USA v. Garcia

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Ruben Garcia,
Defendant.
CR 26-00464-TUC-RM (JR)
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
This matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Rateau for pretrial matters.
Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Suppress. (Doc. 24.) The
Government filed a response. (Doc. 31.) Defendant did not reply. An evidentiary
hearing was conducted on April 7, 2026. (Doc. 35.) At the Court’s request, a
transcript of the hearing was prepared.1 (Doc. 38.) The Government presented two
witnesses, Border Patrol Agent Mackenzie McLeod and Border Patrol Agent Paulo
M. Ramirez. Doc. 36. Nine Government Exhibits were admitted. (Doc. 37.)
Defendant was present and represented by counsel. (See Doc. 35.) The defense did
not call any witnesses and presented no exhibits. Based on the pleadings, testimony,
1 The transcript at times mistakenly refers to Agent Ramirez as Agent Martinez.
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exhibits and arguments of counsel, the Court recommends that Defendant’s Motion
be DENIED.2
I. Facts
On January 10, 2026, Border Patrol Agents Mackenzie McLeod and Paulo
Ramirez were on “roving patrol” enforcing immigration laws on State Route (SR) 82
and SR 83. (TR 31.)3 They were working the swing shift, 2 p.m. to midnight, in the
area of Patagonia, Arizona. (TR 5.) Agent McLeod was driving a marked Border
Patrol vehicle; Agent Ramirez was riding with her. (TR 6.)
The agents were parked in a little pull-out area facing the road at mile marker
21 on SR 82, which is a rural highway approximately 15 miles from the borderline.
(TR 8-11, 36.) The area is a known human and narcotics smuggling corridor because
it is desolate, very rural, and heavily exploited by human and drug smugglers. (TR 9,
36, 48.) At night, under the cover of darkness, foot guides pick up undocumented
people on SR 82. (TR 38.)
Agent Ramirez testified that he knows this about the area because he is on the
intel collection team who gets information, analyzes it, and tries to figure out
patterns. (TR 37.) Also, when agents have encounters with human smugglers, they
2 Jury trial is set for July 7, 2026; the plea deadline is June 18, 2026. Doc. 27.
3 TR refers to the transcript of the April 7, 2026 hearing which can be found at (Doc.
38).
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tell them about their conversations with coordinators in the United States and
Mexico. (TR 38.)
The agents chose mile marker 21 as their observation point because it is east
of Patagonia and provided a way for the agents to focus solely on the cars originating
out of Nogales heading east on SR 82 looking to go north on SR 83. (TR 10.)
At 8:50 to 9:00 p.m., the agents saw a silver four-door Buick Verano sedan
heading northeast. (TR 10-12, 36.) At that time of night, there was little to no traffic,
maybe one car every five to ten minutes. (TR 12.) Not a lot of places were open;
local businesses like the gas station and corner store had all closed at 8:00 p.m. and
the local bar closed at 7:30. (TR 9, 12, 36.) It was also close to shift change when
agents typically head back to the station. (TR 12, 39.) Smugglers frequently take
advantage of the shift change because there is an operational gap where no agents are
out in the field and their replacements are still at the station. (TR 12, 39.)
Agent McLeod described the area they were parked as a “chokepoint,” an area
where agents could avoid the local traffic typically coming from Nogales to
Patagonia and focus only on cars that were suspicious to them. (TR 21.)
Agent McLeod had her high beams and floodlights on as well as the “take-
down lights,” the fog lights on top. (TR 11.) Agents could see the occupants of every
car as it drove past. (TR 11, 52.) As the sedan drove by, agents could see two adult
males in the vehicle. (TR 11.) Agent McLeod described them as roughly in their 40s.
(TR 11.) Agent Ramirez described them as approximately 30 to 50 years old. (TR
35.) Agent McLeod drove the Border Patrol vehicle behind the sedan. (TR 12.)
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The agents followed the sedan for about half an hour as it headed northeast on
SR 82. (TR 12-13, 53.) The car did not appear to be weighed down and there was no
erratic driving or improper lane changes. (TR 23.) The car was going exactly the
speed limit, 35 miles per hour, and while there was nothing notable about the driver’s
behavior, Agent McLeod could see him checking his rear and side-view mirrors. (TR
10-13, 23.)
The sedan turned north onto SR 83 which signaled to agents that the driver
was trying to avoid the Nogales I-19 Border Patrol checkpoint that is manned 24
hours a day. (TR 13-14.) Typically, drivers going from Nogales to Tucson can drive
on I-19 all the way to I-10 directly. (TR 14.) Taking SR 82 to SR 83 all the way to I-
10 is completely out of the way and would add significant travel time, about one- and
one-half hours. (TR 14-15, 41.) Also, the Border Patrol checkpoint that connects SRs
82, 83, and 90 was known to coordinators and scouts to be nonoperational. (TR 36.)
