) that Mr. Hardin was
involved in organized crime or had connections to dangerous individuals who may arrive on scene
(i.e. verbal statements summoning assistance or asking others to confront police), no reasonable
officer could have concluded that Mr. Hardin’s use of a cell phone threatened officer safety. See
Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356; Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244 (objective legal reasonableness is assessed
in light of legal rules clearly established at the time the action was taken). Cf. Yun v. City of Los
Angeles, No. CV 16-05468-SVW-KS, 2016 WL 11969686, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2016)
(“[N]o reasonable officer under these circumstances, with Plaintiff as the subject, could have
reasonably found that her use of a cell phone—after complying with officer orders to produce her
license, registration, and insurance, and without making any verbal threats towards the officers or
physically assaulting them in any way, and without any officer believing that she possessed a
weapon or was otherwise dangerous or would flee the scene—could constitute an officer safety
issue. To hold as such would allow all officers to forcibly remove the cell phone from every
individual they stop for a traffic violation regardless of the specific facts involved. In this case, any
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reasonable officer would have understood that his or her actions violated Plaintiff’s clearly
established constitutional rights.”) (emphasis added).
Thus, qualified immunity is DENIED as to Officer Salala’s seizure of Mr. Hardin’s phone.
C. Failure to Intervene and Integral Participation (Officers Castillo and Remick)
Mr. Hardin alleges in his first amended complaint that Officers Castillo and Remick are
liable for failing to intervene in Officers Salala and Charles’ conduct in removing Mr. Hardin from
the car, taking him down, and handcuffing him on the ground. Since filing the FAC, Mr. Hardin
voluntarily dismissed Officer Remick from all individual-capacity claims. Opp. at 17. Mr. Hardin
has also abandoned the failure-to-intervene theory as to Officer Castillo, recasting the remaining
claim against Castillo as one for integral participation in the allegedly unlawful detention. Id.
(“Officer Castillo stands differently [than Officer Remick], and Plaintiff is precise about the
theory. It is not failure to intervene in the force. It is integral participation in the unlawfully
prolonged detention.”).
The Court GRANTS summary judgment as to Mr. Hardin’s claims against Officer
Remick, and his failure to intervene claim as to Officer Castillo.
To the extent Mr. Hardin claims Officer Castillo’s “integral participation,” now argued but
not formally pled in his first amended complaint, that argument lacks merit. FAC ¶¶ 158–76
(Count 4). “Integral participation” requires an individual assessment of Castillo’s participation
beyond his presence at the scene. Boyd v. Benton Cnty., 374 F.3d 773, 780 (9th Cir. 2004). While
“‘integral participation’ does not require that each officer’s actions themselves rise to the level of a
constitutional violation[,]” “mere bystanders” with “no role in the unlawful conduct” are also not
liable. Id. (quoting Chuman v. Wright, 76 F.3d 292, 294-95 (9th Cir.1996)). Active participation
or facilitation of the conduct beyond mere presence is required. In Nicholson, the Ninth Circuit
held that the officer who gave the order to handcuff teenage boys played an integral role in the
subsequent prolonged detention and sustained handcuffing of the plaintiffs. Nicholson v. City of
Los Angeles, 935 F.3d 685, 692 (9th Cir. 2019). In Boyd, the court concluded that all SWAT
officers involved in a post-robbery search operation were integral participants where only one
officer threw a flash-bang “blind” into a dark apartment that burned a woman who was sleeping in
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the apartment. Boyd, 374 F.3d at 77980. There, because all officers on the SWAT team knew of
the plan to use the flash-bang and did not object, they actively participated in its operation. Id. at
780.
Castillo did not participate in the detention and use of force. He was not involved in the
initial stop or the questioning of the occupants of the vehicle during the initial stop. Nor did
Officer Castillo participate in Officer Salala’s removal of the cell phone from Mr. Hardin’s hand.
The BWC footage depicts Officer Salala taking Mr. Hardin’s phone from him between 3:46:09
p.m. and 3:46:11 p.m. Salala BWC at 2:17. Officer Castillo’s BWC video depicts him arriving to
the scene and turning on his body-worn camera at 3:47:56 p.m. – nearly two minutes after Officer
Salala took the phone from Mr. Hardin.
When Officer Salala pulled Mr. Hardin from the car at 3:48:30 p.m., and Officer Charles
assisted Officer Salala in taking Mr. Hardin down to the ground at 3:48:34 p.m., Officer Castillo
was standing by the driver’s side door, having just arrived on scene about 20 seconds earlier.
Castillo BWC at 0:29–36. The only warning Officer Castillo had before Officer Salala pulled Mr.
Hardin from the car was the driver, Addi, stating loudly, “you can’t grab him like that” – four
seconds before Officer Salala pulled Mr. Hardin from the car. Id. at 0:33–36. On this record,
there is no basis to find Officer Castillo participated in the use of force against Mr. Hardin.
