Khan v. City and County of San Francisco Department of Public Health et al

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MAHROOFA I. KHAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN
FRANCISCO DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
HEALTH,
Defendant.
Case No. 24-cv-09289-LJC
ORDER RESOLVING DISCOVERY
DISPUTE
Re: Dkt. No. 35
Before the Court is the joint discovery brief filed by Plaintiff Mahroofa Khan and
Defendant the City and County of San Francisco (the City). ECF No. 35.1 Plaintiff argues that
many of the City’s responses to her Requests for Admission and Interrogatories are insufficient
and seeks a court order compelling the City to provide further responses. The City argues that it
has responded sufficiently to the majority of the requests at issue and explains that it will provide
further responses to a limited number of requests. The close of fact discovery is on January 30,
2026. The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the overall procedural and factual
background of the case.
For the forgoing reasons, Plaintiff’s request for relief is DENIED in part and GRANTED
in part.
1 As a housekeeping matter, the parties are instructed to comply with the undersigned’s Civil
Standing Order going forward, which, in relevant part at § F-5, provides that joint discovery briefs
“shall not exceed five pages.”
Case 3:24-cv-09289-LJC Document 36 Filed 12/12/25 Page 1 of 9

2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
A. Requests for Admission
1. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36 governs requests for admission. Rule 36(a)(1) permits
a party to “serve on any other party a written request to admit, for purposes of the pending action
only, the truth of any matter within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1) relating to … facts, the application
of law to fact, or opinions about either; and” the genuineness of identified documents. Requests
for admission serve two purposes: “first, to facilitate proof with respect to issues that cannot be
eliminated from the case and, second, to narrow the issues by eliminating those that can be.”
Conlon v. United States, 474 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 2007).
A responding party must either admit the matter, “specifically deny it[,] or state in detail
why” the responding party “cannot truthfully admit or deny it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4). “A
denial must fairly respond to the substance of the matter; and when good faith requires that a party
qualify an answer or deny only a part of a matter, the answer must specify the part admitted and
qualify or deny the rest.” Id. “Where the meaning of a particular term in a request is somewhat
inexact, the responding party should supply its own definition and admit or deny, or qualify its
admission or denial to make it accurate and responsive.” Runway TV, LLC v. De Gray, No. 18-cv-
02503, 2020 WL 6712253, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2020). If a responding party is unable to
admit or deny a request because of “lack of knowledge or information,” it must state in its
response “that it has made reasonable inquiry and that the information it knows or can readily
obtain is insufficient to enable it to admit or deny.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4).
Plaintiff argues that the City’s responses to twenty of her Requests for Admissions are
insufficient. For the most part, the City disagrees and argues that its responses complied with the
requirements of Rule 36(a)(1). The Court agrees in large part with the City and finds that its
responses to the majority of the RFAs at issue were sufficient, but finds that further responses are
warranted to RFA Nos. 7, 11, 18, 36, 43 and 47.
2. RFA Nos. 1, 12, 27, 44-46, 51, 66, and 72
The City objected to RFA Nos. 1, 12, 27, 44-46, 51, 66, and 72, and, without waiving its
Case 3:24-cv-09289-LJC Document 36 Filed 12/12/25 Page 2 of 9

