(HC) Nguyen v. Warden of the Golden State Annex Detention Facility et al

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Case 2:25-cv-03297-SKO Document 20 Filed 01/09/26 Page1of9

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6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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10 os ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR

Petitioner, WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, DIRECTING
11 RESPONDENT TO RELEASE
V. PETTITTIONER, AND ENJ OINING
12 RESPONDENT FROM REDETAINING
PETTTIONER
13 | WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE ORDER NATING O ING
MCFARLAND DETENTION FACILITY, et TERMI UISTAND

14] a. MOTIONS [Docs. 6, 19]
15 Respondents.
16 /
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18 Petitioner Tuan Anh Nguyen is an immigration detainee proceeding with counsel with a
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petition for wit of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). Forthe reasons detailed

20 | below, the petition will be GRANTED.1

21 BACKGROUND

22 Petitioner is a citizen of Vietnam who came to the United States as a refugee in 1979.
23) (Docs. 12 at 2; 12-1 at 5, 7.) He then became a lawful permanent resident in 1982. (Docs. 12 at 2;
24) 12-1 at5.)

29 Petitioner was convicted of the following crimes:

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27), The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Judge, and on December 5, 2025, the case was
9g | assigned to the undersigned for all purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Docs. 5, 8, 9.) Accordingly,

the matter will be adjudicated by the undersigned.

