(HC) G.B. v. Albarran, et al.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
LIDA G.B.1,
Petitioner,
v.
SERGIO ALBARRAN, et al.,
Respondents.
No. 1:25-cv-02061-TLN-CKD
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Lida G.B.’s (“Petitioner”) Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”). (ECF No. 4.) For the reasons set forth below,
Petitioner’s motion is GRANTED and Respondents are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why a
preliminary injunction should not issue.
1 As recommended by the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of
the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Court omits Petitioner’s full name, using only
his first name and last initials, to protect sensitive personal information. See Memorandum Re:
Privacy Concern Regarding Social Security and Immigration Opinions, Committee on Court
Administration and Case Management, Judicial Conference of the United States (May 1, 2018),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/18-cv-l-suggestion_cacm_0.pdf. The Clerk of Court
is directed to update the docket to reflect this change accordingly.
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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2
The instant action arises from Petitioner’s allegedly unlawful detention. (See ECF No. 4.)
Petitioner is a citizen of Colombia and is also an asylum applicant in the United States. (Id. at 5.)
On April 27, 2023, Petitioner was paroled into the United States as an “arriving alien” pursuant to
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). (Id.) The U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), thereby
initiating removal proceedings in immigration court. (Id.) During the pendency of those
proceedings, Petitioner complied with all requirements of her conditions of release. (Id.) At no
point did DHS allege Petitioner posed a danger to the community or risk of flight. (Id.)
On March 28, 2025, an immigration judge terminated Petitioner’s removal proceedings
based on DHS’s failure to prosecute. (Id.) DHS did not appeal, move to reopen, or otherwise
seek to revive those proceedings. (Id.) As a result, Petitioner was no longer in removal
proceedings and remained in the country under parole. (Id.)
On October 8, 2025, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) arrested
Petitioner at a routine check-in. (Id.) DHS did not issue a new NTA, did not initiate new
removal proceedings, and did not identify any material change in circumstances. (Id.) DHS did
not allege Petitioner had violated any condition, committed any crime, failed to appear, or
otherwise engaged in conduct warranting arrest. (Id.)
After Petitioner was taken into custody, DHS subjected her to a credible fear interview
and issued a negative credible fear determination, despite the fact she had already filed an
affirmative asylum application and was not in expedited removal proceedings at the time of her
arrest. (Id. at 6.) Petitioner timely sought review of that determination before an immigration
judge. (Id.) On November 18, 2025, the immigration judge vacated the negative credible fear
finding and concluded Petitioner established a credible fear of persecution, thereby confirming
her eligibility to pursue asylum. (Id.)
///
2 The instant factual background is taken largely verbatim from Petitioner’s brief in support
of his motion for TRO. (ECF No. 4.)
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Notwithstanding this favorable ruling, DHS continued to detain Petitioner at California
City Correctional Center. (Id.) DHS has not issued a new NTA, has not initiated removal
proceedings, and has not provided Petitioner with a bond hearing or any other individualized
custody determination before a neutral decisionmaker. (Id.) DHS has never found, and does not
contend, Petitioner poses a danger to the community or risk of flight. (Id.) Petitioner has no
criminal history, has consistently complied with all immigration requirements, and has
demonstrated her willingness to appear for all proceedings and comply with any conditions of
release. (Id.) Petitioner now challenges the lawfulness of her civil detention and seeks release.
(See ECF Nos. 1, 4.)
II. STANDARD OF LAW
For a TRO, courts consider whether a petitioner has established “[1] that he is likely to
succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public
interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Petitioner must “make a
showing on all four prongs” of the Winter test. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d
1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). In evaluating a petitioner’s motion, a district court may weigh
petitioner’s showings on the Winter elements using a sliding-scale approach. Id. A stronger
showing on the balance of the hardships may support issuing a TRO even where the petitioner
shows that there are “serious questions on the merits . . . so long as the [petitioner] also shows
that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Id.
Simply put, a petitioner must demonstrate, “that [if] serious questions going to the merits were
raised [then] the balance of hardships [must] tip[ ] sharply” in petitioner’s favor in order to
succeed in a request for a TRO. Id. at 1134–35.