While Officers Salala and Charles were handcuffing and searching Mr. Hardin on the
ground, Officer Castillo grabbed Addi by the arm while she was recording the officers. Castillo
BWC at 0:36–54. He then removed Addi from the vehicle, removed her phone, and handcuffed
her. Id. at 1:28. But any use of force in relation to Addi is not the subject of this case.
Furthermore, at the time of the second takedown of Mr. Hardin, Officer Castillo was handcuffing
Addi by the vehicle. Id. at 1:20. Mr. Hardin claims that Castillo knew of and acquiesced to the
plan because he assisted in the “companion seizure” of Addi. Opp. at 18.
This argument is unavailing. Unlike the pre-search knowledge of conduct that conferred
liability for the flash-bang deployment in Boyd, Officer Castillo arrived at the scene minutes into
the stop, and did not consult at any time with Officers Salala and Charles prior to the takedown
and handcuffing. Boyd, 374 F.3d at 779–80. Mr. Hardin’s argument that there was a concerted
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plan – a “single coordinate seizure” – to remove both participants from the vehicle is unsupported
by any record evidence and appears purely speculative. There was no pre-action agreement or
verbal indication that all officers would collectively engage in any specific operation with respect
to Mr. Hardin’s takedown and handcuffing, and Officer Castillo stood on the other side of the car
as the other officers initiated the search and handcuff of Mr. Hardin. Unlike the officer in
Nicholson, Officer Castillo did not engage in any decision making as to the takedown and ground
restraint of Mr. Hardin – nor did he go over to the other side of the vehicle to assist the other
officers in any way. 935 F.3d at 692.
Last, the Ninth Circuit has also previously concluded that an officer who “provided crowd
control” did not participate in “any integral way” to the arrest. Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 481 n.12.
To the extent Mr. Hardin considers removal of Addi from the vehicle as analogous to crowd
control or preventing bystanders from assisting Mr. Hardin, that argument lacks merit.
Summary judgment is therefore GRANTED as to Officers Castillo and Remick on Count
Four.
D. Monell Liability (City of Richmond)
Mr. Hardin’s third claim seeks to hold the City of Richmond liable under Section 1983. A
municipality is not liable under Section 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior; it may be held
liable only where the execution of its own policy or custom inflicts the constitutional injury.
Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691–94 (1978). A plaintiff must identify a
municipal policy or custom and establish “a direct causal link” between it and the constitutional
deprivation – i.e., that the policy or custom was the “moving force” behind the violation. Bd. of
Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403–04 (1997); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,
385 (1989). Because the Court has held that a jury could find the officers used excessive force in
Phases One and Two, an underlying constitutional violation remains live in this case. The Court
thus proceeds to the merits of Mr. Hardin’s three theories of municipal liability: custom,
ratification, and failure to train. Even if a jury were to find the officers’ use of force excessive,
summary judgment is GRANTED for the City on each theory.
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1. Custom
A plaintiff may establish municipal liability by proving a longstanding practice or custom
that constitutes the standard operating procedure of the public entity. A custom is not shown by
isolated or sporadic incidents; it requires “practices of sufficient duration, frequency, and
consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Trevino v.
Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). “A single constitutional deprivation ordinarily is
insufficient.” Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999).
Mr. Hardin’s evidence of custom – internal-affairs files reflecting exonerated uses of force
during stops and civil actions filed against the City before this incident – does not meet that
standard. These materials are offered to show notice of a practice of unlawful use of excessive
force by Richmond police officers, but notice of civilian complaints about use of force is not
sufficient evidence that there was a custom or practice of constitutional violations. The internal-
affairs files reflect that the City investigated and did not sustain any claims of unlawful use of
force, and the civil actions filed in court were unproven allegations. Mr. Hardin does not cite any
verdicts finding excessive force, and certainly not a sufficient number to show a custom or
practice. Moreover, Mr. Hardin supplies no context, such as the number of stops, arrests, or uses
of force against which the identified incidents may be measured, and from which a jury could find
frequency and consistency of such incidents. In addition, the incidents appear factually disparate;
the one sustained finding of excessive force against Officer Salala arose from a separate, later, and
dissimilar matter. On the record herein, Mr. Hardin has not established that unconstitutional use
of excessive force was “the traditional method of carrying out policy.” Trevino, 99 F.3d at 918.
Mr. Hardin thus cannot demonstrate a municipal custom supplied the moving force behind his
injury. Summary judgment is therefore GRANTED on Mr. Hardin’s custom theory.