Due to the lack of manpower, the checkpoint can’t operate 24/7 like the I-19
checkpoint. (TR 46.)
While following the sedan, Agent McLeod requested a records check from
Tucson sector dispatch. (TR 15.) Dispatch informed that the car was not stolen, that
its registration was current and that the car was registered to a woman in Nogales
who was born in 1945 or 1946. (TR 16, 21-23, 39.) Since the occupants of the sedan
were men in their 30s to 50s, that signaled to agents that the driver was probably not
the registered owner. (TR 16, 35.) That was significant to the agents because
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smugglers tend to use cars that are not their own to minimize the risk of their own
cars being impounded. (TR 16, 40.)
The car also had a TECS alert for prior drug smuggling. (TR 16.) Agents
didn’t know how old the alert was or who it was associated with, only that it was
associated with the sedan and not the registered owner. (TR 16-17, 23, 28, 51.) This
signaled to agents that the car had been used to commit a crime by someone other
than the registered owner. (TR 17.) Agents also learned that the sedan’s crossing
history showed that the car had crossed the United States-Mexico border two days
earlier. (TR 41.) It was not crossed by the registered owner but by a person named
Ruben Garcia who looked like the current driver of the sedan. (TR 41- 42.) After
receiving that information, Agent Ramirez conducted a query on his government-
issued phone on Ruben Garcia and learned that he had had previous encounters with
law enforcement for smuggling narcotics. (TR 42-43.) While Agent McLeod was
receiving information from dispatch, Agent Ramirez was running records checks on
his phone which he then relayed to Agent McLeod. (TR 17.)
After receiving all of this information and discussing it with Agent Ramirez,
Agent McLeod decided to stop the sedan. (TR 18, 47.) The driver was Defendant
Ruben Garcia. (TR 19.) Agents determined that the male passenger did not have legal
documentation to be in the United States. (TR 20, 47.) Defendant Ruben Garcia was
later charged with conspiracy and transportation of illegal aliens for profit. (Docs. 1,
19.)
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II. Discussion
The Fourth Amendment protects a person against unreasonable searches and
seizures. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226 (1985). Consistent with the
Fourth Amendment, police may stop persons in the absence of probable cause under
limited circumstances. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 (1968). Police may briefly stop
a moving automobile to investigate a reasonable suspicion that its occupants are
involved in criminal activity. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 226. Reasonable suspicion exists
when an officer is aware of specific articulable facts which, together with rational
inferences drawn from them, reasonably warrant a suspicion that the person to be
detained has committed or is about to commit a crime. United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S. 411, 416-18 (1981).
When assessing the reasonableness of a police officer’s actions, the court must
consider the totality of the circumstances which confronted the officer at the time of
the stop. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989). A determination that
reasonable suspicion exists need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.
United States v. Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 2013).
The articulable facts forming the basis of a reasonable suspicion must be
measured against an objective reasonableness standard, not by the subjective
impressions of a particular officer. Gonzalez-Rivera v. I.N.S., 22 F.3d 1441, 1445
(9th Cir. 1994). An officer is however, “entitled to assess the facts in light of his
experience in detecting illegal entry and smuggling.” United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975). But, inferences drawn from an officer’s experience
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must be objectively reasonable. United States v. Montero–Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122,
1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Reasonable suspicion can be based on the collective
knowledge of officers even if not all information is communicated to the arresting
officer. Cf. United States v. Butler, 74 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing
probable cause).
In relation to stops by Border Patrol Agents, the totality of circumstances may
include:
(1) characteristics of the area; (2) proximity to the border; (3) usual
patterns of traffic and time of day; (4) previous alien or drug smuggling
in the area; (5) behavior of the driver, including obvious attempts to
evade officers; (6) appearance or behavior of passengers; (7) model and
appearance of the vehicle; and (8) officer experience.
United States v. Berber-Tinoco, 510 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2007). “Not all of
these factors must be present or highly probative in every case to justify reasonable
suspicion[,] . . . [a]nd the facts must be filtered through the lens of the agents’
training and experience.” United States v. Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d 1074, 1079 (9th
Cir. 2013).
Guided by these factors the court must determine whether the facts cited by
the Government in support of the present stop constitute behavior that would excite
the suspicions of a trained Border Patrol Agent that criminal activity is afoot. See
United States v. Rodriquez, 976 F.2d 592, 595 (9th Cir. 1992), amended by United
States v. Rodriquez, 997 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1993).