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• May 31, 1989, Sexual Battery, in violation of California Penal Code (CPC) section
243.4, and sentenced to 100 days in jail;
• January 30, 1991, Burglary (Second Degree), in violation of CPC section 459, and
sentenced him to 1 year and 4 months in prison;
• January 9, 1997, Grand Theft of Property, in violation of CPC section 487(a), and
sentenced him to 1 year and 4 months in prison;
• January 24, 1997, Burglary, in violation of Nevada Revised Statutes section 205.060,
and sentenced to probation up to 24 months;
• July 16, 1999, Providing False Identification to a Peace Officer, in violation of CPC
section 148.9, and sentenced to 26 days in jail.
(Docs. 10 at 2; 12 at 3; 12-1 at 9-29.)
On or about April 25, 2000, Petitioner was ordered removed from the United States by an
immigration judge (“IJ”). (Docs. 1 at 2; 12 at 3; 12-1 at 30.) In October of 2000, he was released
pending removal on an order of supervision (“OSUP”). (Docs. 12 at 3; 12-1 at 32.)
In 2002, the Immigration and Nationality Service (“INS”) requested travel documents from
Vietnam. (Docs. 12 at 3; 12-1 at 36.) No such documentation was received. (Doc. 12 at 3.) On
December 9, 2002, Petitioner was released on another OSUP. (Doc. 12 at 3; 12-1 at 38.) Petitioner
remained under the OSUP and did not commit any crimes for the next 23 years.
In 2022, Petitioner was enrolled in the Compliance Assistance Reporting Terminal
(“CART”) to report once a year. (Doc. 12 at 4.)
On October 16, 2025, during his yearly work permit renewal at the Baltimore Field Office
in Baltimore, Maryland, Petitioner was detained and taken into custody by the Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). (Docs. 1 at 2; 12 at 4; 12-1 at 40-41.)
On January 5, 2026, Respondent submitted documentation showing Petitioner was issued a
Notice of Revocation of Release” and “Alien Informal Interview Upon Revocation of Order of
Supervision” on December 24, 2025. (Doc. 15.) These determinations made more than two months
after re-detention undercut any claim that Respondent made any such determination prior to re-
detention.
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There is also no indication when Respondents requested a travel document to Vietnam with
respect to his re-detention. Respondents only proffer that “ERO is actively working to obtain a
travel document for Petitioner to Vietnam.” (Doc. 10 at 2.) The Court can only assume that, like
every other case the Court has reviewed in the recent past, any such request was only made after
Petitioner was re-detained. To date, Vietnam has not issued a travel document.
On November 13, 2025, Petitioner sought his release though a writ of habeas corpus on
four grounds: (1) Petitioner’s continued detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment because there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future; (2) Petitioner’s potential removal to a third country violates the Fifth Amendment, INA,
Convention Against Torture; and implementing regulations; (3) removal to a third country
constitutes banishment in violation of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments; (4) Petitioner’s re-
detention without changed circumstances, without proof that an ICE official determined there was
a significant likelihood of removal, without notification of the reasons for revocation of release,
and without an initial informal interview promptly after return to custody violated Petitioner’s
rights under statute and the Constitution. (Doc. 1 at 12-18).
The Court will begin and end its review with Petitioner’s fourth claim, since relief on that
claim is clearly warranted.
The Court notes that Petitioner filed a motion for temporary restraining order and motion
for preliminary injunction on January 8, 2026. (Doc. 19.) Because the petition will be granted, the
motions will be dismissed as moot.
DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction
Before turning to the merits, the Court must first assure itself of jurisdiction. See Ruhrgas
AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577, 583 (1999). Courts have long had jurisdiction to
issue writs of habeas corpus to petitioners held in custody “in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C § 2241(c)(3). In doing so, we carry out the “historic
purpose of the writ,” namely “to relieve detention by executive authorities without judicial trial.”
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699. But the Supreme Court has consistently “rejected” any suggestion that
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section 1252(g) covers all claims arising from deportation proceedings or imposes a general
jurisdictional limitation. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1, 19
(2020). Had Petitioner sought to challenge the Government’s decision to execute his removal
order, it would indeed bar this Court’s review. But because Petitioner’s due process claim contests
only his detention resulting from violations of the Government’s mandatory duties under certain
statutes, regulations, and the Constitution, the Court finds that it has jurisdiction to determine the
lawfulness of Petitioner’s detention. See Arce v. United States, 899 F.3d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 2018)
(“[W]e have limited [section 1252(g)]’s jurisdiction-stripping power to actions challenging the
Attorney General’s discretionary decisions to initiate proceedings, adjudicate cases, and execute
removal orders.”).
B. Due Process
The Court finds that the Government has violated its own regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 241.13.
Section 241.13 provides “special review procedures” governing ICE’s authority to revoke a
removable alien’s release in cases where, as here, ICE has (1) previously determined “that there is
no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” and then (2)
subsequently seeks to revoke release based on changed circumstances resulting in a
“determin[ation] that there is a significant likelihood that the alien may be removed in the
reasonably foreseeable future.”
First, to revoke a removable alien’s release under section 241.13(i)(2), ICE must determine
that the alien is significantly likely to be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future “on account
of changed circumstances.”2 § 241.13(i)(2). The Government asserts that it has assessed that
“circumstances have changed such that [Petitioner’s] removal will now be ‘effectuated in the
reasonably foreseeable future.’” (See Doc. 10 at 4). The Government has submitted documentation
that it issued a “Notice of Revocation of Release” and “Alien Informal Interview Upon Revocation
of Order of Supervision” on December 24, 2025. (Doc. 15.) Although these actions have been
2 The Court notes that section 241.13(i)(1) provides another avenue for the Government to revoke release
under section 241.13 in instances where an alien “violates the conditions of release.” But nowhere in the
record does the Government purport to rely on this authority for the October 16, 2025, revocation of
Petitioner’s release, so the Court will not address this provision.
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taken, Ҥ 241.13(i)(2) requires that this determination is made before the removable alien has had
his release revoked.” Tran v. Noem, No. 25-cv-2391-BTM-BLM, 2025 WL 3005347, at *2 (S.D.
Cal. Oct. 27, 2025) (emphasis added); see also Sphabmixay v. Noem, No. 25CV2648-LL-VET,
2025 WL 3034071, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2025); Phakeokoth, v. Noem, No. 3:25-CV-02817-
RBM-SBC, 2025 WL 3124341, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2025); Nguyen, v. Noem, No. 25CV2792-
LL-VET, 2025 WL 3101979, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2025) (“However, courts ‘have found that
when ICE fails to follow its own regulations in revoking release, the detention is unlawful, and the
petitioner's release must be ordered.. . . . This is so even when [] the Government has obtained a
petitioner’s travel document back to his or her country of origin after their re-detainment.” (quoting
Truong v. Noem, No. 25-cv-2597-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 2988357, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2025)).
The record thus shows the changed-circumstances determination was apparently made over two
months after re-detention on December 24, 2025, not at or before Petitioner’s re-detention on
October 16, 2025. (Doc. 15.)
There is also no indication that the Government submitted a request to Vietnam for travel
documents until after his re-detention. And, to the extent that the Government advances an
argument that this kind of determination may be supported by evidence showing a general change