2. Ratification
A municipality may be liable where “an official with final policy-making authority ratified
a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” Gillette v. Delmore, 979
F.2d 1342, 1347 (9th Cir. 1992). To show ratification, a plaintiff must prove that the “authorized
policymakers approve a subordinate’s decision and the basis for it,” with knowledge of the
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constitutional violation, and that they “actually approve[d] of it.” Christie, 176 F.3d at 1239
(quoting City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988)); Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978,
987 (9th Cir. 2004). Critically, “[a] mere failure to overrule a subordinate’s actions, without more,
is insufficient to support a § 1983 claim.” Christie, 176 F.3d at 1239.
Mr. Hardin’s ratification theory rests on the City’s investigation of this incident and its
decision not to sustain a finding of misconduct against Officers Salala and Charles. That is
precisely the “mere failure to overrule” that Christie holds insufficient. A decision not to
discipline, standing alone, does not establish that a final policymaker knew of and affirmatively
approved the officers’ conduct. Mr. Hardin identifies no policymaker who reviewed the use of
force and endorsed it as consistent with the Fourth Amendment, as distinct from declining to
sustain a complaint. The City’s post-incident “exoneration” of Officer Salala does not indicate
that the City was the “moving force” behind the injury – particularly one that occurred before the
City allegedly “approved” of the offending conduct. Brown, 520 U.S. at 404 (“The plaintiff must
also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’
behind the injury alleged.”). And the City’s later termination of Officer Salala for excessive force
in a separate matter is inconsistent with the inference of supervisory approval. Mr. Hardin cannot
demonstrate ratification, and summary judgment is GRANTED on this theory.
3. Failure to Train
A municipality may be liable for failure to train “[o]nly where [that] failure . . . reflects a
‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of its inhabitants.” Canton, 489 U.S. at 389. Deliberate
indifference exists where “the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the
inadequacy is so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers . . .
can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.” Id. at 390. Ordinarily,
“[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is necessary,” and a single
incident will rarely suffice. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011). Single-incident
liability, where a pattern of violations may not be necessary to show “deliberate indifference,”
may arise where “the unconstitutional consequences of failing to train could be so patently
obvious that a city could be liable under § 1983 without proof of a pre-existing pattern of
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violations.” Id. at 63-64. And as with any theory of municipal liability, the training inadequacy
must cause the injury. Canton, 489 U.S. at 385, 391.
Mr. Hardin’s failure to train theory does not meet the standard. Opp. at 27-28. The record
does not show an absence of training on the relevant subjects. To the contrary, the City’s own
Rule 30(b)(6) designee testified that Richmond trains its officers on the very practice that Mr.
Hardin invokes — to limit body weight on a prone subject and to roll a subject onto their side.
Mr. Hardin identifies no specific deficiency in the City’s training on traffic stops or treatment of
passengers, and offers no evidence that any such deficiency was so obvious that the City’s
policymakers were deliberately indifferent to the likelihood of law violations likely to result in the
absence of training. See Canton, 489 U.S. at 389. Mr. Hardin fails to point to a likelihood of
severe injury that might support the rare case of single-incident liability for failure to train. See
Connick, 563 U.S. 63–64. And Mr. Hardin has not shown that any training deficiency caused his
injury. See Canton, 489 U.S. at 385, 391.
In sum, Mr. Hardin cannot demonstrate that a failure to train amounted to a policy or
custom, that it reflected deliberate indifference, or that it was the moving force behind the
constitutional deprivation. Accordingly, summary judgment is GRANTED on the failure to train
theory.
4. Rule 56(d)
In the alternative, Mr. Hardin asks the Court to defer a ruling on the Monell claim under
Rule 56(d) to permit additional discovery into the City’s policies and training. A party seeking
such relief must identify the specific facts it hopes to obtain, show that those facts exist, and show
that they are essential to opposing summary judgment. Stevens v. Corelogic, Inc., 899 F.3d 666,
678 (9th Cir. 2018). Mr. Hardin has not identified with any degree of specificity what further
discovery might provide. The request for relief under Rule 56(d) is therefore DENIED.
* * *
Because Mr. Hardin cannot establish municipal liability under any of his theories,
summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of the City of Richmond on the Monell claim.
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V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN
PART AND DENIED IN PART, as follows:
On the excessive force claim, the motion for summary judgment is DENIED as all uses of
force. Thus, summary judgment on excessive force is DENIED as to Officer Salala (Phase One
and Phase Two) and Officer Charles (Phase One ).
Summary judgment as to qualified immunity is DENIED as to Officers Salala and Charles
for both phases of force.
On the unlawful arrest and detention claim, the motion for summary judgment is DENIED
as to Officer Salala’s seizure of Mr. Hardin’s phone, but GRANTED as to the alleged detention
delays. Qualified immunity, however, is DENIED as to Officer Salala’s seizure of the phone.
Summary judgment as to unlawful arrest and detention is otherwise GRANTED as to all other
Defendants.
On the failure to intervene claim, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to
Officers Castillo and Remick; and
On the Monell claim, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of the City
of Richmond.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 7, 2026
______________________________________
EDWARD M. CHEN
United States District Judge
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