3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
objections, denied these requests outright. See ECF No. 35 at 11-24. Plaintiff disagrees with the
City’s denials and argues that the City must be forced to answer the requests “in full.” See, e.g.,
id. at 2. For example, RFA No. 12 asks the City to admit or deny the following: “Supervisor
Tuyet Nguyen was newly appointed and did not have experience in her supervisory role before
Plaintiff joining CBHS Pharmacy - making Plaintiff her first hire under her new role as a
Supervisor.” Id. at 14. The City objected based on vagueness and ambiguity, and, without
waiving its objections, denied the RFA. Id. In the letter brief, Plaintiff explains that the “City has
access to records regarding hire dates, promotion dates, title changing, training records,” and
argues that ordering the City to answer the RFA “in full will prove Supervisor did not have
experience in her role” and show “why Plaintiff’s complaints were not handled properly.” Id. at 3.
Plaintiff is asking too much of Rule 36. Under Rule 36(a)(4), the City is only required to
admit to the RFA, deny it, or state why it “cannot truthfully admit or deny it.” A denial is a
complete response. The City complied with its obligations under Rule 36(a)(4) by denying the
matters Plaintiff asked it to admit or deny. It is not required to go beyond its obligations under
Rule 36(a)(4) and provide additional information to support its denial. If Plaintiff thinks that the
City’s denials are wrong or suspects that documents in the City’s possession will show that a
denial is inaccurate, she may serve interrogatories or requests for production seeking this
information, depose witnesses she believes may have relevant information, or otherwise continue
with discovery as permitted by the Federal Rules. But the City is not required to volunteer this
information in response to her RFAs. Plaintiff’s request that the City respond further to RFA Nos.
1, 12, 27, 44-46, 51, 66, and 72 is accordingly denied.
3. RFA Nos. 6, 19, 68
The City objected to RFA Nos. 6, 19, and 68, and, without waiving its objections, admitted
to portions of each RFA while denying other portions. Rule 36(a)(4) provides that, “when good
faith requires that a party qualify an answer or deny only a part of a matter, the answer must
specify the part admitted and qualify or deny the rest.” The City has complied with this
Case 3:24-cv-09289-LJC Document 36 Filed 12/12/25 Page 3 of 9

4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
requirement and responded sufficiently. To the extent Plaintiff seeks additional information from
the City regarding its responses, she may use other discovery tools permitted under the Federal
Rules.
For example, RFA No. 19 asked the City to admit or deny to the following: “3 out of the 4
weekend Pharmacists … were registered with logins into PRATA to complete the weekend task of
Drug Replenishment after Plaintiff started working the weekend shifts.” ECF No. 35 at 15.
Subject to objections, the City admitted that “all of its pharmacists are registered to perform work
in the Parata” but denied “that the pharmacists’ registrations only occurred after Plaintiff began
working weekend shifts.” Id. This response complies with the requirements of Rule 36(a)(4).
Plaintiff argues that the City “must investigate and request dates of registration for PRATA, for all
Pharmacists who had access during Plaintiff’s time of employment,” but, as explained above, the
City has no obligation to provide information beyond what Rule 36(a)(4) requires. ECF No. 35 at
4. Plaintiff is free to request the City’s records showing “dates of registration for PRATA,” but
the City is not required to volunteer this information in response to the RFA.
Plaintiff’s request that the City respond further to RFA Nos. 6, 19, and 68 is accordingly
denied.
4. RFA Nos. 7 and 18
Plaintiff’s RFA No. 7 asks the City to admit or deny to the following: “City and County of
San Francisco Labor Relations did not respond to Plaintiff's incident report letter (named ‘Letter
of Unfair Dismissal’) emailed to Marc Crumpton after being asked to send a list of incidents in the
workplace.” Id. at 12. The City objected that this request was vague, ambiguous, and
unintelligible, explaining in the letter brief that Plaintiff did not provide the date of the alleged
letter but, if “Plaintiff can specify the date of the alleged communication, the City can conduct a
search for it and provide a further response to this request.” Id. at 2. Consistent with the City’s
proposal in the joint letter, Plaintiff shall identify the specific document she is referring to by
informing the City of the the date of the alleged communication or providing a copy of the
Case 3:24-cv-09289-LJC Document 36 Filed 12/12/25 Page 4 of 9