///
///
///
///
///
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III. ANALYSIS3
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Petitioner has established a likelihood of success on her claims that her detention violates
the INA and the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. The Court discusses each claim in turn.
i. Violation of the INA
First, Petitioner has established a likelihood of success on her claim that her detention is
unlawful under the INA. (ECF No. 4 at 7–9.) Under the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (“§ 1226(a)”)
“provides the general process for arresting and detaining [noncitizens] who are present in the
United States and eligible for removal.” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1196 (9th
Cir. 2022). Under § 1226(a), the Government has broad discretion whether to release or detain
the individual. Id. Further, § 1226(a) provides several layers of review for an initial custody
determination. Id. It also confers “an initial bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, the
opportunity to be represented by counsel and to present evidence, the right to appeal, and the right
to seek a new hearing when circumstances materially change.” Id. at 1202. Conversely, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2) (“§ 1225(b)(2)”) mandates detention during removal proceedings for applicants
“seeking admission” and does not provide for a bond hearing.
Petitioner states that although she was initially paroled as an “arriving alien,” she was not
detained under § 1225(b)(2) at the time of entry. (ECF No. 4 at 8.) Petitioner asserts she was
instead paroled into the United States, allowed to live in the community while pursuing asylum,
and remained in the interior under parole for an extended period while complying with all
requirements. (Id.) Petitioner further asserts that when ICE later arrested her at a routine check-
in, DHS did not issue a new NTA, did not initiate new removal proceedings, and did not identify
any statutory basis for mandatory detention. (Id.) Petitioner maintains she is detained under §
3 The Court finds Petitioner has sufficiently met the requirements for issuing a TRO without
notice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). Petitioner notified Respondents via email that he would be
filing the motion and served copies of the documents. (See ECF No. 4 at 6–7.) See R.D.T.M. v.
Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01141-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2617255, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9,
2025) (similarly finding requirements for TRO were met without notice); Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-
cv-05632-RML, 2025 WL 1853763, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 4, 2025) (same).
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1226(a), which provides for discretionary detention and requires an individualized custody
determination. (Id. at 9.) The Court agrees. As this Court, and many others, have repeatedly
found: § 1225(b) applies only to noncitizens “seeking admission” –– a category that does not
include noncitizens like Petitioner who were detained within the United States. See Morales-
Flores v. Lyons, No. 1:25-CV-01640-TLN-EFB, 2025 WL 3552841, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11,
2025) (explaining this Court’s reasons for taking this position). This Court has made its position
clear. Absent a higher court order holding otherwise, this Court finds Petitioner is not an
applicant “seeking admission” subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b). Petitioner is
instead subject to § 1226(a) and is therefore entitled to the process that statute requires, including
a bond hearing at a minimum. Yet, Respondents have not provided any hearing to Petitioner
either pre- or post-detention. Accordingly, Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of her
claim that Respondents have violated the INA and improperly subjected her to mandatory
detention without a hearing.
ii. Violation of Procedural Due Process
The Fifth Amendment prohibits government deprivation of an individual’s life, liberty, or
property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V; Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d
976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). The Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the borders of
the United States, regardless of immigration status. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).
These due process rights extend to immigration proceedings and detention. Id. at 693–94.
Courts examine procedural due process claims in two steps: the first asks whether there
exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the
procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the
Constitution. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“Once it is determined that due process applies,
the question remains what process is due.”).
a) Liberty Interest
As for the first step, the Court finds Petitioner has established a protectable liberty
interest. See Rico-Tapia v. Smith, No. CV 25-00379 SASP-KJM, 2025 WL 2950089, at *8 (D.
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Haw. Oct. 10, 2025) (noting “[e]ven where the revocation of a person’s freedom is authorized by
statute, that person may retain a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause”). “[T]he
government’s decision to release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon
which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[ ] to live up to
the . . . conditions [of release].” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. July 24,
2025) (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482) (modifications in original)). “Accordingly, a
noncitizen released from custody pending removal proceedings has a protected liberty interest in
remaining out of custody.” Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC, 2025 WL
2637503, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025). To determine whether an individual’s conditional
release rises to the level of a protected liberty interest, courts have “compar[ed] the specific
conditional release in the case before them with the liberty interest in parole as characterized by
Morrissey.” R.D.T.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01141-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 2617255, at *3 (E.D.
Cal. Sept 9, 2025).
Here, the Court agrees with Petitioner that she gained a liberty interest in her continued
freedom after she was paroled into the United States, allowed to live in the community, and
permitted to pursue asylum. (ECF No. 4 at 10.) Under Morrisey, this release implied a promise
that she would not be re-detained during the pendency of her immigration proceedings if she
abided by the terms of her release. For more than two years after her parole entry and six months
after termination of her removal proceedings, ICE arrested Petitioner at a routine check-in, even
though DHS did not issue a new NTA, did not initiate new removal proceedings, and did not
identify any material change in circumstances. (ECF No. 4 at 5.) Petitioner asserts she has no
criminal history, has consistently complied with all immigration requirements, and has
demonstrated her willingness to appear for all proceedings and comply with any conditions of
release. (Id. at 6.) As this Court has found previously, along with many other courts in this
district when confronted with similar circumstances, Petitioner has a clear interest in her
continued freedom as she awaits the outcome of her asylum proceedings. See, e.g., Doe v.
Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1093 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (noting the Government’s actions in
allowing petitioner to remain in the community for over five years strengthened petitioner’s
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liberty interest).
b) Procedures Required
As to the second step — what procedures or process is due — the Court considers three
factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). As set
forth below, the Court finds Petitioner has established her due process rights were likely violated.
First, Petitioner has a substantial private interest in remaining free from detention. As
discussed above, Petitioner was out of custody, living in the community for more than two years,
and has no criminal history, record of noncompliance, or history of dangerousness. (ECF No. 4 at
11.) Additionally, the removal proceedings against Petitioner were terminated and DHS has not
moved to reopen or institute a new case seeking Petitioner’s removal. (Id. at 5.) Despite that,
Petitioner has now been detained without any bond hearing or any individualized custody
determination. (Id. at 11–12.) Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of finding Petitioner’s
private interest has been impacted by her detention. See Manzanarez v. Bondi, No. 1:25-CV-
01536-DC-CKD (HC), 2025 WL 3247258, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (finding similarly).
Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation is considerable given Petitioner has not received
any hearing, either pre- or post-detention. As previously mentioned, Petitioner was not provided
any bond hearing, individualized custody determination, or any neutral adjudication. (ECF No. 4
at 12.) Thus, the Court finds there is a serious likelihood Petitioner was likely erroneously
deprived of her liberty interest. Without any procedural safeguards to determine whether her
detention was justifiable, the probative value of additional procedural safeguards is high.
R.D.T.M., 2025 WL 2617255, at *4.
Finally, the Government’s interest is low, and the effort and cost required to provide
Petitioner with procedural safeguards are minimal. See Garcia v. Andrews, No. 2:25-CV-01884-
TLN-SCR, 2025 WL 1927596, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2025). Where removal is not imminent
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under a final order of removal, “[t]he government has no legitimate interest in detaining
individuals who have been determined not to be a danger to the community and whose
appearance at future immigration proceedings can be reasonably ensured by [ ] bond or
alternative conditions.” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 994; see also R.D.T.M., 2025 WL 2617255, at *4
(“Civil immigration detention, which is nonpunitive in purpose and effect is justified when a
noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the community.”) (cleaned up).
Here, Petitioner asserts the Government’s interest in detaining her without a hearing is
minimal in light of her long record of compliance, the termination of her removal proceedings,
and the immigration judge’s favorable credible-fear determination. (ECF No. 4 at 13.) The Court
agrees. An immigration judge has confirmed Petitioner’s eligibility to pursue asylum and there is
no final order of removal. (See id.) Indeed, according to Petitioner, there are no removal
proceedings against Petitioner at all. (Id. at 2.) Additionally, before releasing her in 2023,
immigration authorities likely found Petitioner was not a danger to the community nor a flight
risk and, in the subsequent years, Petitioner complied with all laws and conditions of her release.
(Id. at 5–6.) As stated above, Petitioner’s arrest is evidence of her compliance because it occurred
during a routine check-in. (Id.) Therefore, on these facts, the Court cannot find any legitimate
interest for Respondents to detain Petitioner.
Additionally, the cost and time of procedural safeguards are minimal here. Notice and
custody determination hearings are routine processes for Respondents. Indeed, these are the very
processes owed to Petitioner under § 1226(a), which Petitioner contends, and this Court has
found, applies to Petitioner. Any delay in detention (if justified) for the time to provide notice
and a hearing would be minimal. Moreover, it would be less of a fiscal and administrative burden
for the Government to return Petitioner home to await a determination on her asylum application
than to continue to detain her. See Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 3:25-CV-05071, 2025 WL 1676854, at *3
(N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025) (“[T]he Ninth Circuit has recognized that the costs to the public of
immigration detention are staggering.”).
The Court finds that, under these circumstances, Respondents are required to provide
notice and a pre-deprivation hearing. The United States Supreme Court “usually has held that the
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Constitution requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty or
property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990) (emphasis in original). The Court
describes post-deprivation remedies as the “special case” where those are “the only remedies the
State could be expected to provide.” Id. at 129. Here — where Petitioner has substantially
complied with the conditions of her release, has been previously determined not to be a flight risk
or a danger, has never been arrested, and removal is not reasonably foreseeable — the Court finds
pre-deprivation notice and a hearing are possible and valuable to preventing erroneous
deprivation of liberty.