in a country’s policy of accepting removable aliens on a case-by-case basis, such arguments have
been repeatedly rejected. See, e.g., Phan v. Beccerra, No. 2:25-CV-01757-DC-JDP, 2025 WL
1993735, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025) (“Respondents contention that Petitioner’s removal is
reasonably foreseeable because removals to Vietnam are in fact occurring is unpersuasive” where
“[p]re-1995 Vietnamese immigrants may be repatriated to Vietnam on ‘a case-by-case basis’” and
Vietnam has “discretion whether to issue a travel document to any individual.” (quoting Hoi Thanh
Duong v. Tate, No. 24-cv-04119-H, 2025 WL 933947, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2025))).
Therefore, the Court concludes based on this record that if ICE assessed a likelihood of Petitioner’s
removal before revoking his release, it could not have been “on account of” legally relevant
changed circumstances pursuant to section 241.13(i)(2). With “no evidence of an actual
determination of changed circumstances that justified the initial revocation of [Petitioner’s]
release,” the Court finds the Government has violated section 241.13(i)(2). See, e.g., Sphabmixay,
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2025 WL 3034071, at *2 (finding the same). Indeed, the evidence submitted indicates the
determination was made well after Petitioner’s revocation of release. (Doc. 15.)
Second, even if the Government had made a determination based on legally sufficient
“changed circumstances,” the Court finds the Government also violated the section 241.13(i)(3)’s
notice requirement. Section 241.13(i)(3) sets forth “revocation procedures” governing revocation
carried out pursuant to this section. To revoke a removable alien’s release under section
241.13(i)(3), an alien must “be notified of the reasons for revocation of his or her release” and
those reasons must be “stated in the [written] notification.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3); see Tran, 2025
WL 3005347, at *3 (holding that this “notice must be in writing and contain all the reasons for the
revocation of the alien’s release”).
Here, the written notice was apparently provided over two months after re-detention on
December 24, 2025. The Government’s untimely actions fail to comport with the requirements of
section 241.13 and Petitioner’s due process rights.
Finally, even if the Court found the Government had made a legally sufficient determination
of “changed circumstances” and that the Notice was sufficient under section 241.13(i)(3), the
Court finds the Government also violated section 241.13(i)(3)’s opportunity to be heard
requirement. In addition to the notice provision, section 241.13(i)(3) requires ICE to “promptly,”
after re-detainment, conduct “an initial informal interview” to “afford the alien an opportunity to
respond to the reasons for revocation.” The interview was provided over two months after re-
detention, (Doc. 15), and fails to satisfy the requirement that Petitioner be “promptly” provided an
informal interview as required by section 241.13(i)(3). The Court, therefore, again finds the
Government violated Petitioner’s due process rights by not complying with its own rule under
section 241.13(i)(3). See Tran, 2025 WL 3005347, at *3 (finding the same); see also Grannis v.
Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (“The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the
opportunity to be heard.”); Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 172 (2021) (“If men must turn
square corners when they deal with the government, it cannot be too much to expect the
government to turn square corners when it deals with them.”).
The Government does not appear to dispute that it has failed to follow its own rules for re-
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detainment. In fact, the Government does not address Petitioner’s argument that his due process
rights were violated by the Government failing to abide by section 241.13’s requirements.
Courts “have found that when ICE fails to follow its own regulations in revoking release,
the detention is unlawful, and the petitioner’s release must be ordered.” Truong v. Noem, No. 25-
cv-2597-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 2988357, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2025) (collecting cases). Even
if the Government were to obtain a travel document from Vietnam subsequent to re-detainment,
Petitioner should be entitled to release. Id. at *1–6 (granting habeas and releasing the petitioner
with a deportation order back on supervision when the respondents failed to comply with §
241.13(i) and § 241.4(l) despite later securing travel documents for his country of origin); Tran,
2025 WL 3005347, at *1–4 (same); Sphabmixay, 2025 WL 3034071, at *3; Phakeokoth, 2025 WL
3124341, at *5 (“Respondents also fail to specify whether ICE requested travel documents for
Petitioner before or after his arrest. Thus, ICE’s revocation of Petitioner's release does not appear
to have been ‘on account of’ changed circumstances.”). This Court will follow suit.
Because the Government was required to, but failed to comply with, section 241.13(i) when
it revoked Petitioner’s supervised release on October 16, 2025, issuing a writ to reinstate that
release is warranted to preserve the status quo before the Government’s unlawful actions. The
status quo ante litem is “the last uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy[.]”
GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney, Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir, 2000) (quoting Tanner Motor
Livery, Ltd. v. Avis, Inc., 316 F.2d 804, 809 (9th Cir. 1963)); see Ariz. Dream Act Coalition v.
Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 2014) (“the ‘status quo’ refers to the legally relevant
relationship between the parties before the controversy arose”) (citing McCormack v. Hiedeman,
694 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2012)).
Here, Petitioner had been on supervised release for over twenty years until he was re-
detained by the government. Because Petitioner challenges his re-detainment, the last uncontested
status of Petitioner was before he was re-detained on October 13, 2025. See Doe, 2025 WL 691664,
at *2 (“It is questionable whether that status quo is properly considered to be detention when the
Government suddenly took an allegedly unconstitutional action in rearresting Petitioner without a
hearing.”); Domingo-Ros v. Archambeault, No. 25-cv-01208-DMS-DEB, 2025 WL 1425558
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(S.D. Cal. May 18, 2025) (granting an injunction for petitioners that sought a “probationary
injunction” to “preserve the status quo preceding this litigation—their physical presence in the
United States free from detention”); Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-05632-RMI-RFL, 2025 WL
1853763, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 4, 2025) (finding that the “moment prior to the Petitioner’s likely
illegal detention” is the status quo). Accordingly, the Court finds Petitioner's immediate release is
required to return him to the status quo.
ORDER
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1) The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED.
2) Petitioner’s motion in support of release, (Doc. 6), and his motion for temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction, (Doc. 19), are DISMISSED as moot.
3) The Government is ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody on the
October 16, 2025, revocation of release and arrest. Petitioner is directed to comply with
all conditions that were in effect before his October 16, 2025, re-detainment.
4) Respondents are ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-detaining Petitioner unless
they obtain a travel document for his removal to Vietnam and until they follow all
procedures set forth in 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(l), 241.13(i), and any other applicable
statutory and regulatory procedures.
5) The bond requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) is WAIVED. See Diaz
v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2011). Courts regularly waive security in
cases like this one. See, e.g., Zakzouk v. Becerra, No. 25-cv-06254, 2025 WL 2899220,
at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025).
6) By January 12, 2026, at 5:00 p.m., the parties MUST FILE a joint status report
to confirm that Petitioner has been released, after which the Clerk will close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 8, 2026 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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