5
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
referenced communication to the City. Within seven days of Plaintiff doing so, the City shall
provide an amended response to RFA No. 7.
Similarly, RFA No. 18 asks the City to admit or deny that the “Standard Work Order for
weekends was changed after Plaintiff started working weekend shifts.” Id. at 15. The City
objected to this request as vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible, but, in the letter brief, explained
that during its meet and confer with Plaintiff, Plaintiff explained she was referring to a specific
document entitled “standard work order for weekends.” Id. at 15, 3. The City has agreed to
“attempt to identify the requested document” and provide a further response, if warranted. Id. at 3.
The Court directs the parties to meet and confer in good faith to identify the referenced documents
and for the City to provide a further response to RFA No. 18 by January 9, 2026.
5. RFA Nos. 11, 36, 43, and 47
The City responded to RFA Nos. 11, 36, 43 and 47 by explaining that it did not have
sufficient information to admit or deny the requests, and on that basis denied them. “The
answering party may assert lack of knowledge or information as a reason for failing to admit or
deny only if the party states that it has made reasonable inquiry and that the information it knows
or can readily obtain is insufficient to enable it to admit or deny.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4). The
“reasonable inquiry” requirement “is in keeping with a basic principle of the discovery rules that a
reasonable burden may be imposed on the parties when its discharge will facilitate preparation for
trial and ease the trial process.” Asea, Inc. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 669 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir.
1981) (internal quotations omitted). It requires the “responding party to make a reasonable
inquiry, a reasonable effort, to secure information that is readily obtainable from persons and
documents within the responding party’s relative control and to state fully those efforts.” A.
Farber & Partners, Inc. v. Garber, 237 F.R.D. 250, 254 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (quoting Henry v.
Champlain Enter., Inc., 212 F.R.D. 73, 78 (N.D.N.Y. 2003)). “Such reasonable inquiry includes
an investigation and inquiry of employees, agents, and others, who conceivably, but in realistic
terms, may have information which may lead to or furnish the necessary and appropriate
Case 3:24-cv-09289-LJC Document 36 Filed 12/12/25 Page 5 of 9

6
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
response.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
The City’s responses to RFA Nos. 11, 36, 43, and 47 fail to state that the City has made a
reasonable inquiry into the matters requested and that “the information it knows or can readily
obtain is insufficient to enable it to admit or deny,” as required by Rule 36(a)(4). Fed. R. Civ. P.
36(a)(4). This raises the possibility that the City has not made diligent, reasonable efforts to
obtain information that would enable it to respond to these requests. To the extent it has not
already done so, the City is ordered to make a reasonable inquiry, by, at minimum, reviewing
documents within the City’s control and making reasonable efforts to contact current and former
employees who may “have information which may lead to or furnish the necessary and
appropriate response.” Garber, 237 F.R.D. at 254 (internal quotations omitted). The City must
then provide amended responses compliant with Rule 36(a)(4) by January 9, 2026.
6. RFA Nos. 13 and 55
Plaintiff’s RFA No. 13 asks the City to admit or deny that “Supervisor Tuyet Nguyen did
not follow the guidelines expected of her when faced with Plaintiff's complaints of bullying and
[harassment,] and therefore did not investigate nor file any reports with HR regarding the
allegations.” ECF No. 35 at 14. Without waiving its objections, the City responded to RFA No.
13 by denying “that Plaintiff made any complaints of ‘bullying or harassment’ to her supervisor
Tuyet Nguyen,” but did not admit or deny the portion of the RFA regarding the failure to
investigate or file HR repots. Id. RFA No. 55 asks the City to admit or deny that “Plaintiff’s
complaints of the hostile work environment created by Jane Perez were ignored by management.”
Id. at 22. Subject to objections, the City denied that “Plaintiff complained of a hostile work
environment to her supervisor Tuyet Nguyen or her director Theresa Maranon,” but did not admit
or deny the portion of the RFA stating that Plaintiff’s complaints were ignored. Id. As the City
denied the underlying premise of both RFAs, the Court construes the City’s responses as outright
denials. That is, as the City denied that Plaintiff complained of a hostile work environment, it by
extension denied that management ignored complaints because it contends no complaints were
Case 3:24-cv-09289-LJC Document 36 Filed 12/12/25 Page 6 of 9