On balance, this Court finds the Mathews factors demonstrate Petitioner was entitled to
pre-deprivation notice and hearing to determine whether detention was warranted. Respondents
did not provide either. Moreover, Petitioner asserts that Respondents have not provided any post-
deprivation process. Accordingly, with respect to her procedural due process claim, Petitioner
has shown she is likely to succeed on the merits.
B. Irreparable Harm
Petitioner has also established she will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a TRO.
The Ninth Circuit recognizes “irreparable harms imposed on anyone subject to immigration
detention,” including “subpar medical and psychiatric care in ICE detention facilities, the
economic burdens imposed on detainees and their families as a result of detention, and the
collateral harms to [family.]” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 995. Such harm is present here. The Court
agrees with Petitioner that the irreparable nature of her harm is underscored by the fact that she
previously lived in the community for an extended period, established relationships, and pursued
asylum. (ECF No. 4 at 14.) Without relief, Petitioner faces the prospect of significant additional
time in detention and an interference with her ability to pursue asylum and to communicate with
counsel. (Id.) Moreover, “[i]t is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights
‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th
Cir. 2012) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). Thus, Petitioner has sufficiently
established irreparable harm.
///
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C. Balance of Equities and Public Interest
As to the final two Winter factors, “[w]hen the government is a party, the analysis of the
balance of the hardships and the public interest merge.” Nat’l Urban League v. Ross, 484 F.
Supp. 3d 802, 807 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (citing Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092
(9th Cir. 2014)). The Court finds these factors also favor Petitioner. First, the balance of equities
tips decidedly in Petitioner’s favor as the Government “cannot reasonably assert that it is harmed
in any legally cognizable sense by being enjoined from constitutional violations.” Zepeda v. U.S.
Immigr. & Nat. Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983). Second, “it is always in the public
interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” Melendres, 695 F.3d at 1002.
Moreover, “the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the costs to the public of immigration detention
are staggering.” Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 3:25-CV-05071, 2025 WL 1676854, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June
14, 2025) (internal citation omitted). Any burden imposed by requiring Respondents to release
Petitioner from unlawful custody and refrain from re-detention unless and until they comply with
constitutionally required process is both de minimis and clearly outweighed by the substantial
harm Petitioner will suffer if she continues to be detained. In sum, these last two factors weigh in
Petitioner’s favor.
Therefore, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s request for a TRO and orders Petitioner’s
immediate release on the same terms as she was released prior to her detention. See Yang v.
Kaiser, No. 2:25-cv-02205-DAD-AC, 2025 WL 2791778, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2025)
(status quo ante is “the last uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.”).
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 4) is GRANTED.
2. Respondents must IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Petitioner Lida G.B. from custody.
Respondents shall not impose any additional restrictions on her, unless such restrictions
are determined to be necessary at a future pre-deprivation/custody hearing.
3. Respondents are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from re-arresting or re-detaining
Petitioner absent compliance with constitutional protections, including seven-days’ notice
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and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral fact-finder where Respondents show:
(a) material changed circumstances demonstrate a significant likelihood of Petitioner’s
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, or (b) Respondents demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence before a neutral decisionmaker that Petitioner poses a danger to the
community or a flight risk. At any such hearing, Petitioner shall be allowed to have
counsel present.
4. Respondents are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why this Court should not issue a
preliminary injunction continuing this Order. Respondents shall file responsive papers by
January 9, 2026. Petitioner may file a reply, if any, by January 14, 2026. The parties
shall indicate in their briefing whether they waive a hearing. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(3).
The Court will consider any stipulation and proposed order filed by the parties if they
agree to a less demanding briefing schedule.
5. Petitioner is ORDERED to immediately serve this Order and all documents filed in this
case to date on Respondents, including a copy via email to: usacae.ecf2241-
imm@usdoj.gov. Petitioner shall file a proof of such service by 10:00 a.m. on
January 5, 2026.
6. Respondents are hereby notified of their right to apply to the Court for modification or
dissolution of the TRO on two days’ notice to Petitioner. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(4).
7. The bond requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) is waived. Courts
regularly waive security in cases like this one. See Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1015
(9th Cir. 2011).
8. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to update the docket to only list Petitioner’s first name
and last initials.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: January 3, 2026___________________________________
TROY L. NUNLEY
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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