//
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Proximity to the Border, Characteristics of the area
and Previous Smuggling in the Area
Law enforcement’s awareness that a particular route or location is
predominantly used for illegal purposes, including alien and drug smuggling, is
strong support for a finding of reasonable suspicion. United States v. Manzo-Jurado,
457 F.3d 928, 936 (9th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,
277 (2002) (finding it significant that officers found the defendant on an unpaved
road used primarily by ranchers and forest service employees but commonly used by
smugglers to avoid a nearby border checkpoint).
Here, the Defendant was seen in a remote sparsely populated area 15 miles
from the border known for drug and human trafficking. There was little to no traffic,
maybe one car every five to ten minutes. It was close to 9 p.m. and the few
businesses in the area were already closed. The agents had chosen a particular
observation point that would allow them to avoid the local traffic (those travelling
from Nogales to Patagonia) and focus solely on cars originating out of Nogales
heading toward Tucson using a route that avoided the Nogales I-19 checkpoint,
which smugglers knew was operational 24 hours a day. That is exactly where the
agents first saw the Defendant’s car. Based on their past training and experience,
agents were able to reasonably infer that rather than taking the most direct route from
Nogales to Tucson using I-19, the Defendant traveled 90 minutes out of his way to
circumvent the checkpoint. In terms of raising suspicion of human smuggling, these
facts merit significant weight in the calculus of reasonable suspicion.
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Patterns of Traffic and Time of Day
The totality of the circumstances analysis includes consideration of the modes
or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers. Berber-Tinoco, 510 F.3d at
1088.
In this case, agents were working the swing shift, 2 p.m. to midnight. The
time of the stop, near 9 p.m., was notable as it was close to “shift change.” For
privacy and investigative reasons, the agents would not disclose exactly when their
shift ended but did explain that agents typically head back to their station after their
shift ends, and that because their replacements are still at the station, it leaves an
operational gap where there are no agents in the field. Based on their experience and
encounters with smugglers, the agents knew smugglers frequently take advantage of
this time gap to smuggle people and drugs. This objective factor also weighs heavily
in the Government’s favor.
Behavior and Appearance of the Driver and Passenger
and Characteristics of Vehicle
Here, as Agents McLeod and Ramirez followed the sedan, they did not notice
anything unusual about the passenger’s behavior. The car was not weighed down
which would have suggested that people or drugs were hiding or concealed in the
back seat or trunk. With respect to the driver, he was travelling the speed limit and
did not commit any traffic violations. The only thing agents noticed was that he kept
checking his rear and passenger side mirror, not an unusual behavior when pursued
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by a marked Border Patrol vehicle for 30 miles. This factor does not weigh in the
Government’s favor.
The characteristics associated with the car, however, do raise legitimate
suspicions. As the sedan passed the location where the agents were stationary and
observing traffic, they saw two adult males ranging from 30 to 50 years of age.
Agent McLeod had on her high beams, flood lights and fog lights. From their vantage
point, the agents could easily see into car as it drove by at 35 miles per hour.
Deciding to take a closer look, agents left their pull-out area and pursued the sedan.
As they followed the car, they conducted a records check and learned the sedan was
registered to an elderly woman from Nogales, Arizona. While the age and gender
mismatch alone was innocuous, combined with all the other factors, the agents
inferred that the driver was using a common tactic of smugglers—using a car that is
not registered to them to minimize the risk that their own car would be seized.
Collectively, the agents conducted three other checks that confirmed their
suspicion. First, they learned that a TECS alert had been issued for the sedan for
prior drug smuggling. While no date or details were provided, it still signaled to
agents that the car at some point in time had been used to commit a crime. Second,
the agents learned that the sedan had crossed the United States-Mexico border two
days earlier and that the crosser was not the elderly registered owner of the car, but a
man named Ruben Garcia who looked just like the driver of the sedan. Third, the
agents learned that Ruben Garcia had previous encounters with police for drug
smuggling. These factors weigh heavily in the Government’s favor.
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Totality of Circumstances
Giving due weight to each of the above factors and considering them in the
totality and collective experience of Border Patrol Agents McLeod and Ramirez, this
Court finds that the agents had reasonable suspicion to believe that Defendant was
engaged in illegal activity. The stop comported with the Fourth Amendment.
III. Recommendation for Disposition by the District Judge
Based on the foregoing and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule
Civil 72.1, Rules of Practice of the United States District Court, District of Arizona,
the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after an independent review
of the record, DENY Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 24).
This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is immediately
appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to
Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of
the District Court's judgment in the case.
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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B), the parties have fourteen (14) days from
the date of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections to these
findings and recommendations with the District Court. Any objections and responses
to objections filed should be filed as CR 26-00464-TUC-RM. No replies shall be
filed unless leave is granted from the District Court.
Dated this 24th day of April, 2026.
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