7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
made. If the City wishes to amend its answers to clarify its responses to RFA Nos. 13 and 55, it
shall do so by January 9, 2026.
Plaintiff disagrees with the City’s responses and requests an order compelling the City to
provide full responses. As explained above, the Court views the City’s responses as denials and
finds that no further responses are warranted under Rule 36(a)(4).
B. Interrogatories
1. Legal Standard
Rule 33(a) provides that “a party may serve on any other party no more than 25 written
interrogatories,” and the interrogatories “may related to any matter that may be inquired into under
Rule 26(b).” To the extent an interrogatory “is not objected to,” it must be answered “separately
and fully in writing under oath.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b). Rule 33(d) provides that if “the answer to
an interrogatory may be determined by examining, auditing, compiling, abstracting, or
summarizing a party’s business records … and if the burden of deriving or ascertaining the answer
will be substantially the same for either party,” the responding party may specify the records to be
reviewed and provide the requesting party a reasonable opportunity for review.
2. Analysis
Plaintiff contends that the City’s responses to Interrogatory Nos. 3, 6, 7, and 10 are
insufficient. The City has agreed to provide a further response to Interrogatory No. 10. ECF No.
35 at 7. It is ordered to do so no later than January 9, 2026.
Plaintiff’s requests that the City provide further responses to Interrogatory Nos. 3 and 7 is
denied. At Interrogatory No. 3, Plaintiff asks the City to “describe in detail the nature of” her
deficiencies on the job “which became the reason of termination.” Id. at 26. The City responded,
explaining that “Plaintiff’s unsatisfactory performance included being late to work and absent
from duty on multiple occasions, amongst other concerns.” Id. at 27. Plaintiff states that she
“disagrees with the City’s response as it lacks merit.” Id. at 6. Plaintiff’s disagreement with the
City’s given reasons is not a legitimate basis for ordering the City to further respond. At
Case 3:24-cv-09289-LJC Document 36 Filed 12/12/25 Page 7 of 9

8
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
Interrogatory No. 7, Plaintiff asks the City to “[i]dentify all documents concerning Plaintiff's work
performance, discipline, or termination, including evaluations, written warnings, emails, or
memoranda.” Id. at 29. The City explains that it has responded pursuant to Rule 33(d) by
producing responsive documents. The Court agrees with the City that no further response is
necessary.
At Interrogatory No. 6, Plaintiff asks the City to “[i]dentify all complaints made by
Plaintiff regarding discrimination, [harassment,] retaliation, or unfair treatment.” Id. at 28. The
City objected, asserting, among other things, that the terms “complaints,” “discrimination,”
harassment, “retaliation,” and “unfair treatment” were vague. Without waiving its objections, the
City listed various written complaints Plaintiff made between January and June 2024. Id. at 28-
29. Plaintiff asserts that the City’s response was inaccurate, as it omitted reports Plaintiff made in
the fall of 2023, and request that the City be compelled to respond further. The City contends that
its response was complete.
“The party objecting to discovery as vague or ambiguous has the burden to show such
vagueness or ambiguity. The responding party should exercise common sense and attribute
ordinary definitions to terms in discovery requests.” Advanced Visual Image Design, LLC v.
Exist, Inc., EDCV 14-2525, 2015 WL 4934178, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2015) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Court does not find Interrogatory No. 6 so vague so as to merit the
City’s objections, and this objection is accordingly overruled. The Court views Interrogatory No.
6 as asking the City to identify all instances, both formal and informal, where Plaintiff
communicated her dissatisfaction or grievances regarding unfair treatment at work or
discrimination, harassment, or retaliation she experienced at work to her supervisors, management,
HR personnel, her union, or other responsive authority figure; when these communications were
made and who they were made to; and how (if at all) the City responded. See ECF No. 35 at 28.
The City appears to have limited its response to identifying formal written complaints Plaintiff
made after she was released from her job. This appears somewhat inconsistent with its duty “to
Case 3:24-cv-09289-LJC Document 36 Filed 12/12/25 Page 8 of 9

9
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
apply a good faith, reasonable interpretation to interrogatory requests” and to respond to each
interrogatory fully. Warner Bros. Int’l Television Distribution v. Golden Channels & Co., No. CV
02-09326, 2003 WL 27384426, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2003). The City is accordingly ordered
to amend its response to identify all communications made by Plaintiff reporting discrimination,
harassment, retaliation or mistreatment at work, as described above, as well as the dates of such
complaints, who the complaints were made to, and the City’s response. The City shall amend its
response by January 9, 2026.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 12, 2025
LISA J. CISNEROS
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 3:24-cv-09289-LJC Document 36 Filed 12/12/25 Page 9 of 9