Warner et al v. Guaranteed Rate Affinity LLC et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Jason-Oliver Warner, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Guaranteed Rate Affinity LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-26-00049-TUC-JCH (MSA)
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Second Ex Parte Application for Temporary
Restraining Order (“TRO”) and Preliminary Injunction (“Second Application”). (Doc. 16).
For the following reasons, the Court will deny the Second Application.
II. Background
The Complaint alleges Defendant Guaranteed Rate Affinity, LLC, originated a loan on
Plaintiffs’ property in Marana. (Doc 1 at 2.) Plaintiffs allege they exercised TILA recession
on the loan on May 15, 2025, just before the loan was referred to foreclosure on that same
day. (Id.) On October 8, 2025, the Property was sold. (Id.) On March 18, 2026, Plaintiffs
were locked out of the Property. (Doc. 16 at 9.) The Complaint argues that these actions
violate the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) and Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(“RESPA”).
Plaintiffs filed an application similar to the instant Second Application on March
18, 2026 (Doc. 14), which this Court denied “under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and
because Plaintiffs have not shown that they are likely to succeed on the merits of the
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Complaint,” on March 20, 2026. (Doc. 15). Plaintiffs assert that their Second Application
“is not a motion for reconsideration of this Court’s March 20, 2026 Order.” (Doc. 16 at 1.)
Rather, Plaintiffs argue the Second Application is “grounded on materially different legal
theories that directly address the Court’s jurisdictional concerns” and that they are entitled
to preliminary relief for their “federal statutory claims” which “no state court has ever
adjudicated.”1 (Id.) The Second Application requests a TRO to enjoin Defendants from
enforcing or executing the Trustee’s Deed or any other action in connection with the
Property that would interfere with Plaintiffs’ occupancy of the Property pending final
resolution of this suit. (Id. at 10.) Plaintiffs also request a mandatory preliminary
injunction, expedited corollary hearing, and waiver of the bond requirement. (Id.)
II. Applicable Law
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.”
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). “A plaintiff seeking a
preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of
equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 20. The
Ninth Circuit takes a “sliding scale” approach in balancing these elements, “so that a
stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.” All. for the
Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). Thus, “‘serious questions
going to the merits’ and a hardship balance that tips sharply toward the plaintiff can support
issuance of an injunction, assuming the other two elements of the Winter test are also met.’”
1 The Second Application impermissibly attempts to expand the scope of the Complaint,
adding additional material facts and claims. A district court only has “equitable power to
grant relief on ‘the merits of the case or controversy before it,’ and ‘does not have the
authority to issue an injunction’ ‘based on claims not pled in the complaint.’” LA All. for
Hum. Rts. v. County of Los Angeles, 14 F.4th 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Pac.
Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen’s Med. Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 2015)). If
Plaintiffs wish to assert these additional material facts and claims, they must amend their
Complaint in compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rules of
Civil Procedure. The Court will not consider Plaintiff’s additional material facts and claims
in this Order.
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Id. (quoting Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 340 F.3d 810, 813 (9th
Cir. 2003)).
III. Analysis
Even assuming Plaintiff’s Second Application adequately addresses the other
concerns in the March 20th Order, Plaintiffs have not satisfied the first prong of the Winters
test, as explained herein.
A. TILA
TILA “gives borrowers the right to rescind certain loans for up to three years after
the transaction is consummated.” Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 574 U.S.
259, 260 (2015). The Act gives borrowers the unconditional right to rescind a loan through
the third business day following the consummation of the transaction. Id. at 261–62 (citing
15 U.S.C. § 1635(a)). Otherwise, the borrower may conditionally rescind the transaction
within three years of the transaction’s consummation only if the lender fails to satisfy the
Act’s disclosure requirements. Id. at 262. “[R]ecission is effected when the borrower
notifies the creditor of his intention to rescind.” Id.
The Complaint asserts Plaintiffs exercised TILA recission on their property on May
15, 2025. (Doc. 1 at 3.) The Complaint does not allege that Defendants failed to make any
required disclosures, as required for a violation of TILA. What’s more, TILA recission
does not apply to “a residential mortgage transaction,” such as the purchase money
mortgage that appears to be in controversy here. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1635(e)(1), 1602(x).
Plaintiffs argue that this exemption only applies to a creditor who makes the required
disclosures. (Doc. 16 at 7–8.) Plaintiff cites no caselaw to support this assertion, and the
Court finds the argument lacks merit. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not shown they are
likely to succeed on, or there are serious questions on, the merits of their TILA claim, and
the Court will deny the Second Application premised on this claim.
B. RESPA
The Complaint purports to assert “violations associated with servicing and
foreclosure initiation timing; RESPA is among the authorities cited in [Plaintiff’s] filings.”
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The Second Application clarifies that Plaintiffs wish to assert a claim under 12 U.S.C.
§ 2605(b). Section 2605(b) requires “[e]ach servicer of any federally related mortgage loan
[to] notify the borrower in writing of any assignment, sale, or transfer of the servicing of
the loan to any other person.”
The Complaint does not clearly allege a violation of § 2605(b), and Plaintiffs have
not shown they are likely to succeed on, or have raised serious questions on, the merits of
their RESPA claim. Moreover, a borrower damaged by a § 2605 violation is entitled to
actual damages and costs—not injunctive relief. As such, any potential RESPA violation
did not cause the irreparable harm Plaintiffs claim (loss of their Property and displacement
from their primary home). See Winter, 555 U.S. at 23 (requiring movants show irreparable
injury from the alleged violation). Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiffs’ Second
Application premised on this claim.
IV. Order
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED denying Plaintiffs’ Second Ex Parte Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. 16).
Dated this 20th day of April, 2026.
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